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The reigning consensus on decentralizing local governance to improve service 
provision, target development interventions and deepen democracy remains splintered 
on the question of how to decentralize. Articulated within two distinct discourses – the 
neoliberal and the communitarian – reform prescriptions include a variety of 
institutional propositions that differ fundamentally in their value premises, theoretical 
rationales and contextual assumptions. The common focus on the community as the 
locus for decentralized governance in the latter discourse masks a further divergence, 
between a ‘revised neo-liberal’ articulation that suggests partnership arrangements 
between local governments and private, non-governmental and community 
organizations, and a progressive vision of direct-democratic governance. There is, 
however, little understanding of the relative suitability of either type to different kinds 
of developing locations.  
 
Focusing on India, this dissertation addresses the gap, by comparing the performance 
of devolved (Panchayat) and liberalized (Sector Reform-Swajaldhara Program) 
arrangements for domestic water provision in three Indian States, Gujarat, Kerala and 
Madhya Pradesh, with different economic, political and socio-cultural characteristics. 
The efficacy of the reformed institutional configurations that are instituted in each 
State, its effeciveness in water provision and the inclusion of women in the reformed 
decision-making processes are assessed, for both devolved and liberalized governance 
  
configurations.  
 
Cross-case comparisons show that both types of reformed arrangements improve 
water availability in all locations, but outcomes are equitable and processes inclusive 
only in a context of high political awareness, civic engagement and social 
development (as in Kerala). Also, though liberalized arrangements perform better than 
devolved arrangements in delivering water in all three States, disparities in access 
between households with private connections and households dependant on public 
sources are exacerbated in Gujarat and Madhya Pradesh.  Surprisingly, in Gujarat, 
with high economic development but moderate political and social development, 
decentralization of both types produce inequitous outcomes, problematizing the 
desirability of contextual fit. For in Madhya Pradesh, with poor social, economic and 
political development, and lacking enabling features for decentralized governance, 
devolution to elected local governments actually reduces disparities. The intersection 
of regulatory and constituent institutional elements that produce these varied outcomes 
is discussed. 
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 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Decentralization is determined by politics, as Manor and others observe, no doubt 
correctly.1  Its success, however, lies in the details, as many other researchers have 
found – details of the policy, organizational structures, rules and procedures that are 
set in place for decentralized governance. Most authors agree that it is the design of 
the reformed arrangements and their contextual fit which determines the nature, extent 
and success of decentralized governance.2 Planners who formulate details of the 
institutional rearrangements that are sketched by political leaders therefore face the 
question: what are the most appropriate institutional arrangements for effective 
decentralized governance in this context?  
 
This, clearly, is the crucial question in decentralizing governance. Yet this question 
remains largely unanswered, despite the enormous attention decentralization has 
attracted in the last three decades. Much of the literature is normative, with 
propositions for decentralization more often resting on a belief in the idea than on 
incontrovertible theory or empirical evidence3. Theoretical arguments for 
decentralization converge on the notion of a centripetal dispersal of centralized state 
functions, but diverge widely on the kinds of decentralization that are proposed.  
Moreover, the propositions provide only broad contours of the institutional changes 
                                                 
1 See Rondinelli et al., (1984), Manor (1999), and Burki et al., (1999:Chapter 1). 
2 See, for example, Burki et al., (1999: Chapter 2), who discuss “Getting the rules right”, and the 
necessity to design decentralization in a way that makes sense in a particular country, and World Bank 
(2001:1) where it is concluded that “outcomes depend on its design and on the institutional 
arrangements governing its implementation.” Litvack et al (1998), Ribot (2001) and Kikeri and Nellis 
(2002), among others, also point to the need for context-appropriate design.  
3 Ribot (2001) articulates this clearly: “… most of the literature on decentralization focuses more on 
expectations and discourse than on practice and outcomes.”(pp.vi). Slater (1989), Mohan and Stokke 
(2000) and Robinson (2003) have substantial critiques of decentralization, and there are now plenty of 
case studies that reveal ‘decentralization failure’. For the mixed results of various kinds of 
decentralization, see Sheahan (1997), Burki et al., (1999), Birdsall and Nellis (2002), Robinson (2003), 
Faguet (2004), Kikeri and Nellis (2004), Mansuri and Rao (2004). 
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that are to be made, and details of the organizational and institutional design are 
unclear. Theoretical prescriptions are also limited in their direct applicability, for the 
strict assumptions on which they are premised rarely match conditions in the real 
world. Empirical studies that examine the outcomes and impacts of various kinds of 
reforms do not offer clear answers either, for while they assess how reformed 
arrangements work in comparison with earlier (centralized) arrangements, there is 
little research on how alternate institutional arrangements would fare in the same 
context. There is thus little understanding of which, among the various institutional 
alternatives suggested by proponents of decentralization, would be most appropriate in 
a specific context. 
 
Therein is a critical knowledge gap – proponents (and theorists) of decentralization 
offer a variety of institutional alternatives for decentralized governance, but the 
relative suitability of these alternatives to various kinds of developing contexts are still 
unclear. This understanding is important as much to extend and refine theories of 
decentralization and effective governance, as to develop appropriate policy and 
implement reforms successfully. Yet reliable, evidence-backed answers are not 
available in the literature. 
 
In this dissertation I address the knowledge gap, by investigating the relative 
suitability of different types of reforms to the kinds of political, economic and socio-
cultural contexts found in developing countries, and thereby identify which is likely to 
be more effective in those locations. To do this, I set the question in the context of 
reforms in the governance arrangements for domestic water provision in India, and 
compare the functioning of devolved and liberalized systems in three Indian States 
(Gujarat, Kerala and Madhya Pradesh) that differ systematically in their political, 
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economic and socio-cultural characteristics.  
 
In the sections below, I briefly discuss the epistemological location of the research, 
particularly the issue of institutional variety, sketching the debates on the application 
of different reforms to developing countries and the contours of the knowledge gap 
that emerges. I then provide an overview of the study, setting the general question of 
context-appropriate reform in the context of water provision in India, noting the 
specific research question, and outlining the methodology, research design and the 
structure of this report.  
 
2. DISCURSIVE DIFFERENCES IN DECENTRALIZATION 
 
There is substantial variation in the way decentralization is defined in the extensive 
literature on the topic, but by mapping the conceptual ground covered by authors in 
their use of the term (see Chapter I), it can be most clearly (and inclusively) defined as 
a purposive set of actions by the state to disperse or distribute centrally held powers to 
a number of non-central entities. The idea that such a centripetal dispersion of state 
responsibilities and authority would resolve a host of economic, political and social 
issues troubling nations rich and poor has had extensive support from development 
theorists, practitioners and most notably, international institutions4. Economists argue 
that private firms, local governments or community groups can provide services more 
efficiently (Bennett 1990, 1994; Savas 2000). Environmentalists point out that natural 
resources are better managed by residents whose livelihoods depend on local ecologies 
                                                 
4 Many see it as not as a theoretical idea supported by international aid institutions, but as the 
‘Washington Consensus’ emerging from the need of western liberal democracies in the North to extend 
markets and contain the crises of capitalism. See Williamson (1993) for a discussion of the emergence 
of this Consensus among “economically influential bits of Washington, meaning the US government 
and the international financial institutions.” (Williamson 1993:1330). 
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(Baland and Platteau 1996, Farrington and Bauman 2000). Development theorists and 
professionals insist that programs are best implemented by those who are most 
familiar with the context (Cheema and Rondinelli 1983, Rondinelli et al 1989, 
Conyers 2000), public services best provided by local governments (Oates 1972, 
Bennett 1990, 1994; Wolman 1990) and economic development stimulated by 
enabling greater competition among state enterprises, organizations and firms (Kikeri 
and Nellis 2002). Decentralizing governance is the necessary prelude, and argued to 
be imperative for successful development and sustained economic growth by these 
authors, among others. 
 
Substantial democratic gains are also expected from decentralization. Devolving 
power to local governments and ethnic groups that occupy distinct regions can, in 
itself, extend and deepen democracy (Blair 1998, 2000; Manor 1999), contain 
resurgent claims to territory and autonomy (Litvack et al 1998, Burki et al 1999, Ribot 
2001), and sustain diverse identities and indigenous cultures in a globalizing world. 
For many of these authors, like Manor and Blair, such a ‘deepening’ of democracy is 
an end in itself; but for others, particularly international institutions, a liberal-
democratic polity is also the necessary political structure for successful market 
economies (World Bank 1992, Williams and Young 1994).  
 
This wide-ranging agreement on decentralizing governance, however, splinters on the 
question of how to decentralize. Proponents suggest a variety of reforms,5 ranging 
from liberalization of the economy to participatory local governance, and the 
institutional differences between most of them are substantial. Prescriptions differ 
                                                 
5 Such as de-regulation, liberalization, privatization (see Williamson 1990, 1993); government reform 
(Osborne and Gaebler 1992); and devolution to local governments (Blair 2000, Ribot 2001), NGOs and 
community organizations (See Uphoff 1993, Bucek 2000, World Bank 2000/2001; also see the review 
of arguments and experiences in Mansuri and Rao 2004, Pozzoni and Kumar 2005) 
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visibly in the kinds of changes that are entailed in the existing organizational ensemble 
for governance, but closer analysis reveals even deeper divergences. These stem from 
their articulation in different discourses6, centered in different theoretical rationales, 
assumptions, valued outcomes, political positions and material resources, which 
differentiate the discussions on decentralized governance. The reform prescriptions 
emerging from different discourses therefore differ in more than just organizational 
terms, for they connote different normative positions on governance and different 
visions of societal organization itself. The issue of selecting appropriate reforms and 
designing appropriate organizational configurations for decentralized governance in a 
specific country or sub-national region is therefore more than just instrumental; it 
implies changes in existing patterns of social, economic and political relations – in 
sum, the way of life – and is therefore both important and complex. 
 
On parsing the decentralization literature, two major discourses are revealed.  One is 
the easily distinguishable and predominant neoiberal7 discourse, which is premised on 
theories of public choice and state failure, and reifies market transactions as most 
efficient for allocation of resources. The other is a communitarian8 discourse, which is 
internally differentiated but distinguished by a common focus on the ‘local’ as the 
prime locus of development and governance action. One strand of this communitarian 
discourse emerges from a ‘revised neoliberal’ position that projects alterations in 
structures of local governance premised on individual rationality and self-interest, and 
a ‘harmony model of power’ in communities. Another strand, premised on a more 
                                                 
6 “A discourse is a shared means of making sense of the world embedded in language…grounded in 
assumptions, judgements, contentions, dispositions and capabilities…[It] will generally revolve around 
a central storyline, containing opinions about both facts and values…Discourses can be bound up with 
material forces. For example, material economic constraints on politics now make themselves felt 
through the discourse of market liberalism” (Dryzek 2000:18) 
7 See Williamson (1993), Kohl (2002), Mohan and Stokke (2000). 
8 Bardhan uses this term in discussing reform propositions (Bardhan, 1996), as do Mohan and Stoke 
(2000). 
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socially embedded rationality and group solidarity, emerges from more progressive 
and radical political positions that question the very notion of development and seek 
fundamental changes in power relations. Thus the communitarian discourse is 
articulated by authors in both the ‘New Right’ and the ‘New Left’, who ultimately 
converge on a ‘post-development’ that is premised on the agency of local actors. 
(Mohan and Stokke 2000)9  
 
Neoliberal and communitarian discourses are closely interwoven in the 
decentralization literature, but are nevertheless distinctly identifiable by the difference 
between the theoretical bases, the reform prescriptions, and their pertinence to specific 
socio-economic and developmental contexts. Most important to this discussion is that 
the two discourses have very different institutional implications, which are more often 
contending than cohering. The neoliberal discourse prescribes liberalization, 
deregulation and de-licensing of state-controlled sectors and privatization of state-run 
enterprises, infrastructure and services, among other macro-economic measures.10 The 
communitarian counterpart of the neoliberal discourse prescribes devolution of service 
provision and development interventions from central to local governments. In turn, 
                                                 
9 As Mohan and Stokke (2000) explain, these positions emerge from two different directions. The 
discourse the authors call ‘revised neoliberalism’ sees civil society as important for exerting organized 
pressure on ineffective and unresponsive states and therefore building democracy and good governance; 
they can also be vehicles for participation of the poor and marginalized in development programs and 
their empowerment.(Desai and Imrie 1998, World Bank 1997, Chambers 1983, Stokke 1998, Mayo and 
Craig 1995). The second strand of communitarian thinking includes radical critiques of the 
development project and the construction of subjects therein, by post-Marxists and post-structuralists 
for whom empowerment is a matter of collective mobilization of marginalized groups against the 
disempowering activities of both the state and the market. Theoretical critiques of the structuralist 
tendency to treat politics in a reductionist way, and the focus on class as the locus of political 
consciousness, shifts the locus of action to local political actors and a celebration of their difference and 
diversity, and to social movements, which become the primary means of political engagement. An 
accompanying position is that only by listening to and revaluing alternative local knowledges can an 
alternative political model emerge. Authors such as Friedman (1992), Castells (1997), Escobar (1995), 
Shiva (1999) and Peet and Watts (1996), for example, articulate these positions. Mohan and Stokke 
(2000) also cite these authors, among others, in making their argument. 
10 See, for example, Williamson (1990, 1993), World Bank (1997), Megginson and Netter (2001), IMF 
(2001), Savas (2000).  
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local governments are advised to function in public-private partnership models with 
local businesses, NGOs and other community groups, through contract-based 
delegation and divestment of service provision tasks.11 Governments at all levels are to 
be reinvented to enable development of markets, private enterprise and self-provision 
of services, and “steer, not row” using corporate management principles.12  
 
Progressive communitarian arguments also suggest devolution to local governments, 
but envision direct-democratic decision-making by citizens in assemblies or referenda 
at the local level. The proposition is substantial redistribution of state power over 
resources and law and policy-making to democratic local governments, which function 
with the direct participation of all citizens in local decision-making processes. This 
calls for patently different organizational and institutional arrangements for local 
governance than those suggested in neoliberal visions.13  
 
Thus the variety of reforms suggested by different proponents entails notably different 
organizational and institutional shifts, though some share their basic premises. 
Liberalization, de-regulation and privatization all denote different kinds of reform 
actions and structural changes, but are commonly directed to the construction of a 
market economy and the transfer of responsibilities and resources from state 
                                                 
11 See World Bank (1990, 1995,1997); Pozzoni and Kumar (2005). 
12 Helmsing (2002); Rhodes (1997, 2000); Osborne and Gaebler (1992).   
13 See Bucek (2000) and Bucek and Smith (2000) for an elaboration of different forms of community 
involvement that are attempted, and the distinction between ‘participatory’ and ‘direct-democratic’ 
modes of functioning. This use of the terms (which I adopt) is different from the use of the term 
‘participatory democracy’ by democratic theorists (see Held 1993, 1996), including feminist political 
scientists like Phillips (1991, 1995), to represent wider participation by all citizens (or members in an 
organization) than is enabled by representative democracy. I refer to such plebiscitary modes as ‘direct-
democracy’ in this dissertation, to distinguish it from the ‘participatory’ modes referred to in the 
development literature, where ‘community participation’ is used to denote the participation of 
individuals, groups or organizations which may or not be representative of the community. See also 
Abers (1998), Baiochhi (2001), Santos (1998) and Isaac and Franke (2000) for examples of direct-
democratic local governance.  
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organizations to private businesses. As such, the three kinds of reform14 constitute a 
category (or type) of decentralization, which is oriented to marketization. Similarly, 
the institutional shifts articulated in both strands of communitarian discourse differ in 
the kinds of organizational re-configurations that are entailed, but all denote transfers 
from central to local governments and local organizations, and thereby constitute 
another category (or type), oriented to democratization.15 Different kinds of reform 
within each category are often complementary and represent actions pertaining to 
different aspects or domains of governance, such as the neoliberal propositions of 
privatization, liberalization and the reinvention of government ‘to steer, not row’. 
However, institutional prescriptions across the two types of reform, and across 
different kinds of democratization, are not equally co-terminus or compatible.16 
 
The conflicts between the neoliberal and progressive-communitarian institutional 
prescriptions clearly stem from the differences in the underlying political and 
economic visions. For though many authors posit all reform to be driven by a 
neoliberal agenda (for example, Williamson 1993, Kohl 2002), their reading of the 
decentralization discourses is arguably partial. It elides the presence of other political-
economic visions in the discussions, for example the communitarian perspectives 
                                                 
14 Other policy and legal changes are also part of the marketization category of reforms, as Williamson 
(1990) sets out, such as tax reform and withdrawal of subsidies; however, some, such as reduction of 
fiscal deficit, are outcomes of reforms rather than a reform in itself. The three mentioned here involve 
the most direct transfer of responsibilities from governments to the private sector and are therefore 
taken as emblematic of the type.  
15 The kinds of democratization include both liberal-democratic and direct or participatory, of which the 
former provides a supportive institutional framework for development of markets. See Table 1.5 for the 
genetic similarities among different kinds of reforms within each category, and the distinctions between 
the two categories. Note also the organizational differences between the reforms prescribed by the two 
strands within the communitarian discourse – the ‘revised neoliberal’ and the progressive – which differ 
fundamentally in the kind of democratic arrangements they envision at the local level.  
16 The institutional restructuring necessary for privatizing service provision, for example, is completely 
different from that required for community-based management, which differs yet again from that of 
service provision by local governments. Similarly, the arrangements for community participation 
through various kinds of organizations and directly by all citizens would necessarily differ. 
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animating alternative propositions like collective resource management (Ostrom 1990, 
1992; Wade 1975) and service provision, Gandhian visions of ‘village republics’ 
(Gandhi 1962; Gupta 1966) and even more radicalized propositions for re-inventing 
social relations (see in Escobar 1992; Friere 1996)17. Admittedly, the neoliberal 
discourse has overshadowed – and often, co-opted – other contending discourses in the 
international arena, but they nevertheless persist, many of them anchored in national 
and sub-national contexts, and inform or affect governance reforms in developing 
countries18.   
 
3. INSTITUTIONAL VARIETY, CONTEXT APPROPRIATENESS AND THE 
KNOWLEDGE GAP  
 
The diversity in institutional prescriptions emerging from neoliberal and 
communitarian discourses poses a particularly difficult problem in crafting effective 
local governance in developing countries, because of the concurrent play of both 
discourses in relation to questions of appropriate governance and development. 
Neoliberal arguments, which emerged initially in the context of industrialized 
economies and welfare states, assume literate, politically empowered, mobile 
populations able to exercise “voice’ and ‘exit’, and communities that are relatively 
homogeneous.19 The existence of a vibrant civil society, private capital and 
entrepreneurship is also assumed. Progressive and radical communitarian 
                                                 
17 See Mohan and Stokke (2000) for an elaboration of these positions and the fundamental differences 
between the neoliberal and the communitarian and radical discourses.  
18 Such as the debates underpinning the social movements, including the Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT 
or the Workers Party) in Brazil, that are linked to the institution of the ‘participatory budgeting’ 
processes in municipalities (Santos 1998) and the visions of local self-governance that animates 
‘people’s planning’ processes in Kerala, India (Isaac and Franke 2000).  
19 Observations on the context-specificity of neoliberal propositions are made by many authors, for 
example in Litvack et al.,(1998) and Turner and Hulme (1997). 
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prescriptions, however, are more rooted in the realities of the global South,20 
characterized by substantial disparities in power and resources among different 
groups, and extensive poverty and lack of basic entitlements. Direct-democratic 
visions and social-mobilization theories that underlie progressive communitarian 
discourses respond to the Third World realities of poverty, marginalization and 
communities marked by social cleavages of various kinds, but also assume that the 
capability to organize, cooperate and deliberate in public fora exists in communities, 
group affiliations are strong and the poor can bear the costs of participation.  
 
Given such distinctly different contextual assumptions of reform prescriptions, 
indiscriminate application of reforms without consideration of the context can sharply 
undercut positive outcomes. Application of neoliberal theories in developed contexts 
is not unproblematic, since theoretical assumptions about the context are only 
imperfectly reflected in real world situations. The application of neoliberal 
prescriptions in developing countries is even more confounding, since the socio-
economic and political realities in the global South are, arguably, even further from 
the assumptions in public choice theory on which they are premised. Yet, neoliberal 
prescriptions have been applied to debt-ridden developing countries by international 
donors through aid-conditionality, and transferred elsewhere through global epistemic 
communities, overlying and intersecting the communitarian discourses (McCourt and 
Minogue 2001, Haque and Zafarullah 2007). This has resulted in implementation of 
different types of institutional reform in the same location – often in the same sector – 
irrespective of their contextual relevance or mutual inconsistencies.  
 
                                                 
20 This does not imply that direct-democratic functioning and deliberative decision-making are not 
pertinent to developed situations, nor that such experiments are not being attempted. For example, 
Bucek and Smith (2000) note that direct and deliberative decision-making is increasingly being tried in 
UK and France.  
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This play of contending discourses and the often-incompatible organizational 
structures implied by their respective reform prescriptions is an important issue, for on 
its systematic resolution hinges the success of decentralization and progressive 
developmental outcomes. All discussions on decentralizing governance – normative, 
theoretical and empirical – emphasize the importance of tailoring reforms to the local 
context, noting that their effectiveness is closely shaped by the socio-economic, 
political and administrative circumstances in which they are instituted and function 
(WB 1992, Turner and Hulme 1997). Politics and policy design may determine the 
reformed institutional architecture, which is manifested in tangible form as an 
ensemble of organizations endowed with specific roles, functions and resources and 
working within a network of legislation, regulation, policy guidelines, rules and 
procedures. Outcomes, however, depend on the compatibility of this organizational 
ensemble with the larger environment within which it functions (Emery and Trist 
1965; Lawrence and Lorsch 1967; Katz and Kahn 1966)21. That is, the effective 
functioning of the reformed institutional architecture depends heavily on its coherence 
with the context, and inappropriate institutional configurations are unlikely to deliver 
desired outcomes. 
 
The task of identifying context-appropriate decentralization, however, is not as simple 
as ascertaining that only contextually rooted and indigenous prescriptions are applied, 
as many who contest the application of neoliberal reforms appear to suggest (for 
example, Shiva 1993, 2002; Barlow and Clarke 2002). For most developing locations, 
embody the contextual assumptions of both neoliberals as well as communitarian 
proponents, in different degrees and combinations. Thus, as critics illustrate from the 
                                                 
21 More recently, Turner and Hulme (1997) elaborate on these intricate connections of governance 
structures to the variables in the context. 
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experience of governance reforms in many countries, neoliberal reforms in most cases 
do exacerbate disparities and further weaken the access of the poor and marginalized 
to basic goods and services, and also widen the disparities between countries.22 But 
others also find that in many cases access of the poor to services has been extended, 
and economic opportunities increased for some groups, such as women.23 On the other 
hand, devolution and participatory governance as suggested in communitarian 
discourses has more often led to elite capture of resources and decision-making fora, 
greater inequity in investment between poor and wealthy neighborhoods and 
occasionally, further entrenchment of regressive social and economic practices.24 
 
The contextual fit of any kind of reform proposition is therefore not a foregone 
conclusion, as the continuing debates on the appropriate type of decentralization, 
which surface the major differences among the proponents of the idea, illustrate. It 
remains an open question, and an important one for successful decentralized 
governance. The latter is important, for assessment of the outcomes of 
decentralizations, with methodologies of varying strength, provide a mixed picture 
relative to pre-reform situations, indicating that decentralizing governance can yield 
desired outcomes if crafted in context-appropriate ways. And the experience across 
countries, of centralized state provision of services and management of resources 
becoming increasingly ineffective, inefficient, costly, and corrupt, also makes a search 
for alternative modes of governance necessary. Finally, the idea of decentralization 
has wide appeal for its promise of autonomy and self-determination, policy innovation 
                                                 
22 For critical discussions of the neoliberal model, including its underlying and stated political and 
economic objectives and the equity effects of neoliberal policies, see Beneria and Feldman (1992), 
Sheahan (1997), Tussie and Aggio (undated). The growing inequality after liberalization and 
globalization is well illustrated in UN (2006). 
23 Reported in Robinson (2003), Fiszbein (1997), Work (2002). 
24 See Mansuri and Rao (2004), Pozzoni and Kumar (2005), Blair (2000), Crook and Manor (1998), 
Crook and Sverisson (2001). 
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and preservation of heterogeneity.  
 
The key question that emerges from this intersection of the normative idea, 
contestation of various reform prescriptions, and the need for context-appropriate 
structures for local governance that pre-empt perverse outcomes and yield desired 
ones is that of the relative effectiveness of the various reform propositions in different 
types of developing contexts. However, despite the now sizeable literature on reform 
experiences across countries, answers this question have yet to emerge. Reform 
experiences are almost all ‘before-after’ studies,25 and while invaluable for the insights 
they frequently offer into the dynamics of the reform process and context, how these 
shape outcomes and how the outcomes compare with the pre-reform situation, these 
studies do not provide answers to the questions of the relative effectiveness of 
alternate types of reform.  
 
Assessing the context-appropriateness of different types of reform is also necessary 
because, given the intricate connections between organizational functioning and its 
environmental variables, the learning in terms of effective institutional design cannot 
be directly transferred across locations. There can be no universalized ‘best practices’ 
for institutional design; even the World Bank, arguably among the biggest supporters 
of best-practices research, admits that such an approach fails to address important 
variables, 
 
…(such as) differences in local conditions, ranging from social norms to 
geography….. Successful institutions are based on many factors, mostly local…. 
(including) existing levels of corruption, degree of transparency, underlying human 
                                                 
25 There are a few exceptions, particularly in the studies of privatization of State-Owned Enterprises 
(see Megginson and Netter 2001).  Pearce-Oroz (2003) compares centralized and decentralized 
arrangements for water provision in Honduras. But studies that compare the performance of alternate 
kinds of reformed arrangements in the same or similar locations did not emerge in the extensive search 
of the literature that was undertaken in this research.  
 14 
 
capacity and technology…. ‘Best practice’ in institutional design is a flawed concept’. 
(World Bank 2002:2, italics and words in brackets mine) 
 
In addition to the epistemic vacuum, there are also political and economic 
implications, for the lack of knowledge on questions of institutional appropriateness 
has not prevented a host of reforms being implemented in most countries across the 
world since the eighties. (Bennett 1994, Cheema and Rondinelli 2007). However, in 
the absence of clear understandings of their context-appropriateness, reform 
prescriptions and actions have remained primarily ideological and the comparative 
utility of the emergent arrangements uncertain. Even after two decades of 
decentralization of various kinds, Ribot observes,   
 
All…assumptions [about decentralization] must be approached with caution since 
surprisingly little research has been done to assess whether [appropriate] conditions 
exist or if they lead to the desired outcomes. In practice there is considerable 
confusion and obfuscation about what constitutes decentralization. In the name of 
decentralization, powers over natural and other resources are being allocated to a 
variety of local bodies and authorities that may not be downwardly accountable or 
entrusted with sufficient powers. Many reforms in the name of decentralization do not 
appear to be structured in ways likely to deliver the presumed benefits…the term 
decentralization is often applied to programs and reforms that ultimately are designed 
to retain central control. (Ribot 2001: vi) 
In sum, there are almost26 no answers to the question: What is the relative efficacy of 
the two generic types of decentralization reforms – marketization and democratization 
– in typical kinds of developing locations?27 
                                                 
26 For certainly, there are some indications to be found on how characteristics of the context shape 
reform outcomes, which can be assembled to derive some idea of the suitability of the reforms to 
particular socio-economic, political and cultural contexts. But not only are they difficult to glean but 
again, without consideration of the counterfactuals, the relative performance of alternative 
arrangements cannot be reliably assessed.   
27 It can be argued that since reform choices are determined more by the prevailing political-economic 
circumstances and dominant ideological frameworks than by fully rational consideration of their 
suitability or efficacy, as Manor discusses (Manor 1999), this question is less important, if not totally 
irrelevant. This is however, not correct, for first, the epistemic value is not undermined by the extent of 
their utility and continues to be significant. Second, it is in the absence of more objective answers that 
political considerations get full play, and more often than not, enable the more powerful to co-opt or 
contain opposing factions. Third, as pointed out at the beginning, details of institutional arrangements 
are crafted by policy designers who therefore have substantial space for making choices, even within 
the contours of political decisions. Finally, answers to this would help the less powerful and those 
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4. THE RESEARCH CONTEXT, QUESTION, METHODOLOGY AND FINDINGS 
 
This study makes a beginning towards addressing the knowledge gap, by exploring 
answers to the above question. To assess the relative efficacies of different types of 
reform, the question is set in the context of reforms in the governance arrangements 
for provision of domestic water28 in India. The task of assuring sustained supply of at 
least minimum quantities of safe water for domestic consumption and hygiene needs 
has become a global priority, with more than a billion people still without access.29 
The increasing water scarcity, contamination of sources and most significantly, the 
failure of state-run systems, has deepened the search for alternative governance 
arrangements.  Prescriptions for reform of this sector mirror the international 
discourses on decentralization, with neoliberal voices prescribing privatization and 
communitarians calling for devolution and community-provision.30 The dimensions of 
the problem in India (which is home to almost a quarter of the global water-poor), and 
the discursive propositions for reform are no different, and both neoliberal and 
communitarian prescriptions have been implemented by the national government to 
decentralize water provision.  
 
In line with the processes of governance reform initiated in India in 1991, state 
systems for water provision have been both devolved and liberalized. First, the 
responsibility for water provision, among other functions, was devolved to rural and 
                                                                                                                                            
contesting dominant views, by providing alternative understandings and information. The question of 
the relative efficacies and context-appropriateness of various reform propositions therefore continues to 
be important, and the lack of adequate answers constitutes a critical gap. 
28 In the literature, the term used more widely is ‘drinking water’, though the reference is usually to the 
water used for drinking, personal ablutions, kitchen use and often, in the developing countries, for 
domestic cattle. Using the term ‘domestic water’ is more accurate. 
29 Though estimates vary, all sources agree that it is over one billion. See, for example, World Water 
Forum (2000) and WHO-UNICEF (2004). 
30 The divergent discourses are discussed in Chapter II, but see Saleth (2002), Shiva (2002), Petrella 
(2001). 
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urban local governments through Constitutional Amendment Acts in 1992-9331. What 
distinguishes this as a progressive communitarian measure is the specification for local 
government decisions to be made through deliberation by an assembly of all voters in 
the jurisdiction – the Gram Sabha32 and Ward Sabha. Subsequently, a Sector Reform 
Pilot program was introduced in 1999 (and re-launched as Swajaldhara in 2002), to 
liberalize State systems by enabling users to initiate and manage projects, contribute a 
portion of the capital expenditure and take full responsibility for – and bear the costs 
of – operation and maintenance. The neoliberal constructions underlying this program 
are clear in the stated objectives of the policy, as also in the ‘participatory’ structure 
specified (GoI 1999, 2003).  
 
This situation provided an excellent setting to assess the relative efficacies of the two 
types of reform in various kinds on contexts, using a comparative case study approach. 
The functioning of Panchayat and Sector Reform arrangements (each constituting a 
case), was studied in three States – Gujarat, Kerala and Madhya Pradesh – that 
differed systematically in political, economic and socio-cultural characteristics. The 
six cases enabled two kinds of comparison – between the two types of reform 
(devolved and liberalized) in the same (State) context, and of the same reform in three 
different contexts.  
 
Reformed arrangements were compared on three parameters. First, the efficacy33 of the 
                                                 
31 The Constitutional Amendments (GoI 1992) specified the devolution of 29 subjects to local 
governments, from among the ones held by the States. Among these was water provision. 
32 This is arguably in line with domestic communitarian discourses which substantially predate the 
neoliberal wave. For a discussion of the history of the idea and practice of local self-governance in 
India, see Chiriyankandath (2001), also Mathews (2000). 
33 Note that efficacy, effectiveness and efficiency are three different concepts. ‘Efficacy’ is the capacity, 
or potential of the reformed institutional arrangements, and ‘effectiveness’ is the extent to which it 
actually achieves a stated objective. Efficiency refers to the relationship between the quanta of outputs 
to the costs of producing them; costs could include financial, temporal, personnel, environmental or 
other kinds. 
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specified organizational architecture, that is, its potential to change pre-reform 
patterns. The extent of decentralization that was instituted was used to assess efficacy, 
on the premise that greater decentralization would alter pre-reform patterns of 
functioning to a greater extent.34 Second, the effectiveness of the arrangements, 
indicated by changes in the average quantity of water, the extent of disparity in 
quantities available to different segments in the population, number of household 
connections, the population within 50m of a protected source and those dependant on 
unprotected sources. Third, the inclusion of marginalized groups, such as women, in 
the reformed decision-making processes. Women are arguably the largest of 
marginalized groups, and in both types of reforms in India, legal provison has been 
made for their inclusion. Therefore the extent of participation of women, assessed by 
the extent and type of formal spaces created in the reformed structure for their 
participation and the actual use of the spaces, was used to indicate inclusiveness of the 
reformed arrangements. 
 
The specific research question was as below –   
What is the relative efficacy, effectiveness and inclusiveness of devolved (Panchayat) 
and liberalized (Sector Reform-Swajaldhara) arrangements for water provision, 
(a) in the same kind of context, and  
(b) in three contexts with different degrees of economic, political and social 
development, as in Gujarat, Kerala and Madhya Pradesh? 
To find answers, the functioning of Panchayat and Sector Reform arrangements in 
each State was mapped by studying the process of development and operation of a 
number of village-level water supply projects (mini cases) developed through the two 
                                                 
34 This was taken from the conclusions drawn by many authors studying reform experiences, that the 
inadequate extent of decentralization was primarily responsible for the ineffectiveness of the reformed 
arrangements and poor outcomes. These studies are discussed in Chapter I. 
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types of arrangements, in a cluster of villages. The effort was to build a picture of the 
typical pattern in each case, through document review, interviews with various actors 
in the process and other key informants, focus group discussions with users and non-
participant observation. From the observed patterns, the performance of devolved and 
liberalized arrangements could be compared along three dimensions – the relationship 
between extent of decentralization and the outcomes in terms of effectiveness and 
inclusion, the relationship between participation and effectiveness, and the modulation 
of reformed arrangements by contextual variables, and how these shape outcomes.  
 
The answers that emerge from this study challenge some current orthodoxies in reform 
discourse. Both types of institutional reforms improved the pre-reform conditions of 
water availability to all groups in all three States, reaffirming the value of 
decentralization per se,35 but liberalized arrangements were more effective than 
devolved governance arrangements (in increasing the sheer availability of water), in 
all three contexts. This can ofcourse be attributed to the addition of water sources, and 
the greater availability of funds for the Swajaldhara program, but the increased scope 
for initiation of projects by non-state actors (citizens, NGOs or CBOs) in the 
liberalized program emerged as an important factor. 
 
The issue of disparities in the amount of water available to households with private 
connections and those dependent on public sources, however, problematizes these 
findings, for liberalized arrangements are equitable only in Kerala, a state with high 
political and social development but only moderate economic development. In both 
Gujarat and Madhya Pradesh, however, liberalized arrangements were found to be 
                                                 
35 This is of course because of the addition of another water supply system in the village; there had been 
little possibility of (or plans for) such additional intervention in the study villages in the immediate 
future, and the very possibility was created by the reforms.  
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highly iniquitous in the distribution of benefits, and less inclusive than devolved 
governance configurations. This makes devolution of water provision to local 
governments (Panchayats) preferable in these two contexts and raises an interesting 
conundrum: The substantially greater aggravation of existing iniquitous patterns of 
water access in economically advanced Gujarat, in both types of decentralized 
provision is startling. Particularly so, when local government provision actually 
reduces disparities in MP, with its low economic, social and political development, 
and despite the resource-capturing proclivities of the local elite that are observed. 
These anomalous findings, discussed in more detail in the Conclusion, are further 
complicated by the relationships between the State context and reform designs, and the 
institutional arrangements at the local level. 
  
5. STRUCTURE OF THE DISSERTATION  
 
A prime issue in at the beginning of this research was the lack of clarity or consistency 
in the definition of the central concepts – governance, institutions and decentralization 
– and the associated terms.36 The first task was therefore to develop conceptual clarity 
and consistent definitions, and this was done by mining existing definitions in the 
literature and reconciling contrary usages by application of a logical framework. The 
existence of and distinctions between the two discourses in decentralization became 
obvious only when the notion of decentralization and the terms denoting various kinds 
of decentralization were defined clearly enough to discern their institutional and 
organizational dimensions. Normative and theoretical discussions were parsed using 
these definitions and the conceptual understanding of typologies, to reveal the inherent 
                                                 
36 See Jessop (1998), Scott (2001) and Oyugi (2000) respectively for observations on the conceptual and 
definitional problems. 
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differences that signal the presence of two separate discourses in the literature. These 
efforts are set out in Chapter I, as is the review of empirical literature of reform 
experiences across countries, which was directed at discerning if there were any 
indications of the relative efficacy of different kinds of reform. In the last section of 
the Chapter, the conceptual framework for researching the question of relative and 
context-specific efficacies of different types of reform in the context of domestic water 
provision is discussed. 
 
In Chapter II, the research context, location, methodology and design are described, 
beginning with a review of the discursive views on reforms in domestic water 
provision and the two types of reforms introduced in India to decentralize existing 
governance arrangements. The specific research questions, methodology adopted for 
the study (comparative case-study), parameters used for comparison (efficacy, 
effectiveness and inclusion), the research design and selection of cases (Gujarat, 
Kerala and Madhya Pradesh), and methods of data collection and analysis are then 
discussed.   
 
Chapter III contains the description of water provision through devolved (Panchayat) 
systems in Gujarat, Kerala and Madhya Pradesh respectively, and the comparative 
analyses of efficacy, effectiveness and inclusion in the three cases. In Chapter IV, 
water provision through the liberalized system (Sector Reform-Swajaldhara) in the 
three States is discussed, and the efficacy, effectiveness and inclusion in the three 
cases are compared. In these two chapters, the objective is to first illustrate how 
differences in the State context modulated the received institutional designs specified 
by the Government of India so that state-specific designs with different efficacies 
(potential for effectiveness) emerged. How these designed configurations intersected 
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with contextual conditions in the study villages to produce an emergent structure, and 
the varying degrees of effectiveness and inclusion that resulted, are then described, 
before comparing the pattern of outcomes for devolved and liberalized systems 
respectively. 
 
Comparison of the performance of devolution and liberalization within each of the 
three different State contexts is contained in Chapter V, which provides a picture of 
how the two types of reformed arrangements intersect with context attributes to 
produce different outcomes. The analytical picture thus gained, is, however, 
disaggregated and nuanced, and does not directly provide policy implications. To 
derive these, the efficacy, effectiveness and inclusiveness of the reformed 
arrangements are amalgamated in each case, using a scoring system (explained in 
chapter II) to gain an overall picture of reform efficacy. By comparing these 
amalgamated scores across cases, policy implications become evident.  
 
The Conclusion brings together the main findings of this research and the implications 
for policy, but also explores the reasons for the pattern of findings that emerged. 
Further, the findings and insights derived in the case studies are also set against the 
current discussions on effective reform, particularly the unresolved questions in 
decentralizing governance and women’s inclusion. The directions for future research 
are also explored.  
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CHAPTER  I 
DECENTRALIZATION: DEFINITIONS, DISCOURSES AND 
REFORM EXPERIENCES 
 
 
We all know that words are multi-meaning, that our concepts are conceived very 
differently, and that our arguments are plagued with ambiguities and inconsistencies. 
The point is what to do about all of this. Can the present-day chaos be turned into a 
cosmos that allows, at a minimum, for intelligible communication and constructive 
discussion? We believe so, and we attempt to show how this can be done. (Giovanni 
Sartori 1984:10). 
 
The literature pertinent to the question of context-appropriate institutional design for 
decentralized governance is enormous, as one can expect from thirty years of 
attention.37 Despite the interest, however, this literature is marked by a lack of 
consensus and clarity on the definition of the three core concepts – governance (the 
object of study), institutions (the unit of analysis) and decentralization (the process 
under study).38 This study was therefore initiated with an exercise to derive 
unambiguous and defensible definitions for these concepts, through a critical review 
of definitions offered by significant authors in the respective domains and application 
of a logical framework as suggested by Sartori (1984).   
 
Examined in the light of the conceptual map that emerged from the above exercise, the 
reform literature revealed two significant patterns. One was the existence of two, 
distinctly different, discourses39 on the question of appropriate reform for 
                                                 
37 The interest in decentralization has a longer history than the last two decades, as a number of authors 
note (see, for example Conyers 1984; Manor 1999). Cohen and Peterson (1999:1) suggest there have 
been “at least three phases of attention, each of which emphasized different but cumulative objectives”. 
Williamson (1993) describes the paradigmatic influence of the idea in contemporary development.   
38 Most authors writing on these topics preface their essay with a remark on this issue: on ‘governance’, 
see Jessop (1998), Pierre (2000), Peters (2000) and Kooiman (1993,2000); on ‘institutions’ see Scott 
(2001); on ‘decentralization’, see Oyugi (2000b), Ribot (2001). 
39 “A discourse is a shared means of making sense of the world embedded in language…grounded in 
assumptions, judgements, contentions, dispositions and capabilities…[It] will generally revolve around 
a central storyline, containing opinions about both facts and values…Discourses can be bound up with 
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decentralized governance, differing in their theoretical rationales, geographical 
moorings, assumptions and most importantly, in the institutional prescriptions. The 
other was a lack of attention to the question of the relative suitability of different types 
of institutional reforms to various kinds of developing contexts. Disentangling the two 
discourses and the embedded institutional propositions was particularly important for 
developing the conceptual framework for the study, and the literature on the reform 
experiences across countries helped to delineate the knowledge gap and specify 
research questions.    
 
Both these exercises are discussed in this chapter. First, the definitions identified or 
derived, and the conceptual mapping through which the latter emerged, are discussed 
in sections 1 and 2.  Meanings identified for the terms ‘governance’ and institutions, 
where the definitional confusion has been addressed to a degree, are laid out in Section 
1, and in Section 2, the derivation of definitions of ‘decentralization’ and allied terms 
is discussed.  In the third section, I use these definitions to review the theoretical and 
normative literature on decentralizing governance and discuss the two discourses that 
are revealed, and the respective institutional prescriptions and contextual assumptions. 
The fourth section reviews the literature on reform experiences and the empirical 
findings on the outcomes of different types of decentralizations in different contexts. 
Finally, I discuss how neither the theoretical nor empirical literature offers answers to 
the question of context-appropriate reform, and the implications for developing a 
research design.   
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
material forces. For example, material economic constraints on politics now make themselves felt 
through the discourse of market liberalism” (Dryzek 2000: 18) 
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1. THE DEFINITIONAL ISSUE AND ITS RESOLUTION 
 
Authors frequently remark on the confusion in the usage of the terms ‘governance’, 
‘institutions and ‘decentralization’ that afflicts the literature on these subjects40, but the 
issue has been addressed systematically by authors in the first two cases. From among 
the attempts to define ‘governance’, the conceptual examinations by Kooiman (1993, 
2003) and Jessop (1998) provide the clearest definition and a consistent analytical 
framework for investigating governance. Referring to ‘institutions’, Scott (2001) has 
followed his observation of the prevailing conceptual differences with a systematic 
review and reconciliation of the many definitions. The definition that emerges, with 
clear differences drawn between institutions and organizations – terms which are often 
used interchangeably by authors - and the analytical framework developed for 
understanding institutions are set out below. Unfortunately, no such effort has been 
made by any of the significant authors on the subject of decentralization41, and 
appropriate definitions had to be derived; this is discussed in the next section.  
 
1.1. GOVERNANCE: THE OBJECT OF ANALYSIS  
 
Despite the wide-ranging interest in the concept42, and the prevailing ambiguity in the 
usage of the term ‘governance’43, few attempts have been made to reconcile the 
                                                 
40 In the case of ‘governance’ see for example, Rhodes (2000); Pierre (2000), Kooiman (1993) and 
Jessop (1998). Oyugi (2000a, b), Ribot (2001), Silverman (1992), Litvack (1998), Wolman (1990) 
among many others note this problem in respect of both ‘decentralization’ as a concept , as well as in 
the case of the many other terms used to denote specific kinds of reform such as devolution, delegation, 
privatization, and liberalization, to name a few.   
41 Various authors, including those noted just above, set out definitions, but the issue of inconsistency 
across authors is not addressed. 
42 Spanning across the fields of development (Rondinelli et al. 1989, Rondinelli 1990, Bardhan 1996, 
2002, 2006; WB 1992, UNDP 1997), public administration (Rhodes 1996, 2000; Minogue et al. 1998), 
political science (Leftwich 1993, Manor 1999; Blair 1996, 1998) and economics (North 1990; 
Williamson 1996) 
43 Noted, for example, by Pierre (2000), Rhodes (1996; 2000), Zafarulla and Haque (2006) 
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multiple meanings, though Rhodes (1996, 2000) maps a variety of usages. An 
extensive review of definitions, including widely-used ones developed by multilateral 
development organizations, reveals that only a few authors actually define the concept 
and not all are consistent.  Most explain the term by reference either to contextually 
and historically contingent structures through which governance occurs such as 
through networks or by government; to the central actors such as civic, 
governmental/state or market; its location or context such as  ‘corporate’/ 
organizational, societal/national or ‘international’ and determinants of its quality such 
as extent of trust, accountability and transparency. These aspects are analytically 
important, but do not constitute adequate definitions.44  
 
Definitions developed by Kooiman (1993, 2000, 2003) and Jessop (1998), however, 
are notable in their clear specification of the term and how it differs from 
‘government’ and ‘governing’. Jessop identifies two (nested) meanings of governance, 
which are also consistent with most others offered in the literature. In the wider and 
generic meaning, it refers to ‘the pattern (or mode) of coordination of interdependent 
activities’. A more restricted usage is to denote ‘governing through ‘self-organizing, 
inter-organizational networks’, i.e., the particular mode of governing that has 
increasingly drawn attention in the contemporary era of reform (Jessop 1998). 
Because the latter covers only a subset of the phenomena/processes included by the 
former, the generic definition is arguably more suitable for investigating the conduct 
of public affairs in the context of post-colonial societies where modernization is still 
uneven and multiple patterns and modes of governance coexist.45 Jessop also points 
                                                 
44 Sartori (1984), explains essential features of a definition – clear specification of a set of unique 
characteristics of the phenomenon and boundary conditions that distinguish it from related terms – and 
sets out methods by which they can be derived. More recently Scott (2001) takes a somewhat similar 
but less semantic approach to define ‘institutions’.  
45 See Ananthpur (2004), Ananthpur and Moore (2007) and Kohli (1990, 1994) for a discussion of the 
way in which traditional or customary and modern modes of governance are typical of developing 
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out that the use of the term has shifted historically, with the current usage 
differentiating it from the allied notion of ‘government’, while expanding the meaning 
to include actors and processes outside government. 
 
[Governance]…originally referred to the manner of governing, guiding, or steering 
conduct, and overlapped with ‘government’, [now] ...governance would refer to the 
resultant modes and manner of governing, government to the institutions and agents 
charged with governing, and governing to the act of governing itself….[As such, it] 
…can refer to any mode of coordination of interdependent activities.... (Jessop 1998; 
italics and words in parentheses mine). 
 
Kooiman (1993, 2003) and Jessop (1998, 2000) also offer cogent conceptual 
frameworks for studying governance within any socio-political system,46 such as rural 
or urban settlements, regions or countries (see Table 1.1 below). Governance, in a 
societal context, includes actors, both individual and organizational, processes and 
structures. Also, diversity of actors, processes and structures, complexity of relations 
between these and dynamics, that is, tensions and changes in their inter-relationships, 
characterize governance at all levels – local, regional, national and international.  
 
Kooiman also suggests that governance can be in three fundamental modes – 
anarchic, hierarchic and heterarchic – which co-exist in any system as ideal types or 
variants.47 Moreover, governance occurs, and can therefore be studied, at three levels 
or orders – interpersonal, inter-organizational and inter-sectoral. Jessop (1998) 
distinguishes these levels in correspondence with the distinction made by Luhman 
(1992)48 between three levels of social structure (interaction, organization and 
                                                                                                                                            
situations. Bakker (2003b) illustrates the co-existence and inter-relatedness of multiple modes of 
governance in her mapping of water supply systems in the South, as in an archipelago.  
46 …‘a system being a whole of entities which display more interrelations among themselves than with 
other entities’ (Kooiman 2000: 140) 
47 It is perhaps not a coincidence that these correspond to the three types of coordination discussed in 
organizational theory – direct supervision (hierarchic), mutual adjustment (anarchic) and distributed 
(heterarchic).  
48 Cited in Jessop (1998). 
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functional system or institutional order), and by a correlative distinction between 
different forms of social embeddedness – the social embeddedness of interpersonal 
relations, the institutional embeddedness of inter-organizational relations, and the 
societal embeddedness of inter-systemic relations.  
 
Table 1.1 
A Framework for Analyzing Governance  
(derived from Kooiman 2000, 2003; Jessop 1998). 
  
Modes    Anarchic 
(Self-governing) 
Example. Markets 
Hierarchic 
(Command-control) 
Example:  
Bureaucracies 
Heterarchic 
(Co-governing) 
Example: 
Networks 
Orders or Levels  
3rd – Meta-governance (governing 
values, paradigms & approaches 
across sectors in societies or 
countries) 
Inter-governmental 
negotiation, bargaining 
and trade 
Macro-policy, political 
agreements, 
constitutional 
provisions 
Inter-systemic 
networks 
2nd – Institutional-organizational 
level (organizations within sectoral 
environments) 
Inter-organizational 
competition, negotiation 
and exchange. 
Sectoral Policy, 
Regulation, Licensing 
Inter-
organizational 
networks 
1st – Routine, action level 
(individuals, in organizational 
settings) 
Individual competition, 
exchange 
Intra-organizational 
policy, rules  and 
procedures 
Interpersonal 
networks 
 
 
Since the notion of governance refers to any mode of coordination of societal tasks, in 
itself the concept of decentralization refers only to the dispersal of the existing state-
centered structures and processes, and does not privilege any particular mode of 
governing. Dispersal could be geographical or territorial, political, sociological or 
organizational. Moreover, the processes could include organizational actors or agents 
inside and outside government. With this conceptualization, the object(s) of attention 
for reforming governance arrangements includes the ensemble of organizations and 
processes involved in any task – for example, provision of a basic service within an 
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area. That is, looking for answers to the question of context appropriate, decentralized 
local governance involves going beyond an analysis of governmental systems to 
examine the nature and functioning of related actors outside government, and the 
inter-relationships between them, including those that may not be formally ‘charged’ 
with governing. 
 
1.2. INSTITUTIONS, ORGANIZATIONS AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 
 
The term ‘institution’ has taken diverse meanings over time as significant authors 
within economics, political science, sociology and organization theory have engaged 
with it, making delineation of an appropriate and robust definition a “challenge… 
[which] resides in the varying meanings and usages of the concept” by different 
groups (Scott 2001:xx). Scott meets this challenge by coherently juxtaposing the 
multiple conceptions of the term in different strands of literature to derive a rich, 
synthesized, definition. According to him institutions are “[multifaceted, durable] 
social structures that have attained a high degree of resilience…. composed of 
cultured-cognitive, normative and regulatory elements, that together with associated 
activities and material resources, provide stability and meaning to social life”49 (Scott 
2001:48, bracketed words taken from his ensuing elaboration). 
 
By weaving together the multiple views, this holistic definition successfully captures 
the essential facets that contribute to the ubiquity, persistence and significance of 
institutions. Authors train different disciplinary lenses that focus on specific facets of 
the whole concept and accordingly define the term. Institutional economists, public 
                                                 
49 As is clearly evident from his extended discussion, Scott’s use of ‘social’ is in its broadest sense of 
including economic, political, legal and other structures that combine to produce what is experienced as 
‘social life’.  
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administration theorists and some political scientists focus on the regulative elements 
and define institutions as a stable system of statutory rules, either formal or informal, 
backed by surveillance and sanctioning power. Other political scientists, organization 
theorists and sociologists who see institutions as systems of normative rules that 
introduce a prescriptive, evaluative and obligatory dimension to social life (through 
values and norms), focus on the normative elements. The conception of rules here is 
broad, including ‘routines, procedures, conventions, roles, strategies, organizational 
forms, and technologies…beliefs, paradigms, codes, cultures and knowledge’ (March 
and Olsen 1989:22, also cited in Scott 2001) – with a focus on social obligations as the 
basis for compliance. Finally, anthropologists and sociologists view institutions as 
‘sedimentation of meanings or, to vary the image, a crystallization of meanings in 
objective form’ (Berger and Kellner 1981: 31, also cited in Scott 2001), stressing the 
importance of shared conceptions that constitute the nature of social reality and the 
frames through which meaning is made; that is, the cultural-cognitive elements of 
institutions. 
 
The three facets of institutions are not only manifested in specific carriers respectively 
(see Table 1.2 below) but also have corresponding bases of compliance, order and 
legitimacy. They are also associated with indicators that not only proclaim and solidify 
their existence, but can also be used to signal compliance. Table 1.2 summarizes the 
overall conception of institutions, their carriers and the elements that contribute to 
their functioning and persistence. All three facets – regulative (rules), normative 
(norms, values) and cultural-cognitive (beliefs, schema) – and the various elements 
that carry the institutional burden in each case, are vital ingredients, forming a 
continuum ‘from the conscious to the unconscious, from the legally enforced to the 
taken-for-granted’ (Hoffman 1997:36). All contribute, in independent and mutually 
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reinforcing ways, to giving institutions their power; their ‘directive force’ results from 
being ‘over-determined in the sense that social sanctions, plus pressure for conformity, 
plus intrinsic direct reward, plus values, are all likely to act together’ (Andrade 
1984:98).  
 
Table 1.2 
Pillars, Elements, Carriers and Functioning of Institutions  
(derived from Scott 2001: 52, 77) 
 
 Institutional Pillars Regulative Normative Cultural-Cognitive 
In
st
itu
tio
na
l C
ar
rie
rs
 Symbolic systems Rules, Laws Values, Expectations Categories, Schema 
Relational systems Governance systems, 
Power systems 
Regimes, Authority 
systems 
Structural Isomorphism, 
Identities 
Routines Protocols, Standard 
Operating Procedures 
Jobs, Roles, 
Obedience to duty 
Scripts 
Artifacts Objects complying with 
(legally) mandated 
systems 
Objects meeting 
conventions, 
Standards 
Objects possessing 
symbolic value 
In
st
itu
tio
na
l F
un
ct
io
ni
ng
 
Bases of 
Compliance 
Expedience Social Obligation Taken-for-grantedness, 
Shared understandings 
Bases of Order Regulative rules Binding Obligations Constitutive Schema 
Nature of 
Mechanisms 
Coercive Normative Mimetic 
Logic  Instrumentality Appropriateness Orthodoxy 
Indicators Rules, Laws, Sanctions Certification, 
Accreditation 
Common Beliefs, Shared 
logic of action 
Bases of Legitimacy Legally sanctioned Morally governed Comprehensible, 
Recognizable, Culturally 
supported 
 
 
Clearly, distinctions between formal-informal, customary-statutory, or regulatory-
normative-cultural-cognitive institutions serve analytical purposes only, but do not 
necessarily connote any greater significance or importance in institutional terms; it is 
coherence and mutual reinforcement across these distinctions that make institutions 
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stable, durable and effective in their purpose. Institutions develop (or change) with the 
collective development of both regulative rules – that attempt to influence 
‘antecedently existing activities’ – and constitutive rules that ‘create the very 
possibility of certain activities’ (Searle 1995:27). Constitutive rules construct the 
social objects, events and activities to which regulative rules are applied and therefore 
make possible their effective operation, but because they are so basic to social 
structure, so fundamental to social life, they are often overlooked. 
 
The term ‘organization’ is often used interchangeably with ‘institution’, but it is 
conceptually different. An organization is ‘the structural expression of rational action’ 
(Selznick 1948:25); a mechanistic instrument designed to achieve specified goals. As 
‘structures of recognized and accepted roles’, organizations can become more or less 
‘institutionalized’ over time to the extent that they enjoy special status and legitimacy 
for having satisfied people’s needs and met their normative expectations (Selznick 
1948; Huntington 1965; Uphoff 1986, 1993). Organizations are instruments, goal-
oriented structures of roles, rules and procedures, but  ‘[b]ecause organizations are 
social systems, goals or procedures tend to achieve an established, value-impregnated 
status … they become institutionalized.’ (Selznick 1949:256-57). Institutionalization 
occurs through a process of value-commitment to structures, people or procedures 
extending beyond their instrumentalities, whereby organizations become ‘infuse[d] 
with value beyond the technical requirements of the task at hand.’ (Selznick 1957:16-
17, emphasis in original). Many organizations are therefore not institutions, which 
concept includes only practices, rules, places, people, structures or organizations that 
have acquired value beyond their immediate utility or instrumentality, and therefore 
persist.  
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What are the implications of these conceptual understandings for the decentralized 
governance problematic? First, that while the discourses in decentralization center on 
the reform of regulatory frameworks and the organizational architecture through 
which they function, it is clear that the effective and stable operation of decentralized 
governance arrangements rests not only on the design of the statutory provisions and 
organizational structures for their operation – which constitute the ‘regulative’ 
elements – but from their coherence with normative and cultural-cognitive elements in 
the local context, which are the ‘constitutive’ elements50. Also, while the instrumental 
objectives of reform must be adequately met (for example, effective provision of a 
basic service), the stability and sustainability of the reformed arrangements depends to 
an extent on the active de-institutionalization of the pre-reform arrangements, and 
interventions for the institutionalization of the latter.51  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
50 Such coherence is likely to be a matter of degree, and clearly, the question is of finding degrees of fit 
that enable success of various kinds of decentralization. Moreover, systematic efforts to alter the 
normative and cultural-cognitive elements in the context so as to enable greater fit, such as training or 
educational programs, or the demonstration effect of changed circumstances can also alter the initial 
degree of coherence. The question then is of the cost of such additional efforts and the time required for 
effect; ultimately, the more efficient and effective approach would be to identify the kinds of 
decentralization that have greater coherence with different kinds of contexts – the exact burden of this 
research. 
51 On the basis of these understandings, one could hypothesize that the efficacy of reformed 
arrangements would depend on (a) the extent to which they prove more effective in providing 
(perceptually) safer, more reliable, regular and/or convenient services than earlier arrangements, (b) the 
extent to which they cohere with existing norms, beliefs, patterns of behavior and activity. Also, one 
could hypothesize that (1) if the first is very significant, the second would matter less in terms of how 
quickly the newer arrangements are accepted, but the longevity and sustainability of reformed 
arrangements may require more frequent attention, (2) if the first is insignificant, reforms would either 
be a non-starter and die quickly where the coherence between regulative and constitutive rules is less, 
but persist for a long time despite their ineffectiveness, where the reformed arrangements cohere highly 
with normative and cultural patterns in the environment. 
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2. DECENTRALIZATION: DEFINITION, DEGREES AND TYPES 
 
Even after decades of discussion about decentralization and application of the concept, 
the multi-valence of the term persists.52 
 
What is clear……. is that people who are regarded as authorities on the subject are yet 
to agree on what exactly the concept [of decentralization] entails. And unless a 
consensus is reached, more conceptual confusion in the name of identifying new 
typologies of decentralization will persist. (Oyugi 2000a:iii) 
 
Though most authors preface their writing with similar observations, they have either 
adopted existing definitions and proceeded with their enquiry, or set out a new set of 
definitions for the purpose of their research. Neither of the two approaches resolves 
the issue of inconsistency across studies, and in the latter approach, a fresh set of 
definitions and meanings are created that add to the existing confusion. In this study, 
therefore, neither of these strategies was adopted. Instead, following Sartori (1984), 
definitions were derived by critically evaluating existing ones for specificity with 
regard to the object it signifies and its clarity in terms of the boundary conditions that 
distinguish it from allied terms, two necessary characteristics of an epistemologically 
defensible definition.53. The specific delineation of the core concepts and accurate 
definitions of various terms in the decentralization lexicon are discussed below.   
 
 
                                                 
52 A major proportion of authors whose writing was reviewed in this project preface their essays with 
this observation, but it is most emphatically pointed out by Silverman (1992), Cohen and Peterson 
(1999), Ribot (2001) and World Bank (2003), among others. 
53 Sartori suggests 3 successive steps towards defining a term, (1) anatomy – sorting out the constitutive 
elements of a given concept – i.e., its characteristics, properties or attributes (2) reconstruction – 
recombining and organizing these elements in some meaningful and logically sound fashion (3) concept 
formation – selecting a definition or definitions of a concept on warranted and explicated grounds 
(Sartori 1984). 
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2.1. DEFINING THE CONCEPT 
 
The most widely used definitions of decentralization in the literature are taken from 
the UN54, Rondinelli (with various co-authors, in 1983, 1984, 1989, 1990), Mawhood 
(1983) and Smith (1985), and are listed in Annexure I. These were all formulated 
before the current phase of interest in decentralization, and suffer from some 
ambiguity and conceptual limitations. The first issue is that the concepts of ‘power’, 
‘authority’ and ‘responsibility’, are used interchangeably, though they have clearly 
different legal and functional implications55. A second issue lies in the use of the 
words transfer or cede, both of which restrict decentralization to ‘handing-over’ of 
powers held by the central authority and exclude other deliberate processes and 
actions that could also constitute decentralization.56 Thirdly, in these definitions, all 
kinds of transfer of powers are included, including to another centralized or single 
entity, such as a para-statal, private enterprise or voluntary agency, operating in a 
monopolistic situation57, which may not disperse or distribute power, authority or 
                                                 
54 Oyugi (2000:iii) observes that  the UN definition remains the standard definition today, but none of 
the many reviews I examined adopted this definition or referred to it, though other content from that 
source has been cited by some (eg, Cohen and Peterson 2000). 
55 Balogun’s definition, that it is the  “…transfer, in varying degrees, of the sovereign power, functions, 
responsibilities, and resources of the state from the center to …” (Balogun 2000:154) does better, but is 
not adopted by others. Transfer of each of these connotes different things – transfer of responsibilities 
without the authority to act to discharge them would be meaningless; but even the holding of authority 
does not necessarily lead to the discharge of shifted responsibilities, if resources – or the authority to 
marshall them and the possibility of their availability – are not ensured. And this – the presence of both 
authority and resources, together – would constitute power. Therefore, when all three – responsibility, 
authority and resources – are not transferred together, there is no transfer of ‘power’, making the 
decentralization either meaningless or ineffective. This alerts us to the fact that such inadequate and 
partial changes may be effected in practice in the name of decentralization, constituting of at best very 
partial steps, (when at least responsibilities and authority are granted), or at worst political posturing 
(when only responsibilities are transferred). These constitutive elements of power, however, must not be 
conflated with different degrees of power, which represent an orthogonal variable. 
56 These could include strengthening or granting official recognition to non-central governing entities 
such as customary or community-based organizations or NGOs, altering legal structures to enable the 
functioning of entities other than the government in tasks or functions that were earlier in the exclusive 
domain of the state, and similar instances. Mawhood and Smith are less exclusive, including ‘any act 
that formally cedes power’. (italics and emphases mine) 
57 Manor (1999) finds this typical of privatization processes, which he therefore excludes as instances of 
decentralization. While the issue of whether all privatization processes need be excluded on this basis 
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responsibility. Finally, and most importantly, these definitions are conceptually and 
empirically limited in the face of the variety of processes currently included in the 
discourses and practices of decentralization, though they well reflect “the 
decentralization efforts that have been tried in developing countries since the early 
1970s” (Rondinelli et al., 1984:9). Changing notions of the nature of public goods and 
the appropriateness of their production, supply and distribution through market 
processes, neoliberal concerns with downsizing of governments and bureaucracies, 
political concerns with extending and deepening democracy as well as a groundswell 
for local and regional autonomy on the basis of religion, ethnicity, or indigeneity in 
the late ‘80s and ‘90s, have all added multiple strands and conceptual variations of the 
notion of decentralization (Cheema and Rondinelli, 2007)58. These are not adequately 
reflected in the older definitions, in which there is only a peripheral concern with 
political decentralization59 and privatization60, the explicit focus being the sharing of 
power between the central government and its sub-ordinate units (Smith 1985; 
                                                                                                                                            
bears examination, but the point about non-distributive transfers not being ‘decentralization’ is well 
made. Ribot also excludes privatization but on different grounds – that there is an “exclusive” logic to it 
that is contradictory to the “inclusive public logic” of decentralization (Ribot 2002:iii). 
58 For discussion on the multiple concerns and reasons around the contemporary heightened interest in 
decentralization, see also Bennett (1990), Manor (1999), Cohen and Peterson (1999), among others.  
59 That is, the sharing of governing powers between different units or tiers in a political system. While 
local governments find mention as one kind of entities to which authority can be transferred, the focus 
is instrumental - they figure only as an alternative implementing unit for central government programs. 
It is recognized that they are political bodies (elected, nominated or customarily constituted), which is 
why, transfers to them are referred to as political decentralization later by Rondinelli (1990a) but the 
concern is not as much with sub-national political development and the transfer of political power, as 
with delegated administrative authority and responsibility to implement specified development projects 
and programs (Slater 1989). 
60 Privatization was included only in the sense that these “evolved from situations in which private 
sector firms offered goods and services which government provided poorly, or not at all, or only in 
some parts of the country”, rather than from deliberate efforts by governments to divest themselves of 
public functions. It is only later that privatization in the latter sense of the term is included, and a clear 
shift in focus is visible, with decentralization itself being additionally defined as  “a situation in which 
public goods and services are provided primarily through the revealed preferences of individuals 
through market mechanisms” (Rondinelli et al, 1989:59, see also Cheema and Rondinelli, 2007).  
Though Oyugi suggests that the interest in decentralization in the developing countries in the earlier 
phase (‘70s) was due to pressure for privatization by multi-lateral agencies, other authors do not suggest 
this – in fact, most clearly see the neoliberal agenda for privatization as a driving force in the 80s and 
90s (eg., Cheema and Rondinelli 2007).  
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Mawhood 1983; Rondinelli et al. 1989; Slater 1989; Oyugi 2000, Cheema and 
Rondinelli 2007).  
 
These definitions are therefore particularly limiting, in the face of the strong normative 
pressures for privatization, liberalization and democratization in the current 
discourses. For example Balogun asserts that the idea of decentralization embodies a 
“…concern for equity, through the redistribution of power.” (Balogun 2000:155) and 
Ribot emphasizes that there is an ‘inclusive logic to decentralization’ (Ribot 2001:v). 
Others equally strongly advocate privatization (Littvack et al 1998, Savas 2000). 
Therefore, using the older definitions limits and de-politicizes the discussions on 
decentralization – a charge leveled by critics such as Slater (1989, 1990)61 and later, 
Mohan and Stokke (2000).  
 
In contrast, Wolman offers a ‘common-sense’ and inclusive definition – “the dispersal 
or distribution of powers away from the center” (1990:29), which succinctly and 
uniquely specifies the action(s) denoted by the term, and is yet broad enough to cover 
the variety of processes which are currently included in the rubric of decentralization. 
It is also surprisingly robust in providing specific distinguishing features and boundary 
conditions for the kind of institutional changes that can be included, as I explain 
below. This generic definition can apply to different contexts62, but in this research, I 
use it (as Wolman has) in the context of governance arrangements for discharge of 
public functions63.  
                                                 
61 See also Samoff (1990), Rondinelli et al. (1989), Rondinelli (1990) for a debate on this issue. 
62 Decentralization in this sense can also be discussed in the context of various types of private 
organizations; in a slightly altered meaning, has been used in relation to geographic disperal of human 
settlements, economic enterprises  etc. There is parallel literature on decentralization of decision-
making power or information within corporate, manufacturing and various other kinds of organizations 
(see, for example, Sherwood 1969, Kochen and Deutsch 1980).  
63 It is to be noted that the domain so delineated is not restricted only to government reform i.e., the 
dispersal of power away from central and state governments, which has been a predominant focus of the 
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By this definition, decentralization implies a redistribution of power from central to a 
number of non-central entities, as is clear from the words ‘dispersal’ and ‘distribute’. 
There is no inherent normative prescription of an ideally decentralized or centralized 
situation; only a specification that there be an outward or centrifugal dispersal from 
whatever distribution exists. Also, as a verb (‘to decentralize’) it clearly indicates that 
the set of actions that constitute or result in this process are purposive – that is, the 
dispersal was intended, and was not an unintended or exogenous result of other 
processes. Finally, the definition is also consistent with those suggested by other 
authors, for there is no disagreement that decentralization refers to centrifugal 
dispersal of powers already held or assumed to be held – explicitly, by default, or as 
residuals – by the ‘center’.  
 
Wolman’s generic formulation, in addition to connoting governance reforms that 
explicitly transfer powers already being exercised by the state away from itself (as in 
the previous definitions), also covers other processes that have been a part of 
decentralization reform in many countries. These include legal actions by the 
centralized state to institutionalize, formally recognize, or strengthen the exercise of 
powers by non-central actors already exercising the same – such as the granting of 
Constitutional status to local governments that existed in India but did not have 
legislative mandate. It also does not preclude processes of organizing non-centralized 
institutions and endowing them with powers that were not explicitly held by any 
‘center’64. This definition therefore effectively includes various types of policy and 
                                                                                                                                            
literature. It also includes instances such as the restructuring of private or parastatal organizations that 
are performing public functions monopolistically, such as Boards, Corporations or Trusts dealing with 
housing, water supply, sanitation or public transport systems. 
64 For example, the strengthening of local governments and imbuing them with planning powers by 
Constitutional Amendment in India. In this case, comprehensive and strategic local development 
planning of rural areas was not previously undertaken by the Central Government nor the powers 
explicitly held by any other State or non-State entity (only welfare and employment programs for rural 
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legislative actions that lead to formal realignment/ redistribution of powers within a 
national system, effected by legal statute. For there is another important attribute – that 
decentralization, to any degree or in any respect, necessarily involves explicit state 
action.65   
 
 Each of these conditions represents a necessary defining characteristic, and together 
they provide a reasonably unambiguous set of characteristics that can be used to 
distinguish among various state actions and state-initiated processes to identify what 
does or does not constitute decentralization. Therefore, by adding these to Wolman’s 
definition in the context of redistribution of public functions and state responsibilities, 
decentralization can be defined as a purposive set of actions by the state to disperse or 
distribute powers from central to a number of non-central entities.  
 
This definition does not preclude any of the wide variety of institutional mutations that 
is currently connoted by this term and affords legitimacy and space to political, 
economic, organizational, administrative, fiscal or other discussions within the rubric 
of decentralization. However, the very width of this definition makes it necessary to 
unpack the term and conceptually distinguish between different kinds of 
decentralization, not only for analytical purposes, but also to understand the different 
implications – for efficiency, effectiveness, equity or any other valued notion – of 
various kinds of decentralizing actions and processes. Various terms have been used in 
the literature to denote these, but not all are specific and clear enough to be acceptable 
                                                                                                                                            
areas were developed and implemented by Central and state governments, and municipal and local 
parastatal bodies existed for development planning in urban areas) 
65 Legislative or executive action is necessary for decentralization because, in all but the most federal of 
systems, residual powers generally accrue centripetally/ upwards to the center, and explicit state action 
is necessary for other entities to hold any authority or power.  However, without explicit legal action(s) 
of this nature, there is no decentralizing involved; where dispersed arrangements for discharge of public 
or common functions already exist, these constitute examples only of decentralized systems, which can 
be described, studied and lessons learnt. 
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definitions. Therefore a logical method to distinguish between different kinds of 
decentralizations is set out below, and applied to the existing vocabulary to derive 
clearer and unambiguous definitions for the terms currently in use. 
 
2.2. DISTINGUISHING DECENTRALIZATIONS: DEGREES AND TYPES 
 
Terms widely used in the early eighties to denote different kinds of decentralizing 
actions and which still remain in use are deconcentration, delegation, devolution and 
privatization (Cheema and Rondinelli 1983; Rondinelli et al 1984). Divestment and 
deregulation have been added subsequently (Rondinelli et al. 1989; Cohen and 
Peterson 1999; Savas 2000; Balogun 2000; World Bank 2003). Also, meta-categories 
of decentralization have been named as spatial, administrative, political, fiscal and 
market types (Rondinelli 1990a; Cohen and Peterson 1999; Manor 1999; World Bank 
2003). Finally, a number of other less-used terms also surface – for example, 
Silverman (1992) lists top-down principal agency, bottom-up principal agency and 
hybrid decentralization66; Mathur (1983) uses the term debureaucratization, Haque 
(1997) uses intermediation and Balogun (2000) de-linking. Since these latter are not 
widely used, and in most cases refer to processes already covered by other terms, they 
not discussed here67.  
 
The use of these terms, however, varies across authors, though there is less 
disagreement or ambiguity about some, for example deconcentration, than others. 
                                                 
66 In a very interesting endnote (Notes: Chapter 1, No.1; p. 49), Silverman (1992) notes a number of 
other terms used such as divisionalization (Kiggundu, 1989) and ‘polycentric or non-centric governance 
systems’ (Ostrom et al 1989), and dismisses them as either an extreme form of devolution (the former) 
or because they are essentially the same as devolved systems (the latter). (citations in original) 
67 As Oyugi (2000) points out, both delinking and intermediation are defined the same as delegation; 
Silverman’s agency additions refer to specific delegation arrangements between particular 
organizations, the notion of ‘hybrid’ decentralization does not refer to a class but to the fact that in any 
sector, there is a variety of arrangements coexisting.   
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However, by applying a logical framework suggested by the very definition of 
decentralization set out above to the definitions offered by various authors, a 
defensible and reasonably consensual specification of each term is obtained, that 
clearly distinguishes between various kinds of institutional reforms that qualify as 
decentralization. At least three classificatory parameters are immediately obvious – 
what types of powers are involved, the extent or degree of power transferred and to 
whom (i.e., the kinds of organizations) it is transferred68. These can be used to classify 
different types, degrees and kinds of decentralization, in specific sectors and to 
different kinds of organizational entities.  
 
Conceptually, the kinds of power decentralized could be any or a combination of any 
of the three enjoyed by states - legislative, judicial and executive. Though in earlier 
phases of decentralization attention was focused on reassignment of executive powers, 
and specifically, administrative powers held by the executive branch of government, 
examples of, and discourses on, transfer of legislative and judicial powers to regional 
or local governments have become increasingly pertinent in recent decades69.  
 
The degree to which powers are transferred, i.e., the extent to which autonomy in its 
                                                 
68 This is used by Rondinelli and his co-authors, as discussed later. (Cheema and Rondinelli 1983; 
Rondinelli et al 1984). Another important classificatory parameter is domains or sectors of State action. 
States, through its various governing structures, exercise these powers and discharge the related 
functions in numerous domains or sectors ranging from defense and foreign affairs, regulation and 
operation of the monetary and financial systems, provision of a variety of public services from 
maintenance of law and order to infrastructure and utilities, transportation, health and education. 
Powers may be transferred or otherwise dispersed in any or parts of any of these. The decentralization 
of public services and implementation of development programs has been the focus of much of the 
literature, particularly in the context of developing countries, but other state functions (such as revenue 
collection) can also be involved (for examples, see Rondinelli et al 1984,1989; Savas 2000). These 
domains differ along a number of dimensions - for example in the nature of the goods and services that 
are involved or the historical, economic, political or other issues related to provisioning arrangements in 
specific sectors. Separating the issues related to decentralization sectorally would therefore be useful for 
analysis, policy and practice. 
69 For example, in the formation of or granting of greater autonomy to existing, regional governments in 
Canada and the United Kingdom; in the Indian context, the issue of Nyaya Panchayats, also, devolution 
to Scheduled VI areas or regional autonomy such as in the northwestern states. 
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exercise is granted, has been widely used to distinguish between different kinds of 
administrative decentralization processes – deconcentration, delegation and 
devolution. Differences in the types of powers transferred as well as the functions to 
which they pertain clearly have different political as well as practical implications; 
therefore these become important bases for distinction. Executive powers of the 
government pertain to functions such as policy design, planning, finances and 
budgeting, personnel, operations and maintenance, supervision, monitoring and 
evaluation (Silverman 1992; Cohen and Peterson 1999). The degree of transfer relates 
to the functions that are transferred, from among these, with devolution including a 
full transfer of the whole range of functions, including policy-making and legislating.  
 
This terminology was consistent with public administration praxis in the 80’s, when 
intra-governmental decentralization was the main focus of decentralization (see 
Cheema and Rondinelli 1983; Rondinelli et al 1984, 1986, 1989). Even at present, 
there appears little disagreement to what the terms essentially connote, though the 
boundary conditions are less well specified. However, there is little reason to restrict 
its use to administrative decentralization only, for such gradations can also feature in 
the transfer of powers other than administrative ones, and to organizations outside the 
administrative structure of the state as described by Savas (2000). 
 
Finally, the type of organizations or entities to which powers are dispersed is arguably 
an important basis for distinguishing among various decentralization processes. 
Organizations differ in their nature, constitution and mode or basis of operation. Some 
or all of such differences would inevitably have distinctive political, economic and 
functional implications, making the nature of the recipient organizations an important 
basis for classifying decentralizations. Uphoff (1986, 1996) offers a broad typology of 
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organizations engaged in development, based on nature of ‘ownership’, which can be 
further extended to include a full range of types as shown in Table 1.3. 
 
Table 1.3 
Types of organizations to which powers may be transferred in decentralization 
processes, developed from the typology delineated by Uphoff (1986, 1996). 
 
Types Non-Commercial Commercial 
Pu
bl
ic 
Local 
Administration 
Central/ regional government departments, 
revenue or other local administration of 
central/regional ministries etc. 
 
Local Government Elected councils or boards, at municipal 
district, county or other regional levels 
 
Parastatals Utility corporations or Boards, special-
purpose districts (eg, school districts) 
Public Enterprises 
Me
m
be
rs
hi
p-
ba
se
d 
(o
r 
As
so
cia
tiv
e)
 
Area-based 
Associations 
Neighborhood or street associations, village 
institutions, etc 
Any of the same, engaged in 
trade or commerce 
Affine  
Organizations            
Caste, community or religious associations Any of the same, engaged in 
trade or commerce 
Interest-based 
Associations 
(incl. 
Cooperatives) 
Trade unions, Employee associations, 
Housing cooperatives, environmental 
groups, women’s groups, etc. 
Any of the same engaged in 
commercial activity (eg., 
producer and marketing 
cooperatives) 
Pr
iva
te
     Trusts, Societies NGOs, Voluntary orgns, Charitable orgns  
Businesses (firms)  Private Enterprises 
 
A consideration of organizational differences may have been less pertinent till the 80’s 
when transfer to sub-national and local governmental units of different kinds was the 
major concern, but in the last two decades transfer of powers and functions to both 
commercial and non-commercial organizations outside the state have drawn 
substantial attention. Distinction between the organizational varieties outside the 
government (or in ‘joint’ formations) is therefore necessary. 
 
On the basis of these three dimensions – types of power transferred, degree to which 
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powers are transferred and the kind of organizational entities to whom powers are 
transferred – some terms in the decentralization lexicon, such as deconcentration, 
delegation, devolution, privatization, divestment and de-nationalization, can be 
specified as in Table 1.4 below.  
 
Table 1.4 
Specific functional and organizational characteristics of different kinds of 
decentralization. 
Term Characteristics Organizations involved 
Deconcentration ‘internal shifting of workload’ 
 Only administrative responsibilities 
 No discretion or autonomy- only operational 
autonomy granted 
Within the central government only. 
 Field administration 
 Local administration 
Delegation ‘Specified managerial functions and duties, with 
broad discretion; principal-agency relationship’ 
 Indirect control by the transferring entity; 
through setting objectives and guidelines. 
 Ultimate responsibility with transferring entity. 
‘An agent; within or outside the 
regular bureaucratic structure’ 
 Parastatals, public corporations 
 Private enterprises 
 Membership organizations 
 Lower level of government 
Devolution ‘Transfer of legislative, policy-making and/or 
planning powers’ 
 Recipient organization substantially outside the 
control of central government 
 Maximum autonomy in exercise of devolved 
powers 
 Strengthening of financial and legal powers 
‘Independent/ autonomous entities 
with corporate status’ 
 Local ‘governmental units’ 
-- Local elected governments 
-- Local administration **  
     -- Parastatals **  
 NGOs, customary authorities, 
private bodies etc (Ribot 2001) ** 
Privatization (a) 
by Delegation  
(‘contracting out’, 
public-private 
partnerships) 
 Transfer of specific tasks through contract, 
franchise, grant, voucher, mandate, etc. 
 State remains responsible for function; 
continuing, active involvement by govt. 
 Selected tasks/ activity transferred 
 Private enterprises,  
 Private non-profit organization 
Privatization (b) 
by Divestment 
(also called 
Denationalization) 
 Transfer of ownership, decision-making 
powers, through sale, conversion to joint 
holding, sale of shares, free transfer, liquidation 
or any other way 
 Private enterprises,  
 Private, non-profit organizations 
Liberalization   Relaxation of restrictions on trade, economic activity, financial transactions etc., by the 
state 
Deregulation  Removal or decrease of regulations pertaining to a state function or activity 
** Some authors include these, but the interpretation is inconsistent with wider usage, and also logically, as has 
been explained in the text.  
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Two terms that are extensively used in the contemporary discussions on 
decentralization, ‘liberalization’ and ‘de-regulation’, do not fit as neatly into this 
matrix, as they do not include the direct transfer of functions to specific organizations. 
They nevertheless constitute decentralization, for they involve explicit state action to 
disperse centralized powers and functions held by the state. Liberalization refers to the 
legal reduction of previous government restrictions, usually in areas of social or 
economic policy, to enable the participation of non-state actors in the governance 
process. De-regulation involves the removal, reduction, or simplification of 
restrictions on business and individuals by governments, with the intent of 
encouraging the efficient operation of markets. 
 
Though the terms are often used interchangeably, deregulation is different from 
liberalization because the latter refers to the ‘opening-up’ of areas of public action that 
were previously the exclusive preserve of government to non-government or private 
actors, which may or not involve decrease of regulation. In fact, new, different or 
additional regulations may be developed, to increase efficiency, ‘level the playing 
field’, protect the environment or consumer's rights, or other publicly valued 
objectives; one example is anti-trust legislation.70 
 
It must be noted that these terms only define ‘pure-types’; there may be gradations and 
variants in practice. Also, there could be a variety in the transfers to a single 
                                                 
70 Deregulation and liberalization are also different from privatization. Privatization involves the 
transfer of functions performed by the state or state-owned organizations to the private sector, to make 
the privatized enterprise more subject to market forces than was the state-owned entity. It may or not be 
accompanied by the reduction of regulation of the sector/ market (i.e., de-regulation), though it is one 
way in which to liberalize. Liberalization, however, is a larger concept, referring to a range of state 
action(s) to enable non-state entities to operate in arenas previously the domain of the state, including 
those aimed at supporting/ enabling the development of markets in those domains. Liberalization may 
or not be accompanied by de-regulation and/ or privatization; while as a concept it subsumes the latter 
two terms, it cannot be used interchangeably with either.  
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organization. For example, powers pertaining to some functions may be devolved and 
other powers delegated to a local government. Or a local user group may be allowed 
to freely tap, allocate and supply water – under powers divested to them – with a local 
government or irrigation department employee placed with them to collect dues and 
maintain accounts (deconcentration).  Or a public utility organization producing 
electric power, for example, may devise a public-private partnership (PPP), 
contracting out the tasks of designing, setting up and maintaining distribution grids to 
a private company, while it generates and actually distributes power. Silverman (1992) 
refers to this as hybrid decentralizations; while the term does convey the idea of 
‘mixed’ kinds of transfers, it may not be entirely appropriate, as in itself, each kind of 
function and the degree of power transferred remains distinctive and differentiable. A 
more accurate picture is that of a non-homogenous ‘bundling’ of different degrees and 
kinds of powers in respect of various functions. 
 
2.3. CATEGORIES (OR TYPES) OF DECENTRALIZATION 
 
In the 1990s, the variety of possible institutional reforms discussed above have been 
also been differentiated into categories or types71:  spatial, administrative, market and 
political (Rondinelli 1990a, also cited in Cohen and Peterson 1999); also economic 
(Wolman 1990; World Bank 2003); fiscal (World Bank 2003; Litvack et.al.1998; 
Manor 1999; Ribot 2001; Smoke and Lewis 1996) and democratic (Ribot 2001; 
Manor 1999). Only in two instances do the authors explicitly state the basis for their 
categorization – Cohen and Peterson, who differentiates the various kinds of 
decentralizations on the basis of different ‘objectives’ of the process, and Wolman, 
                                                 
71 The words forms/kinds/types are variously and interchangeably used by different authors; see Cohen 
and Peterson  (1999) for a discussion on this.  
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who uses the different nature of the powers/ decisions transferred. Both bases, 
however, are questionable as differentiating parameters. In the first place,  ‘objectives’ 
of any decentralization reform can rarely be readily ascertained and will frequently be 
a matter of debate, for even stated objectives if they exist may not reflect the actual 
objectives, since multiple sources of impetus and discursive formations often underlie 
decentralization reforms (see discussions in Manor 1999; Kim 1992). Moreover, any 
reform process may have multiple stated objectives or different kinds of reforms may 
realize the same objective; expectations of a variety of objectives from 
decentralization processes are endemic in the literature, as discussed later (section 3). 
Wolman’s differentiating parameter is equally problematic, for the ‘nature’ of any 
reform is rarely singular and every kind of reform would have administrative, 
political, economic and social implications and consequences.  
 
Other authors such as Manor (1999), Ribot (2002), Littvack et al. (1998) and the 
World Bank (2003) interpret these same terms in different ways, without any explicit 
specification of a classifying principle or basis72. Their perspectives however provide 
important insights, and are analytically helpful when triangulated with the 
categorization of Cohen and Petersen (1999) and Wolman (1990) on one hand and the 
definitions derived in the previous section on the other. It then emerges that many 
terms denoting categories actually refer to cross-cutting dimensions or aspects of 
various kinds of decentralization reforms rather than constituting categories in 
themselves. One reason is that the domains charted by the terms are not mutually 
exclusive – public functions entail economic, political, fiscal and administrative 
                                                 
72 There are, of course, implicit perspectives evident in the respective discussions, more or less easily 
discernible. Manor and Ribot clearly are approaching the decentralization rubric from a democratization 
perspective, and are interested in the political aspects; Littvack et al (1998) are oriented towards the 
issues of resource mobilization and allocation for service delivery and implications for macro-economic 
stability, from the perspective of the World Bank. 
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decisions and these are bundled to different degrees when powers to undertake such 
functions are transferred. So while the extent of spatial, administrative, political and 
economic decentralization that occurs in any institutional reform may vary, all would 
involve some degree of change along these dimensions. Littvack, et al (1998), point 
this out in their discussion of administrative decentralization -   
 
Administrative decentralization is concerned with how political institutions, once 
determined, turn policy decisions into allocative (and distributive) outcomes through 
fiscal and regulatory actions. The political decision to devolve powers from central 
government, for example, can only be translated into actual powers being shifted if 
subnational governments have the fiscal, political and administrative capacity to 
manage this responsibility. (1998: 6, emphasis mine). 
 
The terms spatial, political, administrative, political and economic, therefore, more 
accurately connote the different crosscutting dimensions of any decentralization 
process than typologies of decentralization.  This perspective is also shared by Oluwu 
who also identifies all of them (except spatial) as cross-cutting dimensions (1995, 
cited in Oyugi, 2000:6). The same is true of ‘fiscal decentralization’, defined as the 
decentralization of fiscal resources and revenue generating powers (Ribot 2001; World 
Bank 2003, Manor 1999; see also Smoke and Lewis 1996)73. Therefore to perceive 
such dimensions as different kinds of decentralizations and delineate categories on that 
basis is clearly a conceptual error.74   
                                                 
73 Manor defines fiscal decentralization as the process “by which higher levels in a system cede 
influence over budgets and financial decisions to lower levels” (1999:8). There appears to be a 
conceptual confusion here, in the conflation of the different notions of fiscal and financial powers. For 
‘fiscal’ conventionally refers to decisions about raising of revenues through taxation and allocation of 
expenditures through public decision-making within the political system; ‘financial’ on the other hand, 
relates to a private-sector context and to raising of non-tax monetary resources and administration of 
funds – collection, disbursal, accounting etc. Fiscal decision-making is related to public policy making 
and planning processes, whereas financial decision-making is related to private enterprise management. 
74 In other words, any kind of dispersal of power held by the centralized authority, whether (for 
example) it is through deconcentration to field administrators, delegation to private entrepreneurs, 
devolution to neighborhood associations or delegation to local governments – will have spatial, 
economic, political, fiscal and administrative dimensions, in greater or lesser degree. Devolution to 
local governments or privatization to commercial organizations, of any important public function, may 
have wider and more direct political effects than deconcentration to field offices or contracting out of 
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Finally, therefore, it emerges that market and democratic are the only terms that 
indisputably represent distinct categories of decentralization, involving different 
organizations and processes. Market decentralization (or marketization)75 “focuses 
on creating conditions that allow goods and services to be produced and provided by 
market mechanisms sensitive to the revealed preferences of individuals” (Cohen and 
Peterson 1999: 23). It involves state action to move functions to commercial 
organizations operating in markets, and the pricing of goods and services in response 
to demand; decisions about production and allocation are re-located to business 
organizations. There is little disagreement on the definition of this term, though it is 
incorrect to use it interchangeably with economic decentralization76.  
 
Democratic decentralization (or democratization), on the other hand, is the transfer 
of functions and attendant decision-making to organizations representative of and 
downwardly accountable to user populations. Production and allocation decisions are 
made through a deliberative process, by users themselves or their representatives. It 
must also be noted that ‘marketization’ and ‘democratization’ are generic categories or 
types that are premised in different beliefs about the capacities of markets and states in 
the allocation and management of public resources, are oriented to different ends and 
                                                                                                                                            
administrative/ operational tasks to local entrepreneurs, but even these changes have political 
implications, as Manor observes (1999:8). Also, there are spatial and economic dimensions in all such 
institutional changes, though they may differ in degree or immediacy of effect. And any kind of 
decentralization inevitably includes administrative and fiscal/ financial changes, for without such 
alterations, the transfer of functions would be ineffective. 
75 The term ‘marketization’ is broader in scope than ‘market decentralization’ as it can also refer to the 
shift of activities to the market without state intervention, as when housework is transferred from the 
household to a paid activity. The Merriam-Webster dictionary defines the term as “the act or process of 
entering into, participating in or introducing a free market economy” (www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/marketization ); it is only the last which connotes decentralization, for it 
involves state action. The term is used here in that interpretation, as is common in recent writings on. 
decentralization (for example, Ravich 2000, Bloom and Standing 2001, Taylor 2000). 
76 Such usage is problematic, even though the World Bank uses this latter term, for ‘economic’refers to 
more than transactions in the market, and ‘economic value’ and ‘market value’ are conceptually and 
practically different. 
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differ along multiple dimensions. The two types include in their fold different kinds of 
reforms (as listed in Table 1.5), which share the defining assumptions and key 
institutional objectives that characterize the type, and differ only in the specific 
organizational entity to which powers are transferred. That is, democratization and 
marketization both represent institutional changes, while privatization, for example is 
an organizational shift.77 It is only in the transfer of responsibilities to collective 
(democratic) organizations that function commercially (for example, cooperatives) 
that both types overlap.  
 
The tendency to treat the transfer of responsibilities to private non-profit agencies 
engaged in various developmental and service functions (such as NGOs, charitable or 
voluntary organizations and the like), as a transfer to civic organizations, is also 
problematic, for the same reason. This kind of decentralization is more accurately 
termed privatization, since the decisions about production, operation and allocation 
are, in the case of NGOs as much as in private companies, made by the proprietors or 
managers.78 Moreover, such transfers represent an organizational shift, and whether 
they also involve institutional changes depends on the nature of the transfer.  
 
 
 
                                                 
77 Bakker (2003) makes a parallel distinction between commercialization and privatization, in 
discussing the privatization of water provision.  
78 By the same logic, the question arises if marketization (and privatization) should be considered 
decentralizations at all. This question itself appears heretical in the face of the widespread neoliberal 
proposition of decentralizing economic decision-making to markets. But moving economic decisions 
from (democratic) states to markets, they are transferred from the purview of decision-makers – 
bureaucrats and elected representatives - who are de jure accountable to all citizens, to proprietors or 
managers representing a much smaller group of investors clearly concentrates rather than disperses 
decision-making. On the same principle, liberalization, de-regulation and divestment would also not 
qualify as decentralization. However, considering the usage in the contemporary discourses and the fact 
that they are pre-dominant types of reform actually being undertaken, in this study they are included as 
kinds of decentralization. Also, as Savas (2000) points out, the distinction between ‘private’ and 
‘public’ is blurred when functions are transferred to companies with a large number of small 
shareholders. 
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Table 1.5 
Varieties of Decentralization 
 
 
 
                                   Kind of power transferred 
                            
 
 
        Nature of organization 
Internal 
shifting 
of 
workload 
 
Transfer of 
specified 
managerial 
functions and 
duties, with broad 
discretion; 
principal-agency 
relationship. 
Transfer of 
legislative, policy-
making and/or 
planning powers, in 
addition to 
managerial functions 
Pu
bl
ic 
Non-
commercial 
Local administration 
(Intra-governmental 
decentralization) 
De-
concentrat
ion 
Delegation  
Local Government 
(Inter-governmental 
decentralization) 
 Delegation Devolution 
DEMOCRATIZATION 
Public sector entities 
Corporations, Boards, 
special-purpose 
Authorities or Districts 
 Delegation 
(Delinking) 
 
Commercial Public Enterprises  Delegation 
MARKETIZATION 
 
Me
m
be
rs
hi
p-
ba
se
d 
Non-
commercial 
Area-based 
Associations 
 Delegation Devolution or 
Divestment? 
DEMOCRATIZATION 
Affine-based 
Associations (e.g., based 
on caste, religion, kinship) 
 Delegation Devolution or 
Divestment? 
DEMOCRATIZATION 
Interest-based 
Associations/ Non-
commercial Cooperatives 
 Delegation Devolution or 
Divestment? 
DEMOCRATIZATION 
Commercial Commercial 
cooperatives, Enterprises 
run by trade unions or 
employee associations 
 Delegation 
MARKETIZATION 
Divestment 
MARKETIZATION 
Pr
iva
te
 
PR
IV
AT
IZ
AT
N Non-commercial 
NGOs, Voluntary 
Organizations, Charitable 
organizations, etc. 
 Delegation Divestment 
Commercial Private Enterprises  Delegation 
MARKETIZATION 
Divestment 
MARKETIZATION 
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Other terminological issues also emerge from this exercise. For example, there are no 
specific terms suggested in the literature to denote the transfer of public functions to 
collective organizations of various kinds to distinguish them from decentralization to 
private or public/governmental entities79. This is a significant terminological gap, 
which constrains analysis in an era of various kinds of CBOs and SHGs are 
increasingly expected to be involved in the provisioning of basic services such as 
water80. I argue that all instances of transfer to non-commercial membership 
organizations should be considered as democratization, except when public functions 
transferred to them are discharged on a commercial basis for largely non-member 
customers. This is because such organizations are formally democratic in structure, 
and users/members participate in the decision-making, though they vary in other 
ways.81 
 
Despite these gaps and contentious issues, laying out the various kinds of 
                                                 
79 In fact, transfers to such organizations have been conflated either with ‘privatization’ (from 
Rondinelli in 1983 to Savas in 2000, and many in between) or with ‘devolution’ (eg., Ribot 2002); the 
former because they are clubbed with NGOs or ‘voluntary’ organizations and the latter because of their 
perceived representative nature. In short, their distinctive characteristics and extensive variety have 
been generally missed in the decentralization literature. While examining this in any detail is beyond 
the scope of this chapter, it is an important area that needs attention in the context of decentralization. In 
particular, the distinctions between different kinds of organization within this set and corresponding 
implications for the valued objectives of decentralization – growth, democratization, efficiency, equity, 
or any other – urgently need to be explored. This is because, not only are the inter-organizational 
structural relationships between various organizational actors involved in governance important, but 
also their intra-organizational structure and nature of operation, to critically analyze validity, efficacy 
and effectiveness of decentralizations. 
80 Sartori (1984), for example, explains how lack of categorical vocabulary and definitional rigor 
constrains analysis. 
81 There are normative differences within what appear to be structurally and politically similar processes 
across different kinds of membership organizations. The key distinction is the underlying institutional 
conception of democracy that informs the analysis: direct or representative, in the case of local 
governments, or pluralistic and associative in the case of other kind of organizations based on common 
interests. The former constructs the individual as citizen and as part of a community of citizens with 
respect to a state founded on an implicit social contract; the latter constructs her as a self-interested 
rational agent bound by explicit choice to others of similar interest, consistent with a liberal political 
framework. Organizations that are area-based such as Neighborhood Groups or Residents Associations, 
where all adult residents or all households are members by virtue of their residence in the area, are more 
akin to local governments. In such cases, the functioning may be representative (through an elected 
executive) or participatory wherein decision-making is through deliberation in the general assembly. 
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decentralization as above and clarifying the definition of various terms associated with 
the process, provides a clear analytical framework to investigate questions of 
governance reform. Using this conceptual map to parse the decentralization literature 
also reveals that the normative and theoretical arguments for decentralizing 
governance contain significant divergences and differences. I discuss these 
differences, and the respective discourses that are thereby constituted, in the next 
section.  
 
 
3. DISCOURSES IN DECENTRALIZATION  
 
Examining the literature on decentralization in the light of the conceptual map 
developed in previous sections, reveals two characteristics that are important to 
answering the question of context-appropriate institutional design. One is the internal 
divergence within the apparently wide-ranging agreement on decentralization as the 
most desirable development strategy. Discussions of governance reform are not 
homogeneous but composed of two distinctly different discourses – an easily 
distinguishable and predominant neoliberal discourse, and another that is internally 
differentiated but can be best characterized as ‘communitarian’82.  
 
“A discourse is a shared means of making sense of the world embedded in 
language…grounded in assumptions, judgements, contentions, dispositions and 
capabilities…[It] will generally revolve around a central storyline, containing 
opinions about both facts and values…Discourses can be bound up with material 
forces. For example, material economic constraints on politics now make themselves 
felt through the discourse of market liberalism” (Dryzek 2000: 18)  
 
True to this definition, the two discourses in decentralization are centered in unique 
                                                 
82 Bardhan uses this term in discussing reform propositions (Bardhan, 1996), as do Mohan and Stoke (2000). 
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rationales or ‘storylines’ and theoretical propositions, and linked to particular sets of 
assumptions, valued outcomes, political positions and material resources. Most 
important to this discussion is that they have different institutional implications, not all 
of which are cohering or compatible.  The two discourses are closely interwoven and 
apparently converge on certain positions such as the primacy of the ‘local’ as the locus 
of development, but are nevertheless clearly identified by the difference in the 
theoretical bases, the reform prescriptions, and their roots in specific socio-economic 
and developmental contexts. The other characteristic of the literature is that, despite 
the different geo-historical moorings and political-economic pertinence of the two 
discourses, both intersect in the discussions on decentralization and development in 
the Third world, and figure simultaneously in reform policies and practices in 
developing countries. 
 
Few authors recognize the discursive differences, as they frame their discussion within 
a singular conceptual or developmental framework (as in Manor 1999; Ribot 2001; 
Roychoudhury 2002; Oyugi 2000a,b). This undifferentiated approach results in 
considerations of all kinds of decentralization as institutionally co-terminus and 
consistent. Normative and practical differences between kinds of reform, and the 
contextual appropriateness of specific kinds of institutional changes,83 are therefore 
elided.  The distinction sometimes drawn between economic and political (as in 
Wolman 1990) appears to be a close parallel, but fails to recognize that any 
reformulation of governance arrangements implicates both economic and political 
                                                 
83 Some of the purely theoretical literature (eg., in public choice) does link particular kinds of reform action (like 
fiscal decentralization) to specific desired outcomes, and often also specifies conditions under which they happen. 
The normative and prescriptive discussions which dominate the field, however, fail to do so, except in categorical 
terms such as ‘privatization’ or ‘devolution’, which terms cover a number of different kinds of organizational shifts 
and institutional changes, as discussed in the previous sections.  
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dimensions84. In identifying discourses, the distinction I draw is not between 
economic and political arguments, but in the differences, in both economic and 
political terms, in the origins, objectives, theoretical premises, and institutional 
instrumentalities that characterize the two discourses. 
  
The existence of two discourses is implicit in the exchanges between Slater, 
Rondinelli, Samoff and others85 on the de-politicisation of development and 
governance reform and the construction of decentralization as a-political 
reconfiguration of public administration. The distinction is more explicitly recognized 
by Mohan and Stokke (2000) in their analysis of the apparent convergence between 
the ‘new Right’ and the ‘new Left’ on “‘the local’ as the site for empowerment and 
therefore as a locus of knowledge generation and development intervention” (Mohan 
and Stokke 2000:247-48). In this context, they identify two strands of development 
thought and practice – ‘revisionist neoliberalism’ and ‘post-Marxism’ – and explicate 
how the emphases on community participation and empowerment in both are rooted in 
divergent theoretical critiques of the state and opposing valuations of the development 
project. The discourses on decentralization are well differentiated in Mohan and 
Stokke’s analysis of the political use of ‘the local’ by hegemonic and counter-
hegemonic interests, but their focus on the political bypasses the issue of institutional 
differences and the links between specific reforms and outcomes in any detail. 
   
Below, I discuss in turn the two discourses – neoliberal and communitarian – 
                                                 
84 Reforms that constitute ‘economic’ decentralization (eg, liberalization, privatization) has extensive political 
implications, in the reallocation of economic opportunities and restructuring of economic relations that reconstitute 
the distribution of power among different groups in society. Equally, so-called ‘political’ decentralization, in 
reallocating access to state authority and public resources, also involves a restructuring of economic relations 
between different groups.   
85 See Slater (1989), who critiques the prescriptions of decentralization by Rondinelli and others as emerging from 
a-political constructions of governance and governance reform, both of which are inherently political. See also 
Samoff (1990), Rondinelli et al. (1989), Rondinelli (1990) for a debate on Slater’s critique.  
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delineating their respective theoretical rationales, adaptations and variations, 
institutional prescriptions, contextual assumptions and critiques. I then trace the policy 
transfers that lead to a simultaneous application of both discourses in developing 
countries, before reviewing the empirical literature on the efficacy of the resultant 
variety of institutional reforms.  
 
3.1. THE NEOLIBERAL DISCOURSE: DECENTRALIZATION AS MARKETIZATION  
 
In a dramatic shift from the belief in state production of goods and services which are 
natural monopolies in the 60s and 70s, the neoliberal discourse centers on the 
promotion of markets as the most efficient in delivering services, economic growth 
and social development. Rooted in public choice theories, which address the question 
of efficient governance within economic frameworks of competitive markets and 
welfare-maximizing, rational individuals, the proximate concerns are accelerating 
macro-economic growth and more cost-efficient production and provision of public 
services (see Williamson 1993). Many authors, however, read the central objectives of 
this development paradigm to be economic reforms that enable the extension of global 
markets into newer geographical locations, goods and services, and political reforms 
that enable and support this process.86               . 
 
The theoretical scaffolding that supports the neoliberal case for decentralizing public 
service provision and divesting public enterprises includes theories of bureaucratic 
inefficiency and ‘government failure’ and Tiebout’s (1956) model of public choice. 
The former emerges from the empirics of government ownership and technological 
and ideological changes that eroded the indivisibility of natural monopolies that had 
                                                 
86 See discussions in Kohl (2002), also World Bank (1992), Leftwich (1993,1996). 
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been understood to preclude competitive production.87 Reducing government control 
of economic activity and liberalizing trade, financial markets and other sectors is 
expected to increase economic growth by increasing investments and competition. 
Decentralizing service provision to private businesses and local governments is 
expected to be more efficient, because,   
 
Regional or local governments are in a position to adapt outputs of public services to 
the preferences and particular circumstances of their constituencies, as compared to a 
central solution that presumes one size fits all. Moreover, in a setting of mobile 
households, individuals can seek out jurisdictions that provide outputs well suited to 
their tastes, thereby increasing the potential gains from the decentralized provision of 
public services (Tiebout 1956). Finally, decentralization may encourage 
experimentation and innovation as individual jurisdictions are free to adopt new 
approaches to public policy; in this way, decentralization can provide a valuable 
“laboratory” for fiscal experiments. (Oates, 2006:1, italics mine) 
 
The central tenet of public choice, thus, is that information of citizen-consumer 
preferences can be better captured at the local level by their exercise of voice and exit, 
that is, by them ‘voting with their feet’. Localization also reduces transaction costs of 
service delivery and allows the capture of citizen preferences through user groups and 
citizen boards at the local level. While agreeing with this, others add that privatizing 
or contracting out services is even more efficient than municipal supply since private 
providers operate in a competitive market whereas bureaucratic monopoly encourages 
rent-seeking and parochial decision-making that leads to oversupply and inefficiency 
(Boyne 1998, Zafarulla and Haque 2006)88. The main argument here is that the price 
mechanism best captures user preferences and leads to cost-efficient provision. 
Another market solution is inter-municipal contracting, whereby adjacent 
                                                 
87 See Littvack et al (1998) for a review of the many reasons offered for decentralizing as well as the 
(inconclusive) theoretical underpinnings to the argument 
88 There was little evidence to substantiate such arguments to start with, and in recent years, there is 
increasing evidence that these suppositions are incorrect – that privatization does not increase efficiency 
or reduce costs, among other failures (Bel and Warner 2008) 
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municipalities contract out to each other in a public market to obtain economies of 
scale (as noted by Warner and Hebdon, 2001; Warner and Hefetz, 2002). 
 
These arguments are complemented by propositions of the ‘New Public Management’, 
a set of prescriptions for government reform. These include changing government 
roles from ‘rowing’ to ‘steering’,89 and introduction of business management 
principles and practices in public sector organizations to increase bureaucratic 
efficiency (Osborne and Gaebler 1992). Local governance, in this discourse, should be 
reformed by transferring service production and distribution, to private organizations; 
by applying user charges and similar fees for public services; by ‘reinventing’ 
government to play a primarily regulatory role; by restructuring government to 
increase intra-governmental competition and promote bureaucratic efficiency; and by 
granting greater autonomy to local governments in the kinds and extent of public 
services offered, to increase inter-jurisdictional competition.  
 
Reforms prescribed are predominantly of the marketization type. As Mohan and 
Stokke observe, “the organizational arrangements for decentralization include, in 
order, privatization, deregulation, delegation, devolution and deconcentration” 
(Mohan and Stokke 2000: 251, emphasis mine). At the macro-level, the institutional 
vision includes liberalization of trade, financial and other regulated markets, and 
extensive divestment. Except devolution, all these kinds of reform fall into the 
‘marketization’ category; that is, they are genetically identical in that they all involve 
the shifting of functions from the state to business organizations. They differ only in 
the kind of (business) organization and the degree to which functions are transferred; 
                                                 
89 That is, from producing and delivering services to enabling private providers and regulating 
provision. 
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other institutional elements and assumptions that embody the neoliberal paradigm for 
governance, incorporating liberal economic and political philosophies, remain 
common90. Devolution, which is also prescribed, is institutionally different, but as 
configured within the neoliberal discourse shares the same basic premises as the 
marketization reforms. The World Bank, in fact, defines marketization as allowing 
“functions that had been primarily or exclusively the responsibility of government to 
be carried out by businesses, community groups, cooperatives, private voluntary 
associations and other non-government organizations.” (World Bank 2003). Some 
authors located within the Bank also see privatization as the most complete form of 
decentralization (Litvack et al 1998:25), though there are many who disagree with 
this; in fact, there is some consensus that it is not decentralization at all, such as Ribot 
(2001), Manor (1999) and Balogun (2000), among others.91  
 
These theoretical propositions rest on assumptions of perfectly mobile citizenry who 
are fully informed of service levels in different municipal jurisdictions, who make 
(re)location choices based solely on services available (and not, for example, 
employment location) in a perfectly rational manner, no costs of relocation, no 
externalities from services provided within a jurisdiction beyond its boundaries and 
sufficient number of private suppliers and demand to develop a competitive market, 
                                                 
90 For example, the transfer of responsibilities for public service production and distribution to private 
organizations; the application of user charges and similar fees for public services, and ‘reinventing’ 
government to play a primarily regulatory role. 
91 This question, whether ‘marketization’ qualifies as a process of decentralization needs to be 
considered carefully. Marketization connotes processes that involve not just a shift of decision-making 
power from a center to non-central entities, but also a paradigmatic shift in the basis and nature of 
decision-making itself. It is not only who decides or on what that is changed, but the normative 
framework and principles within which the decisions are made. Decision-making in regard to public 
functions is moved from a discourse of macro-economic stability, political accountability, citizen needs, 
state responsibility and authority, to one of micro-economic viability, financial desirability, consumer 
preference, market demand and supply. This is a paradigmatic shift, of a different order than in case of 
the delegation or devolution of state functions to geographically dispersed locations, parastatals or local 
governments.  
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among others. Some other conditions have also been specified – that the services be 
‘fully congestible’ or close to it – i.e., services in which increasing the number of users 
will raise marginal costs of provision proportionately, and which the central 
government is obliged to provide uniformly across all jurisdictions. Another is that the 
unit cost of production of the service/public good is equal across jurisdictions, but 
demand differs sharply and is price-inelastic – the more price inelastic the demand for 
the public good, the greater the economic gains from decentralization (Seabright 1996, 
Oates 1997, 2006). Finally, there is an implicit assumption of reasonable market 
conditions, such as availability of private capital and entrepreneurship, a relatively 
homogenous access to information and a level of effective demand (as opposed to 
need) signified by the willingness to pay, which enables development of a market. 
 
There are substantial critiques of these propositions for decentralization. The link 
between liberalization and growth is neither unambiguous nor universal, for it will 
depend on the specific circumstances of each country, the timing and sequencing of 
reforms and the social policies put in place to offset the ‘adjustment shocks’.92 
Moreover, the link between growth and reduction in poverty and inequality is a 
contested one, for growth without distribution can increase inequalities, and neoliberal 
theories are silent on distributive aspects (Birdsall and Nellis 2002). The theoretical 
benefits of decentralizing to localities may not accrue in practice, for the strict 
assumptions on which they are based rarely, if ever, match ground realities. Relaxing 
them to approximate reality weakens the public choice argument for decentralization 
considerably. In a situation of asymmetric information and incomplete contracts, 
centralization can actually increase welfare by improving coordination and accounting 
                                                 
92 For trade liberalization, see Tussie and Aggio (undated); for liberalization in general see Sheahan 
(1997) and Berg and Taylor (2000).           
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for spillover effects (Seabright 1996). Where mobility is constrained and linked to 
employment, or when the public goods are less than fully congestible, the welfare 
function is not as optimal (Oates 2006). Decentralization also leads to the loss of 
economies of scale, negative externalities, deepening disparities between communities 
in levels of services and tax burdens, privileging the sovereignty of individual 
preferences over widely held national values such as equity and redistribution, and 
reduction of within-community diversity (Wolman 1990).  
 
Also, the merits of the actual institutional arrangements must be ascertained as they 
may not all be similar, and not only in terms of efficiency; for, as Warner and Hefetz 
point out, 
 
Although efficiency is important, public service provision is also about equity, 
democracy, and community building (Frug 1999). Ensuring citizens equitable access 
and voice in public decision making is an important part of the public service. Market 
solutions to metropolitan service delivery—private or public—must be assessed for 
their performance with respect to all three governance goals: efficiency, equity, and 
voice. (Warner and Hefetz 2002: 71, citation included in original) 
 
Others (deLeon and Denhardt 2000, Self 1993) also have normative objections to the 
marketization approach, for its conflation of the state-citizen and market-consumer 
relationships –  
 
Voters are likened to consumers, political parties become entrepreneurs who offer 
competing packages of services and taxes in exchange for votes, political propaganda 
parallels commercial advertising, government departments are public firms dependant 
on receiving adequate political support to cover their costs and interest groups are 
cooperative associations of consumers or producers of public goods, i.e. all those 
goods supplied through a political instead of a market process. (Self 1993:3) 
 
These critiques are significant and cogent; but the democratizing propensities of 
decentralization are also among the public-choice arguments offered by authors 
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writing in the framework of this discourse. Wolman (1990) and Bennett (1994), for 
example, argue for devolution of substantial functions and fiscal powers to local 
governments to increase local voice and thereby, government responsiveness and 
accountability to citizens, to provide a proximal site for political and civic 
participation, political education and leadership development, and to protect 
democracy by fostering countervailing centers of power. The political vision in these 
accounts is discernibly liberal-democratic, of rational choice, individual interests and 
representative government, and as articulated in the neoliberal discourse, framed in a 
‘narrative of capital and ‘efficiency’ (Mohan and Stokke 2000:250).   
 
This neoliberal discourse is clearly rooted in the geo-historical and economic context 
of the Atlantic seaboard and its state-centered governance paradigm. Initially centered 
on divestment of public sector organizations, it gathered momentum in the early 80’s 
Thatcher-Reagan responses to stagflation, the Washington Consensus, fiscal 
imbalances at national, regional and local levels, rising cost of public services and 
growing public antipathy to ‘big’ government (Bennett 1990, Litvack 1998) This 
contextual origin of the neoliberal wave is important, for the rationale and theories 
then rest on the assumptions of the kind of conditions that prevail in developed 
countries,  including a historically contingent backlash to the growth of the welfare 
state in post-industrial economies.93 Despite this original location-specificity of the 
discourse, however, the prescriptions for smaller government, privatization, 
liberalization and de-regulation have been transferred to the developing economies of 
the global South – and therein lies a major issue, as I discuss later.  
 
                                                 
93 A number of authors point this out (for example, Leftwich 2005, Turner and Hulme 1997), but see 
Bennett (1990a), Osborne and Gaebler (1992), Self (1993), Holtham and Kay (1994), Manor (1999), 
Savas (2000) and Barton (2001) for the constructions of the arguments for decentralization, which 
assume conditions in western industrialized democracies.  
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3.2. COMMUNITARIAN DISCOURSES: DECENTRALIZATION AS DEMOCRATIZATION 
 
Paralleling the neoliberal discourse of ‘state-downsizing’ and centripetal transfer of 
responsibilities, there is a centrifugal location of governance responsibilities in the 
community, which is constructed as the prime locus of governance and development 
action by decentralists across the political spectrum (Bardhan 1996). This apparent 
convergence articulates a communitarian discourse that is, however, internally 
differentiated in the location of its proponents, the frameworks of articulation and the 
divergence of the basic premises.  
 
[Decentralization] holds up a promise of the re-ordering of political space and a 
revitalization of ‘the local’ in terms of accountability and choice … [But it] constitutes 
a flexible discourse that can be utilized by different ideological interests … the major 
lenders have promoted decentralization as a means of breaking the power of central 
ministries, increasing revenue generation and shifting the burden of service delivery 
onto local stakeholders. This is a very different inflection compared to liberal and 
radical approaches that see devolution of power to local government as a means of 
promoting a new communitarian spirit and forming the seedbed of democratic 
practice.” (Mohan and Stokke 2000: 250) 
 
The hegemonic strand of this discourse is a ‘revised neoliberal’ vision wherein 
devolution to local governments is “part of a broader market-surrogate strategy” 
(World Bank 1983:123). Increased involvement of local interest groups is stressed in 
this donor-led discourse; local participation, in the World Bank’s articulations, refers 
to local businesses, NGOs, user groups and other civil-society organizations (World 
Bank 2003:website). The primacy of local knowledge, community-driven 
development (CDD) and importance of ‘social capital’ animate this development 
narrative and practice, and partnership approaches involving the local state, private 
businesses and civil society organizations (Mohan and Stokke 2000). Institutionally, it 
recommends transfer of responsibilities to local actors in this spectrum. 
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A more radical and counter-hegemonic notion of decentralization is articulated by a 
range of proponents including political theorists interested in deliberative democracy, 
the ‘new Left’, and social and environmental activists (such as Shiva 1989; see 
Escobar 1995). Emerging from both academic explorations into deepening democracy 
through wider participation in deliberative fora (Bohman and Rehg 2002, Fung and 
Wright 2001), and more radical critiques of existing power relations (Friere 1996; 
Laclau and Mouffe 1985) that reject both the state and market as locii of development, 
a ‘bottom-up’ approach based on conscientization and social mobilization to challenge 
existing power relations is articulated. These visions are premised, variously, on the 
primacy of local knowledge for effective development, ideals of citizen participation 
and control over local decision-making, collective ownership and stewardship of 
natural resources for sustainable development, and community rights to local 
autonomy, particularly in the case of indigenous populations and ethnic groups. 
Institutionally, the more radical versions privilege social movements that challenge 
existing power structures, while others focus on the devolution of powers, functions 
and resources to local governments or community-based organizations (CBOs) 
organized for direct, deliberative and participatory decision-making.   
 
Thus the communitarian discourse includes two different strands: articulations by 
academics (Blair 1996, 1998; Manor 1999; Bardhan 1996, 2002, 2006) and 
international institutions (World Bank 1995, 2002, UNDP 2002) on one hand, but also 
from theorists (such as Dryzek 2000) and activists with liberal (Chambers 1994, 1997) 
and radical (Shiva 1989) perspectives, on the other. Local participation, traditional 
knowledge, development choices and action by communities figure in the visions of 
both groups. The difference lies in the political-economic visions, and constructions of 
social change and the development project held by the respective proponents, as also 
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in the prescriptions for institutional and organizational reform.  
 
Though both groups prescribe devolution to local governments, the ‘revised 
neoliberal’ discussions refer to representative government within a liberal-democratic 
framework94 while the others configure a participatory democracy at the local level. In 
the former, community participation ensues through the engagement of local 
businesses, NGOs, user groups and the like, and is expected to make governance more 
transparent and accountable, and thereby reduce corruption. Equally important here is 
the communities buy-in necessary for the success of state and donor development 
programs and the contribution of beneficiaries towards the costs of development. For 
more liberal and radical communitarians, on the other hand, only a fully participatory 
process or oppositional social movements hold the promise of empowering currently 
marginalized groups and altering existing power relations. It is these articulations, 
reflected in institutional reforms towards direct-democratic arrangements for local 
governance in places like Brazil and India,95 which constitute a counter-hegemonic 
discourse to the neoliberal agenda. The inclusion of all citizens, particularly the poor 
and marginalized, is the key instrumentality in this process, the pivotal condition; the 
defining vision is of full participation, deliberation and direct-democratic decision-
making in community assemblies. Therefore, though the organizational reforms 
proposed by communitarians all belong to the democratization category, (see Table 
1.5), they differ not only in the degree of powers which are transferred and the kinds 
of recipient organizations, but also in the organizational structures and processes of 
                                                 
94 Some authors, however, draw explicit attention to the differences between developed and developing 
locations and the dangers of applying neoliberal prescriptions. See, for example, Bardhan (2002). 
95 Participatory budgeting in municipalities in Brazil that emerged from the social movements that led 
to democratic changes in the polity (see Abers 1998, Santos 1998, Heller 2001), and the People’s 
Planning process in Kerala that owes its origins to both Gandhian notions of ‘village republics’ and 
decades of political mobilization around the ideological stances of the Left in the State (Heller 2001, 
Isaac and Franke 2000). 
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local governance that are envisaged.  
 
Mohan and Stokke (2000) critique the tendency to essentialize and romanticize the 
‘local’ that characteristizes both kinds of communitarian thinking. They also point to 
the false construction of the community as homogenous and innocent of political 
tensions, and the local as isolated from national and international economic and 
political processes. Others point out that the contextual assumptions implicit in 
communitarian propositions are not often found in developing situations. Citizens do 
not always have local information to the extent and in the complexity required, or the 
capacity to self-govern as assumed (Herring 2002). Nor do conditions always exist for 
democratic functioning at the local level, particularly in locations in the global South 
where extreme disparities of income and position together with multiplex dependency 
relationships within communities preempt democratic transactions (Beteille 2002; 
Leftwich 2005). The acute disparities of class, caste and income stemming from these 
same political economic circumstances also prevent the expected transparency and 
accountability, and pose the danger of elite capture of devolved public resources 
(Bardhan 1996, 2002). Critics of communitarian thinking do not, however, point to the 
other problems of localization, such as increasing inter-regional disparities, that have 
been articulated by some authors of the neoliberal discourse.  
 
Ideas of local self-governance also have indigenous roots in developing countries, 
which often pre-date the international development discourses. The origins are diverse 
– philosophical and political arguments such as Gandhian ideals of self-help and 
community-owned development, historical movements for local self-government 
under colonial rule, and social activism against the effects of rapid modernization in 
developing countries. These domestic articulations were not always homogenous nor 
  
 
66
rooted in similar understandings of the context and visions of change96, but they have 
often foreshadowed and shaped post-colonial development interventions by national 
governments, and informed arguments for community participation in donor-funded 
development programs and projects by development practitioners and policy makers 
since the 70s. The groundswell of demands for autonomy and control over local 
resources by sub-national and local groups on the basis of region, ethnicity or cultural 
difference and the communitarian turn in natural resource management strategies 
following extensive degradation under state management have also added weight to 
communitarian arguments for democratization and devolution.97  
 
Though there is some discussion (and instances) of service improvements through 
citizen participation in local governance in developed countries, the major strands of 
communitarian discourse relate primarily to the global South98. They are oriented to 
concerns of extensive poverty and marginalization of groups, inaccessible and 
ineffective service provision, poor impact and sustainability of development 
interventions, and extensive degradation of natural resources that characterize 
developing countries. What is significant, however, that indigenous discussions on 
decentralized governance have been overlaid by the contemporary neoliberal and 
‘revised neoliberal’ discourses that center on the community, which have also 
                                                 
96 The Gandhian vision, for example, was heavily critiqued by B.R.Ambedkar for its elision of 
oppressive power structures in Indian villages, among other issues, much like the radical critique of 
current neoliberal formulations. Beteille (2002) explains this divergent understanding of Indian villages 
among national leaders as emerging from their (lack of) experience of village life, which sociologists 
observe to more accurately match Dr. Ambedkar’s understanding. 
97 See, for example, Manor (1999); Bardhan (1996); Diamond and Tsalik (1999); Ribot (2002); 
Richards (1997); Blair (1996); Carney and Farrington (1998). 
98 The proposition that citizens should be more involved in governance has also been made in the 
context of developed countries. These ideas have also been applied by local governments and public 
agencies in various locations in developed countries, for example in the street policing and school 
systems that Fung (2001, 2004) calls ‘street-level democracy’. However, this discourse has primarily 
been oriented to the situation in developing countries, perhaps because democratization itself has 
remained partial or uneven and its extension and ‘deepening’ is a project by itself (Leftwich 2005). 
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shadowed the more progressive and radical communitarian discourses internationally. 
This has resulted in a seemingly homogeneous discourse on decentralization for ‘good 
governance’ and sustainable development in the global South, despite the significant 
internal divergences and conflicting institutional propositions.  I discuss the dynamics 
and implications of this below. 
 
3.3. POLICY TRANSFER  AND ‘GOOD GOVERNANCE’ IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
 
Clearly, the neoliberal and communitarian discourses differ in very fundamental ways: 
they rest on distinctly different normative positions, theoretical propositions and 
contextual assumptions, and emerge from two different visions of political and 
economic organization of societies. The two therefore articulate distinctly different 
cross-sectoral, societal paradigms for ‘meta-governance’, in Kooiman’s (2003) and 
Jessop’s (1998) terms. They also generate two different ‘families’ of institutional 
reform  – ‘market’ and ‘democratic’ reforms. Further, this difference is reflected as 
much within the communitarian discourse as between the neoliberal and the 
communitarian, in the different kinds of democratic reforms proposed – those that 
transfer power to local governments, private businesses and interest-groups in the 
former and those that devolve power to citizen assemblies, elected local governments 
or area-based associations, in the latter. Fig 1.1 illustrates this difference in the 
organizational shifts. 
 
The two discourses also discernibly emerge from and are pertinent to different 
geographical and economic contexts. The neoliberal arguments are primarily 
articulated by authors located in and referring to governance arrangements in the 
global North, though it is explicitly identified as such by only a few such as Ahmed 
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(2002), Litvack et al (1998) and Turner and Hulme (1997). In this context, local 
governments have been significant actors in the governance ensemble, and their 
functioning institutionalized over some decades. Markets extend to most locations and  
to a wider range of goods and services than in less developed countries. The central 
concern in this context is increased efficiency of service provision99. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1: Organizational shifts suggested in neoliberal and communitarian 
discourses. 
 
                                                 
99 Ofcourse, these discussions also focus on the democratizing effects of further devolution, and the 
implications of the increasing transfer of responsibilities for service provision to local governments, but 
again, in the context of the global North (for example, see Warner 1999) 
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In contrast, communitarian discourses focus on improving the effectiveness of service 
provision, even more on effectively extending basic services to currently unserved 
citizens in the global South, where local governments hardly existed or if they did, 
functioned weakly.  An equal concern is with accelerating development, which 
includes a host of concerns from poverty reduction to local economic development, 
and not least, the better management of centralized development programs. Though 
many authors anchoring the communitarian discourse are located in the advanced 
economies, their writings address questions of uneven global development and 
specifically, with changing conditions in the global South.100 
 
Despite this locational specificity, discussions on governance reform in developing 
countries reveal the interweaving of both discourses. Neoliberal prescriptions have 
been carried to developing countries by the conditionalities attached to international 
development aid, emerging from the Washington Consensus, and global epistemic 
networks (Crawford 1997, McCourt and Minogue 2001, Common 1998, Zafarullah 
and Haque 2006), and have overlaid and intersected with indigenous discourses on 
decentralized governance. From the Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) initiated 
in debt-laden Latin American and African countries by international lenders such as 
the World Bank and IMF (Beneria 1999), to prescriptions for ‘good governance’ 
articulated by the World Bank (1992,1994), neoliberal frameworks have been 
particularly influential, and shaped policies and programs in developing countries in 
the last two decades (Sheahan 1997, Robinson 1996) Even where neoliberal policy 
prescriptions have not been tied to aid – for example in India (Manor 1999) and 
Uganda (Saito 2002) – policy prescriptions have been transferred through epistemic 
                                                 
100 As discussed before; authors like Escobar (1995), Peet and Watts (1996), Bardhan (1996), Manor 
(1999).   
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communities and influenced reform. 
 
While SAPs embody an unmitigated neoliberalism, the ‘good governance’ discourse 
brings together propositions for marketization as well democratization. Political 
decentralization, the rule of law, competitive elections & political processes, a 
politically active civil society and transparent governance are prescribed alongside the 
suggestions for marketization in the economic sphere (World Bank 1994, 2002). 
Democratization (in a liberal-democratic model) is argued as necessary to successful 
functioning of (neoliberal) economic arrangements that spur development (equated to 
economic growth), as it provides the necessary institutional context (World Bank 
1992; Williams and Young 1994; Leftwich 1996, 2005; Blair 1998; Rodrik 2000)101. 
The key difference between these propositions and the more radical communitarian 
discourse, and one that makes the former the political counterpart of economic 
neoliberalism is again, the underlying ‘market’ concept of politics.102 A pluralist, 
liberal-democratic model of appropriate governance around interest-organization and 
competition is naturalized, unlike the communitarian or republican models of 
governance, with direct-democratic (or atleast more widely participatory) 
arrangements, as discussed before.  
 
The play of both neoliberal and communitarian discourses in relation to 
decentralization in developing countries has led to an elision of their inherent 
                                                 
101 Leftwich writes explicitly “…Democratic polities on the liberal model are inextricably linked with 
capitalist or mixed economies, and thus the pursuit of democratization needs also to be seen as part and 
parcel of the wider economic dynamic which has driven globalization. (2005:687) 
102 Rhodes (2000:57) points this out clearly, on the basis of the World Bank’s prescriptions to 
encourage ‘good governance’, noted by Williams and Young (1994:87) “…encourage competition and 
markets; privatize public enterprise; reform the civil service by reducing over-staffing; introduce 
budgetary discipline; decentralize administration and make greater use of non-governmental 
organizations.....In short, ‘good governance’ marries the new public management to the advocacy of 
liberal democracy.’ (emphasis mine) 
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differences, and concurrent application of a variety of reforms premised on very 
different theoretical frameworks. India is a prime example (Jairath 2003, 
Roychoudhury 2002), as is Bolivia (Kohl 2002). In the former, local self governance 
and community-based decision-making have been part of the nation’s political 
discourse for almost a century, with the Gandhian ideal of ‘village republics’ as units 
of governance underlying Constitutional and development debates in the country since 
Independence (Gandhi 1962; Gupta 1966; Mathew 2000) The groundswell for 
institution of strong local governments had also found expression intermittently in 
legislation and experiments in some Indian States over the years. Since 1991, 
however, neoliberal reforms have also been progressively introduced in many sectors. 
In Bolivia, the radical and progressive political visions of many social movements 
found expression in the Workers Party and experiments in direct democracy, alongside 
neoliberal reforms such as the Law of Capitalization. (Santos 1998, Kohl 2002). 
Though some authors, such as Roychoudhury (2002) and Jairath (2003) in India and 
Kohl (2002) for Bolivia, have drawn attention to the incompatibilities between 
different types of reform that have been simultaneously introduced in the same sectors, 
there is no visible fault-line between the two discourses in the policy literature of these 
countries. 
 
This simultaneous application of different types of decentralization reform in respect 
of specific state functions raises an important question – which type of reform is more 
effective in such locations (for any specific function)? Since institutional efficacies are 
closely tied to the environments in which they are embedded, this encompasses the 
issue of context-appropriateness of reformed arrangements, particularly in large and 
heterogeneous countries with significant regional variations in political, economic and 
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socio-cultural characteristics.103 No comparative assessment of the relative suitability 
of neoliberal and communitarian reforms is, however, visible in the normative and 
theoretical literature. Whether and in what ways such questions have been asked in the 
empirical writings that examine the outcomes of these diverse reforms across 
countries, I investigate in the next section.  
 
 
4. GOVERNANCE REFORMS: THE EMPIRICAL EXPERIENCE  
 
Despite the uncertainties about the actual outcomes of the theoretical propositions, for 
“we do not know enough empirically to make definitive recommendations about 
which types of decentralization are best for which services in which institutional 
settings” (Ahmed 1998), the ‘decentralization movement’ that has swept across 
countries Manor (1999) has resulted in a variety of reforms. Governance has been both 
‘marketized’ (liberalized, de-regulated and privatized) and ‘democratized’ (devolved 
to local governments and delegated to interest groups and community-based 
organizations), often in parallel104. The sizeable literature on the effect and outcomes 
in different countries, provide a mixed picture of success and failure, and attribute the 
mixed outcomes to a range of policy and contextual conditions. I summarize these 
below, with particular attention to the experiences in developing countries, in respect 
                                                 
103 A question can be posed, about the need to assess the relative efficacy of the two types of reform in a 
situation where one – the neoliberal – has clearly been shown to be transferred from a different socio-
economic context and should therefore be expected to be unworkable in the developing contexts under 
consideration. However, the need to compare the efficacies of both kinds of reform arises because there 
are sharp dissimilarities between developing countries, and across sub-national regions within them, in 
the levels and kinds of socio-economic and political development. That is, developing regions do 
embody the assumptions underlying both genres of reform in various degrees and combinations, though 
very imperfectly in relation to the theoretical assumptions. The actual performances of different kinds 
of reform are therefore not predictable on the basis of their origins or underlying theoretical premises. 
104 As, for example,  in the US (Warner 2006), Bolivia (Kohl 2002) and India (Joseph, 2007), for 
example. 
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of their pressing development issues such as poverty and lack of access to basic 
services.  
 
4.1. MARKETIZATION: LIBERALIZATION, DE-REGULATION AND PRIVATIZATION 
 
With the rise of the neoliberal orthodoxy in development, economic activities which 
were previously controlled strictly by the state, such as trade, finance and 
infrastructure development, have been liberalized and deregulated. Programs for 
privatization of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have also expanded functionally 
across sectors and geographically across industrialized and developing countries 
(Meggison and Netter 2001, Kikeri and Nellis 2002, 2004). Liberalization and 
privatization programs are not explicitly aimed at social concerns like poverty and 
equity, but by reducing inflation, increasing competition and stimulating investments 
and innovation are expected to increase growth, which in turn is expected to reduce 
poverty in the long run (Sheahan 1997, Berg and Taylor 2000; Birdsall and Nellis 
2002).  
 
The literature on the outcomes of liberalization and privatization in the developing and 
transitional economies, however, mostly belies these suppositions. First, the effects of 
trade, financial and other kinds of liberalization on growth, unemployment, and wages 
have been mixed at best, with a larger proportion of neutral and negative outcomes. 
The problematic assumption of a positive correlation between growth and reduction in 
poverty has been observed to be almost wholly unfounded; even when GDP has 
increased, the poor have mostly not benefited, and inequality between the top and 
bottom quartiles of the population have increased. Neither has privatization yielded 
better or cheaper services in most instances, though some successes have been 
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reported.  
 
Assessing the post-liberalization changes in GDP in 32 countries in South Asia (4), 
Africa (12), Latin America (8) and East Asia (7) that liberalized to different extents 
after 1985, Greenaway et al (1997) report an overall deterioration of growth, both in 
statistical before-after analysis and from panel data. Examining the economic and 
social consequences of liberalization in nine developing and transitional economies105, 
Berg and Taylor (2000) found that growth was positive only in Argentina and Mexico 
(after 1995), and either neutral or negative in the other seven; social impacts were 
neutral or unfavorable in all; income-inequality increased in most countries; and wage 
differentials between skilled and unskilled workers widened. Unemployment among 
the economically active increased as well. Tussie and Aggio (undated), in their study 
of eight countries106 that reformed at various times, find that economic performance 
has been ‘unsatisfactory’ in Malawi and Zimbawe, and accompanied by a 
deterioration of social and education indicators. In Bulgaria, Bangladesh, Jamaica and 
the Philippines, economic performance was somewhat positive, though in the former it 
resulted in high unemployment and persistent poverty. 
 
There are, however, positive outcomes as well. In the above study, Tussie and Aggio 
(undated) estimated that in Bangladesh, poverty had decreased by 1% per annum. In 
the Philippines too social indicators – life expectancy, literacy and access to 
infrastructure and technologies – improved and the proportion of urban poor declined. 
In Jamaica, unemployment and poverty fell in the 80s. Growth rates in Brazil were 
                                                 
105 Argentina, Colombia, Cuba, India, South Korea, Mexico, Russia, Turkey and Zimbawe. Detailed 
analysis of the experiences in each country – provided in the paper - is used to arrive at the overall 
conclusions reported here. 
106 They study the countries in pairs: Malawi and Zimbawe, Bulgaria and Bangladesh, Jamaica and 
Phillipines, and Brazil and India. In the first two, infant mortality rates, adult illiteracy, malnutrition and 
poverty remained as high.  
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better than the world average in the decades after liberalization, though they have 
fallen since and unemployment increased. India has had an impressive growth post-
liberalization, but regional inequalities have worsened and employment in 
manufacturing stagnated. Brazil and India were also among the more moderate and 
slow liberalizers, and in the latter, authors have pointed out that the growth cannot be 
attributed substantially to liberalization (Patnaik 2001).  
 
Tussie and Aggio also point out how specific factors such as the level of 
industrialization, preferred access to markets and world demand for specific 
commodities substantially affected growth in the eight cases they studied. Sheahan 
(1997), examining the cases of Chile, Mexico and Peru – often cited as paradigmatic 
liberalizers, but which implemented reforms with different combinations of social 
programs – finds that the “purest version, the standard model (of liberalization) is 
adverse to reducing poverty and inequality” but alternatives with social programs in 
Chile progressively reduced poverty and inequality (Sheahan 1997:31) 
 
Different methodologies of variable strength107, and the fact that effects cannot fully 
be attributed to specific reforms since in most cases they are implemented as part of a 
wider set of economic and political reforms, mean that the results of these studies 
cannot be taken to be conclusive. Nevertheless, a degree of consensus exists on the 
overall dismal picture of outcomes, with very few exceptions. One is the 1991 study 
by Papageorgiou et al. of liberalization in 19 countries, where he found that overall, it 
resulted in rapid growth without serious employment or macro-economic problems; 
the findings have however, been sharply challenged by Greenaway (1993) and Collier 
                                                 
107 See, for example, Tussie and Aggio (undated) and Greenaway et al. (1997) for limitations and 
weaknesses of some methodologies used in these studies. 
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(1993). In a review of books on liberalization by Geddes (1995), observes that 
internationalizing financial activities spurs improvements in domestic systems and 
thereby helps economic development.  
 
Most countries have undertaken privatization of SOEs since the early eighties, despite 
the fact that “privatization in the early years was [only] a leap of faith” (Kikeri and 
Nellis 2004:92). Reviews of studies that assessed outcomes of privatization across 
countries (Vickers and Yarrow 1991, Birdsall and Nellis 2002, Kikeri and Nellis 2002, 
2004; Meggison and Netter 2001), indicate that while firm performance (profitability) 
often increased, consumers faced cost increases, and employees loss of jobs, and when 
markets fell, wage cuts. All authors, however, point to the limitations of most 
privatization studies – data constraints, problems of comparing like-with-like in 
private and public organizations and inadequate counterfactuals, among others.  
 
Vickers and Yarrow (1991) classify privatization into (1) transfer of State owned 
enterprises (SOEs) in competitive product markets generally free from market failures, 
(2) transfer of SOEs with substantial market power such as infrastructure networks in 
telecommunications or electricity, and (3) contracting out of publicly financed services 
previously performed by the public sector. Examining cases in Britain, Chile and 
Poland, they conclude that the results depend mostly on the market and regulatory 
frameworks within which they exist, and results vary substantially. Efficiencies and 
profitability increased most often in the transfer of SOEs in competitive product 
markets, while political and distributional gains were less certain. 
 
In their review of “the increasing (but still uneven) literature” on privatization, 
Birdsall and Nellis (2002) conclude that, 
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“On the whole, privatization has proven its economic worth. The shift to private 
ownership generally improves a firm’s performance. There are some exceptions, but 
this finding holds up in most countries, including some that are very poor, and many 
of the formerly socialist economies in the transition region. Post-privatization, 
profitability has generally increased, often substantially, as have output dividends 
and investment….[but] Privatization’s economy-wide effects on the government 
budget, and on growth, employment and investment are less established.” (Birdsall 
and Nellis, 2002:12).   
 
The authors go on to considering the distributional effects of privatization, and finally 
sum up thus  -  
 
“…most privatization programs appear to have worsened the distribution of assets and 
income, at least in the short run. This is more evident in transition economies than in 
Latin America, and less clear for utilities such as electricity and telecommunications, 
where the poor have tended to benefit from much greater access, than for banks, oil 
companies, and other natural resource producers.”(Birdsall and Nellis, 2002: abstract, 
italics mine) 
 
These conclusions are echoed in other reviews of privatization cases (for example, 
Kikeri and Nellis 2002, 2004; Rao and Rao 2004; Meggison and Netter 2001) but the 
observations on positive outcomes must be moderated by the fact that these reviews 
emanate mostly from authors located within the World Bank system. Revenue gains to 
the government accrue mostly from the initial sale, and little thereafter; it is often 
accompanied by falling employment. Negative political fallouts of privatization range 
from moderate to severe, with the process being unpopular among stakeholders almost 
everywhere.  
 
The outcomes of privatizing services are also mixed; though efficiency increases, so 
does the cost of services (see for example, Berne and Pogorel 2004, Rossi 2001, Howe 
2000). As Kohl (2002) describes, privatization initiatives in Bolivia led to efficiency 
increases in service provision, but the substantial increases in the cost of basic services 
and energy – upto 100% in the case of water – led to massive protests and riots that 
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ultimately forced some reversals108. The economic restructuring that was to improve 
the resource position of the state and spur growth in reality led to increases in 
unemployment, decline in government revenues and continuing economic crisis. In the 
US, Warner (2006) reports that privatization of services by local governments does not 
reduce costs or increase efficiencies, for competition is poor if not completely absent, 
and there is therefore an increasing reversal of privatization. 
 
Kikeri and Nellis (2002) identify the conditions for successful privatization, referring 
mostly to competitive product markets:  
 
“…strong political commitment combined with wider public understanding and 
support for the process; creation of competitive markets—removal of entry and exit 
barriers, financial sector reforms that create commercially oriented banking systems, 
effective regulatory framework—to reinforce the benefits of private ownership; 
transparency in the privatization process; and measures to mitigate the social and 
environmental impact.” (Kikeri and Nellis, 2002:1) 
 
Rao and Rao (2004) add four other considerations: tailoring to country contexts, clear 
political backing, operational improvements to SOEs before privatizing and explicit 
consideration of existing and future employment in the enterprise. However, creation 
of such conditions are not easy, particularly for monopoly public goods subject to 
market failure like infrastructure and basic services like electricity and water, even in a 
country like the US. For the monopoly nature of the service or good pre-empts private 
players and the number of suppliers is often limited resulting in a monopsonistic 
situation. Privatization of services in rural areas is particularly problematic because of 
the latter, compounded by the limited managerial capacity of rural local governments 
(see, for example, Warner 2006). 
 
                                                 
108 For example, in the privatization of water supply in Cochabamba (see Forero 2005) 
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4.2. DEMOCRATIZATION: DEVOLUTION, DELEGATION AND DIVESTMENTS 
 
Communitarian discourses that advocate decentralizing governance to localities have 
resulted in widespread devolution of service-provision and developmental 
responsibilities to local governments and various kinds of community organizations 
(see Work 2002). Three broad kinds of shifts are evident. Neoliberal ‘partnership’ and 
‘participatory’ approaches have included decentralization to local governments with 
mandates to partner with private, non-governmental and community organizations on 
one hand, and the institution of community participation in programs and projects of 
state departments, parastatals and international donor agencies on the other109. More 
progressive reforms have devolved responsibilities and resources to local governments 
structured for direct-democratic decision-making in assemblies and through referenda 
(Bucek and Smith 2000; Baiochhi 2001; Abers 1998; Isaac and Franke 2000). The 
extent and patterns of devolution in all cases vary across countries and sectors (see, for 
example, Shah and Thompson 2004, Work 2002).  
 
The experience of the three different kinds of decentralization to localities can be 
assessed in three ways, with respect to common objectives articulated by proponents. 
These expectations include improvements (in efficiency, effectiveness, quality and/or 
accessibility) in service provision, and outcomes of development programs (again, in 
efficiency, implementation, better targeting), reduction of disparities between different 
groups of citizens and across localities, and increased participation of citizens in 
decision-making. 
 
                                                 
109 The literature on such participatory arrangements is extensive. See for example, Fung and Wright 
(2001) and other articles in the same issue of Politics and Society (2001: 29, 1), Goldfrank 2002,Work 
(2002), Fergusson and Mulwafu (2004), King and Yue Ma (2000), Helmsing (2002), among others 
cited in this section.  
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Service provision by local governments, in various kinds of partnership and 
participatory arrangements has had mixed outcomes. Generally, gains are reported in 
efficiency, access and occasionally, quality of services, but significantly, equity and 
participation has been problematic across countries and continents (Robinson 2003). 
For example, in Work’s (2002) evaluation of devolved health and education services 
in nine countries, improvements in efficiency and access were observed, including 
increased access by the poor. Similar other success stories are reported by donor 
agencies (see examples at http://magnet.undp.org). Devolution also improved 
efficiencies and levels of provision in city services in Montevideo (Goldfrank, 2002), 
and increased service coverage, attention to rural areas and the poor, cost 
consciousness and resource-raising efforts, and citizen satisfaction in Chile (Fiszbein 
1997). Mahal et al (2000) also found a positive correlation between devolution of 
health care and education services and improvements in child mortality and school 
enrollment in India.  
 
On the other hand, successive decentralization efforts failed to improve services in 
Bangladesh, and in Haiti, provision actually worsened (Burki et al 1999). Motoya-
Aguilar and Vaughan (1990) also find no extension in coverage or improvements in 
quality of health care after the decentralization of primary care clinics in Chile. In the 
Phillipines and Uganda, Azfar et al (2001) report that local governments are not 
always responsive to local preferences, though they are aware of them; this, despite 
greater local political mobilization and policy initiative. Revenue needs of local 
governments that lead to imposition of local cesses and taxes may actually exacerbate 
poverty and endanger livelihoods in poorer areas, as Ellis et al (2003) report in the 
case of Malawi. This acquires even greater significance in light of the poor fiscal 
devolution, not commensurate with devolved responsibilities, that is seen in many 
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cases (for example, see Livingstone and Charlton 2001, Robinson 2003, Azfar et al 
2001). In the same vein, Larsen (2002) finds that local governments display a 
commercial orientation to natural resource management when such responsibilities are 
devolved to them, more than one of resource regeneration and sustainability. In health 
and education services, in a review of findings in a number of cases in Latin America, 
Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia by various authors, Robinson (2003) concludes 
that neither quality nor access has increased nor have costs fallen; disparities in quality 
between private and public provision have actually widened. Pearce-Oroz (2003) also 
reports little difference between centralized and decentralized provision of water and 
sanitation services in Honduras, in access, efficiency or sustainability.  
 
Equity outcomes have been equally problematic. Robinson concludes from his review 
of experiences that “equity outcomes have generally not been realized for poor and 
socially marginalized people…. The gap in quality between wealthier and poorer areas 
has often increased under decentralization” (Robinson 2003:7). The positive 
correlation between decentralization and pro-poor policies or decentralization and 
poverty alleviation assumed by the proponents of decentralization has also not been 
observed, as Johnson (2001) notes from the studies of various authors.   
 
Though Fiszbein found a positive correlation between inclusion and outcomes in his 
study of decentralization in Chile (Fiszbein 1997), civic engagement does not improve 
in most cases (Goldfrank 2002). The main issue was the power differences that existed 
in communities and were reflected in the participatory mechanisms – such as citizen 
boards and user groups – that were used. In almost all instances where participation is 
discussed, the pattern that repeatedly surfaces is that of the wealthy and better-
informed capturing such avenues, though such capture is not always maleovolent 
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(Mansuri and Rao 2004). This issue has attracted even more attention in the case of 
community participation in state and donor funded programs, through mechanisms 
such as forest management committees (Sundar 2001), water users associations 
(Wilder and Lankao 2006) and similar organizations. Two extensive reviews of 
participation in such programs (Pozzoni and Kumar 2005; Mansuri and Rao 2004) 
finally conclude that  
 
 “…the literature points to a ‘double exclusion’ of weaker groups from decision-
making fora created by community participation initiatives. Not only do these groups 
face considerable difficulties in entering such spaces, but even when they succeed in 
attaining formal inclusion, they find it difficult to voice their views and have them 
taken into account by better-off participants…evidence on the inclusion of poor and 
marginalized citizens in innovative institutions of participatory points to a greater 
level of formal inclusion, but similar low levels of substantive inclusion. While 
legislative provisions have contributed to attaining greater formal inclusion of hitherto 
marginalized groups, decision-making processes in the majority of these spaces 
continue to be dominated by the more powerful actors.” (Pozzoni and Kumar, 2005:8) 
 
Unfair resource-sharing between state agencies and community partners, low 
commitment of bureaucracies, poor design, inadequate understandings of complex 
concepts like participation and empowerment among project implementers and 
unsuitable timelines are among the programmatic reasons for the situation, in addition 
to contextual conditions. Even more important is the unfair distribution of costs and 
benefits of participation among the better-off and the poor, and men and women. 
These patterns, among other problems, make Sundar (2001) question if such 
devolution is democratization at all. 
 
Direct-democratic forms of participation, as have been tried in Kerala, India and Porto 
Allegre, Brazil however, lead to more extensive participation from all sections of the 
local population and also yield distinctly pro-poor outcomes. Though participation in 
local planning was more uneven in Kerala (Isaac and Franke 2000) than in the public 
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budgeting in Porto Allegre (Abers 1998; Baiochhi 2001, Santos 1998), in both 
instances it led to an alignment of service levels and provision to local priorities, 
particularly of the poor. Local government investments through ‘participatory 
budgeting’ exercises in citizen assemblies in Porto Allegre has been observed to be 
redistributive to an extent that some analysts name it ‘redistributive democracy’ 
(Santos 1998; Marquetti 2001, cited in Pozzoni and Kumar 2005). In addition to 
extensive participation and progressive outcomes, direct-democratic processes have 
also led to the development of local organizations and increased ‘social capital’110. 
The connection with increased participation of the poor leading to socially desirable 
outcomes is also observed by Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004), who find that the 
inclusion of a marginalized group (women) through reservation of seats in local 
governments leads to improved delivery of local public goods to marginalized 
populations.  
 
Authors examining decentralization experiences also explore the reasons for these 
outcomes. Weak commitment to decentralization appears to lead to absence of 
participation, elite capture of resources, and ineffective outcomes (Robinson 2003). 
Inappropriate channels for participation constrain civic engagement (Goldfrank 2002) 
and inattention to the weak institutional capacities of local governments reduced their 
authority in comparison with other local organizations (Way 2002). Simultaneous 
privatization and fiscal constraints led to the negative outcomes of the transfer of 
primary health care in Chile (Montoya-Aguilar and Vaughan 1990). In the US, Warner 
(1999, 2006) shows that devolution undermines the possibilities for redistribution, 
                                                 
110 For discussions on Porto Allegre, see Abers (1998), Santos (1998); for Kerala, see Heller (2001), 
Isaac and Franke (2000, 2002).               .  
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increases regional disparities between rural areas because local governments have low 
managerial and fiscal capacity, and their tax efforts are sensitive to State policy. 
 
Conditions under which successful outcomes emerged included presence of substantial 
State direction (Mahal 2000), political commitment of individual municipalities 
(Heller 2001) and a combination of added responsibility, more resources and policy 
reform (Fiszbein 1997). The role of central governments appears to be crucial, and not 
only in implementing adequate devolution. Successful pro-poor devolution appears to 
depend on governing partiies commitment to the empowerment of local governments 
and the success of decentralization reforms (Robinson 2003, Heller 2001). Johnson 
(2001) posits that successful devolution requires a careful balancing between 
autonomy and accountability, a strong role for counter-elites like external NGOs or 
higher echelons of government, strong civil society organizations and adequate 
information about the new roles being taken on by the local actors. In sum, it emerges 
that central states have a strong and continuing role in ensuring pro-poor discharge of 
devolved responsibilities.  
 
An issue that frequently surfaces is that devolution of any kind does not happen easily, 
with initiators facing political obstacles from various quarters, but most often from 
policy segments close to or within government itself (Manor 1999, Eaton 2001). 
Devolution of the administrative, fiscal and other powers necessary for discharging 
devolved responsibilities is therefore uneven and often inadequate, making local 
government capacity very weak in many cases (Livingstone and Charlton 2001, Pal 
2004, WB 2001). On the other side, civil society or private organizations are not 
always present thickly enough in the locality for local governments to partner with or 
to develop the competitive markets for services that are envisaged. 
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5. THE QUESTION OF CONTEXT-APPROPRIATE REFORM 
 
The studies of reform experiences reviewed above present a mixed picture of 
successes and failures, of both marketization and communitarian reforms, especially in 
relation to service provision and poverty alleviation in the global South. This counters 
any simplistic assumptions of geographical relevance or greater symmetry in the 
ordering principles of either governance paradigm with the conditions in developing 
countries, and leaves the question of context-appropriate reform open. This is not 
surprising, since developing countries are at different points in multidimensional 
trajectories of modernity and post-modernity, and their integration with the world 
economy. Geo-historical, economic, political and socio-cultural characteristics of 
various nations or sub-national regions therefore embody the environmental 
assumptions of both decentralization discourses to different degrees, and in different 
ways, countering dualities of developed/undeveloped, industrialized/agrarian or pre-
modern/modern. The question of context-appropriateness must therefore necessarily 
be seen as relative and multidimensional.  
 
Yet the case for decentralization in developing countries is not negated, as the 
instances of improved outcomes suggest decentralization is both necessary and can be 
successful under suitable conditions. Taken together with the intrinsic democratic 
merit of decentralized over centralized governance, this warrants efforts to identify the 
context-appropriate institutional-organizational configurations for effective 
decentralized governance. The key question therefore, and the one that this study 
engages with is – what are these?  
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5.1. THE KEY QUESTION AND THE KNOWLEDGE GAP 
 
Two kinds of (related) issues are identified as necessary to the success of reformed 
arrangements. The first is the design question. One aspect of this relates to the 
distribution of tasks between actors in and levels of governance, and another, perhaps 
more significant, to adequate devolution of the resources and authority concomitant 
with the devolved responsibilities. Both of these refer to the extent of decentralization, 
which is most often identified as the main reason for failure. A third aspect is the 
necessity of ‘bundling’ of various kinds of reform. For example, privatization must be 
accompanied by other allied reforms to develop competitive markets, as explained by 
Kikeri and Nellis (2002, see quote above). In sum, the details of the organizational 
arrangements are critical.  
 
A second issue is the ‘fit’ between the design of the decentralized arrangements and 
variables in its context, which is crucial to the success of any decentralized 
governance arrangement. Context here is plural: the sector, the pre-decentralization 
institutional pattern, and most important, the political, economic and socio-cultural 
characteristics of the locality. The latter can vary on many parameters, of which a 
large number are relevant to effective functioning of governance structures, as Turner 
and Hulme (1997) point out.111 Not only do these differ between developed and 
developing countries, but also among developing countries, and the kind of reform 
                                                 
111 Turner and Hulme (1997: chapter 2) list country-level environmental elements that they find 
pertinent and significantly different between developing and developed countries – economic factors 
such as gross national product, structure of production, the human resources profile, domestic capital, 
foreign aid and debt, foreign exchange reserves, infrastructure, technology, poverty and inequality and 
the informal sector. Cultural factors include ethnicity, family and kinship structures, values and norms, 
gender relations and history. Important demographic factors are population growth rates, age structure, 
urbanization and migration patterns, and the health profile of the population. Political factors include 
social class structure, legitimacy of governing regimes, policy scope ans capacity, the strength of the 
state and neo-patrimonial patterns of rule.  
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must therefore be adequately tailored to the local context.  
 
Authors take two approaches to the question of environmental fit. Some focus on the 
creation of conditions for success of particular kinds of decentralization – for example, 
Kikeri and Nellis (2002), evident in the quote above – without questioning the 
desirability of instituting the reform when conditions for success do not exist. This 
approach embodies the naturalization of a particular governance paradigm – neoliberal 
in this case – and constructs the need to reshape the context. Others, such as Burki et 
al (1999), Work (2002), Litvack (1998), point to the need to tailor reforms to the 
existing conditions, perceiving success or failure as residing in the institutional design 
more than in the characteristics of the local socio-economic, political and cultural 
context. In either approach, knowledge of the relationship between particular reforms 
and environmental conditions for its success is essential, but the latter is clearly less 
presumptive of the inherent merits of any particular governance paradigm, and 
thereby, (relatively) innocent of ideological imposition. Morever, as Turner and 
Hulme (1997) also point out, the design of organizations and processes within them 
can be directly influenced, or in this case, reshaped, but many environmental factors 
are outside the control of policy-makers and cannot be directly influenced, particularly 
in the short or medium term. Therefore the question to ask is not ‘which conditions are 
necessary for the success of various reforms’, but ‘what is the relative suitability of 
different types of reform to the variety of developing contexts’.   
 
Answers to this question are completely missing in the literature, for the almost-
universal approach has been to study the performance of reformed arrangements 
relative to the previous (more centralized) ones. Studies reviewed above reveal 
successes and failures of specific institutional configurations in specific locations, but 
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fail to consider if – and what type of – alternatives would have worked better. In other 
words, outcomes and effects of decentralization are almost always examined in 
relation to previous arrangements (before-after studies)112; but there are no studies that 
compare the effects of alternative institutional designs in or across similar contexts. 
This is certainly possible, for different types of decentralized arrangements, 
configured according to the prescriptions of neoliberal and more progressive 
discourses respectively, have been instituted in many countries for the same functions, 
in the same locations, for example in forest management and water provision in India 
(Sundar 2001, Jairath 2003) and water provision in Uganda (Saito 2002). Yet few such 
comparisons have been undertaken, and the question remains unanswered.   
 
5.2. A FRAMEWORK FOR RESEARCH 
 
Discursive differences between various kinds of reform indicate that they belong to 
two generic types or categories, ‘market’ and ‘democratic’, as discussed before. Not 
only do the different reforms within each type share basic premises, there also appears 
to be a ‘bundling’ in terms of the necessity to institute a number of them in tandem.113 
The question of context-appropriate reform therefore is, at the first level, essentially a 
question of the relative suitability of marketization and democratization to specific 
types of contexts. Also, since contextual fit is key to successful functioning and 
desired outcomes, the relative efficacy or success of the two types would be a good 
measure of their relative suitability to the context. Therefore, to answer the question of 
context-appropriate design of decentralized arrangements, a comparative assessment 
                                                 
112 Glenn Pearce-Oroz (2003) compares concurrently operating centralized and decentralized systems 
for water provision in Honduras.  
113 For example, as Kikeri and Nellis (2002) point out in the passage cited in section 4.1 in this Chapter, 
privatization has to be necessarily accompanied by ‘removal of entry and exit barriers’, i.e., 
liberalization, and deregulation.  
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of the operation and outcomes of the two types of reform in the same locality would 
be appropriate. A corresponding comparison of the same type of reform in different 
localities would also add to the understanding of context-appropriateness of the two 
types.  
 
Sectoral location also makes a difference, and the research was therefore located in a 
sectoral context where both types of decentralization have been instituted for the 
performance of the same tasks or functions. The issue of domestic water supply was 
found appropriate – it is a priority in developing countries, which centralized 
governance arrangements have failed to address, and decentralization has been 
undertaken over the last decade. Discursive differences mirroring the larger 
discussions on decentralization have led to the simultaneous introduction of a variety 
of reforms, of both marketization and democratization types – liberalization and 
privatization, devolution to local governments and delegation to user groups, other 
community groups or NGOs – witness the policies in Uganda (Saito 2002), India 
(Jairath 2003, GoI 2002a, 2002b, Sundar 2000) and Britain (Howe 2000).  
 
In the next chapter I locate the general research question identified above in the 
context of decentralization of domestic water provision in India, define the specific 
research questions, explain the methodological approach and the research design, the 
selection of cases and the methods used for data collection and analysis.  
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CHAPTER II 
 RESEARCH CONTEXT, METHODOLOGY, LOCATION AND 
DESIGN 
 
  
The general question of the relative suitability of marketized and democratized local 
governance is fruitfully explored in this research in the specific context of domestic 
water provision114 in the global South. This is not only because the lack of access has 
attained critical proportions but also because the solutions advanced for effective 
reform accurately mirror the discursive patterns in the wider discussions discussed in 
the last chapter. Also, both types of governance reforms have been concurrently 
implemented in some countries, such as in India, providing the opportunity for 
empirical investigation of their relative effectiveness.  
 
India provided an excellent geographical and policy setting for this research, for the 
variation in socio-political, economic and cultural characteristics of different sub-
national regions. The federal structure of the polity provides a systematic variation in 
economic, political and administrative terms between its constituent States, though 
there are cultural and socio-economic variations within States. Most important to this 
research, reforms in state water provision have included both devolution and 
liberalization, as described later, and both kinds of reforms are nationally applied. 
Comparative study of reform efficacy was therefore possible, for the two kinds of 
reformed arrangements could be compared across diverse locations.  
                                                 
114 In the literature, the reference to drinking water and domestic water are often conflated, with most 
often, the term ‘drinking water’ being used to indicate ‘domestic’ water, which is generally meant to 
include water required by households for drinking, cooking and basic ablutions, though sometimes that 
required for activities like cleaning of clothes or for domestic animals is also included. In this study, the 
term domestic water is used to denote the water used in the house, minimally for drinking, cooking and 
basic ablutions, but which could include some other uses. 
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Below, I discuss the dimensions of the water provision problem, the discursive 
differences in reform prescriptions and the reform experience across countries, which 
still leaves the question of context-appropriateness open. I then explain the 
methodological approach taken in this study to look for answers, and how the location 
of the study in India provided appropriate cases for examination.  By locating the 
question in the specificities of the water sector, identifying an appropriate 
methodology for research and exploring the relevant empirics of the country context 
(sections 1-3), the specific research questions for this study, set out in section 4, could 
be developed.  
 
A comparative case study approach, which assessed the relative performance of 
marketized and democratized arrangements in a common location was found most 
appropriate to investigate the research question, which focused on the relative 
efficacy, effectiveness and inclusiveness of the two types of reform. Further, assessing 
the performance of the same type of reform across distinctly different locations 
provided additional understanding of its appropriateness in different contexts. Three 
Indian States – Gujarat, Kerala and Madhya Pradesh – were selected as the contexts 
for comparative study, as they differed systematically in their political, economic and 
socio-cultural attributes. The bases for case selection, the characteristics of selected 
locations, the research design, and the methods used for data collection and analyses 
are presented in that sequence in sections 4 to 7.  
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1. THE SECTORAL CONTEXT: DOMESTIC WATER PROVISION, DISCURSIVE 
REFORMS AND INDICATORS OF IMPROVED GOVERNANCE 
 
Though estimates vary,115 globally at least a billion people still remain without 
reasonably convenient, safe and dependable supplies of water to meet basic 
requirements. This includes water required for drinking, cooking and ablutions, which 
is estimated to be 50 liters per capita per day.116 Lack or scarcity of adequate 
freshwater is only one of the reasons; lack of safe, regular, dependable and convenient 
supply systems is more often the prime cause of this deprivation. As climatic 
variations, competition over water for other uses and contamination from geological, 
industrial or agricultural sources increase, even people with reliable sources become 
water-poor.  
 
There is little disagreement on the seriousness and the dimensions of this problem – 
the real decrease in water availability and increasing difficulties and cost of access. 
The (natural) human right to the amount of water required for basic needs, at 
affordable cost, has also been internationally endorsed at least since 1977117, and 
underpinned diverse efforts by countries and international development communities 
                                                 
115 Estimates of people without adequate and appropriate drinking water and sanitation vary. For 
example, Gleick (1993: Part 2:C) estimates that nearly 1300 million were without drinking water in 
1990, the end of the International Water and Sanitation decade; according to ADB (1999), one-fifth of 
the people in the world are without access to safe and adequate drinking water; the World Water Forum 
(2000) notes 1.1 billion without drinking water; the WHO-UNICEF estimated the population without 
improved water supply as 1.1 billion in 2004.  
116 Recommendations based on fundamental health considerations and technological choices typical for 
moderate levels of economic development put the minimum human requirement for a person each day 
is to be around 5 liters for drinking and 55 liters for other needs such as cooking, bathing, sanitation. A 
daily water supply of 300 liters per person, which is about the level of use achieved in many developed 
countries, is considered an appropriate design standard for modern urban water supply schemes (ADB 
1999). Gleick (1996, 1998) suggests a basic water requirement (BWR) of 50 liters per person per day.  
117 All international deliberations since the 1977 Mar del Plata United Nations Conference on Water 
articulate this; and the Dublin Principles include that arrangements for water provision must recognize 
this right.  
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to ensure universal access. Huge investments in large-scale production and distribution 
infrastructure, and management by state bureaucracies with substantial technical 
expertise since the seventies has not improved the situation, and developing effective 
strategies has become a priority.118  
 
Most of the people without improved sources119 live in the global south, which is 
predominantly low-income, but not necessarily water-scarce. About two-thirds are in 
Asia, and close to half – i.e., half a billion people – are in China and India120, where 
high population densities accentuate the negative health consequences of inadequate 
or unsafe water for drinking, cooking and ablutions121, and such basic deprivations 
obstruct much-needed economic development122.  
 
The extent and urgency of the problem has spurred extensive debate on the nature and 
causes of scarcity and effective reform of water supply systems in developing 
countries, which mirror the discursive patterns in the larger discourses on 
decentralization. Among the essential services, domestic water supply in particular has 
apparently been host to the fundamental flaws of centralized governance and a notable 
casualty of state provision123. Therefore the issue has have been subject to the same 
                                                 
118 Though water deprivation is more extensive and acute in the South, particularly the lack of access to 
even the basic minimum required for life, water scarcity is increasingly being felt in regions within 
countries in the North, for example, in the US, Spain and Italy. Issues of water scarcity and appropriate 
governance have therefore attracted attention globally.   
119 Improved drinking water sources include ‘household connection, public standpipe, borehole, 
protected dug well, protected spring, [and] rainwater collection’. ‘Unprotected well, unprotected spring, 
rivers or ponds, vendor-provided water, tanker or truck water’ are considered unimproved sources. 
‘Bottled water is not considered improved due to limitations in the potential quantity, not quality, of the 
water’ (WHO-UNICEF 2004:4) 
120 According to a mid-term survey of achievement of the Millenium Development Goals (WHO-
UNICEF 2004). 
121 See, for example Stillwaggon (1998), Falkenmark and Lindh (1993), Gleick (1998). 
122 The developmental issues related to this lack are discussed in FAO (1996), ADB (1999), Mollinga 
(2000). 
123 The problems in State provision include inadequate information on local needs and preferences, 
unsuitability of cookie-cutter solutions to the diverse contexts and preferences, lack of local 
identification with and ownership of centrally decided and administered programs and projects, and not 
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variety of reform prescriptions for decentralized governance as are recommended for 
improving provision of public services and governance in general, as shown below. 
  
1.1. WATER SCARCITY : DIVERGENT ANALYSES, DIFFERENT PROPOSITIONS 
 
While there is reasonable agreement on the dimensions of the drinking water problem, 
authors are sharply divided on its nature and causes, the arguments coalescing around 
two paradigmatic positions. The hegemonic neoliberal view, articulated most 
persistently by international institutions and authors associated with them, is that 
treating water as a ‘free’ public good is at the heart of the current problems. Water, 
being a critical biological need and increasingly scarce resource, has significant 
economic value. Though geographical variations in water availability and increasing 
competition over available resources lead to scarcity in some locations, authors in this 
discourse contend that the supply-demand gaps are equally the result of inadequate 
incentives for efficient conservation and use. The problem is therefore perceived to be 
rooted in both natural and institutional circumstances, with the persistence of state-
centered approaches, policies and institutional frameworks of the erstwhile ‘surplus’ 
era being the central issue. In traditional models, it is argued, water was treated as a 
‘free’ public good, the state was perceived to be responsible for provision and 
centralized, bureaucratic allocation and management systems were developed. Such an 
approach has not only failed in creating universal coverage, but state systems have 
accumulated huge losses and lack resources to develop further supplies and 
distribution systems: a problem that also stems from the absence of appropriate pricing 
                                                                                                                                            
least, the dissipation of or sheer inadequacy of central resources as they are transferred through 
administrative layers. Decentralized governance that enables involvement of local citizens in decision-
making is expected to counter these deficiencies and therefore yield more effective outcomes. See 
Saleth and Dinar (1999) and Bakker 2003 for a detailed exposition of the issues, and the counter-
constructions. 
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of water and recovery of costs from users.124  
 
Articulators of this neoliberal discourse prescribe decentralizing water provision to 
private entities to enable allocation though market transactions, with a system of 
tradable water rights and appropriate charges for water use – in essence, treating water 
as a priced, private commodity instead of a free public good. State responsibilities 
should be limited to regulation and monitoring, infrastructure development and 
management must be shifted to the private sector (alone or in partnership 
arrangements), decision-making professionalized and decentralized to the operating 
agencies, and stakeholders included in corporate governance processes. Also, in 
recognition of the interconnected nature of water resources within river basins, 
‘integrated water resource management’ (IWRM) approaches must be used to map and 
manage flows and uses within watersheds and river basins.  
 
The revised neoliberal version of this is communitarian, advocating participation of 
local governments, private enterprises, users and local civil society organizations in 
water management systems. Multi-stakeholder partnerships are the privileged 
governance model, and seen as key to effective provision and sustainable use. The 
involvement of women is particularly emphasized, as they are in almost all locations 
responsible for collection and use of domestic water, and therefore have the most 
detailed understanding of local sources and use patterns. Since they most acutely 
experience the hardships of inadequate, unreliable and inconvenient access, they are 
also most likely to look after sources and installed supply systems, and ensure their 
sustainability.125 The involvement of community groups, or marginalized sections 
                                                 
124 Among others, Saleth and Dinar (1998, 1999, 2000),  Pitman (2002), ADB (1999), FAO (1996), 
IUCN (2000), WWC (2003), Rosegrant and Biswanger (1994), Briscoe (1997) and Cosgrove and 
Rijsberman (2000); but see also Bakker (2000). 
125 See Zwarteveen (1997), Cleaver (1998b), Jackson (1998), WWC (1999), among others. 
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such as women, is however, fully instrumental, for there is little mention of 
transferring ownership or property rights to local populations. Ostrom (2000:34) 
points out that this ill-guided strategy of devolution to user groups lacks theoretical 
and empirical foundation.  
 
It is one thing to self-organize to create your own property and slowly develop the 
rules of association that enable a group to benefit from the long-term management of 
the resource. It is quite something else to have a government tell you that now you 
have to manage something that the government can no longer handle itself. Especially 
after you have been told that it is the government’s responsibility to do this for 
you”(Ostrom 2000:34). 
 
In contrast, the more progressive communitarian discourse, articulated by political 
ecologists and activists, rejects the singular, utilitarian approach to water evident in 
neoliberal formulations, and questions the tenability of viewing water primarily as an 
economic good.126 For authors in this discourse, its multifaceted existence and 
importance – ecological, social, political, economic and cultural – and the diverse 
values it carries in addition to use-values, including symbolic, aesthetic, religious and 
ethical, invalidates a reductionist conception of water as a primarily economic 
resource. The very ethicality of the neoliberal, singular conceptualization is questioned 
by many analysts, as it devalues and/or elides other understandings of water that are 
central to human existence in many cultures and the construction of different social-
cultural identities. In this opposing discourse, water is more than a basic need; it is a 
common global heritage to which all life – human, plant, animal – has a natural right 
not only to quantities and kinds that are required biologically or economically, but 
more pervasively, to water in all its various forms, natural and social. Its 
commoditization is therefore strongly opposed, as it privileges economic use, buying 
                                                 
126 For example, Petrella (2001); Bakker (2003); Barlow and Clarke (2002); Shiva (2002); also 
illustrated in the cases contained in Donahue and Johnston (1998). 
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power and ‘technical’ knowledge, and supports ownership and control by those with 
financial/economic power and techno-managerial expertise. Such control is perceived 
to reproduce and aggravate social, economic and political disparities and the 
ecological and environmental devastations that are emblematic of industrialized 
production. Some (Jairath 2003; Regmi 2003) even object to the very language and 
concepts used in the dominant formulations, which they observe to be perpetuating the 
problem of unavailability and distributional inequities. 
 
Authors in this contesting discourse explain the problem of scarcity and lack of access 
differently. First, scarcity is demonstrated to be a function of socio-economic position, 
incident more on the poor and marginalized, rather than a natural phenomenon. 
Second, the roots of the ‘water crisis’ faced by these groups are not seen as primarily 
natural, material and hydrological, but to lie in the large-scale appropriation of water 
by the state, its primary allocation to industrialized production, and the extensive 
environmental alteration in the course of modernization127. Scarcity is therefore seen 
to be socio-historically and discursively constructed within modern social and political 
relations of production, with the state as primary interlocutor of elite interests. The 
erosion of customary community control over local resources and lack of ‘voice’ of 
the socially and politically marginalized in modern governance processes is perceived 
to be a major part of the problem (Mehta 2001, 2003, 2007; Petrella 2001, Bakker 
2003).  
 
Progressive communitarians also suggest decentralization to communities, premised 
on a locally-differentiated, ecologically situated approach that values universal rights, 
                                                 
127 These critics also question the state-centered paradigm of water management, observing it to be 
equally implicated in the capitalist modernization processes that have degraded the environment. 
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collective ownership and sustainable use128. They propose that resource relationships 
be reordered for decentralized management based on local knowledge and community 
needs and practices, with fully participatory and democratic decision-making 
processes and multi-level networking across watersheds. Authors within this discourse 
are ambivalent on the role of the state, though some see it as the site for political 
contestation and progressive change because of its differentiated nature. For others, 
the local state is as susceptible to capture by local elites, and only governance by 
universal membership-based user associations can work. Further democratization 
through measures that enable greater voice and participation by currently marginalized 
groups are central to this position. Despite these differences, the suggestion in essence 
is to decentralize political authority, decision-making and control over water to local 
communities, for management by those directly dependant on local sources and 
ecologies would lead to conservation and stewardship. This would also resolve the 
issue of scarcity, which they argue is a product of over-exploitation of water in 
capitalist modes of production.  
 
Both the dominant and the opposing formulations rest on undeniable realities – the 
inability of state-run systems to provide universal access; inefficiencies, waste and 
high costs of such arrangements; large financial losses accumulated by state-run 
systems of water provision; and lack of resources to expand coverage or 
maintain/upgrade existing systems. On the other hand, it is equally evident that it is 
the poor and marginalized in the global south that constitute an overwhelming 
proportion of those lacking adequate and safe water, and who are generally not 
                                                 
128 For example, Petrella (2001) and Shiva (2002), but see also Bakker (2003). There is little advocacy 
for a state-centered paradigm among these authors – the state is seen as the interlocutor of elite and 
capital interests and equally implicated in the historical construction of scarcity and ecological 
degradation. Mostly, attitudes to public/state management are rather ambivalent, though individual 
positions vary.  
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connected to public systems (WHO-UNICEF 2004; Gleick 1993, 1998). Proposals for 
reform fully resonate with those in the larger discourses on decentralizing governance. 
Though an extensive literature critically re-examines the propositions noted above, to 
extend, refine or suggest suitable operationalization129, the relative merit of different 
kinds of institutional re-arrangements in specific locations has not been considered. 
Comparative investigation of the performance of different kinds of reform 
arrangements for domestic water provision therefore provides an excellent lens to 
investigate answers to the question of reform efficacy.  
 
Despite the uncertain success of any kind of decentralization, as in other sectors, 
reforms spanning the gamut of normative institutional propositions have been 
instituted in many countries, including divestment of public utilities, privatization to 
national or multinational corporations, devolution to communities, user-groups and/or 
local governments, and delegation to NGOs or local enterprises. I discuss the 
empirical literature on these experiences below, to develop a picture of the successes 
and failures, and the reasons for or conditions under which these emerged.  
 
 
 
                                                 
129 Without challenging the theoretical and conceptual framework, Savenije (2001) discusses why water 
cannot easily be treated as an economic good and Perry et al (1997) raise the difficulty of relegating its 
allocation to competitive market pricing, in the face of its many roles such as basic human and 
environmental need, merit good, social and economic resource. Other characteristics such as its fugitive 
nature, indivisibility, bulkiness, non-substitutability and complex flow patterns cause externalities and 
high transaction costs that lead to market failures (see Bauer 1997). Arguing the difficulty of 
establishing well-functioning markets in particular geographical contexts with pre-existing communal 
arrangements, Trawick (2003) suggests a context-specific composite system incorporating elements of 
both. Critiquing the effectiveness of urban privatized water supply, Hukka and Katko (2003) argue for 
partnership arrangements where core operations are retained in the public sector. Identifying problems 
of equity in reformed arrangements, van Koppen (1998) suggests institutional design changes in 
devolving water allocation to irrigators, and Meinzen-Dick (1997) and Zwarteveen (1997) argue for 
extending water rights to women. 
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1.2. EXPERIENCE OF WATER REFORMS  
 
The nature of water – its flow characteristics, bulky properties and fugitive nature – 
makes its provision the ideal “natural monopoly” of economic texts. The required 
infrastructure is costly and specialized, and duplication by potential competitors would 
be prohibitive. Thus one cannot count on competition of the usual sort to maintain 
reasonable prices and levels of service. Despite this, in Europe, Kallis and de Groot 
(2003) report that   
 
“[there has been]…a general trend towards State retreat from the regulation and 
provision of water, the liberalization and privatization of water services and, more 
generally, increased emphasis upon market-assigned values (e.g. prices or cost-benefit 
evaluations) as opposed to political activity in the allocation and management of water 
and its services…….Economic efficiency is prioritized in private or public utilities 
and the pricing mechanism is freed from public control, increasingly aiming to 
recover the full—capital and operational—cost of the service. An increasingly large 
part of the activities in the urban hydrocycle is subcontracted or financed by private 
enterprise (e.g. hydraulic infrastructure in Spain). Water utilities are privatized 
(London), are in the process of being privatized (Athens), or increasingly use market 
principles in their operation as publicly owned organizations (Amsterdam). There are 
also plans for the introduction of water-trading markets (Spain and England). (Kallis 
and de Groot 2003:224-225) 
 
Marketization, particularly through privatization, has also been undertaken across 
Latin America, in Chile (Bauer 1997), Bolivia (Finnegan 2002, Assies 2003), 
Columbia, Costa Rica and El Salvador (Haglund and Gomez 2006), Peru (Trawick 
2003) and in Guinea in Africa (Clarke et al 2002). Privatization of water services has 
also been widely applied in the US (see Bel and Warner 2008), and is being initiated 
in India (Sharma 2005, Urs and Whittell 2009) 
 
Devolution or delegation of responsibility for water supply and management has also 
been undertaken in countries across Africa – in Honduras (Pierce-Oroz 2003), South 
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Africa (Wester et al 2003, Wijesekara and Sansom 2003), Malawi (Ferguson and 
Miulwafe 2004). In Latin America, though privatization is more extensive, devolution 
has been initiated in some countries, for example in Mexico (Tortajada 2006, Wester 
et al 2003) and Brazil (Tortajada 2006). Water provision has also been devolved to 
local governments in India. 
 
The outcomes of privatization of water provision have been almost uniformly 
discouraging, either in terms of conservation, extending coverage or reducing costs. 
This is not surprising, for as Kallis and de Groot point out, “given the supremacy of 
marketization, ‘rational’ in practice translates to ‘cost-beneficial’, and conservation is 
pursued as far as it produces benefit.” (Kallis and de Groot 2003). Kallis and 
Coscossis (2001) report increased water use in Athens and Barcelona despite a policy 
to control demand, for there is an inbuilt incentive for the water utility to expand the 
system.130 Castro et al. (2003) and Bakker (2000), analyzing the cases of privatization 
in London and Yorkshire respectively, find that it is not an instrument to deal with 
water scarcity, but a political ideological project producing scarcity, as is been 
contended by those who oppose neoliberal prescriptions. They also show that under 
the new regulatory regime of London’s privatized water suppliers, both environmental 
standards and/or social fairness in terms of the affordability of water service for the 
poor have been sacrificed in the pursuance of profits. 
 
The issues of redistribution, the rising cost of water and externalities of environmental 
policies such as price-based demand management are major ones that have plagued 
                                                 
130 For, as the authors note, water use is an outcome of the way water supply is managed and the 
incentives available to the private provider. The cost-benefit calculus of reducing wastage is affected by 
the regulatory regime, subsidies and the profit-focus of the operator. Central to this process is the fact 
that the market is not a ‘friction-free’ ideal but an institution that is modulated by prevalent regimes of 
rights and duties, which allows Athens to externalize the cost of increasing water use to the 
environment and peripheral areas. 
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privatization, and generated extensive social conflicts in various countries and 
cities.131 Howe (2000) reports that in Chile, the agricultural sector and cities had to 
pay exorbitant prices for added water supplies, when the sudden privatization of water 
resources led to greater monopolization of water supply by the national hydroelectric 
generating companies. He also reports that in the UK, there has been 100 percent to 
200 percent increase in water charges, and the number of service shutoffs has 
increased dramatically, raising great concern. Owners and shareholders, however, 
have been able to appropriate profits: company directors’ salaries are much higher 
than in other utilities, as are their returns from the large numbers of company shares 
they hold.  
 
Very few instances of success surface in the literature on privatization, but Clarke et al 
(2002) show that in Guinea, private sector participation benefited all constituents, in 
spite of a difficult institutional environment. Bauer (1997) finds that in Chile, the 
privatization of water rights reduced state administration, but attempts to stimulate a 
free market in water rights have had mixed and uneven results, indicating that setting 
up water markets is harder and more complicated than it may seem. While such reform 
has had little positive impact except for private companies, transferring governance 
models from industrialized to developing countries is even more problematic, as 
Haglund and Gomez (2006) show in their study of Costa Rica, Columbia and El 
                                                 
131 In the city of Barcelona, in the so-called water tax revolt, some 80,000 families in the poorer 
neighbourhoods of the city refused to pay the part of their increased water charges corresponding to a 
tax for wastewater treatment. The privatization of water supply in Cochabamba, Bolivia, to the 
multinational Bechtel elicited massive protests and riots till the arrangement was reversed (Finnegan 
2002, Assies 2003). The World Bank promotion of privatization in Peru as a solution to the problems 
commonly afflicting irrigation and water management has led to strong protest among peasant farmers 
throughout the Andes (Trawick 2003). Howe (2000) reports that in the UK, there has been strong public 
discontent with the private companies. Fears of enormous tariff increases resulting from privatization of 
the Delhi water supply, and reduced water unavailability for the poor and marginalized has generated 
concern and protest in India (Sharma 2005, Urs and Whittel 2009). Bennett (1995, 1998) reports 
protests in Mexico. 
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Salvador. There they find that success depends on “pre-existing state structures and 
social relations in determinate ways” (abstract). Even within the same country, Bakker 
(2001) points out that the economies of scale required to attract private sector 
investment only occurs in urban areas, where the vast majority of private sector 
participation contracts in water and sewerage currently operate, and replicating similar 
approaches in rural areas involves different technical and institutional challenges. 
Bakker (2003a) also points out that in both rural and urban areas, privatization redraws 
the hydro-social landscape.  
 
Devolution of water provision and management to communities and groups, in line to 
neoliberal prescriptions, does not seem to have delivered better results, though the 
issues are different. In Honduras Pierce-Oroz (2003) compares the performance of 
water supply systems that were transferred to municipalities with others that are still 
centralized. He finds that extent of coverage and rationing was the same, but water 
treatment was not even across the devolved cases in contrast to the centralized 
systems. There was also no metering of production, but tariff collections stood at 90% 
on average. Tariffs were also as regressive as before devolution, and where subsidies 
existed, they benefited the high-income households most. In South Africa, where 
water provision has been devolved to local governments and contracting to private or 
community-based organizatons has been permitted, the experience appears to be 
equally mixed (Wijesekara and Sansom, 2003). Local governments have little 
capacity, slim resources and inadequate authority, therefore provision suffers on many 
counts.  
 
Sustainability of installed systems has not improved either. For example, in the 
Malawi rural piped scheme program studied by Kleeimer (2000), which exemplified 
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the participatory approach to rural drinking water supply, only the smallest and newest 
schemes are performing well, but about half the schemes perform poorly, and a third 
of these are functioning abysmally. Fergusson and Mulwafe (2004) also point out that 
users were aware that the call for construction and maintenance of infrastructure and 
other ownership responsibilities to be handed over to villages, user groups, 
associations and scheme participants, though couched in terms of empowering users, 
actually represented the government’s effort to reduce its responsibilities and 
expenditures. In their study areas in Malawi, almost all the infrastructure devolved 
was in a state of near total collapse. 
 
The extent and nature of participation by local actors is mixed, with more situations 
being less than satisfactory. Wester et al (2003) assessed emerging forums for river 
basin management in Mexico and South Africa, and concluded that the pace of 
democratization in both places is slow. In Mexico, the issue is continued government 
dominance and attempts to include already organized stakeholders in decision-making, 
while substantive stakeholder representation is lacking. The emphasis on social 
mobilization and transformation in South Africa is leading to a slower implementation 
process and struggles over the redistribution of resources. Ferguson and Miulwafe 
(2004) found that in Malawi, local participation is constrained by the proliferation of 
participatory bodies set up by different Ministries. They also find that there are limits 
to the local, for the most acute problems faced by their study communities were not 
local in origin and therefore not amenable to local solutions. These included pollution 
of river water and degradation of the watershed, and the floods caused by upstream 
deforestation.  
 
The same authors (Ferguson and Mulwafe 2004) also point out that despite their 
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central involvement in water provision in households everywhere, women are not 
accorded any special role in decision making, but elided in the ‘homogenized’ 
perception of the community. In their study cases, where gender was taken into 
account, women’s interests were assumed to be restricted to the domestic sphere, and 
they were not involved in new decision-making bodies like the proposed Catchment 
Management Authorities. Even in cases where women are included on committees, 
their roles are circumscribed.  
  
Tortajada (2006), comparing the devolution in Mexico with that in Turkey and Brazil, 
observes more encouraging results. Decentralization has resulted in new opportunities 
for local parties to participate and express their views in all types of activities. But 
decentralization in the water sector has mostly been in the form of deconcentration, 
which has led to little change in the problems that plagued central provision. The 
limited capacity of the municipal governments to handle the responsibilities and 
ambiguities in laws and regulations is a factor. The transfer of irrigation districts 
implemented both in Mexico and Turkey are somewhat more successful, with support 
from the highest political levels, the necessary organizational and financial 
arrangements, and the will of the formal and informal institutions involved.  
Tortajada also sets out the factors required for devolution to succeed as in the 
irrigation districts – overall support by the central institutions, transparent financial 
arrangements, appropriate incentives to the farmers and provision of agricultural 
extension services, technical assistance, attention to legal aspects and training 
programs. Kleemeier (2000) points out that in Malawi, increasing the stakes of the 
users through cash contributions and construction of smaller schemes – neither if 
which was done – would have improved performance.  
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There are few studies of water projects developed or managed by entire communities 
in a fully participatory or plebiscitary mode, as progressive communitarians would 
have. Nevertheless, in the People’s Planning processes in Kerala, India, Isaac and 
Franke (2000) report that water projects have been among the most extensively 
selected projects, and allocated a major share of the budget. Where women are 
included in the decision-making and participate substantially, the same pattern was 
observed, as in four States in India studied by Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004)  
 
1.3. SUCCESS, FAILURE AND THE QUESTION OF CONTEXT-APPROPRIATE REFORM 
 
Privatizing water supply has clearly not yielded positive outcomes, in terms of 
extending coverage and reducing waste or costs in either industrialized or developing 
contexts, or in extending control of sources and systems to women in the latter. 
Liberalized communitarian approaches that involve communities in different kinds of 
arrangements, however, have had some success. Where participation is more 
extensive, as in the Kerala case, or where women are substantially involved, greater 
and more sustained attention to water provision is also observed (Isaac and Franke 
2000, Chattopadhyay and Duflo 2004). This indicates the possibility of improved 
provision through communitarian approaches, liberalized or more progressive, if the 
institutional design is appropriate.  
 
The need for appropriate institutional design is also indicated by the observations in 
the empirical literature about the reasons for failure – inadequate decentralization, 
particularly in transfer of powers and resources, and lack of adequate attention to 
participation. Successes have emerged where users are closely involved, there is 
greater devolution and adequate resources are provided to the local actors. The extent 
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and nature of participation is not only a function of appropriate design, but also the 
meshing of reformed arrangements with local practices and preferences. The question 
of context-appropriate institutional reform therefore emerges again as the critical 
issue.  
 
As in the larger empirical literature on decentralization, there is little attention to 
appropriate design (see below) and none to the issue of context-appropriate reform 
design in the literature on water provision. Except the comparison of centralized and 
decentralized systems by Pearce-Oroz (2003), studies have examined outcomes and 
effects of specific reforms, in ‘before-after’ designs. The relative effectiveness of 
different types of decentralized arrangements for water provision has not been 
investigated as yet, despite their simultaneous introduction in some locations. By 
addressing this question, this study can make a beginning towards finding answers. 
 
 
2. STUDY FRAMEWORK, METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH AND RESEARCH DESIGN  
 
Of the different kinds of reform that comprise the marketization and democratization 
categories, privatization and partnership approaches for water provision are more 
extensively implemented and studied132. Provision through more progressive kinds of 
devolution such as to local governments that function in a direct-democratic mode are 
not common, though water projects are among those that have been implemented 
through such arrangements. Since privatization has been found to be less than 
successful, to the extent of being reversed in some instances, (for example in 
                                                 
132 See for example, Rossi (2001), Bakker (2003a), Wilder and Lankao (2006), Assies (2003), 
Wasserman (2001).  
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Cochabamba, Bolivia)133 it is more useful to focus on the various kinds of 
communitarian arrangements where some success has been reported. The latter are 
broadly of two types as discussed before – the neoliberal, which prescribes (less) 
participatory and partnership arrangements, and the more progressive (even radical), 
which advocates direct-democratic and deliberative arrangements. Both apparently 
focus on community involvement, but the respective premises and institutional 
prescriptions, among other aspects, are substantially different. Assessing the relative 
performance of these two types – liberalized and devolved systems respectively – 
yields insights into their context-appropriateness.  
 
The question of which type of reform is most appropriate – and therefore can be 
expected to best deliver desired outcomes – in any location, in its very formulation, 
necessitated a comparative approach. A clear understanding of the relative suitability 
of the two types of reform is obtained by assessing and comparing the functioning of 
liberalized and devolved arrangements where these have been concurrently 
implemented, in locations which share the same (or have similar) attributes. Further, 
investigating the relative performance of each type across locations with different 
attributes provides additional insight into the question of context-appropriateness.  
 
In this study, I undertake both these kinds of comparisons. The methodological 
approach, the parameters for comparison and indicators used are discussed in 
sequence below. 
 
 
 
                                                 
133 See Assies 2003, Sadiq 2002 and Forero 2005, for the experience of water privatization in Bolivia. 
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2.1. METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
Considering one type of reformed arrangements for water provision in a locality as a 
case, a comparative case study approach emerged as the most suitable for this 
research, on a number of considerations set out by Yin (2003). First, and most 
important, because of the nature of the question, that required an exploration of how 
the reformed arrangements worked and why they worked as they did. As Yin explains, 
how and why questions are not well answered by survey or archival methods, though 
the latter readily provide answers to questions of who, what, where, how many and/or 
how much. Second, the study focused on contemporary events and processes that 
could not be manipulated as in an experiment. Third, the question focused on the 
relationships between the functioning of the reformed arrangements and characteristics 
of its real-life context, and the boundary between the phenomenon and context was 
unclear. In fact, it was the intersection of the phenomenon and the context that was a 
prime focus. This meant there could be expected to be many variables of interest, only 
some of which can be expected or listed prior to the research; one aspect of such a 
study is the expectation of uncovering other variables that affect performance of 
governance systems. Both for their number and this partially exploratory nature of the 
research, a survey would have been unsuitable.  
 
A case study approach also enabled the triangulation of evidence by enabling data 
collection through a variety of methods, including document review, interviews with 
individuals, focus group discussions, participatory mapping and direct observation; 
this was the fourth reason for the methodological choice. A fifth was that the research 
intention was ‘analytical generalization’ i.e., to extend and generalize the findings to 
theory, and not ‘statistical generalization’ to enumerate frequencies or find how 
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reforms performed across all locations (‘the population’). There is sufficient prior 
development of theoretical propositions, as discussed before (see section 1.1) to guide 
data collection and analysis towards the intended ‘analytical generalization’. The cases 
were studied not for their representative nature, but for their distinctive characteristics, 
to discern the pattern of outcomes in diverse contexts and investigate how they were 
related to the design of the governance arrangements on one hand, and relevant 
variables in the context on the other.  
 
An intra-national comparison, particularly in a large country with a federal polity 
(such as India), where the functioning of the same (or similar) reforms could be 
studied in different kinds of locations was found most appropriate. Jenkins (2004) 
identifies a number of reasons that make intra-country comparative study particularly 
suitable to understanding the effects of context on economic policy and politics, of 
which the most important is the common political and economic framework that 
provides “control variables [which] represent a major boon to students of comparative 
politics who seek to understand and explain the divergent patterns and outcomes that 
the practice of democracy can produce” (p.3). 
 
2.2. PARAMETERS FOR COMPARISON AND INDICATORS  
 
The two types of reform being studied were compared along three parameters – 
efficacy, effectiveness and inclusiveness. Efficacy refers to the capacity or potential to 
produce a desired effect under ideal or optimal conditions. In the context of this 
research, efficacy relates to the capacity of the reformed institutional configuration to 
achieve the two objectives of effective water supply and inclusive functioning, which 
are the two other parameters used for comparison. Effectiveness refers to the extent to 
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which a desired outcome is actually produced, under the existing conditions. In 
practical terms, the distinction between efficacy and effectiveness lies in the difference 
between how well the reformed institutional architecture is designed in relation to the 
objectives and how well it performs under the actual the contextual conditions within 
which it functions. Inclusiveness refers to the extent to which spaces created for 
marginalized groups in the reformed arrangements are actually used, that is, the extent 
to which they actually participate. The latter is a product of both context variables as 
well as the extent to which the reformed organizational arrangements are supportive. 
134  
 
Efficiency, particularly in terms of cost, often taken to be a key aspect was not 
included as a parameter for three reasons.  The first is a conviction that in developing 
contexts (such as India), where unacceptable proportions of the population remain 
without access to the minimum quantity of (safe) water required for survival, 
efficiency of water systems (in costs, energy consumption or any other dimension) is 
less of a priority than their effectiveness135, although both are important. Secondly, 
when options are limited or absent as they frequently are in such contexts, 
arrangements for provision of minimum, life-sustaining quantities of water cannot be 
subject to considerations of cost or systemic efficiency. A third reason is that 
                                                 
134 Though decentralization discourses differ in many ways - in their geographical origins, theoretical 
underpinnings, objectives, institutional (and organizational) prescriptions for reform, and not least, in 
the fundamental conception of human nature and her construction as a consumer or citizen – the two 
objectives of improving water provision and making the governance processes more inclusive are 
common. The two are valued and constructed differently; in the neoliberal communitarian discourse, 
participation is valued as an essential instrumentality to improve provision, while in the more 
progressive discourse, fully-participatory governance constitutes an end in itself, which would in turn 
produce improvements in public services and local development. Nevertheless, both effectiveness and 
inclusion are among the prime objectives that are commonly claimed as the raison d’etre for 
decentralization in both discourses and can therefore fruitfully be used for comparing the performance 
of the two. 
135 This is because the minimum quantity of water must be ensured for all citizens under any 
circumstances (universal access), even if under some technological or geographical circumstances the 
costs of provision are disproportionate to the outputs such as amounts of water being delivered.   
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assessments of efficiency are confounded by the incomparability of costs of large, 
centralized bureaucratic systems intended to cover large regions and those of small, 
local systems that are expected when provision is decentralized to communities136. 
How effective the arrangements are in providing reliable and sustained access is the 
more pertinent and important question, and therefore, the effectiveness of reformed 
institutional arrangements is an appropriate parameter to assess efficacy of water 
reforms in developing contexts137. 
 
2.2.1. EFFICACY: IMPORTANCE AND INDICATORS  
 
Inadequate decentralization, of either administrative, fiscal or other powers has been 
found to be one of the most frequent reasons for failure of reformed systems, 
particularly when the decentralization is to communities, for it compromises the 
possibilities of any functional gain from decentralization at the outset. 138  In other 
words, the extent of decentralization determines its capacity to achieve desired 
outcomes; that is, its efficacy. The design of reforms, including the extent to which 
governance processes are actually decentralized, depends on political-economic 
factors of the state context which are likely to favor some types and degrees of reform.  
                                                 
136 For example, the costs of multipurpose dams from which drinking water is often supplied to cities or 
large rural regions, would need to be allocated across the many uses and users of the water (such as 
irrigation, power generation and domestic supply), an exercise which cannot be done with any 
reasonable accuracy.  
137 Effectiveness of service provision has also arguably been a prime concern in the discussions on 
service provision in developing contexts, specifically in water and sanitation which are very basic to a 
humane existence (WHO-UNICEF 2004, Gleick 1996), though issues of cost-recovery and 
conservation are also highlighted. This is unlike the concern with increasing efficiency that is central to 
the marketization discourses pertaining to developed countries. 
138 This is clear in the empirical literature summarized in section 1.2. In the case of privatization, there 
is less scope for ‘inadequate’ transfers, though the elements of a water provisioning system may be 
privatized in various combinations (see Bakker 2003). This may also be due to the fact that 
governments realize substantial monies from ‘selling off’ state-owned enterprises or utilities to private 
investors (see Kikeri and Nellis 2002, 2004) whereas they – or sections within them – face reduction of 
powers and resources in decentralizing to localities.   
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Three indicators were used to assess the extent of decentralization: which and how 
many elements of the water provisioning system are decentralized, and to whom the 
tasks are transferred. It is not assumed that the water supply system would be a piped 
network, for in developing countries other technologies are also used, as are many 
agencies at various levels of jurisdiction. Therefore, the list of tasks involved and the 
relative importance of each in the whole process was necessarily developed during the 
case studies, with the help of key resource persons, as is explained later in section 5. 
 
In Chapter 1, classifications were developed for the various kinds of agencies/ actors 
that could be involved in the reformed organizational configurations (Table 1.3) and 
the degrees of transfer of functions that could be involved (Table 1.4), from a critical 
review of the conceptual literature. These could be used directly for analyzing the 
extent of decentralization, by placing the horizontal and vertical distribution of tasks 
across groups (government, para-statal, local government, community-based, non-
governmental and private-commercial) and levels of jurisdiction (locality, district, and 
State) in a matrix that is also scaled to the degree of transfer (de-concentrated, 
delegated or devolved). The distance from the central or national government, either 
vertically or horizontally, represents the extent of decentralization. 
 
2.2.2. EFFECTIVENESS AND ITS INDICATORS  
 
A number of dimensions have been used in the literature to assess water supply 
systems, including quantity, quality, ease of access, reliability or dependability of the 
source, and not least, its sustainability. However, other aspects such as the disparities 
in the availability of water to different groups, who owns or controls the source, 
whether it is private (household) or shared, and frequency and duration of supply are 
  
 
114
also important. From among these, five indicators have been selected for this study, in 
the light of three important considerations – quantity, equity and access. These are 
listed below. Quality of water supplied is not included, despite its importance, because 
of the uncertainties of actual laboratory testing in the field situations. However, 
whether the users (or other actors) test the water supplied for quality as a part of the 
operational arrangements, and the perception of changes in potability, are questions 
explored. 
 
It must be reiterated here that in the literature, the reference to drinking water and 
domestic water are often conflated, with most often, the term ‘drinking water’ being 
used to indicate ‘domestic’ water. The former is generally meant to include water 
required by households for drinking, cooking and basic ablutions, though sometimes 
that required for activities like cleaning of clothes or for domestic animals is also 
included, therefore the term ‘domestic water’ is more accurate. In this study, the term 
domestic water is used to denote the water used in the house, minimally for drinking, 
cooking and basic ablutions, but which could include some other uses. Also, in this 
study, it is not the performance of the post-reform installed system of water supply that 
is in focus, but the performance of the reformed governance arrangements through 
which they are created and managed. 
 
 Change in the per capita availability of water (in liters per capita per day)  
Increase in the quantity of water available from safe sources is a clear indicator, 
specially at the margins where many remain without assured access to even the 
minimum required for a dignified existence. Therefore, the change in the average per 
capita quantity of water available to households is taken as the first and most telling 
indicator. Internationally, the minimum quantity estimated to be necessary for human 
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existence is 50 liters per person per day, for drinking, cooking and personal hygiene; 
including other activities or changing the technology of supply raises this minimum 
substantially (WHO-UNICEF 2004). The WHO standards are however, not binding, 
and countries can and do fix their own levels. 
 
 Change in extent of disparity (also in liters per capita per day or lpcd) 
Averages conceal as much as they reveal, and in a context where every liter of water is 
important, equitable distribution of water from systems developed with public funds is 
desirable. Also, neoliberal reforms have widely been critiqued for their propensity to 
increase disparities, and whether such an effect is produced by the reformed 
arrangements needs to be ascertained.  In developing areas, the difference between 
those with private sources and those fetching water from elsewhere – public 
standposts, handpumps or wells, ponds rivers and not least, irrigation wells – can be 
substantial. To assess the extent of change in disparity, the difference of the averages 
for the two groups is taken, that is, the difference between 
a. Change in per capita availability for those with household connections 
or sources 
b. Change in per capita availability for those dependant on public or 
shared sources. 
 
 Increase in the number of households with private connections/sources (as 
a percentage of total households in the local jurisdiction) 
For maximum convenience, it is certainly desirable that all households have 
independent sources, preferably in the house, but this is not common in most 
developing locations. It is, however, an important and valid aim; therefore the 
percentage increase in the number of household connections in the village after 
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reforms is taken as a third indicator of its effectiveness. 139 
 
 Decrease in the number of households outside a convenient radius from a 
protected public source (as a percentage of total households in the local 
jurisdiction) 
For those without household connections, the reduction of the distance to their 
source(s) from the house is an important consideration. For as the literature highlights, 
fetching water is women’s work in most developing countries, and the long distances 
they have to walk to do so is a major concern. Besides the hardship, the opportunity 
costs of the time consumed – frequently, hours – is important, and to be judged 
effective, water supply systems must reduce that. To estimate this, the change in the 
percentage of households within an acceptable radius was taken as another indicator. 
The maximum radius used for this was fixed in light of the prevailing conditions, 
norms developed as a part of the governance arrangements, and the local settlement 
structure. 
 
 Decrease in the proportion of households dependant on unprotected 
sources (as a percentage of total households in the local jurisdiction) 
The proportion of people in the village that still remain without access to safe 
(‘protected’) sources, despite the installation of new systems, must be ascertained, for 
it serves as an indicator of ‘coverage’. This is also a measure of inclusion of all 
households in public provision, an important consideration in relation to the concern 
about resource capture by the local elite in the decentralization literature.  
 
                                                 
139 This was also a pertinent indicator in the Indian context, for the liberalized system (Sector Reform-
Swajaldhara) is designed for the provision of piped supply. 
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2.2.3. INDICATORS OF INCLUSION 
 
The objective of increasing citizen participation in local governance, in practice 
translates into enabling the inclusion of groups marginalized by the pre-reform 
arrangements. For others already figure in some way in the existing set-up, formally or 
informally, legitimately or otherwise, or have access to it. It is segments of the 
population that remain systemically excluded, such as the poor, the ethnically different 
and women, and in India, the lower castes, whose presence and participation in 
governance is an issue. The extent and nature of inclusion of such groups can therefore 
be used to assess the inclusiveness of reformed arrangements.  
 
Among such groups, women are arguably the largest and also systemically excluded 
from governance structures and processes (Phillips 1991,1995). Moreover, gender 
overlies all other identities that vivify societies such as class, caste, income, ethnicity 
and race, and makes the task of women’s inclusion particularly challenging, since 
multiple identifiers must be taken into account. Therefore, assessing the extent to 
which their inclusion is enabled by the reformed arrangement is a clear measure of 
their inclusiveness and a good indicator of the efficacy of the reformed systems.  Also, 
women’s participation in the processes of water provision – as in other development 
projects - has been an objective since the early eighties, and subsequently, their 
inclusion in larger governance structures have also been in focus.  
 
The understandings of women’s marginalization and approaches for its rectification 
have, however changed over the years, though all views continue to variously 
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influence and structure development policy and action.140 In section 2.3 below, I 
review these positions and discuss how they are mirrored in the ‘women and water’ 
literature, before identifying the indicators used to assess women’s inclusion in 
decentralized arrangements for water provision.  
  
2.3. WOMEN’S INCLUSION IN GOVERNANCE 
 
The focus on women’s inclusion in governance structures has emerged from three 
directions, articulating different understandings of women’s place in society and in 
development. Within development discourses and practice, there are both instrumental 
and substantive constructions, which see women’s participation as necessary for the 
success of development interventions on one hand, and for its intrinsic democratic 
merit and as a definitional characteristic of development itself on the other. These 
have been variously influenced by more academic feminist thought, and transformed 
from ‘women-in-development’ (WID) to ‘gender and development’ (GAD) and 
empowerment approaches141. The work of feminist political theorists who provide 
more scholarly analyses of women and governance issues is a third focus.142 This 
work provides a deeper understanding of the barriers to women’s inclusion and 
specific institutional features that have been found supportive of their involvement. 
All these inform constructions of women’s roles in reformed arrangements for water 
                                                 
140 Assessing their inclusion in reformed governance structures is therefore also an assessment of the 
validity of these approaches. 
141 See Beneria (2001) for a succinct review of the shifts. Writings that discuss specific formulations in 
more detail are reviewed below, and many are also contained in Beneria and Bisnath (2001), who 
provide a collection of the seminal writings that have structured and described the theoretical, empirical 
and practical approaches in respect of women, gender and development.  
142 Political theorists include Anne Phillips, Iris Marion Young, Nancy Fraser and Marie Dietz, among 
others who focus specifically on the inclusion of women in formal political and policy structures (see 
Phillips 1998 for a collection of writings by these and other authors). Development theorists who focus 
specifically on emerging governance arrangements are Anne Marie Goetz and Cecile Jackson , among 
others. 
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provision, and a review suggests appropriate indicators of inclusiveness for the study.   
 
2.3.1. WID, WAD, GAD AND WOMEN’S EMPOWERMENT  
 
The trajectory of concerns about women’s marginalization in development theory and 
practice is succintly traced in Beneria (2001), and other authors offer more extensive 
discussion.143 The issue was initially recognized in terms of their exclusion from the 
benefits of development interventions, and attention directed towards addressing this, 
in a ‘women-in-development’ (WID) approach. This focused on including them in 
‘beneficiary groups’, developing special programs to support economic activity, and 
directing attention to their needs in other programs as well. Along with this attention 
in the prevalent ‘basic needs approach’ to development, their inclusion (or its lack) 
was also promoted by the emerging call for participation of beneficiaries in 
development programs, to better align them to with local needs (Palmer 1977, see also 
Tinker 1990). Women’s participation was advocated also as they had a direct and 
primary stake in basic public services like water, primary education, health and 
welfare programs that addressed food shortages and poverty (because of their 
domestic responsibilities) and were therefore more apt to have an interest in the 
success of such programs. With growing concerns about environmental degradation, 
the impact on access of rural women to fuel and fodder was noticed; their reliance on 
ecosystems and their privileged connection with nature was also emphasized by eco-
feminists and added to the calls for their inclusion in environmental programs.144  
 
                                                 
143 For example, Tinker (1990), Rathberger (1990), Baden and Goetz (1998). 
144 See Nightingale (2006) for a review of the ecofeminist positions. Bina Agarwal suggests that 
women’s connection with the environment, in the context of the Third World, lies both in the greater 
impact of environmental degradation on women as well as their agency in environmental protection 
arising from their material reliance on their local natural resources (Agarwal 1992, 2000, 2007).  
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The WID approach was to support and ‘mainstream’ women, which was criticized for 
its de-politicised, instrumental approach and neglect of deeper social structures that 
perpetuated inequities between men and women. The critiques emerged from more 
radical, but academic perspectives that rejected donor-led notions of development and 
viewed transformations of the iniquitous power relations in society, including class 
and gender, as central to meaningful societal change. The ‘women and development’ 
(WAD) analyses, along with increased understanding of women’s subordinate position 
in society as a function of the very definition of masculinity and femininity and 
relations between men and women in society influenced the shift in development 
thought from WID to a ‘gender and development’ (GAD) approach. This recognized 
women’s marginalization as embedded in the deep structures that constructed relations 
between men and women (Beneria 2001, 2003) and their relative entitlements (Sen 
1995), agency and bargaining power (Agarwal 1997). Attention was focused on the 
need for development interventions to address women’s ‘strategic’ needs along with 
‘practical’ ones (Moser 1989). Increasingly sophisticated theoretical understandings of 
the social constructions of gender and its pervasive structuring of economic, political 
and social relations have brought other perspectives to development, and animated 
subsequent ‘empowerment’ approaches; the notions of gender and empowerment, 
however, still remain inadequately applied across development thought and practice 
(Beneria 2001).   
 
The understanding of women’s centrality in development has grown dramatically in 
the decade or so, with the reduction of inequality increasingly being constructed as 
intrinsic to any progress (Dreze and Sen 1995). Investigations into their contribution 
and key roles in supporting globalized production processes as well as the 
disproportional impact of SAPs and globalization on women have drawn focused 
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attention (for example, Floro and Schaefer 1998, Cagatay and Ozler 1995). Increased 
understanding of women’s participation in both formal and informal economic 
processes has challenged existing orthodoxies that posit the importance of markets and 
globalization to development.145  
 
Scholarly attention has also been directed on the exclusion of women from politics, 
government and policy-making – that is, from governance – by feminist-democratic 
theorists who also articulate the importance of their inclusion. In addition to its 
intrinsic democratic merit, feminist theorizing, like development discourses on the 
gains from including women in decision processes, also argues that women can bring 
important concerns and considerations into policy-making. Two reasons, both 
essentialist in their formulation and instrumental in their logic, are advanced in these 
literatures – one, that everywhere, women’s domestic experiences provide special 
insights and a relational, inclusive approach in dealing with important public services 
(such as in health, childcare, or education), and two, in developing locations, their 
ecological knowledge, understanding and concern produces an orientation to more 
sustainable choices.146 The more substantive position is that women’s inclusion is just, 
democratic and necessary for their empowerment and existence as equal members of 
society (Phillips 1991, 1995, Fraser 2005).  
 
The issue of women’s inclusion in water governance reflects both the instrumental and 
substantive positions. It is particularly valued and now widely advocated as a means to 
                                                 
145 See, for example, the collection of papers in Kudva and Beneria (eds) 2005 and Sen 1999.  
146 Women’s association with sustainable development and their greater ecological sensitivity has been 
widely discussed both theoretically within eco-feminism and empirically in developmental literature. 
(see, for eg, Sandilands 1999; Agarwal 1999; Dietrich 1999; Braidotti et al., 1995, Mies and Shiva 
1993). Inclusion of issues from the ‘private’ realm and the possibilities of changing the nature of 
governance is discussed in the feminist explorations on politics and democracy. (see for example, 
Phillips 1991, 1995; also 1998 for a collection of key writings) 
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improve management and sustainability of installed water supply and irrigation 
systems (van Wijk 1985, 1998; Narayan 1995, Cleaver 1998a, 1998b; Jackson 1998, 
WWC 1999). Alongside, attention has also been drawn to their claims, as community 
members, to water rights that also enable their engagement in productive activities 
(Zwarteveen 1997, van Koppen 1998). 
 
Despite such diverse attention, women’s representation in formal governance 
structures remained near absent across countries and cultures till the nineties. 
Governance reforms in many countries in the last decade have paid particular attention 
to this marginalization and included spaces for women, increasing their presence 
(UNDP 2000, UNRISD 2005, WEDO 2003)147 though in most instances this remains 
to be translated into active participation in decision-making. The varying patterns of 
participation observed across locations, however, underscores the importance of 
appropriate institutional design and contextual fit, for they are unexplained by 
differences in individual attributes such as educational and employment status. The 
explanation is found in institutional variables such as socio-cultural and political 
differences, and variations in the electoral systems, which appear to have a greater 
effect on women’s representation, particularly at the local level. These and other 
supportive institutional features have been identified in the political literature, which 
offers a deeper understanding of the barriers to women’s involvement in governance.  
 
 
                                                 
147 The average presence of women in national legislatures remained at about 9% till 1995. A wave of 
legal and institutional reforms in the nineties to increase the proportion of women in national 
legislatures and local governments has raised this average to about 16% and 15% respectively. In India, 
one-third of the elected positions in local government are reserved for women since 1992, but no such 
provision exists for State and National legislatures. Only 16 countries have 30% or more women in 
national legislatures, and a similar proportion is observed in local governments only in countries that 
allocate a quota of local government constituencies for women contestants like India, Uganda, France 
and Bolivia. (UNRISD 2005, WEDO 2003, UNDP 2000a). 
  
 
123
 
2.3.2. BARRIERS TO WOMEN’S INVOLVEMENT 
 
In the political literature, the reasons for women’s exclusion are identified as relating 
to the gendered separation between the ‘public’ sphere of economic and political life, 
and the domestic, ‘private’ sphere of the household. (Phillips 1991; Okin 1991; 
Pateman 1989; Mansbridge 1991; Dietz 1987). The gendered distribution of labor 
almost everywhere assigns reproductive, productive and nurturing responsibilities 
within the family and the household to women, and economic and political work in the 
‘public’ domain to men.148 Entrenched in political theory and practice, this assumption 
is institutionalized even in democratic governance systems that, while purporting to be 
based on ‘universal’ ideas of civic equality of right-bearing individuals, are actually 
structured around a male norm, usually males of the majority or dominant groups 
(Pateman, 1983,1989; Eisenstein 1989, Phillips 1991).149  
 
In addition, women’s traditional relegation to the domestic sphere has socialized them 
against public politics, encumbered them with domestic responsibilities, prevented 
public work that leads to political careers, and precluded development of skills 
required in these domains. This is changing, with sharp increases in women’s 
participation in the labour force and at all levels in industry and public service, though 
                                                 
148 While the boundaries between public and private have shifted with the emergence of the modern 
industrial economy and the attendant liberal-democratic political framework, the private-household 
domain continues to remain excluded by a ‘double separation’, from both the public-political and the 
public-social, which encompassed the social and economic activity of consenting men (Pateman 1989, 
also Arendt 1958, cited in Phillips 1991: 29). 
149 The contemporary idea of citizenship accords all individuals the same status as political peers, but in 
its interpretation of sameness, it transcends particularity and difference to focus on commonality and 
uniform application of laws and rules. This idea of a transcendant citizenship and general political will 
works to exclude those who do not ‘fit’ the universal (male) norms, such as women; and the strict 
application of the principle of equal treatment to all in the face of social differences and inequalities has 
perpetuated their disadvantage (Young, 1989). 
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their proportion in respect to men in such fields remains very low150. Active exclusion 
by male selectorates and others in decision-making positions arising from either 
competition or gendered socialization continues to be an important barrier to their 
participation in political structures. The exclusion of issues related to the domestic 
realm (such as child and elderly care) from public policy concern151 has also 
handicapped women attempting to breach institutional, material, perceptual and 
behavioral barriers to their involvement in economic and political arenas outside the 
home. (Phillips 1991; Rhode 1992; Mohanty 1992; Jain 1996; UNDP 2000a).  
 
While individual attributes such as the lack of time, qualifications, experience and 
connections that result from these larger constructions may explain women’s absence 
from governance to an extent, the persistence of patriarchal social arrangements and 
cultural norms at the local level, which differ across locations in their content and 
modulate exclusion in context-specific ways emerge as the most significant barrier. 
This is specially the case in developing countries, where modernization is uneven and 
traditional norms and practices persist more extensively. This observation not only 
emerges from all investigations of women’s participation152 but is also self-evident, 
for it is the underlying social-institutional structures that determine women’s access to 
education, employment and public space, and within which their individual self-
efficacies are developed. Measures to counter such barriers have also been explored, 
and efforts made to increase the involvement of women in formal governance 
processes. I discuss these propositions and experiences below.   
                                                 
150 Except in service professions like teaching, nursing, child and senior care and similar fields. 
151 Though these exclusions have increasingly been challenged and policy attention pulled to such 
issues in the advanced economies (see, as one example, discussions on childcare policy in US in 
Warner (ed., 2006), this is not often the case in developing countries, though specific issues such as 
dowry-related violence, child-mortality and other issues have attracted policy attention. 
152 All studies relating to women’s experience in society contain such accounts, including reviews by 
the international organizations such as UNDP (2000a) and UNRISD (2005) and academics and 
researchers (see Kapadia 2002). 
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2.3.3. WOMEN’S INCLUSION: INSTITUTIONAL MEASURES 
 
Authors such as Phillips, who argues that universal suffrage and representative 
government are valuable mechanisms for democratic inclusion, particularly where 
democracy is relatively new, have identified institutional mechanisms that counter 
various barriers and enable inclusion. Phillips advocacy of representation, for 
example, must be augmented with measures that ensure the presence and voice of all 
social groups and fleshed out with direct-democratic decision-making and measures 
for greater accountability (Phillips 1991). Time and location of public processes, and 
the reallocation of domestic/caring work become critical variables in making this 
possible. Affirmative mechanisms such as quotas or proportional representation are 
also particularly important, though they must be treated as transitional measures 
towards ‘a world in which gender should become less relevant and the abstractions of 
humanity more meaningful…’ (Phillips, 1991:7). Young (1989, 2000) suggests that 
the presence and role of marginalized and oppressed groups must be guaranteed, 
demonstrable inclusion of their views in decisions must be obligated, and veto power 
provided over policies that affect them directly153, through legal-formal institutional 
mechanisms. Also, women’s self-organization needs to be publicly supported, to make 
their participation effective in both representative and plenary bodies. 
 
In empirical investigation, institutional differences in the electoral system have proved 
to be a predictor of differences in women’s presence in elected bodies, with various 
kinds of proportional representation, mandated quotas of women-only constituencies, 
quotas in party lists and multi-member constituencies being visibly advantageous over 
single-member constituencies with first-past-the-post systems. The experience of 
                                                 
153 This last is problematic for Phillips (1991) 
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reforms that alter the design of electoral and governance processes, which are specific 
to countries and localities, present these as significant factors that have sharply 
affected the presence and involvement of women in governance (WEDO 2003). 
 
The degree of political egalitarianism in the context has also been found to be 
important, and the effect of socio-economic conditions and dominant religion 
insignificant (Valance 1979; Norris 1985; and Sapiro 1981 on religion). However, 
Phillips has convincingly argued that economic equality is instrumental and necessary 
for meaningful political equality. (Phillips, 1999), and more recently, Fraser (2005) 
has argued that recognition, redistribution, and representation are all equally important 
and indivisibly linked. Educational levels and employment rates appear to be unrelated 
to the pattern of women’s participation across countries but local political mobilization 
and educating women to critically reflect on their situation and act together to 
overcome barriers are factors that successfully increase women’s involvement (Sapiro 
1981, Niranjana 2002).  
 
2.3.4. RESEARCHING WOMEN’S INVOLVEMENT: APPROACH AND INDICATORS 
 
The theoretical and empirical literature on women’s inclusion in governance provided 
a number of methodological indications for this study. These relate to (a) defining the 
object of study, (b) delineating case boundaries and identifying the structures and 
process that need to be studied and (c) the variables that are particularly relevant to 
women’s participation. 
 
The literature indicates that in investigating women’s inclusion in structures and 
processes for the provision of domestic water, as in this study, attention cannot be 
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restricted to formal governance arrangements, but the reasons for the observed 
patterns must be explored in other organizational and private domains, such as their 
participation in civic or community organizations and their household responsibilities 
and roles. This is because inequalities of men and women in the worlds of politics, 
work and the household are demonstrably and inextricably related in causal cycles, 
and therefore cannot be understood or interpreted in isolation. (Sapiro 1981; Okin 
1991)154  
 
Diamond and Hartsock (1981) suggest that finely dissecting the process of (state) 
policy-making and implementation through and across the variegated structure can 
expose how gender (or class, race, or caste) hierarchies shape each step, and exclude 
particular groups or interests. For in addition to being closely inter-related and 
mutually constitutive, none of the three worlds (politics, work and the household) are 
undifferentiated in their structure or singular in their embodiment of ‘patriarchal’ 
notions or gendered interests.155 Moreover, these patterns differ across locations – and 
sometimes, across communities in the same location (Okin 1991) – and thereby alter 
mechanisms of women’s exclusion and inclusion in different ways. These differences 
then become important factors in comparing women’s participation across locations. 
                                                 
154 However, feminists do not deny the concept or value of privacy in human life nor that some 
distinctions need to be made between public and domestic spheres. But Okin notes, from cross-cultural 
studies, that what is private and the value of privacy differs from one society to another, though none 
have been found that do not value privacy of some sort. (Okin 1999: Notes, 1). 
155 For example, the public-political realm, embodied in the state, is diverse, divided, contradictory, and 
variegated. Contemporary post-modern, Foucauldian understandings of the loci of power, suggest it 
operates relationally, in a capillary fashion from below; and the ‘state’ is revealed as an overall effect of 
these relations rather than a coherent agent of particular groups. Attention has shifted from the 
intentionality of the state to its differentiated techniques and apparatuses of regulation visible in the 
discourses of ‘governmentality’;  to how ‘localized and specific mechanisms and technologies of power 
... get annexed and appropriated to more global forms of domination’ (Pringle and Watson 1998: 206). 
The state is a ‘series of arenas’ or a plurality of discursive forums, which does not necessarily act to 
preserve patriarchal or capitalist relations, nor can that be assumed to be its ‘purpose’ (Yeatman, 1990). 
However, this does not reduce its importance as an analytical construct or site/object of struggle, the 
need is to focus on particular institutions, its specific histories and relationships with other parts of the 
structure, and acknowledge historical, cultural and locational specificities. 
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Thus theoretical and empirical literature on the dynamics of women’s exclusion from 
governance reaffirms that investigating women’s participation in reformed 
arrangements is an excellent way to gauge the context-appropriateness of reforms, in 
addition to being an important question in itself. Also, the adoption of a comparative 
case study approach appears most suitable, for while Diamond and Hartsock’s 
suggestion for intricate policy analysis can expose gender exclusion, only comparative 
study (of similar policy structures or processes across dissimilar contexts or different 
structure and process across similar contexts) can reliably identify enabling and 
disabling features. In other words, while studying one case can reveal the limitations 
(or capacities) of a governance structure and process, to understand if alternative 
arrangements could be more efficacious in the same context requires comparative 
analysis. 
 
Methodologically, the investigation not only calls for attention to legal institutional 
configurations of the political-administrative system but also customary and statutory 
institutional characteristics of the private and civil spheres. Also, to study the 
appropriateness of reformed institutional structures, tracing the processes – policy 
making and planning, implementation, and administration – that constitute 
governance, and investigating the organizational frameworks within which they 
operate (in any location – state, market, civil society or household) is more appropriate 
than an a priori focus on a specific organization, for example, the local government. 
Such an approach precludes methodological pre-determination of the study.  
 
2.3.5. INDICATORS OF INCLUSIVENESS 
 
From these understandings of the dynamics of women’s inclusion, three indicators 
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were identified to assess the inclusiveness of reformed governance systems, as below.   
 
 Extent and type of spaces statutorily provided for women.  
The inclusiveness of the reformed institutional architecture; that is, its efficacy (or 
potential) to bring women into the process is the first question in relation to women’s 
participation. In operational terms, this translates into assessing to what extent and 
what kinds of spaces have been created in the organizational structures and procedures 
for women. This can be determined from the statutory provisions made for them in the 
reformed design, such as the proportion of organizational positions earmarked for 
women, which therefore becomes the first indicator of reform efficacy. But the more 
important question, of the kind of spaces created – for example, whether and how 
central they are in the decision-making processes – is less easily transformed into a 
measurable indicator for use in comparing across reformed systems. A first-level 
assessment can however, be made by disaggregating such provisions, into those for 
key decision-making structures (such as executive committees) and for other, more 
general inclusion, such as in the general body. The proportion of positions that are 
earmarked for women in key decision-making structures is therefore another indicator.  
 
 Proportion of these spaces actually occupied 
The second question pertaining to women’s involvement is the extent to which women 
actually occupy the spaces made available. In view of the many hurdles discussed 
above, that almost universally deter women from participation in public affairs, the 
full utilization of spaces provided cannot be assumed. The proportion of spaces 
actually occupied in relation to that provided indicates the actual extent to which 
women are present in the structure. This indicator can be applied to the various kinds 
of positions. If the earmarked positions are not fully occupied, the reasons could lie in 
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disabling features of the institutional arrangements or the local circumstances. This 
can also be researched, but is not useful for quantitative comparison, for in 
transforming it into a measurable indicator, much of the detail and intricacies of the 
interaction between the institutional arrangements and the context would be lost.    
 
 Proportion of opportunities actually used, from the total available 
The third, and more important question is of the extent to which women actually use 
the spaces they occupy, by participating at meetings, taking part in the proceedings 
and discussions and undertaking executive or managerial responsibilities. In a general 
context of women’s customary exclusion, inhibiting social norms and the demands of 
their domestic responsibilities and income earning imperatives, even attendance at 
meetings is an issue. The proportion of organizational meetings they even attend must 
therefore be included as an indicator. For comparison, a consolidated proportion is 
used – the proportion of the total opportunities for participation that are used. The 
‘total opportunities for participation’ is the product of the number of meetings held 
and the number of women members, and the ‘opportunities used’ is the product of the 
total meetings attended by all members and the number of members.  This is in the 
nature of weighted averages, to account for the different number of meetings held in 
different organizational entities and the differences in the numbers of women 
members. Again, this indicator can be used to gauge levels of attendance in different 
kinds of meetings, for example in the executive and general bodies.  
 
One dimension that was particularly important in the analyses was to understand 
women’s patterns of participation in relation to that of their male cohorts. This is 
important in gauging if women’s (lack of) participation is gendered, or similar to a 
wider pattern that shapes the involvement of both men and women in local-level 
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governance processes in similar fashion. Without this comparison, it would be difficult 
to state if the reformed institutional design is inhospitable to citizen participation in 
general, or if they are specifically unsupportive of women’s participation. Therefore, 
to assess the extent to which women’s levels of participation are a product of gendered 
circumstances, the pattern of participation of men is also captured, using the same 
indicators. Beyond mere presence, their actual involvement in proceedings and 
responsibilities is not compared quantitatively, but explored qualitatively.  
 
 
3. THE RESEARCH LOCATION AND SPECIFIC RESEARCH QUESTIONS  
 
India emerged as a most suitable location for the study, for a variety of reasons. One 
was the researcher’s familiarity with the country, but the more important 
considerations were the federal polity, regional economic, political and socio-cultural 
diversity, and the variety of reforms that have been undertaken.  In the last decade, 
there has been both devolution and liberalization of domestic water provision, and the 
functioning of the reformed arrangements could be studied in selected locations that 
varied systematically in political, economic and socio-cultural characteristics.156 Intra-
country comparisons in India have been particularly useful in uncovering State-wise 
variations in governance and policy outcomes, such as in poverty-alleviation (Kohli 
1987), post-reform economic performance (Ahluwalia 2000), political regimes 
(Harriss 1999) and economic policy making  (Kennedy 2004, Sinha 2004). Jenkins 
(2004) makes a particularly strong case for the utility of intra-country comparative 
study in India, arguing that the unified economic framework, sustained democratic 
                                                 
156 The reforms are equally applicable to urban and rural jurisdictions, but this study focused only on 
rural areas. 
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polity and the socio-historical, administrative and cultural variation across States 
makes it eminently suitable for understanding policy and context intersections. 
 
Governance reforms in India, initiated in 1991, have been driven by both neoliberal 
and communitarian discourses, and included different kinds of initiatives for 
marketization and democratization. A substantial move was made towards 
democratization through the 73rd and 74th Constitutional Amendment Acts157(CAAs), 
which devolved planning powers and responsibilities for a host of public functions to 
local governments, and mandated the constitution of citizen assemblies at the 
municipal and sub-municipal levels for local decision-making (see for example 
Mathew 2000; UNDP 2000; World Bank 2000). More widely, in a process of 
liberalization, private firms have been permitted in areas that were exclusively in the 
state sector, such as banking, insurance and infrastructure construction (for example, 
Bhagwati 1994; Ahluwalia 2000; Jalan 1996). Service provision in particular has been 
liberalized extensively, with private sector and community participation in areas such 
as power supply, telecommunications, roads and notably, water provision. A number 
of administrative reforms have also been instituted, for inclusion of citizen-groups and 
civil-society organizations in state functioning, and to enable the ‘third sector’ – 
including user groups, a variety of community-based organizations, and local and non-
local NGOs – to take on a number of functions till recently the responsibility of 
Central or State governments (Sundar 2000; Sarin 1996; Krishnan 2003; Kumar 
2002). The extent to which each kind of reform applies to a particular local 
jurisdiction, as well as the actual institutional-organizational mechanisms and 
                                                 
157 These two Amendment Acts, enacted in 1992 and 1993, pertain to the devolution of powers to 
elected local governments in rural and urban areas respectively, and provided the template for state 
legislation for local government strengthening and functioning. While specification of the powers and 
functions of local governments were left to the discretion of the state governments – within specified 
parameters – many details of its structure and functioning were made mandatory and are therefore 
uniformly incorporated in the state legislation. 
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processes that have been set in place, however, differ across States (and sometimes, 
districts within States), since in the federal polity, a number of these subjects are under 
State jurisdiction.    
 
Water provision has been reformed as a part of these processes, with devolution to 
local governments and liberalization of State systems of water provision. Contours of 
the water reforms in India, regional variations along relevant parameters and selection 
of cases for study are described in the sections below. 
 
3.1. WATER REFORMS IN INDIA: DEVOLUTION AND LIBERALIZATION  
 
Constitutionally, water provision in India is primarily the responsibility of State 
governments, though the Central government has increasingly been setting major 
policy, determining approaches and providing substantial funds for infrastructure 
development since 1985. After 1992, responsibility was however, transferred to the 
newly strengthened local governments, and subsequently, also to community and user 
groups through a Sector Reform Program, piloted in 1999 and in 2002 extended as the 
‘Swajaldhara’ program to all States158. These two reform initiatives both reflect the 
communitarian discourses on local governance, but as clearly, the former is cast in a 
progressive-communitarian mould and the latter in distinctly neoliberal structures.  
 
Elected local governments were statutorily mandated and given the ‘right to life’159 for 
the first time in India, by the Constitution 73rd and 74th Amendment Acts (CAAs). 
Emerging as much from a national history of ideas and efforts to develop local self-
                                                 
158GoI 1999, 2003; see also Krishnan 2003. 
159 As expressed by Mr. Sivaramakrishnan, ex-Secretary, Ministry of Urban Development, GOI, in 
personal communication. This means they are legally safeguarded against arbitrary dismissal, 
dissolution or supercession by state governments, who hold powers to legislate on local governance.  
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governance and decentralize development initiatives as from the international 
discourses around decentralization, three-tier, elected local governments were 
instituted compulsorily in rural and urban areas, across all States and Union Territories 
(UTs) after 1992. In this legislation, both Panchayats (rural locals governments) and 
municipal governments were mandated ‘to function as units of self-government’ and 
to be endowed with powers, responsibilities and resources for ‘the preparation of plans 
for economic development and social justice’ and ‘the implementation of schemes that 
may be entrusted to them’ by superior levels of government (GoI, 1992). In addition, 
the Nagarpalika Act also mandated the constitution of a District Planning Committee 
(DPC) in every district160 of the country, to ‘consolidate the plans prepared by the 
Panchayats and the Municipalities in the district and to prepare a draft development 
plan for the district as a whole’ (GoI 1992). In a provision that soon brought more than 
a million women into local governments, one-third of the electoral constituencies at all 
levels were statutorily earmarked for women.  
 
While these provisions of the Central Acts apply uniformly throughout the country, 
and provide a skeletal uniformity, various details of the structure and procedures were 
left to the discretion of the State legislatures, to be specified in their respective 
Conforming Acts. This has not only resulted in significant variations in the local 
government structure and functioning across States, but also in the nature and extent 
of their authority, responsibilities and resources (see Mathew 2000, Pal 2004, Mishra 
2008). Water provision was one of the responsibilities devolved to local governments 
in most States, though resources and most notably, technical personnel were not 
always transferred. 
                                                 
160 Districts are sub-state administrative units, which in turn are further subdivided into smaller revenue 
jurisdictions variously called talukas, mandals or tehsils in different parts of the country. Development 
‘blocks’ were constituted in the sixties and seventies under the community development program 
(CDP), including one or more talukas, for implementation of development projects and programs.  
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Beginning in 1991, a spate of neoliberal economic reforms including both 
liberalization and privatization were also implemented in many sectors of the 
economy.161 Dovetailing with these were subsequent administrative reforms of 
government departments and the revision of development programs along more 
business-like principles. The communitarian strand of the liberalization initiatives 
were directed to increasing the involvement of citizens in local governance, in very 
‘neoliberal communitarian’ approaches. For example, in the Forest Department’s 
program for Joint Forest Management (JFM), forest-dependant village communities 
have been allowed to manage demarcated forest areas through JFM Committees, and a 
similar approach has been taken in the participatory Watershed Management program 
of the Ministry of Rural Development. Various kinds of user committees have also 
been formed, for example in education, health and irrigation. The application of these 
reforms and the specific organizational arrangements at the local level, again, varies 
regionally across States and sometimes, districts. These reforms for citizen 
involvement, typically include a quota for women in the beneficiary or user groups 
that are constituted, usually one-third of membership, emulating the provisions in local 
governments. The pilot Sector Reform Program (SRP) initiated by the Department of 
Drinking Water Supply (DDWS), of the Central Government’s Ministry of Rural 
Development (MoRD) is one of such reforms, initially introduced in selected districts 
but in 2002 extended to all as Swajaldhara (SP). 
The progressive and neoliberal characteristics of the two reforms respectively are 
                                                 
161 Tariff rates were cut, and legislation and policy was put in place to enable private firms to compete 
with formerly protected government monopolies in, among others, power, air transport, 
telecommunications, public services provision, banking, media and infrastructure construction and 
management. Public sector organizations have been restructured or divested to the private sector 
(Bhattacharya 1999; Bhagwati 1994). Again, while most of these reforms apply to the whole country, in 
many sectors, States have been free to implement the reforms in different forms and timelines, resulting 
in different degrees and kinds of restructuring in the local arrangements for provision and distribution of 
services. 
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distinctly evident. Though both neoliberal and progressive discourses intersect in the 
domestic articulations on devolution to local governments, what distinguishes it as a 
progressive-communitarian type of reform is the provision for direct-democratic 
functioning at the town, village or habitation level. The assembly of all voters in the 
jurisdiction was constituted as a decision-making assembly (Gram Sabha) by the 
CAAs, with the elected local government serving as the executive body.162 The 
neoliberal underpinnings of the partnership approaches to citizen participation 
(through user committees and the like) adopted in Central and State departmental 
reform, are clearly evident in the stated objectives of the SRP as also in the 
institutional design that is mandated. (GoI 1999, 2002) 
 
With governance reforms of these two types, and the variation in institutional 
arrangements across States (sometimes even districts) structures for ‘multi-channel 
government’ emerged at the local level, with competing institutional structures 
coexisting uneasily. (Manor 1999, World Bank 2000, UNDP 2000). The concurrent 
operation of reforms premised on different discursive formations has sharply surfaced 
contradictory and competing processes in local governance (Roychoudhury 2002; 
Patnaik 2001; Bhattacharya 1999). Conflicts have emerged between the legitimacy, 
functions and domains of local government and the varied types of organizations that 
have been constituted at the local level, and also between processes of democratic, 
locally determined development and expert-centered top-down approaches (Manor 
2001). This impacts both effectiveness of and participation in the reformed 
governance structures, for not only are resources and expertise fragmented and 
selectively channeled, it sets up variations in the kind of spaces and channels for 
                                                 
162 This is the vision read in the Constitutional provisions, though the allowances made for States to 
develop locally suitable arrangements to actualize such functioning enabled substantial variations 
between the vision and the reality. (Misra and Mishra 2000, 2001) 
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citizen involvement across locations. The latter is further confounded by the variations 
in locally institutionalized customs and practices which intersect with uniformly 
overlaid formal institutional arrangements to modulate the involvement of different 
groups, and these are particularly relevant in shaping the public participation of 
women and dalits (Buch 2000a, b).  
 
3.2. PRE-REFORM MODALITIES AND DISCURSIVE REFORM PRESCRIPTIONS  
 
Nowhere are the contradictions and issues of competing reforms better highlighted 
than in the instance of domestic water provision. Drinking water provision is a subject 
of State jurisdiction163 and till the last decade, was the responsibility of (variously) 
State departments of Public Health Engineering, Rural Development and Urban 
Development. Central assistance and incentives for attention to ‘problem’ areas has 
been extended through the Accelerated Rural Water Supply Program (later with an 
urban counterpart), and as a component of other programs such as the Integrated 
Development of Small and Medium Towns, which also included water supply and 
sewerage projects. While the programs were variously reformulated and grouped in a 
‘mission’ mode by the Central Government (the Rajiv Gandhi National Drinking 
Water Mission) for the rural areas in 1986, the responsibility for domestic water 
provision for both rural and non-metropolitan areas remained with the State 
governments.164  
                                                 
163 Functional responsibility and authority for policy-making and legislation functions on ‘subjects’ of 
governance attention are Constitutionally distributed between the Central and State governments, with a 
Concurrent List containing subjects on which both are enabled to legislate. The Central governments, 
however, can develop policy and legislation in State subjects (as was done in the instance of local 
government reform) if requested/ permitted by a specified proportion of State governments. 
164 Funds for drinking water projects have been provided in state budgets from since the first Five Year 
Plan; Public Health Engineering Departments were set up for this purpose in all States. Limited 
effectiveness of this arrangement, with coverage only to readily ‘accessible’ villages and parts of urban 
areas, eventually led to introduction of the Accelerated Rural (and later, Urban) Water Supply Program 
by the Central Government in the 4th Five Year Plan, that provided full grants for ‘problem villages’ 
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Reforms in the earlier governance arrangements for domestic water provision in India 
were undertaken in the context of increasing uncertainty and difficulty in accessing 
safe water for drinking and other domestic purposes for a large proportion of the 
households in both urban and rural areas in India. Though the figures vary across 
surveys, a regression of the various figures obtained shows that in 1990, only about 
55% of the households in rural areas and 85% in the urban had access to safe sources 
of water. Despite the efforts of the National Drinking Water Mission, by 2000 this had 
improved to 65% in rural areas and 87% in urban (Planning Commission 2002: 31). A 
survey by the Joint Management Program of the WHO and UNICEF in 2004 reported 
that overall, 14% of the households in the country still had no access to safe drinking 
water. (WHO-UNICEF 2004) 
 
Apart from bureaucratic sluggishness and inefficiency in implementing Central and 
State programs for universal coverage, other reasons for this situation are  the 
degradation and drying up of traditional sources, excess water withdrawal, 
contamination of ground and surface water sources by pollution, competing demand 
from other uses, increased seasonal variability in stocks and flows and inequity of 
access, rather than population increases. An absolute shortage in terms of overall 
water availability is not the prime issue in India, though there are significant regional 
                                                                                                                                            
and urban areas; this continues still but now only matches allocations by States. In the attention 
focussed on the issue during the International Drinking Water and Sanitation Decade, this program was 
grouped with a number of others under the National Drinking Water and Sanitation Mission in 1986. 
Fully funded by the GoI, the other programs involve district-based integrated projects, health 
information, treatment of special problems, appropriate technology to attain sustainable water supply 
with close intervention of NGOs and community in implementation, in 55 districts with unique 
problems. Adjunct sub-missions are oriented to eradication of guinea worm, desalination of water, 
control of fluorosis, removal of excess iron, water conservation and recharge of acquifers. The program 
design included cost recovery from users to develop ownership, feeling of partnership and self-
confidence, O&M by community including appointment of staff and collection of revenue with minimal 
help from government (except staff training). Communities were expected to assist the government 
(implementing department) in situation analysis and need assessment, formulating identification 
reports, concurring with/ modifying said report, assisting in Final Project Report and implementation, 
monitoring and evaluation of performance.  
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and temporal variations (Planning Comission 2002, Saleth 2004). Analysts have 
located the core of the problem in the relative neglect of domestic provision vis-a-vis 
other uses (primarily irrigation and power generation), misplaced regional-
development choices and the accompanying institutional frameworks that have been 
put in place over the years (Saleth, 2004).  
 
Unanimously, the solutions are seen in reforming institutional arrangements at various 
levels; but most urgently at the local level, for in-situ water harvesting and aquifer 
recharge, repair and maintenance of traditional sources and protecting them from 
pollution, and equitable and sustainable use. But the proposals for institutional reform 
acutely reflect the discursive differences embedded in neoliberal and progressive 
views. Among the former are prescriptions for user financing to ensure sustainability 
of drinking water projects, particularly in the context of the poor resource position of 
States, with cross-subsidization to offset adverse effects on economically weaker 
groups (Pushpangadan and Murugan 1998, Saleth 2004). Propositions of the latter 
kind include providing resources to local governments while ensuring plebiscitary 
decision-making in Gram Sabhas (GS) as mandated in the constitution or devolving 
responsibility to democratic community organizations. As explained before165, both 
kinds of reforms have been instituted in the nineties. 
 
With devolution of responsibilities for domestic water provision to local governments 
after 1992 (Pal 2004, Mishra 2008), they are now required to plan and implement 
measures for extending access to unserved households.  The roles of the local 
government and the State bureaucracy in the planning, implementation and 
management of the service has been reconfigured by State legislation, but unlike many 
                                                 
165 In section 1.2 in this Chapter. 
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other functions devolved, the transfer of the necessary technical personnel from the 
State organizations166 has not been undertaken in most States. Despite this, water 
supply projects are among the top priorities in local government plans, and allocated 
substantial proportion of the untied funds devolved to local governments. The 
participation of women in local government functioning remains uneven, though it has 
improved with time (Buch 2000a, b; Jayal 2006, 2008; GoI 2008).  
 
The Sector Reform (later Swajaldhara) Program of the DDWS, on the other hand, was 
initiated with the explicit aim of changing ‘the basic premise that provision of safe 
drinking water is the responsibility of the Government’, promoting perception of water 
as a ‘socio-economic good’, attracting more funds for repair and rehabilitation of 
existing systems from users, ensuring the sustainability of the systems and sources, 
and preserving quality of water through effective monitoring and surveillance (GoI 
1999, 2002, 2003). The AWRSP also continues, but has been revised along the same 
principles. The involvement of women is emphasized in the revised program, because 
it was ‘more important to them’, but was to be implemented ‘without antagonizing 
men’ (GoI 1999) as this could undercut program achievements. The program 
guidelines mandated attention to their needs; developing women-oriented technology; 
training and certifying women as maintainers/ mechanics, educating them to create 
‘demand’ for better sanitation; setting up exclusively women’s Pani Panchayats or 
Village Water Supply Committees (VWSC) or at least ensuring that 50% of the 
members in such committees were women. However, in reformed arrangements under 
Swajaldhara, there is no specific stipulation for the proportion of women to be 
included (GoI 2003).167  
                                                 
166 Public Health Departments or parastatals. As will be described later in the case studies, these have 
been the most difficult to restructure, even where most other departments have been, such as in Kerala. 
167 There are other Central and State government programs that also address water provision, as well as 
donor-supported ones, but in terms of coverage and resources, provision by local governments and 
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3.3. THE SPECIFIC RESEARCH QUESTIONS  
 
Since the distinct characteristics of progressive and neoliberal reforms are embodied in 
the devolution to local governments and liberalization of State systems respectively, 
the question of the relative suitability of marketization and democratization reforms to 
different kinds of developing contexts could suitably be investigated in this setting. By 
comparing the functioning of the institutional architectures for water provision by 
local governments and in the Sector Reform Program (SRP) in the same location, their 
relative suitability to that kind of context could be assessed. Moreover, since the same 
reforms have been applied across States, which vary in the political, economic and 
socio-cultural characteristics, the functioning of both types of reformed arrangements 
could be compared across State contexts, which vary systematically on these 
dimensions. This provided an answer not only to the question of context-
appropriateness of local government and SRP arrangements in a specific kind of 
location, but also provided a picture of their relative suitability to different kinds of 
contexts.  
 
It was necessary also to define what constituted the ‘local’ context for a reformed 
governance configuration. The reformed arrangements stretch from the Central 
Government, which instituted the reforms and provides substantial funds for water 
provision, to the local government jurisdictions where water is actually provided to 
households. There are two significant contexts which affect the functioning of the 
                                                                                                                                            
through the Swajaldhara program are the most significant and applicable country-wide. Drinking water 
supply projects assisted by multilateral and bilateral donors continue in various locations across many 
States, channeled through both Central and State governments and including projects in both rural and 
urban areas. Many have some elements of participation by beneficiaries, though the extent and nature of 
such participation differs across projects. Local governments have not been enabled to initiate or 
directly interact with donors for project funding, except in the case of metropolitan bodies though even 
they have to seek the assent of State governments. 
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reforms designed and instituted by the Government of India (GoI) - at the State-level, 
and in the localities where it is expected to deliver desired results, and both are 
pertinent to their functioning and performance. The efficacy of the reforms in terms of 
its potential to achieve the desired results is determined to a large extent by the State-
level transformations of the institutional designs mandated by the GoI. The realization 
of the potential of the de-jure architecture set in place by the State, that is, its 
effectiveness and inclusiveness result from the intersection of the designed 
arrangements and institutional characteristics of the locality, that is, the emergent 
institutional architecture. Both the State and locality are therefore relevant contexts. 
 
What are the important variables in the context that affect governance institutions? 
Turner and Hulme (1997) list a large number that are pertinent, as do authors studying 
women’s inclusion in governance structures (see section 2.3). However, for this study, 
these can fruitfully be grouped as political, economic and socio-cultural. Extent and 
design of decentralization has been observed to be politically determined (Manor 
1999), therefore at the State level, political factors are expected to be the most 
pertinent. However, at the local level, all three could be expected to affect functioning 
of governance structures, though with regard to women’s inclusion, socio-cultural 
features have been found to be most influential.   
 
With these considerations, the specific research question(s) for the study were:  
What is the relative efficacy, effectiveness and inclusiveness of devolved (Panchayat) 
and liberalized (Sector Reform-Swajaldhara) arrangements for water provision,  
(a) in the same type of context, and  
(b) in the three contexts with different degrees of economic, political and social 
development? 
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Answers to these could provide indications for reform choices by policy designers, an 
important objective of this study. While answers to these questions are theoretically 
important, for application, policy makers in any location require answers to the 
question of ‘which type of reform is most suitable (or appropriate) for this specific 
context?’ and this can be derived from the findings. 
 
 
4. CASE SELECTION , STUDY DESIGN AND DATA COLLECTION 
 
The most logical way to assess the comparative efficacy of devolution and 
liberalization in different kinds of contexts was to compare how effective and 
inclusive the respective reformed systems were in different locations in the country. 
Given that the efficacy of the reformed arrangements was modulated both by the 
State-level political-economic and administrative characteristics – that led to a 
different institutional architectures in the States – as well as the village-level 
circumstances, the State was clearly the appropriate unit for comparison. That is, 
performance of the reformed arrangements had to be compared across States,  that 
differed distinctly and significantly in their economic, political and socio-cultural 
characteristics. Then, by exploring how these intersected with elements of the 
reformed institutional architecture in each case, the relationships between reformed 
institutional arrangements and contextual characteristics could be inferred. This was 
important, and ultimately, the larger purpose of this research, for the aim was not to 
just evaluate how the two kinds of reforms work in different States, but to understand 
why they do so in order to derive generalizable propositions about how suitable the 
two generic types of reform – marketization and democratization – are to different 
developing locations.  
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The case here is the multi-tiered institutional-organizational structure and processes 
for water provision in the rural areas, which extends from the State level, through the 
district and block (or taluka or mandal) levels to the village level. It was decided to 
focus on the rural areas, as the issue is relatively greater, the reforms had changed 
governance arrangements substantially and had been implanted for a longer 
duration.168 In each State, therefore, two cases had to be examined and their 
performance compared – the ‘devolved case’, that is, the reformed institutional 
architecture for water provision by rural local governments (Panchayats), and the 
‘liberalized case’, that is the reformed institutional arrangements for State water 
provision under the Sector Reform Pilot– Swajaldhara Program, (SRP-SP) and how 
both functioned.  
 
The actual functioning of the (de-jure) reformed arrangements instituted by the State 
at the village level, and the emergent structure and processes, could be understood by 
studying the (organizational) structures and process(es) through which new water 
supply projects were developed in the villages through the local government, i.e., the 
Panchayat (PR), and the Sector Reform (SR) program. Though projects are located in 
the village or habitation, the decision-making is not restricted to the village, but is 
spread over organizational structures at the block (or Taluka) and district levels and 
therefore, in effect, the district becomes the most cogent unit to map the ‘local-level’ 
emergent structure. While the district is singular, and usually has characteristic 
political, economic and administrative qualities169, villages can differ in their socio-
                                                 
168 Rural areas in India were directly under State administration, through District Collectors (DC) and 
district heads of various State departments, while urban areas had functioning municipal governments. 
Local government reforms therefore changed rural governance substantially. Also, the Sector Reform 
Pilot was introduced only for rural areas, as the Swajaldhara initially also was, since these were 
programs of the Ministry of Rural Development. The urban counterpart of Swajaldhara was introduced 
later through the Ministry of Urban Development.  
169 For districts have been the most significant administrative units since colonial times, and in recent 
decades have undergone little change;e latter does not however alter the typical characteristics of the 
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economic and demographic characteristics. Functioning of the reformed arrangements 
at the village level may therefore differ, and to decipher a pattern – that constitutes the 
emergent architecture - project processes had to be mapped in a number of villages, 
for the two kinds of cases respectively. These were therefore embedded mini-cases, 
nested within the larger case. The selection of the study states, and the mini-cases 
within one selected district in the respective States in explained in the next section, 
along with the methods used for data collection. 
 
4.1. CRITERIA FOR CASE SELECTION  
 
To select States that differed in a systematic manner in economic, political and social 
characteristics, the States with both kinds of reforms (Panchayat and SRP-SW) were 
first ranked by per-capita State GDP (economic development indicator) and State HDI 
(social development indicator). A few with low, medium and high performance on 
each were identified, and additional indicators of social, economic and political 
development such as sex-ratio, literacy level, percentage of people below the poverty 
line (BPL)170, per-capita newspaper consumption, voter turnout and other indicators 
were used, along with descriptive studies of the context, to identify three that differed 
significantly in their economic, socio-cultural and political conditions. Table 2.1 
below lists the indicators and the dimensions represented by each, and Table 2.2 
provides the comparative figures for the States and highlights the final selection. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
district, though the new ones formed may have over time diverged in developmental and administrative 
terms.  
170 The ‘poverty line’ is the income level necessary for survival, fixed by the Planning Commission of 
India, on the basis of a basket of basic goods and services that are considered necessary for life. 
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Table 2.1 
Indicators of economic, social and political conditions used to select study states 
 
Per capita State GDP Economic development indicator 
State HDI Social development indicator 
% of Popn Below Poverty Line (BPL) Extent of poverty 
% Literacy  Indicator of social development, awareness levels and capacity 
to deal with formal governance processes;  
Difference between male and female literacy 
(%) 
Relative social development of women  
Sex-ratio Indicator of social development and cultural attitudes towards 
women 
GINI Coefficient Degree of inequality in resource and income levels 
Per capita newspaper consumption Access to and consumption of information, political and general 
awareness 
   
 
4.2. SELECTED CASES AND MINI-CASES   
 
The three States finally selected for study were Gujarat, Kerala and Madhya Pradesh, 
with relative characteristics as shown in Table 2.3 below. The levels of development 
as evident from the economic, political and social indicators are not only in relation to 
each other, but also broadly reflect their position among the States in India compared 
above. The three States also differ in cultural characteristics and each has a distinctive 
‘State character’ (also well reflected in the particular districts selected) that have been 
documented and described by various authors. Ahluwalia’s (2000) analysis of pre- and 
post-reform rates of growth across States also provides the same picture of relative 
economic development between the three study States as the indicators in Table 2.3. 
Harriss’s (1999) analysis of the political development and relative position of upper, 
middle and lower caste and income groups in various States adds a qualitative picture 
of the relative political development, lower-caste mobilization and extent of erosion of 
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caste differentials in Gujarat, Kerala and Madhya Pradesh.  
 
Gujarat is ‘industrially advanced’, with industrialization spatially distributed across 
rural and urban areas; “the urban-rural divide does not map directly onto the 
industrial-agricultural dichotomy”(Jenkins 2004: 10-11). With a diversified economy 
and workforce, developed capital and financial markets, large expatriate business  
 
Table 2.2 
Economic, social and political development indicators of States with both 
Panchayat reforms and Sector Reform Program* 
 
States  SDP-
2000 
 
State 
HDI 
rank 
% Literacy Sex-
ratio 
BPL %  
(2006-
2007) 
Per-capita 
Newspaper 
consumption 
GINI 
Coeffici-
ent 
(2000) 
Voter turnout 
(average of 
last 3 national 
elections) 
M F 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Andhra Pradesh 2550 10 70.3 50.4 978 8.49 59 0.310 66 
Gujarat 3918 6 79.7 57.8 920 2 134 0.288 46 
 Surat district   70.3 56.8 835     
Haryana 4025 5 78.5 55.7 861 2 50 0.285 67 
Himanchal Pradesh 2556  85.3 67.4 968 2 51 0.298 60 
Karnataka 2866 7 76.1 56.9 965 7.85 79 0.321 63 
Kerala 2490 1 94.2 87.7 1058 3.61 293 0.320 71 
 Kollam district   83.2 78.7 1069     
Madhya Pradesh  1922 12 76.1 50.3 919 29.52 120 0.312 53 
 Sehore district   62.7 38.3 909     
Maharashtra 5092 4 86.0 67.0 922 16.18 121 0.345 NA 
Orissa 1066 11 75.3 50.5 972 41.04 125 0.292 59 
Rajasthan 2225 9 75.7 43.9 921 12.11 119 0.281 51 
Tamil Nadu 3141 3 82.4 64.4 987 6.61 124 0.398 62 
Uttar Pradesh 1725 13 68.8 42.2 898 24.67 142 0.327 61 
West Bengal 2977 8 77.0 59.6 934 18.3 98 0.328 78 
* Excluding the north-eastern (Assam) and newly-formed States (Chattisgarh); Data for columns 1,2,5,8 from GoI 
(2002c); 3,4 from GoI (2001); 6 from Institute of Applied Manpower Research, Year Book 2003; 7 and 9 from 
www.indiastat.com   
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Table 2.3 
Relative economic, political and social development in Gujarat, Kerala an 
Madhya Pradesh (from the indicators in Table 2.2). 
 
Relative ‘level of development Gujarat  
 
(Surat) 
Kerala  
 
(Kollam) 
Madhya 
Pradesh 
(Sehore) 
Economic  
(Per-capita GDP, per-capita number of private 
companies, % BPL) 
High Moderate Low 
Political  
(voter turnout, per-capita consumption of newspapers) 
Moderate High Low 
Social  
(HDI, sex-ratio, M/F literacy, BPL %) 
Moderate High Low 
Other Descriptors 
 
Business acumen, 
Entrepreneurial, 
market orientation, 
civic philanthropy 
State-
centered, high 
political 
engagement 
Feudal, poor, 
socially 
backward. 
 
communities who maintain strong ties to their native villages, a predeliction for 
innovation and adoption of new technologies, and an investment-promoting 
bureaucracy, Gujarat has consistently been among the most economically developed 
States in India.171 Social and human development, on the other hand, has lagged 
behind (Hirway 2000), and the though the “lower castes”172 have won political ground 
in recent decades, the upper-caste political, economic and social dominance remains, 
through a politics of accommodation (Harriss 1999). Morever, Gujarat has been ‘a 
cauldron of political discontent” for atleast two decades, with violent caste and 
communal conflicts and till 2001, “high government turnover” (Jenkins 2004:10-11). 
Contradictions in the development model have surfaced in the extensive displacement 
and politicization of large-scale projects (Hirway and Goswami 2008, Mosse and 
                                                 
171 Detailed pictures of Gujarat’s economy, development trajectory and other characteristics mentioned 
here can be found in Hirway (2000), Unni et al (2001), Steefkerk (200)1, Bagchi et al (2005), Dholakia 
(2000, 2007), Mehta (2001), Shah (2005).  
172 According to Harriss’s (1999) categorization of the numerous castes in India as ‘upper’, ‘middle’ 
and ‘lower’ castes, based on the economic, political and social position of different caste groups.  
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Gupta 2005, Sangvai 2002). Persistence of traditional patriarchal norms is evident in 
the highly adverse sex ratio (see Table 2.2) and domestic violence against women 
(Visaria 2000, Poonacha and Pandey 2000). A (eroding) Gandhian ethic and the 
presence of a large number of NGOs, which have played significant roles in the 
development processes in the State, are other distinctive characteristics (Iyengar 
2000). 
 
Kerala has been an outlier among Indian States and among developing regions, and a 
development puzzle, for the high level of social and human development 
accompanying moderate economic growth173; the latter has been the case both prior to 
and after economic reforms in India (Ahluwalia 2000). Harriss (1999) places Kerala 
among the States in which lower castes and classes have gained political power, civil 
society is strong and political mobilization high. Despite the religious and communal 
diversity, communal violence has been minimal, even during periods of widespread 
communal tension and violence in other States such as Gujarat; Varshney (2004) 
attributes this to strong ‘bridging’ type of social capital and secular civic engagement. 
A strong presence of left-of-center parties, a “peaceful transition to socialism” since 
the late sixties, widespread unionization and cadre-based political mobilization has 
eroded feudal and caste inequities and promoted an egalitarian ethos (Krishnaji 2000, 
Heller 2001, Lieten 2002). Though patriarchal practices of property ownership and 
transfer – such as in dowry – persist alongside the more egalitarian gender equations 
(Kodoth 2004; Kodoth and Eappen 2005), women are relatively free of customary 
restrictions against education, employment and participation in public life.174  
                                                 
173 Dreze and Sen (1995) highlight, describe and analyze this anomaly to develop Sen’s concept of 
‘entitlements’ and their role and importance to development.  
174 Details of Kerala’s economic, political and social development, the characteristic civic and political 
engagement and the introduction of economic reforms and decentralization are also found in Isaac and 
Franke (2000), Devika (2007), Jeromi (2005), Chaudhuri (2006), Chakraborty (2005), Kannan (2005), 
Mohanakumar (2002) and Panda (2003). 
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Madhya Pradesh is among the least economically and socially developed States in 
India, though the post-reform rate of growth of state GDP has been close to the Indian 
average (Ahluwalia 2000). Politically, Harriss (1999) classifies it as one of the States 
where upper caste and class domination has persisted, the shadow of princely rule 
persists and the politics of accommodation of lower castes has been sketchy. However, 
because the Scheduled Tribes comprise 22% of the State population, along with 14% 
of Scheduled Castes, a politics of SC-ST inclusion has emerged in the last decade 
(Jaffrelot and Zerinini-Brotel 2004), though there are few political movements 
(Jenkins 2004). Administratively, the historical differences inherited from the 72 
Princely States from which Madhya Pradesh was formed are still visible in legal 
statutes and governance practice, and socially and culturally, patriarchal and feudal 
practices remain entrenched in most parts of the State.175 
 
In these three selected States with clearly different economic, political, socio-cultural 
characteristics as discussed, the functioning of the two types of reformed governance 
arrangements for water provision were studied as two separate cases. For each case, 
patterns of functioning were mapped in a number of ‘mini-cases’, that is, water supply 
projects developed in the villages through the reformed arrangements within five years 
of this research (conducted between 2004-2006). Projects were selected within a 
cluster of villages in one district of the three States – Surat in Gujarat, Kollam in 
Kerala and Sehore in Madhya Pradesh. These districts were selected from among the 
districts where the SR Pilot program had been implemented before it was renamed as 
Swajaldhara, were not critically water-scarce, and located close to the political-
administrative center (the State capital).  The latter two considerations were necessary 
                                                 
175 Details of Madhya Pradesh’s economic, political an social characteristics and development trajectory 
can also be found in Srivastava et al (2007), Pani (2007), Shah (2005), Shankar (2005), Ghosh (2005) 
and Gupta (2005).  
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to ensure that the effect of reforms on water provision was not masked by absolute 
water scarcity, or political or geographical marginalization; on the other hand, it was 
expected that if there were district-wise differences in the degree of implementation of 
reforms, districts close to the State capital are likely to have the best implementation 
and therefore provide the best example of the reformed arrangements.  
 
The cases in the three States and the respective mini-cases are listed in Table 2.4. As 
far as possible, projects (mini-cases) located in villages within a single block/taluka 
 
Table 2.4 
List of cases and respective mini-cases 
State Case Taluka Panchayats Villages / Hamlets/ 
Neighborhoods 
GUJARAT 
 
SURAT 
district 
Local Government 
(Panchayat) system 
-- G-PR 
Kamrej Umbhel (single) Umbhel 
Ladvi Ladvi 
Chorasi Bhatia-Lingad  Bhatia 
Vaktana Vaktana 
Sector Reform- 
Swajaldhara system 
– G-SR 
Kamrej Laskana Laskanai 
Ladvi Ladvi 
Palsana Tatizaghada  Tatizaghada 
Vadadla 
KERALA 
 
KOLLAM 
district. 
Local Government 
(Panchayat) system 
– K-PR 
Pathanapuram 
 
Anchal (single) Mallavattam 
Yeroor (single) Kanjavel 
Sector Reform -  
Swajaldhara system 
– K-SR 
Pathanapuram Anchal (single) Nilamootil 
Ambalakonam 
Yeroor (single) Mayiladumkunnu 
Puleri 
MADHYA 
PRADESH 
 
SEHORE 
district 
Local Government 
(Panchayat) system  
 -- MP-PR 
Sehore Kharpa Kharpa 
Lasudiya Dhakad Lasudiya Dhakad 
Lasidiya Khas 
Rola Manpura 
Sector Reform -  
Swajaldhara system 
– MP-SR 
Sehore Kharpa Kharpa 
Ramkhedi 
Lasudiya Dhakad Lasudiya Dhakad 
 Lasudiya Khas 
Rola Manpura 
  
 
152
were selected, except where sufficient number of projects could not be found for study 
or access to information was an issue. In Kerala, because of the unusual settlement 
patterns, large size of Panchayats and villages within them, and the multiple projects 
developed in each, only two contiguous villages were selected. In Madhya Pradesh, on 
the other hand, villages were very small, and the jurisdiction of Village Panchayats 
(that is, the village government) included a number of small villages. To distinguish 
between the area of a VP and the actual villages within, I refer to the latter as hamlets 
or habitations. Though the number of villages selected in each State differed, about the 
same number of projects (4-5 mini-cases) was studied. Annexure II contains the 
details of study villages and projects.  
 
4.3. CASE STUDY QUESTIONS AND NORMS FOR INDICATORS 
 
Indicators identified in section 2.2 for the three parameters (efficacy, effectiveness and 
inclusion) were used, but the minimum norms adopted were those set by the GoI 
(DDWS) or the States, as listed in Table 2.5.  
 
To understand the extent of change from pre-reform arrangements, and successive 
modulations of the GoI instituted reforms by State-level and then local-level 
contextual attributes, data was collected to answer the following questions - 
1. What was the organizational configuration for domestic water supply before 
reforms, at the Central and State levels? How did it function and what were 
the issues in each State? 
2. What was/is the reformed institutional architecture specified by the GoI in the 
case of local governments and sector reforms (including provisions for 
women/users/ citizen involvement)?  
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Table 2.5 
Parameters, indicators and norms for water provision used in the study. 
 
Parameters Indicators Norms or units used   Description 
Efficacy  Extent of decentralization Quantum of functions 
transferred horizontally and 
vertically away from Central and 
State governments. 
Calculated on the basis of the list of 
functions involved in the process and 
their relative ‘weight’ assigned by 
key resource-persons.’ 
Effectiveness Per capita availability Minimum 40 lpcd Set by GoI (DDWS) 
Disparity in per capita 
availability 
Liters per capita per day (lpcd) Calculated as the difference between 
the quantities available from 
household and public sources. 
% popn with household 
source 
As a proportion of the population 
in the village / hamlet 
 
% popn within 
convenient distance from 
protected public source 
Proportion of population in vill/ 
hamlet within 50 m from source 
GoI norm is 200 m, but the Gujarat 
government specifies 50m. 
% popn dependant on 
unprotected source 
As a proportion of the population 
in the village/ hamlet 
 
Inclusion  %  of seats reserved for 
women   
As specified by State 
governments 
GoI specifies 33% of the total 
membership 
% of seats occupied As observed  
%  of meetings attended 
(a) In executive 
committee 
(b) In general assembly 
As a proportion of the ‘total 
opportunities’ available in the 
previous year.  
‘Total opportunities’ was the product 
of the number of seats statutorily 
earmarked and number of meetings 
  
3. What were its stated objectives and how were they reflected in the elements 
of the prescribed structure?  
4. What were the State-specific designs and how did they differ from the 
received design on one hand, and the pre-reform arrangements on the other?  
5. What led to the modulations of the received design to the State-specific one?  
6. How did the alterations affect the potential of the reformed arrangements 
either in terms of its effectiveness or women’s inclusion in the processes? 
7. Post-reform, how were water supply systems developed at the local level, 
including the organizations and individuals involved and their respective 
roles and in the process(es)? 
8. How did this emergent structure differ from the de-jure structure, and why?  
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9. To what extent and in what ways were women involved in these processes 
(participation)? 
10. What were the enabling or inhibiting factors or elements either in the 
institutional arrangements, or in the locality? 
11. What was the extent of change in water availability, its distribution and 
access in the village/habitation after the new project (effectiveness)? 
These questions guided the development of the interview schedule and short 
questionnaires for user surveys.  
 
4.4. METHODS AND TIMELINE OF DATA COLLECTION 
 
Data to build the cases and mini cases was collected during 2004 –2007, using a 
variety of methods including document review, unstructured and semi-structured 
interviews, focus-group discussions and non-participant observation. The formal 
governance structure, inter-organizational relationships and prescribed organizational 
procedures were understood by reviewing government documents. Key informants 
were identified through a snowball sampling process and pertinent information 
collected through unstructured and semi-structured interviews. Key informants 
included State government officers (both administrative, and technical, such as 
engineers), known authors/ academics working on drinking water issues in the State 
and staff of reputed State-level NGOs involved in the drinking water sector. This 
captured additional details of organizational and systemic functioning, including 
unwritten norms and practices, historical trajectories in domestic water provision in 
the State, and undocumented information on the reform process. Annexure III contains 
the people interviewed and Annexure IV the lists of documents used. 
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For the mini-cases, records or documents pertaining to the project were sourced where 
possible, and key informants at the district and village level were interviewed. These 
included elected VP members (men and women), Secretaries or administrators of VPs, 
State government officers posted at district levels (administrative and technical 
personnel), and staff of non-governmental organizations in the study villages listed in 
Table 2.4. At the village/ hamlet levels, data was additionally collected through non-
participant observation of some Panchayat and user-group meetings, focus-group 
discussion, participatory mapping of water sources by users and a small random 
survey in each village. The survey was to elicit brief information about the 
respondents’ water collection practices and water sources used before and after the 
new projects were installed, involvement in the institutional processes through which 
the new system was developed, and their resource contributions (money, labor or 
other).  
 
Data was collected for this research between May 2004 and August 2007. Preliminary 
visits to each State were made in mid-2004, pertinent documents collected and some 
interviews conducted with State officials and other key informants, to identify 
locations for research and develop the field research design. Field research was 
conducted over a number of subsequent fieldwork trips lasting from 2-6 weeks. 
Collection of relevant information from published articles and government documents, 
and occasionally from short interactions with key informants176 was continuous during 
the process of data analysis and preparation of the report.  
 
 
                                                 
176 The research in India was conducted from a primary base location at the Institute of Rural 
Management in Anand, Gujarat. The frequent seminars, workshops and other consultative occasions 
provided numerous opportunities for interaction with important key informants from government, 
NGOs and the academic firmament of the three study States.  
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5. FRAMEWORK AND METHODS OF ANALYSIS.  
 
Four methods were used to analyze the data and elicit answers to the case study 
questions (section 4.3). The first was diagramming and graphical analysis to answer 
questions of ‘what’ changed and by ‘how much’ after the reforms. The second was 
content analyses of documents and interviews to find answers to the ‘why’ and ‘how’ 
questions. Third, simple mathematical operations such as averaging, finding 
percentage changes and comparison of means were applied to the quantitative data 
obtained for the indicators in the mini-cases, to enable comparative analysis across 
projects, States and types of reform. Lastly, a simple scoring method was applied at 
the end, using the mean changes on the indicators for effectiveness and participation 
respectively to develop an overall score of effectiveness and participation for each 
case. This enabled comparison of effectiveness and participation for the two types of 
reformed systems (cases) in each State, and the comparison of cases across the three 
States. 
 
To assess (and understand) the efficacy of the reformed arrangements, the extent of 
decentralization was graphically represented in organizational diagrams, that 
represented the ensemble of organizations involved and their relationships in the pre-
reform, reformed and observed (emergent) governance system in each case, in a 
common format.177  Organizational actors involved were categorized as the Central 
government, State government, Local government, community based organizations 
(CBOs), non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and private entities, and the 
distribution of functions and activities among them was mapped using a list generated 
                                                 
177 The organizations involved in any configuration – the GoI prescribed design, and the pre-reform, 
reformed and emergent (observed) structures – were arrayed horizontally by type and vertically by level 
(national, State, district, taluka and village), along with their functions/ activities/ roles. 
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at the preliminary fieldwork stage. This list of functions, the constituent activities (or 
task-responsibilities) and the relative importance of each178 (functional score) was 
developed through an iterative discussion with key resource persons in all three States 
during the initial visit and is given in Table 2.6 (Devolution Score Sheet). The basic 
list, of tasks/ steps that is typically involved in water provision, which was used to 
develop these ‘scores’ is appended in Annexure V.  
 
Table 2.6 
Devolution Score Sheet: Relative importance of functions, activities and 
resources in the development of water supply projects 
 
 KINDS OF RESPONSIBILITY SPECIFIC TASKS FUNCTIONAL 
SCORE 
1 Policy Framework Policy framework, & legislation, rules            3 
  Program design                                              4 
  Monitoring and evaluation                              3 
1A Organizing Community/ User/ 
Beneficiary Groups 
Community organizing 3 
2 Planning Identifying need, deciding on project: 
Planning 
3 
  Design decisions – size, location, 
coverage, etc 
4 
  Choice of technology 3 
3 Resources Funds 4 
  (Technical) Design expertise 3 
  Project Management expertise 3 
4 Construction Process Tendering/ contracting 2 
  Procuring materials & equipment  2 
  Recruiting and managing labor 2 
  Supervising construction, monitoring 
progress 
2 
  Managing funds, payments 2 
5 System Administration Fixing/ revising tariffs 3 
  Collecting tariffs  3 
  Operation and maintenance 4 
6 Ownership Ownership 3 
                                                 
178 The ‘relative importance’ of functions/ resources combines perceptions (of the key resource persons) 
about the importance of each item in the process, and the extent of authority and responsibility it 
endows on the agent who performs the function.   
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Degrees of decentralization in each case could then be derived as the total score for 
each category of organizations, both vertically as well as horizontally. The earmarking 
of a percentage of memberships in decision-making bodies for women is the statutory 
mechanism used to ensure their participation. Therefore by calculating the total  
the extent of inclusiveness in the reformed arrangements could be assessed. The shift 
in the distribution of functions/ activities/ roles is represented diagrammatically in the 
organizational charts by fading out previous arrangements, and graphically by charting 
the scores for pre-reform, reformed and emergent configurations in each case. Spaces 
created for women are also indicated in the organizational diagrams and the total 
provisions as an overall percentage for the case.  
 
To assess the effectiveness of the reformed arrangements in each case, mean values of 
change in the five indicators in each case were derived from those observed in the 
respective mini-cases. Extent of change in the indicators, as a percentage of the pre-
reform level was first compared across the mini-cases (within-case comparisons) to 
assess if there was a pattern across water-supply projects, before deriving mean 
values. The same method was used to derive extent of inclusion in each case. 
However, cross-case comparisons required first an aggregation of the indicators for 
each parameter, and then aggregation across the two parameters, effectiveness and 
inclusion. For this aggregation, a scoring method was used which is described below, 
along with the rationales used.   
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5.1. EFFECTIVENESS AND INCLUSION: A METHOD FOR AGGREGATED 
COMPARISION 
 
To answer the research questions, a composite measure for the performance of each 
kind of reform in different locations was necessary, that could provide a basis for 
comparison and policy decision. Since policy choices are neither a-contextual nor 
value-neutral, whatever claims might be made to the contrary, the attempt was not to 
develop an ‘objective’ set of measures. Instead, the comparison is made on the basis of 
universally valued objectives, and logic, and both are made explicit.  
 
In this study, five indicators have been used to assess the effectiveness of water 
supply, and three indicators to assess extent of women’s participation, as below: 
 
A. Effectiveness –   
1. Increase in per capita availability in the village, 
2. Change in the extent of disparity between households dependant on 
private and public sources.  
3. Increase in the number of households with private sources/ 
connections, 
4. Improvement in access to public sources, and 
5. Reduction in the number of households dependant on unsafe sources. 
B. Participation –  
1. Proportion of earmarked seats occupied 
2. Proportion of opportunities for participation in executive meetings that 
are used, relative to men and 
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3. Proportion of opportunites for participation in assemblies that are used, 
relative to men.  
 
The question is first, whether all the indicators are of equal value or importance in a 
policy context, and second, whether effectiveness and participation should be equally 
valued. I have argued before that efficiency is less relevant than effectiveness in 
assessing the performance of the arrangements for water provision, particularly in 
developing situations where access to even small quantities is an issue.179 For the same 
reason, I argue that the propensity of the institutional arrangements to increase 
disparities cannot be assigned the same wieght as their capability to improve water 
availability or access, though it merits more consideration than the question of 
efficiency. Also, in the context of a publicly provided, essential service, particularly 
when the provision levels are very close to the minimum required for survival, a wider 
distribution of moderate benefits is arguably more valuable that substantially greater 
benefis distributed across much smaller segments of the population.  Finally, in the 
case of essential supplies of domestic water, effective provision cannot be fully 
discounted on considerations of (non)participation, though the latter certainly must be 
accorded some weight for the control it accords to users over a critical resource, in 
addition to its sheer democratic value180.    
 
                                                 
179 This is because the supply of life-sustaining quantities of a natural resource cannot be weighed down 
by considerations of cost or effort. Though the question of who should bear the costs is important and 
widely debated.  
180 This valuation becomes easy if we consider that given a choice between getting water through a 
completely non-participatory process and having a participatory process that is not effectively making 
water available, the first emerged as the better option and the choice of users in almost all locations. 
The criticality of the resource particularly under circumstances of severely reduced availability largely 
outweighs other concerns. At the same time, ceding complete control over the supply mechanisms for 
such a critical resource to others is also a dangerous proposition.  
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In relation to effectiveness, other considerations such as improvements in quality of 
water and reliability of supply are also important. The quality dimension is already 
included as only water supply from ‘safe sources’ have been considered181. Similarly, 
the extent of spaces created in the structure for women, in how many organizational 
components (eg., in Panchayats, its Committees, VWSCs, Beneficiary Committees), 
and the type and extent of provisions (such as quorum requirements) are also 
important measures. However, most of these are measures of efficacy – that is, of the 
potential of the institutional design – rather than actual participation, and since only 
the latter is being considered here, they have not been included182.  
 
In view of these considerations, and since per-capita increase in availability, increase 
in number of households with private connections, improvements in access (i.e., in 
bringing shared sources closer to users) and reduction in the proportion of the 
households dependant on unsafe sources are all important but different measures, they 
have all been accorded equal value in the composite score.183 The disparity between 
those with household connections and those without must also be considered, and 
accorded atleast the same importance as any of these four from a policy perspective. 
Ofcourse, increase in the disparity before and after the new system was installed is 
negatively valued and any decrease positively. In a composite score for effectiveness, 
therefore, all five indicators are accorded 20% weightage each.  
                                                 
181 Despite the ‘safety’ of the new sources, cases of contamination during particular seasons have 
emerged in the study, such as the SR project in Nilamootil in Kerala. This issue requires separate and 
further investigation and assessment, which has not been included in this study. 
182 The rationale for not considering efficacy is that in making policy, the effects or outcomes are of 
more interest than a theoretical consideration of efficacy.  Moreover, the performance of institutional 
arrangements is a function of both the efficacy of its design and its appropriateness to the context.  
183 Without systematic study to ascertain the importance that users and policy-makers accord to these 
dimensions, there is no particular basis for privileging any aspect over the other. Moreover, in the 
policy documents all these are stated objectives, with no emphasis on any one; in practice, however, an 
overriding concern with achieving minimum per-capita availability – without any measures of disparity 
in distribution – emerged in the interviews with government officers and in the data that was sourced 
from them.  
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Similarly, all three indicators used to assess participation are, arguably, equally 
important, and a composite indicator of participation that combines the three in equal 
measure is justifiable. Also, in this study, women’s participation is assessed in relation 
to that of men, with the reasoning that this would eliminate the effect of non-gendered 
factors (such as class or caste considerations) that handicap both men and women. 
 
For an aggregate measure that combines effectiveness and participation in each case, 
effectiveness is taken to be atleast twice as important as participatory functioning. 
While this valuation is arbitrary to an extent (why not less, equal, or even more 
important?), it is based on the conclusion from the months of fieldwork and the 
conversations with users that faced with a choice between an additional 10 litres of 
water on a base of 40-60 litres (which is the average in most places), and 
unconstrained opportunities to participate in the decision-making process, almost all 
marginalized users would choose the former immediately. This is true both of lower-
income users for whom participation carries non-negligible opportunity costs in 
livelihood terms, and for higher-income (typically, also upper caste) women who 
would have to contravene social norms and o not expect participation to yield any 
additional benefits. In light of these considerations,  both from the perspective of users 
and policy makers who have broader concerns of equity and coverage, the indicators 
which are considered, their relative weights and method for assigning and combining 
performance scores for each is described in Table 2.7. The derived scores are more 
notional than statistical, but they also include a measure of the quantitative changes 
that are produced by the reforms.  
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Table  2.7 
Derivation of composite scores for comparision of devolved and liberalized 
governance arrangements 
 
 
 The operations on the data shown in Table 2.7 enabled three kinds of comparison:  
1. Between devolved arrangements in the three States (cases G-PR, K-PR and MP-
PR).  
2. Between liberalized arrangements in the three States (the cases G-SR, K-SR and 
MP-SR).  
3. Between devolved and liberalized arrangements in each State (G-PR and G-SR, 
K-PR and K-SR and MP-PR and MP-SR) 
Para-
meter 
Indicator % Change in state average 
after new project 
Performance score 
= % change / 10 
Relative 
weight 
EF
FE
CT
IV
EN
ES
S 
Per capitawater availability A = (avg qty after – avg qty 
before) *100 / avg qty 
before  
A / 10 = A1 20% 
12.5% 
Households with private 
connection 
B =  avg % after – avg % before B / 10 = B1 20% 12.5%
Households <50m from 
safe pub source 
C = avg % after – avg % before C / 10 = C1 20% 12.5%
Households dependant on 
unsafe safe sources  
D= (avg % before – avg % 
after) 
D / 10 = D1 20% 12.5%
Disparity between Hh with 
pvt conn and hh without 
E = (avg disparity before – avg 
disparity after) 
E / 10 = E1 20% 12.5%
TOTAL SCORE FOR EFFECTIVENESS…. EFF= Sum(A1…E1) 100% 62.5% 
PA
RT
IC
IP
AT
IO
N 
Earmarked seats occupied 
by women  
X =  100-(State avg % reserved 
– state avg %occupied) 
X / 10 = X1 33.3% 12.5%
% of meetings in executive 
body attended by women  
Y =  avg % att by women – avg 
% att by men 
Y / 10 = Y1 33.3% 12.5%
% of meetings in general 
body attended by women 
Z =  avg % att by women – avg 
% att by men 
Z / 10 = Z1 33.3% 12.5%
 TOTAL SCORE FOR PARTICIPATION…..         PART= Sum(X1…Z1) 100% 
37.5% 
 OVERALL COMPOSITE SCORE….. (0.67 EFF +  0.33 PART) 100% 
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Further, from the detailed understanding of the encounters between the governance 
arrangements and the context at the State and local levels gleaned in the case studies, 
two kinds of relationships discussed in the literature could be explored – between 
extent of decentralization and extents of effectiveness and inclusion, and between 
extent of participation and effectiveness of outcomes. 
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CHAPTER III 
DEVOLUTION: EFFICACY AND DEMOCRACY IN THREE STATES  
 
 
Local governments in India had existed in different forms and with varying degrees of 
authority and responsibilities since before the country’s independence, but were not 
Constitutional entities till 1992-1993. In that year, they were vitalized and given 
Constitutional status as the third layer of government184 by the 73rd and 74th 
Constitutional Amendments. They were vested with a number of service and 
developmental functions, and the responsibility of “preparing plans for economic 
development and social justice” for their jurisdictions. The Government of India 
effected the Amendments, and the State governments were required to enact 
conforming legislation within one year, and devolve a specified list of functions along 
with the resources (funds and functionaries) from among those within their own 
purview. Water provision was among the first functions to be devolved to the rural 
local governments185 (Gram Panchayats)186 in almost all States, though the specific 
tasks assigned and resources provided differed across States.  
 
In 1990, by official estimates, 45% of the rural population in India did not have 
access187 to the specified minimum of 40 lpcd of safe water188, despite the investments 
                                                 
184 After the Central (national) and State governments.  
185 Urban local governments (municipalities) already had some service provision functions entrusted to 
them, including water provision, though they also depended on the State governments to actually 
develop the systems. 
186 In this report I adopt the practice of referring to the elected local government as ‘Panchayat’, and to 
its geographical jurisdiction as ‘panchayat’. 
187 Academics and non-governmental organizations engaged with the issue estimated the proportion to 
be much higher, as many sources enumerated in government surveys were either frequently out of 
order, dry for many months in the year or due to over-extraction and pollution, yielded contaminated 
water – and the government agreed (see for example, Planning Commission 2002)  
188 Specified by the Department of Drinking Water Supply, Ministry of Rural Development, 
Government of India. 
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and programs of the Central and State governments since the seventies. Devolution of 
the task to local governments rested on advocacy by researchers and development 
practitioners alike, and was expected to change this situation rapidly. The question is, 
to what extent have the reformed arrangements been successful?  And how do the 
gains from devolution differ across the three study States? In this chapter I look for 
answers to these questions in the three cases of devolved arrangements that were 
studied in Gujarat, Kerala and Madhya Pradesh (G-PR, K-PR and MP-PR).  
 
The functioning of local governments in India at this time is governed by State 
legislation and executive orders and intricately linked to that of the local-level offices 
of various line departments of the State government189. The case studies therefore have 
two parts. One examines the changes in the institutional architecture for water 
provision that have been instituted in each State after devolution, and the efficacy of 
the designed configuration. This encompasses an ensemble of organizational 
structure(s) and procedures, which spans vertically from the State to the district and 
sub-district levels, and horizontally links with State departments, local governments 
and civil society organizations such as NGOs, CBOs and private firms. Another part 
examines the processes of development and functioning of water supply projects (the 
mini-cases) to identify the emergent institutional architecture, and assess how effective 
and inclusive it actually is.   
                                                 
189 That is because the constitution and powers of local governments are determined ultimately by State 
legislation, ‘local governance’ being a ‘State’ subject in the Constitution of India, which specifies the 
policy and legislative jurisdiction of the State and national governments in the Seventh Schedule 
(Bakshi 2005). In addition to separate ‘State’ and ‘Central’ lists, there is also a ‘Concurrent’ list on 
which both levels of government can act, through a specified process of concurrence. In the 73rd and 
74th Amendments on local government existence, constitution and functioning, a list of 29 subjects 
which may be devolved to local governments (the ‘Panchayat list’ was added, in the Eleventh Schedule. 
By this, however, local governments are not endowed with powers to legislate on these subjects, but 
can only act to the extent that State legislation empowers them to do so. Because States have the 
discretion to effect only partial transfers of functions, and have done so, the concerned State line 
departments continue to exist and work even at local levels, and local government action is closely tied 
to the field offices of these departments.  
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In the next section, I discuss the wider context that has shaped the relationships 
between State and local governments in India, and the design for local governments 
specified by the GoI in the 1993 Panchayat Act.190 The efficacy of the design in terms 
of actually devolving power and reforming existing patterns of governance is also 
discussed. The cases of water provision through the reformed organizational 
arrangements after devolution in the three study States are discussed in sections 2, 3 
and 4, including the historical roles of local governments in service provision, the pre-
reform modalities and status of domestic water provision, and the reformed local 
government structure in the State. The State-specific variations in the design mandated 
by the national Act and the dynamics of the State political, economic and bureaucratic 
context that were implicated are also discussed. Finally, in each case, the emergent 
structure as discerned from the study of the mini-cases, and the patterns of 
effectiveness and inclusion are delineated.  
 
The concluding section of this chapter compares the extent and nature of the post-
reform shifts in the three States, exploring the apparent reasons for the inter-state 
variations and the comparative degree of effectiveness and women’s inclusion that 
resulted. The task here was to assess how the different characteristics and dynamics of 
the three State contexts - at the State and local levels - had respectively modulated the 
State-designed structure and thereby mediated its performance. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
190 The 73rd Constitutional Amendment Act is also called the Panchayat Act. 
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1. DEVOLUTION IN INDIA AND PANCHAYATI RAJ 
 
Though village local governments, called Gram Panchayats (henceforth, GP) as they 
existed in different states had been involved in water provision to different degrees, 
their existence itself had been uncertain and uneven across the country. The primary 
responsibility for local governance, including provision of basic services rested with 
the State governments, through various line departments, the office of the District 
Collector and various autonomous organizations such as the District Rural 
Development Agency (DRDA), which implemented rural development programs 
funded by the Central government. With the devolution of some functions to the 
Panchayats mandated by the Panchayat Act, water provision was among the first 
responsibilities to be transferred.    
 
Devolution to local governments in India is attributed to the cumulative effect of a 
number of forces – the repeated attempts by the Central government since the 60’s to 
constitute community organizations to anchor local development initiatives, the 
persistent Gandhian vision of self-governed ‘village republics’ that intermittently 
animated national discourses, the recommendations of various Committees on local 
government chaired by well-known votaries of local self-governance, the experience 
of local government systems instituted in seven States following the Ashok Mehta 
Committee recommendations in 1977, the need to decentralize sufficient power to the 
local level to contain the ambitions of regional and local political elites, and not least, 
the international discourses on decentralization and democratization in the late eighties 
and nineties.191 The reforms were instituted alongside the other reforms for 
                                                 
191 Kudva (2003), Mishra (2002), Pedersen (2000), Kohli (2002) among others, provide different 
accounts and analyses of the reasons for and process of reforms in India. 
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decentralization and liberalization that was initiated in India after 1991, and therefore 
modulated by the attendant neoliberal discourses on the economy and polity.  
 
That is not to say that the notion of service provision by local governments, as an 
important constituent of local self-governance, was not indigenous or that local 
governments did not exist before in India.192 Villages in almost all parts of the territory 
that is now India are understood to have historically been self-governed, though the 
structures were significantly eroded or transformed in the two centuries of British rule. 
There is evidence of village councils (Panchayats) of elders who enjoyed respect and 
authority through a combination of religion and tradition, and assemblies (sabhas) of 
lay citizens, through these structures varied regionally in their form, composition and 
functions. These bodies were usually responsible for provision of basic services, 
village administration, policing and adjudication.193 The constitution of formal local 
government structures for initially, municipal administration and later, regional/ 
district administration by the British undermined the authority of these traditional 
institutions; but like them, the new structures had responsibility for municipal services, 
among other functions. By the later part of the Independence movement, the vision of 
self-governed villages with substantial autonomy for local development were a 
significant part of the discussions on the political and governance structure of 
Independent India, but by representative local governments in place of hereditary, 
customary or nominated Panchayats.  
 
Local governments did not finally find place in the Constitution of India except as a 
                                                 
192 A detailed account of the history of Panchayats in India is given by ISS (2000), Chiriyankandath 
(2001) and Mishra (2002), which is briefly sketched here. 
193 Alongside, there were usually other institutions like caste panchayats which governed the social and 
economic life of different caste-groups, often across a number of villages, and trade guilds which 
regulated norms and practices within different trades. 
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desirable vision194, because of strong objections by the Chairman of the Constituent 
Assembly that drafted the Constitution, Dr.B.R.Ambedkar. It is notable, and pertinent 
to this study, that his prime objection was that the extreme inequities and entrenched 
exclusionary practices endemic in rural India would preclude any democracy at that 
level, and that constituting local governments would only further concentrate the oft-
misused power of local elites by enabling them to capture local state authority and 
resources. This fear is still articulated by many authors in the more recent 
decentralization literature, as a prime reason why devolution may not be appropriate in 
all kinds of developing contexts.195 Rural India is however now arguably 
heterogeneous and the variation in social, economic and political conditions across 
locations calls for a more nuanced examination of the consequences of devolution, 
which remains a normative democratic ideal.  
 
With such deep roots in the nation’s political history and philosophy, to categorize the 
devolution of 1993 as a part of the ongoing neoliberal reforms and the international 
prescriptions for ‘good governance’ would be incorrect. This is even more obvious 
from the Panchayat structure that was articulated in the reform legislation, which was 
more progressive than neoliberal, as discussed below. 
 
1.1. REFORMED STRUCTURE OF THE PANCHAYAT SYSTEM AND INTER-STATE 
VARIATIONS 
 
The Panchayat Act mandated the constitution of three-tier local government structures 
(Panchayats) in the rural areas across the country, specifying a uniform skeletal 
                                                 
194 They were mentioned in the Constitution of India as one of the ‘Directive Principles’ of state policy, 
which did not have an enforceable legal status, though it did influence policy discourses (see Isaac and 
Franke 2000:17). 
195 A review of these views is provided in Chapter I. 
 
 
 
 
172
structure that could be detailed by the States according to local conditions. The Act 
came into effect on 30th April 1993, and all States were required to enact conforming 
legislation within a year, by 30th April 1994 (ISS 2000). The haste, and the natural 
reluctance of State governments to disperse some of their powers resulted in often, 
poorly formulated legislation, the lack of revision of other conflicting legislation that 
existed, and a minimal devolution of powers.196 Even for those functions and powers 
that were devolved, the executive orders necessary for their effectuation were not 
issued with any alacrity, and though Panchayats were constituted and elections held in 
most States in 1995, their functioning differed little from the pre-reform situation.  
 
The basic organizational structure for local governments is specified in Article 273 of 
the Constitution and is shown in Figure 3.1. Three levels of local government were 
constituted, at the village (Gram), intermediate (Taluka, Mandal or Block) and 
district197 (Zilla) levels, with members directly elected from territorial constituencies 
delineated for the purpose. In the accompanying legislation for urban areas, a District 
Planning Committee (henceforth, DPC) representing both rural and urban local 
governments was specified, to amalgamate plans developed successively by the Gram 
Panchayat (henceforth, GP) and Intermediate Panchayat (henceforth, IP) and develop 
a comprehensive plan for the district.  
 
Independent State Election Commissions conduct the elections. In addition to the 
directly elected representatives, Panchayats at the intermediate and district levels  
                                                 
196 The ‘imposition’ of local government reforms by the Central government, though ‘local governance’ 
is a subject of State jurisdiction in the federal political system in India, meant that many States were 
reluctant converts, and conforming Acts were assembled in the last few weeks before the 1994 April 
deadline. 
197 Districts are sub-state revenue and developmental administrative units, also important at which 
levels for departmental administration. They include urban and rural settlements, except when the urban 
area is of metropolitan scale and spans a number of districts. 
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Figure 3.1:  Skeletal 3-tier structure of local governments in States with more 
than 2 million population, as specified in the CAAs 
 
could also include elected representatives from the lower levels (typically 
Chairpersons of the GPs and IPs respectively), and those members of State legislatures 
and the national legislature whose constituencies wholly or partially overlapped with 
the Panchayat jurisdiction. One third of the elected seats at all three levels are 
compulsorily earmarked for women, to be allotted by rotation to different 
constituencies, as are one-third of President or Chairperson and Vice-President or 
Vice-Chairperson positions. A proportion of the seats are also reserved for Scheduled 
Castes and Scheduled Tribes (together often identified as dalits) equivalent to their 
respective proportions in the Panchayat population. Further, the Gram Sabha (GS), or 
the village assembly of all voters in the village has been given a Constitutional status, 
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the functions and powers of the assembly are however not defined, though its 
envisaged role in planning, monitoring, budgetting and social auditing can be 
undeniably discerned in the legislation (Misra and Mishra 2000). Overall, therefore, it 
was a mandate to devolve significant planning, administrative and fiscal/ financial 
powers to Panchayats, and institute participatory and direct-democratic governance in 
the village community. 198 
 
In their conforming legislation199 States independently specified those details of 
structure and procedure which were not compulsorily mandated by the Central 
legislation. Among these were the procedures for election and reservation of the 
position of GP Chairpersons or Presidents (called Sarpanches); the inclusion of ex-
officio members in IPs and DPs; the powers and functions that were to be devolved to 
different tiers of the Panchayat system; the constitution, functions and powers of the 
GS; and the composition, membership procedures and functions of the DPC. Two 
areas left to the discretion of States are particularly important in understanding 
variations in the arrangements for water provision in the States. One is the 
constitution, functions and powers of Committees for various functions or tasks. The 
other is the legal, administrative and organizational arrangements necessary to 
effectuate the legislated provisions, as well as attendant reforms in the State line 
departments necessary for effective functioning of the Panchayats. A third area 
particularly relevant to the inclusion of marginalized groups such as women and 
dalits200 was the procedures for election of the Chairpersons of the GP, IP and ZP, 
                                                 
198 The 74th Amendment (Nagarpalika) Act similarly mandates the constitution and operation of Nagar 
Panchayats, Municipalities and Municipal Corporations for urban areas according to their size, with the 
same provisions for reserving elected positions for women and dalits. Citizen assemblies in urban areas 
are constituted and convened at the ward (electoral district) level (see Bakshi 2005) 
199 Many States had existing legislation which they revised to  conform to the GoI legislation. 
200 Dalits are people belonging to the Scheduled Castes, that is, the lower castes that have been listed in 
the Indian Constitution for affirmative action. 
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which was crucial for disabling casteist and exclusionary maneuvers by members 
more experienced in realpolitik, and precluding their removal from office with ‘no-
confidence’ motions. 
 
1.2. RELATIVE EFFICACIES OF DIFFERENTIAL DEVOLUTION 
 
Twenty-nine subjects of State jurisdiction that may be devolved to Panchayats are 
specified in the Eleventh Schedule, but the discretion allowed to States resulted in 
tardy transfer of functions, in almost all States.201 The issue was not only the natural 
reluctance of State political leaders and government staff to give away powers and 
resources but also that there was little clarity on the actual mechanics of devolution. 
Despite initiating the process, even the Central government had little idea on the next 
steps, and it was not till 2001 that some clarity on process and specific steps to be 
taken emerged in the report of the ‘Task Force on Devolution of Powers and Functions 
upon Panchayati Raj Institutions’ set up by the Ministry of Rural Development (GoI 
2001a). The Task force had the experience of the very substantial devolution in Kerala 
after its 1996 People’s Plan Campaign that kick-started extensive administrative 
reform to activate Panchayats, and experiments in some other States. The report 
contained various blueprints for the “manner of doing devolution”, and possible 
obstacles and strategies to overcome them, and has been the primary referent for 
devolution in all States (Mishra and Misra 2008).202  
                                                 
201 Kerala was a notable exception, with the State government actively intervening to kick-start local 
planning and governance by the Panchayats.  This is described in more detail in section 3. 
202 A detailed account of the slow process of devolution of powers is provided in Mishra and Misra 
(2008). Briefly, in 2004, the Central Government bifurcated the responsibilities of the MoRD and set up 
a Ministry of Panchayati Raj (MoPR) to focus on devolution, and by organizing the Round Table of the 
Ministers of Pachayati Raj of all States in 2004, the MoPR has begun to develop a political consensus 
on devolution among the States. The pace of devolution has varied widely among States in the last 
decade, and some of the more practical steps towards systematic administrative and legal reform such 
as ‘Activity Mapping’ of different functions of State departments to identify specific tasks that are 
appropriate to different tiers of the Panchayat system are only beginning in most. Though many 
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The situation of incomplete reforms results in wide variation in the institutional set-up 
for discharge of functions by local governments, including water provision.203 While 
the responsibility has been devolved in all the three study States, the distribution of 
various functions and tasks among the organizations involved, the administrative 
changes have made to alter the flow of funds and Panchayat control over State 
government staff engaged in the process varies. The resulting institutional 
configuration for water provision after devolution in the three States therefore differs, 
and raises the issue of their relative efficacies. In the next three sections, I map the 
differences in the reformed arrangements that have emerged in each of the three study 
States, to assess the extent and pattern of devolution, and then describe how these are 
further modulated by the socio-economic realities of the respective local contexts to 
yield particular patterns of effectiveness and participation.  
 
 
2. PANCHAYATS AND WATER PROVISION IN GUJARAT 
 
Historically, water provision was almost fully the responsibility of Panchayats in the 
geographical areas now in Gujarat, where they survived British governance reforms to 
remain more vibrant than the Panchayats in most other States. In the many Princely 
States in the region not under the direct control of the British, they continued with 
fairly undisturbed vigor, supported in most cases in their service provision and 
developmental activities by the rulers. Legally constituted local government bodies 
                                                                                                                                            
functions have, over the years, been legally entrusted to Panchayats, the transfer of funds and State 
departmental personnel, which will actually enable the Panchayats to function as units of local self 
government, have not been done systematically. The jurisprudence that governs the discharge of 
specific functions of each State department also needs to be amended to be consistent with devolution, 
and the necessary executive orders for the effectuation of new processes have to be issued. 
203 Details of the extent, characteristics and variations of devolution in all States as has taken place over 
the years are contained in ISS (2000), Pal (2004) and Alagh et al (2008). 
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including a Gram Panchayat, a District Panchayat, Mandal and District Local Board 
existed in most parts of Gujarat even before it became a separate State in 1960. All 
public works and development schemes were routed through the Gram Panchayat, 
which held public properties and was allocated a substantial proportion of the local 
land revenue204. After 1960, a three-tier, elected panchayat structure was constituted, 
comprising the Gram Panchayat (GP) at the lowest tier, the Taluka Panchayat (TP) as 
an intermediate tier and the Zilla Parishad (ZP) at the district level, with substantial 
powers, responsibilities, and resources including a special cadre of Panchayat 
personnel. A State Panchayat Council of elected leaders and the Gujarat Panchayat 
Parishad of Zilla Panchayat Presidents at the State level coordinated and advised 
lower-level Panchayats.  
 
Panchayats in Gujarat had both revenue and development functions, and all tiers had 
statutory powers to levy different kinds of taxes within their jurisdiction, enabling 
them to get almost 50% of their total annual income from their own sources. With 
100% of land revenue, varying percentages of other taxes and levies (for example, 
irrigation cess) and 25 % of State revenue earmarked for budgetary allocations, all 
tiers of the Panchayat system had sufficient resources for substantial infrastructure 
development and social development initiatives.205 Matching grants were provided 
from the District Rural Encouragement Fund, and State departments had budget 
allocations for various rural development programs. Panchayat personnel were 
recruited and trained by a State-level Panchayat Service Commission, and the 
                                                 
204 The District Village Panchayat Mandal with the district Collector as Chairperson and selected 
Sarpanches as members supervised the village Panchayats, and the District Local Boards managed by 
elected representatives had a wide range of functions (such as primary education) and were supported 
by sufficient resources to undertake them. 
205 The per capita income of Village Panchayats in 1987-1988 was Rs.22.52, the highest in the country 
and far above the incomes of Panchayats in other states like Madhya Pradesh (Rs 0.59), Orissa (Rs. 
1.25) and Uttar Pradesh (Rs 0.78) (Sheth 2000).  
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relationship between the elected members and the official bureaucracy were largely 
positive and productive. Affirmative provisions like reservation of seats for dalits and 
Scheduled Tribes206, constitution of Social Justice Committees with a majority of 
members from the weaker sections of the population and non-lapsing budgetary 
allocations were other notable features. In sum, vibrant and active Panchayats existed 
in Gujarat for most of the decades between Independence and the 1994 reforms, and 
were primary actors in the provision of basic services such as water, primary and 
sometimes secondary education, construction of village roads and minor irrigation 
structures, and arbitration and adjudication.207  
 
Institutionalized as the primary structure of representative local governance, with 
regular elections, visionary leaders and substantial autonomy from State interference, 
Gram Panchayats functioned with vigor till the mid-seventies, when many powers of 
elected representatives were transferred to the Chief Executive Officers at the taluka 
and district levels. Till then, the Panchayat system was, however, dominated by upper 
castes and elites, with almost no woman or dalit being elected as Sarpanch or 
President. Subsequently, dalit dissatisfaction with this state of affairs, and caste-based 
sectional politics by the political parties operating in the State, who aimed at 
displacing traditionally dominant rural elites, changed this composition. Previously 
excluded castes, tribal groups and religious minorities gained political power both at 
the local and State levels.208 The Panchayat system became the primary channel for 
                                                 
206 Like Scheduled Castes (dalits), Scheduled Tribes (adivasis) are indigenous populations listed for 
special affirmative action in the Constitution of India.  
207 This is perhaps not surprising given that significant votaries of local self-government in India like 
M.K.Gandhi, Balwantrai Mehta and Ashok Mehta were all natives of Gujarat. 
208 This was due to the KHAM (Kshatriya, Harijan, Adivasi, Muslim) strategy of the national Congress 
party to counter the steady rise of the Hindu right; it substantially altered the power equations between 
the existing rural elites and the less powerful sections. The political dynamics of this, the changing caste 
composition of elected members of local government and the effect on the Panchayats attention to 
developmental tasks has been well described by Ghosh and Kumar (2003).  
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induction of lower and middle-class leaders into political parties in the 80’s. The 
attention towards the poor and Dalits, and the independent initiatives for local 
development however, declined, and in the eighties Panchayat legitimacy was steadily 
eroded, as a result of many powers of the elected members being transferred to 
government officials. The Gujarat Panchayat Parishad and State Panchayat Council 
were also sidelined.  
 
The autonomy of the Panchayats was further compromised by the institution of 
District Rural Development Agencies (DRDAs) and the District Planning Board 
(DPB) in the mid-eighties, run primarily by the District Collector and other State 
officials, and the introduction of Central government and State government programs 
undermined their initiative for self-devised and self-financed development projects. 
Water provision was made the responsibility of the Gujarat Water Supply and 
Sanitation Board (GWSSB) set up in 1979, to plan and construct water supply systems 
in rural (and urban) areas, which were then to be transfered to Panchayats (or 
municipalities) for operation and maintenance. Despite this, the strong tradition of 
local government and relatively successful functioning of the Panchayat system in 
Gujarat was remarkable in the context of absent or weak systems in most of the States.  
 
2.1. PRE-REFORM MODALITIES AND STATUS OF WATER PROVISION IN GUJARAT 
 
The predominant mode of water provision in rural Gujarat has been through piped 
water supply systems, from groundwater extracted through tubewells and stored in 
overhead reservoirs. Public standposts with taps and handpumps in areas where 
overhead storage was absent or inaccessible have been the main sources for those 
without household connections. Since its inception the GWSSB has implemented all 
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State and Central government programs to install water supply systems in rural areas, 
of which the Accelerated Rural Water Supply Programme (ARWSP) introduced by the 
Central government in the early 70s eventually became the largest. 
 
The GWSSB initiated, developed, owned, operated and maintained almost all systems, 
including regional (multi-panchayat) water supply schemes and single-panchayat ones. 
However, many Panchayats, particularly in south Gujarat, have developed their own 
systems, or augmented existing ones from their own resources and the philanthropic 
contributions of village elites, and sometimes with contributions from users in the 
community. Single-panchayat schemes were transferred to the Gram Panchayats after 
construction and were owned, operated and maintained by the Gram Panchayat from 
of their own resources. In effect, though the GWSSB was one of the main organs of 
the State government that was charged with the responsibility of ensuring domestic 
water provision in all villages, in single-panchayat systems their role was primarily 
restricted to construction and major overhaul of supply systems, though they had a 
greater role in smaller villages with either less income or capabilities or both. The 
institutional structure and distribution of functions that existed prior to the 1994 local 
government reforms is shown in Figure 3.2. 
 
In 1991, only 36% of rural households in Gujarat had access to drinking water.209 
Rapid coverage was getting increasingly difficult with not just households but whole 
villages becoming water-poor due to falling ground-water levels, salinity ingress, 
fluoride contamination or chemical pollution from industries. Though Gujarat is 
currently seen as ‘drought-prone’ it was historically not known to have a problem of 
drinking water availability; the condition emerged with over-exploitation of  
                                                 
209 87% of urban households had water, with overall coverage in the State about 52% (GoI 1991). 
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Figure 3.2: Pre-Reform institutional architecture for water provision in Gujarat 
 
groundwater in an already water-deficient State210. The State government had 
undertaken a variety of infrastructure development programs, including a mega-dam 
                                                 
210 According to the GWSSB, freshwater availability in Gujarat is only about 1137cu.m, against the all-
India average of about 2000 cubic meters, and the distribution is highly uneven with north Gujarat 
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(the Sardar Sarovar Project) designed to carry river water in open canals from the 
Narmada river in the south to drought-prone areas in the north. However, say some 
critics, it is unlikely to actually solve the drinking water crisis in the north, given other 
issues such as groundwater extraction and the unrealistic arrangements for bulk 
supply. Yet others have critiqued the content of discourses on water scarcity in the 
State, as being ‘constructed’ and not a natural situation (Bharwada 2002, Mehta 2001, 
2003, 2007). In the early nineties, water provision – both for domestic and agricultural 
use – had emerged as a volatile and highly politicized issue in the State; it was in these 
circumstances that the mandate for local government reforms and devolution of 
functions, including water provision, was introduced by the Central government 
(Hirway 2005). 
 
2.2. TRAJECTORY OF DEVOLUTION AND (LACK OF) PANCHAYAT REFORMS IN 
GUJARAT 
 
In 1993-94, Gujarat had a Congress government, as did the country, and the tradition 
of a strong Panchayat system, therefore the national Panchayat Act created few waves. 
Since many features mandated by the Act already existed in the Gujarat local 
government system, the Gujarat Panchayat Act enacted in April 1994 did not 
introduce many structural changes. The most significant new feature was the 
reservation of one-third of the seats for women and direct election of members to all 
three tiers as mandated by the GoI. Seats continued to be reserved for dalits, and an 
additional 10% reservation for other ‘socially backward castes’ (SEBCs & OBCs)211 
was introduced. But many of the other ramifications of the Central Act such as 
                                                 
211 SEBC refers to castes categorized as ‘socially and economically backward castes’ and OBC to ‘other 
backward castes’ 
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devolution of the power and capacities to plan for ‘economic development and social 
justice’ were not immediately explored, and in 1996, the Congress party lost the State 
elections and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) formed the government212.  
 
The BJP government continues till date, under the leadership of a popular Chief 
Minister who entered office in 2001, the last year of the government’s five-year term, 
and won a resounding victory in the 2002 elections. With a Congress government at 
the Center and no reason for the BJP to push a reform initiated by it, the efforts 
towards devolution in Gujarat has been weak at best, though the proffered reason is 
that Gujarat already has all the features mandated by the national Panchayat Act 
(Mathew 2001). This was technically correct, but applied only to the structure; the 
planning function, some of the developmental responsibilities and attendant authority 
to be invested in Panchayats, envisaged in the Central legislation, were missing.  
 
Despite little devolution, at this time Panchayats have been invested with the 
responsibilities and powers of fourteen State departments, and others are in process of 
being devolved. Among the responsibilities transferred early to the GP is drinking 
water, tincluding development and management of water distribution schemes at the 
village level.  Since Panchayats in Gujarat have historically taken substantial 
responsibility and initiative in developing drinking water systems either out of their 
own funds or those from various government programs other than the ones channeled 
through the GWSSB, this pertained only to the devolution of the responsibilities, 
                                                 
212 The rise of the BJP had accompanied a resurgence of ‘Hindu nationalism’ in Gujarat, as elsewhere in 
the country, epitomized in the tremendous response to the 1992 ‘Rath Yatra’ of L.K.Advani, a noted 
BJP leader. That has been followed by a series of events valorizing Hindutva, communal riots, and a 
pogrom against the Muslim population that has shocked the world. The Chief Minister in power during 
these events, however, has risen in popularity, as evidenced by a second victory in the 2007 elections; 
in addition to playing the ‘Hindutva card’, effective governance and substantial liberalization of the 
economy has provided mass appeal as well as endorsement by a large section of the intelligentsia (see, 
for example, the analysis in Shah et al 2008). 
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authority and resources – human, infrastructural and financial – vested till then in the 
GWSSB.  
 
Reportedly, little has changed with this statutory devolution, with GWSSB continuing 
to be the primary institutional structure for water provision (Hirway 2005, CEO, 
Wasmo) It was with the revision of the AWRSP guidelines by the GoI (DDWS) in 
1999 that some changes in perception and practice were triggered (ex-GWSSB Chief 
Engineer). The new Guidelines required the involvement of Panchayats in “the 
implementation of schemes, particularly in selecting the location of standpost, spot 
sources, operation and maintenance, fixing of cess/water tariff, etc.” (GoI 1999, 
AWRSP Guidelines 2.1.2) The GP began to be more materially involved, as they were 
required to contribute 10%-25% of the construction cost213, and bear the responsibility 
and costs of operation and maintenance.  
 
In addition, a Sector Reform Pilot Program (SRP) was introduced as a part of the same 
revised Guidelines, for 60 selected districts across India. This program emphasized 
community involvement, beneficiary contribution to capital costs, community 
ownership of assets, recovery of charges, operation and maintenance (DDWS 1999: 
Chapter 3). Though Gujarat was not one of the States in which the Pilot Project was 
first introduced, the fact that this program came as a part of the revised AWRSP 
guidelines indicated the direction of change and “had an effect on governmental 
mindsets” (CEO, WASMO). This has resulted in greater demands for new systems by 
Panchayats and requests to the GWSSB for implementation, some involvement in 
selecting the location of the source, the households to be covered, monitoring of  
 
                                                 
213 Depending on the population and number of households without adequate access as per the funding 
patterns set out in the revised ARWSP Guidelines (GoI 1999). 
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Figure 3.3:  Reformed institutional architecture for water provision after 
devolution in Gujarat 
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households, and occasionally, from the discretionary funds at the disposal of their 
representatives in the State or national legislatures, commonly referred to as MLA-
LAD (Member of Legislative Assembly-Local Area Development) and MP-LAD 
(Member of Parliament-Local Area Development) funds. (interviews: EE, Surat; Gram 
Sachiv214, Laskana). The cumulative effect of these changes, instituted from a number 
of directions, on the existing governance structure is shown in Figure 3.3. 
 
The lack of notable reform in the institutional architecture (visible in Figure 3.3) 
meant that the efficacy of the pre-reform local governance arrangements for water 
provision changed little after the reforms. However, the pre-reform structure was 
decentralized to a comparatively greater extent than in most other States (as has been 
described at the beginning of this section), even though they were less vibrant than in 
the sixties and early seventies. The potential for women’s inclusion, however, 
increased to the extent that one-third of the elected seats in the GP, IP and DP were 
earmarked for women as mandated by the Panchayat Act.  
 
 
2.3. BUSINESS AS USUAL? GWSSB AND THE ROLE OF REFORMED GUJARAT 
PANCHAYATS 
 
To examine the emergent structure and processes at the Panchayat level, the decision-
making process for water provision was studied in three villages in two adjacent 
panchayats – Umbhel and Ladvi in the Kamrej Taluka, and Bhatia in Choriasi Taluka 
of Surat district. Village profiles are provided in Annexure III and Table 3.1 provides 
the situation of water supply in the two Talukas.  
 
                                                 
214 The Gram Sachiv is the Gram Panchayat Secretary.  
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Panchayats in this part of Gujarat are typically not very small,215 but with 
comparatively better infrastructure than in many parts of Gujarat, and most of India. 
The four study panchayats are well-connected by metalled access roads and regular 
bus service to nearby towns, and have piped water supply, electricity, schools, post-
office, telephone and TV connection. The main occupation is agriculture, though a 
segment of the working population commutes to other jobs in the nearby towns. 
Agriculture is a mix of foodgrain and cash crops, with two or in some instances three 
crops supported by the network of irrigation canals in the area; landowning families 
are therefore well-off, while the landless find year-round employment, as farm labor in 
the agricultural seasons, at higher rates than in most parts of India.  The area is flat,  
 
Table 3.1 
Percentage distribution of households by source & location of water in study 
Talukas 
 
Gujarat: Surat District, Kamrej Taluka 
Location of 
Water Source 
Total 
No.of HH 
% of 
HH 
Tap Hand 
pump 
Tube
well 
Well Tank, 
Pond 
River, 
Canal 
Spring Any Other 
Total 29,527 100.0 89.0 6.2 2.4 1.4 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.8 
Within Premises 12,269 41.6 40.2 0.5 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 
Near Premises 14,954 50.6 44.2 4.4 1.1 0.5 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.3 
Away 2,304 7.8 4.7 1.2 0.7 0.8 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.2 
Gujarat: Surat District, Chorasi Taluka 
Location of 
Water Source 
Total 
No.of HH 
% of 
HH 
Tap Hand
pump 
Tube
well 
Well Tank, 
Pond 
River, 
Canal 
Spring Any Other 
Total 40,265 100.0 66.9 9.6 2.1 19.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.7 
Within Premises 17,480 43.4 40.3 1.5 1.3 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 
Near Premises 15,516 38.5 23.3 7.4 0.6 6.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 
Away 7,269 18.1 3.3 0.6 0.2 12.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.1 
Source: Census of India, 2001: H-Series, Table H-8 
                                                 
215 Umbhel was one of the exceptions, but not unique. 
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and houses are clustered in different neighborhoods of the ‘Gamtal’ or village area. 
according to caste, with the lower-caste and dalit neighborhoods at a little distance 
from the other clusters as is typical of villages in India. The pattern of clustering puts 
about 25 households within a 50m radius around existing public water sources. Details 
of older and new water sources in the village, and other village statistics relevant for 
this discussion is provided in Table 3.2. 
 
Table 3.2 
Details of old water sources and new projects after Panchayat reforms in the 
study villages in Gujarat. 
 
Panchayat Population Old Elevated 
Storage Reservoir 
Hand 
pump
Pub. 
Well
Other sources New Elevated 
Storage Reservoir 
New 
hand 
pump Total 
Popn 
No of 
HH 
HH 
size 
Old 
ESR 
Hh 
conn 
Stnd 
post 
New 
ESR 
Hh. 
conn 
Stand 
posts 
Umbhel 5117 1102  30,000 350 16 3 3 Pond 100,000 380 6 0 
Ladvi 1546 280  10,000 67 5 2 1 Tank 0 33 0 2 
Bhatia 882 186 5.5 20,000 100 3 2 0 Tank 0 128 7 0 
Vaktana 1140 228  0 0 0 2 2 RO, pond, dam 40,000 66 6 0
Sources: Census of India 2001; for water sources, GWSSB Sub-division files, focus group discussions and 
transect walks in the village. 
 
All villages except Vaktana had a piped water supply system, from groundwater 
(depth about 42-45 m on average) raised to an ‘elevated storage reservoir’ (ESR), 
from which the distribution network begins.216 The public standposts connected to the 
network were almost all in working condition. The ESRs had been constructed in the 
70’s and 80’s by the GWSSB and despite some major repairs since them, the tanks in 
Umbhel and Ladvi were leaking and/or unstable and had to be replaced. Also, with 
growing populations, existing capacities were not sufficient and augmentation was 
required. Two villages therefore have had construction of additional or replacement 
                                                 
216 No one remembers the exact year, and the records are now either not accessible, and in the one 
instance that it was located, too old to be reliably deciphered. 
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ESRs and extension of supply networks by the GWSSB after 2000; the other have had 
smaller installations like handpumps (Ladvi)217 and standposts (Bhatia) The time from 
project initiation to completion in the four villages ranged from a year (for standposts 
or handpumps to as much as 5-6 years for an ESR and distribution network. 
 
The emergent institutional architecture that could be discerned in the processes of 
development of the four water supply systems did not differ from the reformed design 
shown in Figure 3.3, which in turn differed little from the pre-reform set-up except for 
the 33% reservation of elected seats for women. In each case Panchayat members and 
village residents initiated the project, by contacting the Deputy Executive Engineer 
(DEE) in the Public Health and Sanitation Sub-division of the GWSSB Division office 
in Surat. In all four villages, many villagers knew the DEE, and in turn he appeared to 
know the details of the water situation and the new structures in fair detail218. The 
DEE conducted the technical survey of the situation and possible locations for the 
installation of the bore and ESR, and the hydrologist in the GWSSB Sub-division 
office assessed the water potential and quality. Consultations with the village social 
worker, the ‘Talati’ (village revenue officer), the Sarpanch (President of the Gram 
Panchayat), the schoolteacher (in Bhatia) and a village elder (in Ladvi) were part of 
this process. The consultations were “necessary” (DEE, PHSS, Surat) to get informal 
opinions on the nature and extent of the problem, information on the water quality in 
private bore-wells in the village, determine land availability and secure the agreement 
of the Panchayat for operation and maintenance of the system after construction. The 
preliminary engineering report, the hydrologists’ report and a proposal with detailed 
                                                 
217 Ladvi also had a new ESR and additional water points and household connections through a Sector 
Reform Project – this will be discussed when the SR program is considered.  
218 That is, in our discussion, he was able to recollect the technical details of the new projects such as 
depth of bore, height and capacity of the ESR and the approximate dates when construction began and 
was completed. He was also aware of the number of standposts in each village, and that one was mal-
functioning in Umbhel, though he was not aware of the one in Bhatia that needed repair.  
 
 
 
 
190
cost estimates was forwarded from the Sub-division to the Executive Engineer (EE) in 
the GWSSB Division office in Surat for approval, financial and technical sanction. On 
approval, tenders were invited and construction initiated by the Division office, and 
the DEE monitored the actual construction process. Completion reports were furnished 
by the Subdivision to the Division, and the systems were inaugurated by the EE.219  
 
The only change that could be discerned in the emergent institutional architecture 
observed in the four mini-cases that the DEE from the GWSSB Subdivision now 
definitely consults with a number of people in the village – but typically, other officers 
familiar with the village, and the Sarpanch of the Gram Panchayat. This was not 
absent earlier but was more informal and not seen to be necessary by the GWSSB 
officer; now, in the words of the EE, Surat Division,  
  
“…consultation should be done, after all, it is their village and their requirement…we 
have to find out what they need and what is most suitable. Ofcourse, the technical part 
they are not able to do, so we have to do all the actual work….” (EE, Surat) 
 
Local NGOs (Uthan), civil society networks (PRAVAH), and experts studying the 
issue (interview: Dr Indira Hirway), perceive the lack of change in pre-reform patterns 
of functioning of the GWSSB to be a major reason for inadequate progress in meeting 
rural domestic water needs. Decentralization of responsibility, authority and resources 
to communities, and involvement of ‘community organizations’ in the process is 
identified as necessary for effective and sustainable provision (PRAVAH 2004). It is 
however, also true that many Gram Panchayats have, and continue to make some 
arrangements for domestic water needs in their jurisdiction by other means, quite apart 
from the GWSSB interventions. Vaktana is a case in point where a Reverse Osmosis 
                                                 
219 Except in Ladvi, where there was a long gap between the transfer of the EE in place during 
construction and the new EE assuming office. 
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plant for purified drinking water had been installed by the Panchayat, from its own and 
donated resources, despite the village being predominantly tribal and comparatively 
less prosperous. 
 
2.4. PANCHAYAT PROVISION: EFFICACY, EFFECTIVENESS AND PARTICIPATION.  
 
The lack of any visible institutional change in the existing architecture of local 
governance in Gujarat after the Panchayat Act (see Figure 3.4) was due to political 
reasons, as well as a function of the local socio-economic circumstances. The change 
to a Bharatiya Janata Party (henceforth, BJP) government in Gujarat in 1996 in 
Opposition to the Congress government in the Center effectively stalled any Congress-
initiated agenda as the Panchayat reforms were, and the existence of Panchayats 
structurally similar to that mandated in the GoI Panchayat Act provided an alibi for 
inaction. The primary intent of the reform, of enabling Panchayats to plan for social 
and economic development of their jurisdictions was completely bypassed. Without 
strong political intent or administrative action, the small changes that were made for 
the involvement of the GP settled into the existing system and lost steam (CEO, 
Wasmo; Secretary, GUDC). As the CEO of WASMO – the new parastatal set up to 
implement the Sector Reform program – observed,  
 
‘’….reforms require continuous energy to routinize the new approaches and different 
ways of doing the work, if that is not there, everything falls back into the same 
pattern…..that is why WASMO had to be set up, otherwise the Sector Reform 
Program would have just slowly fallen into the regular pattern of GWSSB” (CEO, 
WASMO).  
 
To the question of why Panchayats in Gujarat, otherwise active and well-established, 
would not readily take on roles that increased their authority and functions, his 
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response was the same as that of many others’-  
 
“…they really haven’t been given any more power, just some more work…not like in 
the Sector Reform Program where the beneficiary group can actually invite bids, hire 
other contractors and not the ones the GWSSB always gets…sometimes someone in 
the village itself….so why should they get involved? You know Gujarati people, they 
always do things that will benefit them, why spend more time on Panchayat work 
when it makes no difference to their powers or brings more money to the 
Panchayat……in any case, its not as if the Surat Division [of GWSSB] isn’t doing its 
work and people are really desperate for water, as in Saurashtra and Kutch…...”(CEO, 
WASMO) 
 
In sum, the fact that the GWSSB system functioned well enough, and the few reforms 
did not bring the Panchayats very much more authority or resources also precluded 
any political demand from them for more devolution. The local socio-economic 
context that was characterized by high levels of employment and economic activity of 
some kind throughout the year, reasonable levels of infrastructure and services, and 
the characteristic Gujarati entrepreneurship noted by many that made people use extra 
time for some profitable activity, also supported the existing pattern.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.4: Distribution of functions in pre-devolved, devolved and observed 
governance arrangements in Gujarat, derived using the Devolution 
Score Sheet (Table 2.6) 
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Despite the lack of any devolution, the specification of Panchayat involvement did 
change the effectiveness of water provision, as shown in Table 3.3 and Figure 3.5. 
There are increases on all indicators that were assessed, but whether it was a function 
of the addition of one more source of water or a reflection of greater effectiveness is 
not clear. On one hand, the Panchayats in Gujarat were both well-resourced and 
entrepreneurial, and developed water supply systems to augment those developed by 
the State or Central programs, as discussed before, but on the other, without any  
 
Table 3.3 
Change in effectiveness of water provision after Panchayat reforms in Gujarat 
 Umbhel Ladvi Bhatia Vaktana  
 Before After Before After Before After Before After Before After 
Per Capita Availability 45.7 61.0 48.9 58.1 56.1 73.1 47.9 78.2 49.6 67.6 
Per Capita from HH Source 38.8 77.5 47.0 47.0 39.8 59.4 0.0 102.6 31.4 71.6 
Per Capita from Public Source 14.6 29.0 16.3 22.6 32.2 58.0 21.9 22.4 21.2 33.0 
Disparity 24.2 48.6 30.8 24.4 7.6 1.4 0.0 80.2 15.6 38.6 
% HH with Private Source 34.9 69.4 29.3 29.3 55.9 71.0 2.6 31.6 30.7 50.3 
% HH < 50 m from Public Source 60 76 86 100 80.6 100.0 52.6 100.0 69.7 94.1 
% HH  - Unprotected Sources 5 0 0 0 0.0 0.0 44.7 0.0 49.7 0.0 
Calculated from data obtained from Gram Panchayat and office of the Executive Engineer, GWSSB Surat Division  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.5: Effectiveness of water supply projects after devolution in Gujarat, 
based on Table 3.3 
 
 
 
 
194
change in structure (except creation of some space for women) or process, the 
improvements in availability and access cannot wholly be attributed to any increase in 
efficacy, but more to the efficacy of the pre-reform arrangements.  
 
Could the inclusion of women – the only major change from the pre-reform structure - 
have contributed to greater effectiveness? This is certainly precluded by the dismal 
picture of women’s participation that emerged from the study, and is shown in Figure 
3.6. Also, apart from the reservation of Panchayat seats, there are few other spaces 
designated for women in the Gujarat Panchayat structure except in the Standing 
Committees of the Panchayat, where there is atleast one woman member. On enquiry 
as to why it was not one-third as had become a norm, the reason given was arithmetic 
(Sarpanch and Sachiv, Ladvi). With only 5 women in a 15-member Panchayat, and 5 
Standing Committees of 6 members in each, having women constitute 33% of the 
membership meant that all the women Panchayat members would have membership in 
multiple Committees. It was clearly not very palatable that the women should be  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.6: Participation in the development of water supply projects after 
devolution in Gujarat (from interviews and Panchayat records) 
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accorded so much importance, as evidenced by the opinion that  
 
‘It makes no difference to them…in any case they rarely come to Panchayat 
meetings…they would not come to the Committee [meetings] and it would be 
impossible to conduct business because the quorum would never be 
filled…’(Sarpanch, Ladvi) 
 
Few elected women attended meetings, either of the Gram Panchayat or Gram Sabha, 
and they irregularly, and only two remembered speaking at any meeting. However, 
most of them had almost full information of the new water supply projects, and of 
some other Panchayat activities and decisions; often, they read the minutes and 
resolutions when those were brought to them for signatures. This last was sometimes 
not possible because,  
 
‘…they [whoever brought the register] are sometimes in a hurry and I would be busy 
in housework… when they came in the evening and chatted with the men [of the 
family] I had time to read it, ofcourse I would have to send water, make tea…I like it 
when they just leave the register for me to sign, I can look at many pages….I like 
knowing whats [sic] going on in the village…” [Woman Panchayat member, Bhatia] 
 
In the Gujarat villages, except the one dalit member, all other elected women 
interviewed were school educated at least to the pre-secondary level (8th grade)220. 
Two had male relatives who were also Panchayat members from a different 
constituency in the village. 
 
Though the earmarked spaces were occupied as statutorily required, women made 
scant use of the opportunities that were presented. The primary reason for attendance 
was ‘curiosity’, and the deterring factor the customary norms in respect of women in 
public life. The uneven and moderate participation of women is also credibly 
                                                 
220 The dalit woman Panchayat member had only been in school till the fourth standard (fourth grade) 
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explained by the fact that despite a high level of economic development, traditional 
customs and patriarchal attitudes towards women persist strongly, as evidenced by the 
adverse sex-ratio. 
 
Customary norms of seclusion in upper castes and caste exclusion keep away women 
from the upper and lower castes respectively; and also, as one dalit elected member 
explained,  
 
“…why should I bother, I can’t read the papers they pass around……how many times 
can I keep asking……as if anyone will listen to me……I have water, 20 ft from my 
house, it has been there for many years….actually, they [the upper-caste, high-income 
members] think about us, the tap was put in by them only so many years ago……I 
was not here, I was not married, but my mother-in-law said she used to go to the pond 
in that field [about 300 m away], then those people talked to the government and put 
in this pipe….”(interview, Panchayat member, Umbhel) 
 
It is the women in the middle and low income groups and middle-castes who are most 
involved, being literate and reasonably informed either through television, 
newspapers, social interactions or because they do some income-generating work 
either at home or outside; but it is precisely this economic engagement that makes 
their attendance irregular. But media access and mobility made all women interviewed 
well informed about the plans and progress for the new system, though the higher-
income women only knew of the augmentation to the piped system, and not about the 
standposts that were also installed in the less well-off clusters as a part of the same 
project. 
 
The low participation of women in Gujarat is however, not mirrored among the male 
elected members. Panchayat meetings and Gram Sabhas are conducted in routine, 
business-like manner, and most elected members attend on as many occasions as they 
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can. Being a Panchayat member conferred a status in the village all were conscious of 
and enjoyed, even lower-caste members, and being aware of village events and 
processes was a matter of pride, even among the wider male population in the 
village.221 The most common sentiment expressed was  
 
‘…they [GWSSB officers] will do something, why should we bother with details…as 
long as they do something for these big problems like water…we know they have 
annual budgets, and if they don’t have money this year they will do it next 
year…ofcourse, they listen to the ‘big people’, but that is the norm, we cannot change 
that much…’(user, in FGD, Bhatia) 
 
In sum, Gujarat throws up a paradoxical situation. Despite little reform, the 
institutional arrangements are definitely effective in improving the water situation. On 
the other hand, the only major reform that was introduced – the mandatory inclusion 
of some women in the structure and processes – has had little effect. The question is, if 
more extensively reformed arrangements resulted in substantially greater effectiveness 
and participation, and in the following two sections this is explored, in the cases of 
Kerala and MP respectively. 
 
 
3. KERALA: PANCHAYATS AND PEOPLE’S PLANS FOR DRINKING 
WATER 
 
Historically, the primary sources for domestic water in Kerala were private and 
community dug-wells, tanks and ponds, and traditional caste-based Panchayats called 
‘kootams’ undertook substantial responsibility for development of community sources. 
Rulers of the area provided resources for larger projects or poorer villages. The 
                                                 
221 This sentiment was absent in Madhya Pradesh, except among a few of the youth. 
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Panchayats were stable units of self-governance with civil and judicial powers, which 
continued under different rulers till the British converted them to legal entities in 
1920, when they lost much of their traditional status and powers. Rulers of areas 
outside British jurisdiction had emulated the British laws, and when the independent 
Kerala State came into being in 1956, Panchayats and Municipalities were part of the 
governance landscape across the State. Panchayats in Kerala were – and continue to be 
– large, with a population of about 29,000 on average (Ramchandran et al 2000). Even 
with limited sources of income, they remained viable organizations with a number of 
important functions, including water provision, for two decades after Independence. 
Subsequent changes, the current governance structure after the 1994 local government 
reforms, and the emergent institutional architecture for water provision at the local 
level as found in this study are explained in the sections below.    
 
3.1. PRE-REFORM MODALITIES AND STATUS OF WATER PROVISION IN KERALA  
 
After independence, water supply for those without private sources remained mostly 
the responsibility of local governments till the mid seventies, when their functions and 
powers were progressively eroded with increasing centralization. This was despite 
strong votaries of decentralized governance presenting detailed suggestions to 
successive governments in Kerala, who initiated various legislative processes; 
however, the resulting Kerala District Administration Act of 1979 and the 
Amendments to it in 1990 did not result in any substantial devolution. The 1990 
Amendments did add a provision for 30% of seats to be reserved for women, but little 
changed in actual practice (Ramachandran et al., 2000). In the wave of centralization 
across States in the seventies and early eighties, the Kerala Water Authority (KWA) 
was constituted under the Kerala Water Supply and Waste Water Ordinance 1984. 
 
 
 
 
199
Water supply systems under local governments were handed over to the new 
organization and the powers and functions of local governments relating to domestic 
water provision were extinguished (GoK 2002). 
 
The KWA was responsible for water provision in rural and urban areas – from 
identifying need, to design, tendering, construction, operations and maintenance. The 
organization developed and managed a number of large multi-panchayat piped water 
schemes, smaller local systems, and handpumps and standposts for community use 
across the State (GoK 2002) The only role Panchayats played in the process was 
requesting the KWA to include particularly critical projects in their annual budgeting 
exercises, as shown in Figure 3.7. Panchayats maintained the open community wells 
or tanks as best they could, and sometimes installed and maintained additional 
handpumps and/or standposts from their own or special-grant funds (Secretary, SPB)   
 
The funds for KWA installations came from State and Central government programs, 
of which the AWRSP of the GoI was the largest, but by the early nineties, it was 
evident that progress was too slow and other strategies were required to address the 
domestic water situation in Kerala. In 1991, only about 12% of rural households and 
39% of urban households (19% combined coverage) had access to safe sources of 
drinking water, an increase of only about 6% in combined rural and urban coverage 
since 1981. Falling water tables and increasing pollution from urbanization, open 
defecation, agricultural run-offs and industrial plants had also begun to affect existing 
sources, both private and public222, and increasingly, many of those with assured 
supplies were becoming water-poor. 
                                                 
222 In  1991, with epidemics of diarrohea, municipalities and the KWA had to begin programs for 
disinfecting wells and educating communities to pre-treat water for drinking and cooking, despite the 
widespread and traditional domestic water-treatment practices that had rendered water safe till that time 
(for example, boiling with specific local spices) (SEUF, undated).   
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Figure 3.7:  Pre-devolution institutional set-up for water provision in Kerala 
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3.2. PANCHAYAT REFORMS AND THE PEOPLE’S PLANNING CAMPAIGN IN KERALA 
 
The enactment of the Kerala Panchayat Act in 1994, in conformity with the national 
Panchayat Act, did not immediately change the situation of either local governance or 
of water provision in Kerala villages. The United Democratic Front (UDF), the Kerala 
version of the Congress party, was in government at the time, and the conformity Act 
was enacted without any problem by April 1994, and a comprehensive government 
order was issued in 1995 transferring various institutions and staff to Panchayats. In 
the State budget next year, a separate Annexure was introduced which detailed the 
development programs and grants-in-aid transferred to Panchayats, establishing a legal 
status to the allocation to local governments. The actual effectuation of devolution 
however, only happened after the State Government changed in 1996, when the Left 
Democratic Front (LDF), an affiliate of the Communist Party of India-Marxist (CPI-
M) won the elections.  
 
The LDF government initiated a statewide People’s Planning Campaign (PPC) in 
1996 to kick-start a process of participatory planning by Gram Panchayats. With this, 
a process of substantial devolution to local governments was set in motion, which has 
been widely acknowledged to be a landmark in the country and unique internationally 
(see Heller 2001). The PPC was a revolutionary exercise for participatory, bottom-up 
planning across the State, with the preparation of development plans of the 991 Gram 
Panchayats and their successive integration at the level of Intermediate (Block) 
Panchayats and District Panchayats, to be finally included in the State Plan. In August 
1996, the State Planning Board and the Department of Local Administration initiated 
the Campaign and in collaboration with NGOs and CBOs, mobilized widespread 
participation. The Kerala Sahitya Shastra Parishad (KSSP), a non-governmental 
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organization with local branches across the State, whose membership overlapped to a 
substantial extent with the LDF cadres, was among the most central of these. 
 
The PPC was a ‘historic landmark’ in the development planning scenario in India, and 
has arguably been the most extensive and significant of exercises in participatory 
planning not only in India but internationally (Heller 2001). It therefore bears 
discussion; and Isaac and Franke (2000, 2002) provide a detailed account of the 
process. The former author was member-in-charge of decentralization in the Kerala 
State Planning Board during the Campaign period and widely credited to be the 
‘architect’ of the PPC.  
 
The PPC was multi-staged with mid-course corrections as issues arose; in the words of 
Thomas Isaac, it was “a huge action-research project” (Isaac, in interview). Briefly, 
the process started with Gram Sabhas (village assemblies) organized in every electoral 
district (Ward) of the villages, to identify local problems and needs. This was followed 
by formation of smaller Working Groups (WG) on twelve ‘subjects’, for more 
structured discussions anchored by trained resource persons from the locality. The 
next step was a participatory resource mapping223 and data assembling exercise in 
each Ward, and the preparation of a comprehensive Development Report (DR) for 
each village. The latter integrated the reports of the twelve WGs, which were based on 
the data assembled in the mapping process, as well as from other government sources. 
Development Seminars were then conducted in every district of Kerala, which 
included representatives elected by the GS, two representatives from each WG, 
                                                 
223 The participatory maps developed in every village were stored in the house of its ‘architect’ (Thomas 
Isaac) and during the interview with Mr, Isaac he not only showed the stacks, but permitted 
examination of a few. By then the government had changed, and the plans to “…further develop and 
use them [as a basis for more meaningful discussion at the Ward level] had to be shelved along with the 
plans…” said Thomas Isaac (interview). 
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Panchayat members and invited experts. The DRs were eventually converted to 
projects and schemes by Task Forces constituted for the purpose, which reports were 
then vetted by Voluntary Technical Committees at the block and district levels. This 
‘shelf-of-projects’ was then successively integrated at block and district levels to 
prepare an overall District Plan. The projects were funded under various development 
programs of the State and Central government, utilizing more than 35-40% of the 
State Plan budget224, with 10% of the total funds earmarked for women-specific 
initiatives.  
 
A number of changes were introduced in subsequent years to streamline and 
institutionalize the process. The experience of the PPC helped identify the changes 
required in the existing legal framework and administrative processes to enable 
Panchayats to function effectively, and the financial, human and organizational 
resources that were necessary. A Committee for Decentralization of Powers had been 
constituted in 1996, and their recommendations made in the light of the Campaign 
experience were eventually incorporated into the Kerala Panchayat Act of 1999, and 
provided the legal basis for transfer of powers and responsibilities to Panchayats. A 
large number of subjects, and district and lower-level staff of some State departments, 
and a number of development organizations set up and run by the State departments 
have been transferred to Panchayats (GoK 2001a, Pal 2004) 225. Drinking water 
provision was devolved, but as discussed later in this section, the human and 
organizational resources were not (GoK 2001a: Annexure II).  
                                                 
224 With the next change in government in 2001, this has dropped to between 15-20% of the State 
budget 
225 The Third Administrative Reforms Commission of the Government of Kerala, set up in 1997, 
recommended extensive reforms, including for decentralization (13th Report, 2001). Annexures I and II 
of the Report on Decentralization (2001) spell out the functions, personnel and organizations to be 
transferred to various tiers of local government (village, taluk and district). For example ‘Krishi 
Bhavans’ or farmer’s centers of the Agriculture Department, the Public Health Center of the Health 
Department, etc. 
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There have been some alterations in this planning process226, and reduction in the 
proportion of State funds allocated to Panchayats, with the defeat of the LDF 
government in the 2001 elections and the UDF’s return to office (Mohanakumar 
2001). The essential structure, however, continues till date, and most tasks and 
resources devolved to Panchayats have remained with them. Not only was it politically 
infeasible for the State to take back power after the widely participatory and 
consciousness-raising PPC, but the LDF government had deliberately ensured that 
most of the legal changes were ‘irreversible’; in fact this decision was explicitly 
communicated to those involved in the process of administrative reform in a 
Government Resolution (GR) and was used as a touchstone for all changes. 
(interview: Secretary, State Planning Board) 
  
In all the participatory plans developed, drinking water projects were important items; 
Isaac and Franke report that 8% of the total expenditure budgeted in the Panchayat 
plans were for small-scale drinking water projects. This was in addition to those 
included in planned housing; drinking water had emerged as one of the high-priority 
areas in the participatory plans, as much as it was a priority in the State plan. The 
projects proposed in the participatory plans however, were sharply different from the 
State (KWA) plans for large piped water schemes, and included the restoration of 
local ponds and wells, excavation of new wells, tube-well installations and small-scale 
piped water distribution systems. These were mostly designed to be community-
managed, with beneficiary contributions in labor, materials and/or finances. Even 
more startling was that these were often located in areas that had been listed as ‘fully 
                                                 
226 Some interviewees called it a ‘roll-back’, with many roles shifting back to State departments and 
officials; others remarked that it had become ‘less participatory’. There was undoubtedly a movement 
towards greater involvement of government officials in the decision-making process; for example, the 
VTCs were eventually converted into Block Level Expert Committees (BLEC) and District Level 
Expert Committees (DLEC) by adding technical staff from government departments. 
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covered’ by the KWA, and many locations the KWA listed as priority areas were in 
reality adequately supplied from traditional sources. (Isaac and Franke 2002:124).   
 
3.3. LOCAL CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT, MOBILIZATION AND PARTICIPATORY 
PLANNING  
 
Three important factors undergirded the success of the PPC and the subsequent 
extensive transformation of local governance in Kerala. The first was the statewide 
presence of the Kerala Shastra Sahitya Parishad (KSSP) - literally meaning ‘Science 
Writer’s Forum of Kerala’ - an activist association of teachers, students, professionals 
and community leaders, which has been working for the last 45 years to, in its own 
words, 
 
“….popularize science among the people of Kerala in their mother tongue, i.e., 
Malayalam….with a membership of about 40,000 drawn from all walks of life and 
distributed in about 2000 units within the state of Kerala…The KSSP is involved, in 
broadly three types of activities: educative, agitative and constructive, in areas like 
enviroment, health, education, energy, literacy, micro-planning and development in 
general.”  (KSSP, undated:7)227 
 
                                                 
227 From an organization of science writers, KSSP has developed into a movement for the 
popularization of science and support of development initiatives at the local level. Its origin can be 
traced to the formation of a Science Literary Forum in 1957 by a group of Marxist activists and science 
writers concerned at the divide between the elite, English-language discourses in science and its 
knowledge and application by lay people for development. Established in 1962, by 1968 it had 
developed ties with scientists from Kerala working all over India, and become a well-defined 
organisation with a focus on the popular communication of science in Malayalee, the local language. By 
1976 it had become a movement for the mass dissemination of science in Kerala with a membership of 
2,600, and the following year it began organising All India Workshops for science activities. In 1987, at 
one of these workshops, the All India People's Science Network was born and People's Science 
Movements, inspired by KSSP, have now sprung up across the country. The organisation itself has 
60,000 members organised in about 2,000 units and is engaged across the whole range of development 
issues. Its Executive Committee has 65 members and at local levels there are more than 10,000 office 
bearers. KSSP has received a number of awards including the 1996 “Right Livelihood Award’, UNEP's 
Global 500, the Vriksha Mitra and the King Sejong (UNESCO) award for its work in education, 
development, environment, small-scale entrepreneurship development and other grassroots efforts. 
(KSSP, undated) 
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The KSSP’s large network of members, extending to the village level, familiarity with 
the field realities, long experience in development interventions and the respect and 
confidence they commanded in most parts of the State228 helped mobilize extensive 
participation and enthusiasm. Moreover, they had previously collaborated with the 
Center for Earth Science Studies (CESS) in the State capital (Thiruvananthapuram) to 
develop a methodology for participatory resource mapping (PRC) in a pilot project in 
twenty-five panchayats, and prepare a comprehensive village plan in Kalliasseri 
Panchayat (in north Kerala) through participatory planning. This experience and 
methodological understanding helped in the design and conduct of the Campaign. The 
collaboration between the KSSP and the State was possible as the KSSP is closely 
tied229 and ideologically aligned with the Left Democratic Front (LDF), the political 
party in office which that initiated the Campaign, though it is an independent and 
autonomous organization which frequently differs with the party on policy and 
strategy issues.230  
 
Another major factor was the training, capacity-building, publicity and information 
dissemination undertaken during the Campaign with the help of a wide range of 
government and non-government organizations. This extensive effort was supported 
                                                 
228 The local bases of the two major political parties in Kerala – the UDF and LDF – are chequered 
across the State, and the KSSP, with its identification with the LDF, does not enjoy as much popularity 
in the UDF-dominated areas (interviews: CEO CapDecK, Plan Coordinator, Yeroor Panchayat). This 
was also one reason for the somewhat patchy nature of the PPC’s success (Isaac and Franke 2002)  
229 The links are primarily because of the overlap between the KSSP members and the party cadres of 
the LDF; senior members and ideologues of the party have at various times occupied leadership 
positions in the KSSP, and the funding the KSSP has received from the left government for its 
development activities. This relationship is however, not untroubled, for there have often been 
differences in the development strategies advocated by the organization and those of the party. 
Therefore while KSSP can perhaps more appropriately seen as a part of ‘political society’ than ‘civil 
society’ in Ndegwa’s (1999) and Chatterjee’s (undated) frameworks, it is nevertheless a free-standing 
organization working for social change through mass education. 
230 Their championship of decentralized planning and governance by KSSP leaders and activists, many 
of whom were card-holding members of the CPI(M), was particularly at odds with the centralized 
(state) planning model at the core of the party’s ideological position. (interviews: President, KSSP; 
Secretary, SPB; CEO, CapDeck) 
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by the Swiss agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC), which promoted a new 
organization, CapDeck, to train resource persons in the participatory planning 
approaches being attempted. CapDeck worked with the KSSP members, the Kerala 
Institute for Local Administration (KILA) and technical experts to train staff of the 
State Planning Board, members of the District Planning Committees and elected 
representatives and others nominated by the panchayats as State-level Key Resource 
Persons (KRPs), district–level District Resource Persons (DRPs), and village-level 
Local Resource Persons (LRPs) to anchor the planning process. The Department for 
International Development (DFID) of the UK government also supported the exercise. 
Manuals, signage, educational leaflets, formats, questionnaires and other literature to 
inform and support the process was also developed by the organizations, with the 
input of the Resource Persons as the process unfolded. Other organizations that were 
also involved, and continue to provide training are the State Institute of Rural 
Development (SIRD), Institute of Management in Government (IMG), State Council 
for Educational Research and Training (SCERT), Integrated Rural Technology Center 
(IRTC), Center for Science and Technology for Rural Development (COSTFORD). 
The Plan Campaign Cell (C-DIT) and the Information Kerala Mission (IKM) maintain 
databases and information and provide publicity.231  
 
The third factor was the previous experience of large-scale mobilization and 
organizing, for example with the Total Literacy Campaign (TLC) which preceded the 
PPC, and the presence of what Isaac and Franke (2000) call ‘a vibrant civil society’ 
right down to the village level. The experience of the KSSP, and the number of 
innovative projects undertaken by communities in various localities across the State 
                                                 
231 For a mapping of the various organizations involved in the support of local governance and their 
activities, see charts 1, 2 and 3 in Sankaran 2006: 69-71. 
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which served as ‘models’ of participatory projects, were clearly important to the 
success of the PPC. It is also true that Kerala has a rich variety of local organizations, 
far more than in other States, that occupy the space between the government and 
economic institutions, even if we were to exclude those based on caste, kinship, 
religion or ethnicity232 (Serra 2001, Mayer 2001, John and Chathukulam 2002). But 
here it is important to note that a significant proportion of these are trade unions 
affiliated to the political parties in Kerala – with “just 3.5% of India’s people, Kerala 
has 7.5% of its trade union members…. (and) a century of struggle for improved 
education, public health, health care, land reform, worker’s rights and the abolition of 
caste discrimination” (Isaac and Franke 2002:29-30). It has had a strong Left party - 
the CPI(M) – with an extensive cadre of card-holding members across the State, and is 
the only State in the world where a Communist party has been voted to power in a 
democratic and open election. Even mass organizations like the KSSP are explicitly 
political in their articulation and organically tied to a political party with many of its 
leaders also significant leaders and members of the CPI(M). Therefore, it may be 
important to understand many of these organizations as belonging to what Ndegwa 
(1999) calls ‘political society’, and analyse the working of democracy at the local 
level in this context. Differentiating between ‘civil’ and ‘political’ society in this 
manner does not negate the point made by many authors (Isaac and Franke 2002; 
Heller 2001) that Kerala has a rich organizational culture, with “more than half of the 
population belonging to mass and class organizations”.  
 
What is equally important in analyses of the links between the success of the PPC, the 
establishment of decentralized planning and the local organizational density is the 
                                                 
232 The definition of civil society is still unresolved, with authors debating the inclusion of affine-based 
organizations on one hand and ‘for-profit’ organizations on the other. See Zafarulla and Haque (2006) 
for a review of different definitions and arguments for inclusion or exclusion of various kinds of 
organizations. 
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proliferation of a variety of existing and new neighborhood and ward level 
organizations as a result of the PPC. These include Residents Associations (RAs), 
Community Development Societies (CDSs), Neighborhood Groups (NHGs), Area 
Development Societies, Beneficiary Groups, Self-Help Groups and more, though all 
are not uniformly present across localities233. NHGs (called ‘Ayalkootams’ in the local 
language), composed of two voters (a man and a woman) from each of 30-50 
households in a neighborhood have specifically emerged as important units for 
generating greater citizen involvement in local development and planning by linking 
households to the larger Ward and Grama Sabhas. NHGs are federated at the Ward 
and Panchayat level into Development Committees. Beneficiary Committees are 
linked to project implementation, now legally permitted to implement projects by 
themselves or by contracting out. These organizations are in addition to others like 
library, sports, theatre, art or other clubs and associations, and NGOs operating at 
various levels that already populated local society. While authors differ in their 
analyses of the dynamics and governance implications of this ‘organizational 
revolution’ (Sankaran 2006, John and Chathukulam 2002, Isaac and Franke 2000), 
there is no disagreement that they are now an important part of the organizational 
architecture of local governance.  
                                                 
233 Residents Associations are formally registered neighborhood organizations in urban areas, and in the 
absence wide participation in urban Ward Sabhas as happened in the rural Grama Sabhas, became an 
important forum to elicit citizen participation. Community Development Societies were small groups of 
15-40 poor women organized in all municipalities and 96 panchayats as part of a Central Government 
funded participatory poverty-alleviation program based on thrift-and-credit. In 1997, they were 
extended to all parts of the State under the “Kudumbasree” program of the State government’s Kerala 
Poverty Eradication Mission. 50-70 households in a neighborhood now constitute a Neighborhood 
Group with a 5-member managing committee, which are federated at the ward level into a Development 
Committee, which is linked to the ward-level Area Development Societies of Kudumbasree. ADSs are 
federated at the Panchayat/ Municipal level into a Community Development Societies. Kudumbasree is 
a women’s program, and both members and officers are usually women. Self-help Groups are small 
thrift-and-credit groups organized by NHGs, NGOs, some banks and as a part of various State and 
Central government programs, to facilitate flow of plan funds and bank credit in a transparent and 
mutual-guarantee basis. All these organizations are now closely linked to Panchayat functioning. 
Beneficiary Committees are representative groups of the beneficiaries of any project, who implement or 
contract, monitor and supervise projects. See Sankaran  (2006) for types and growth of community 
organizations in Kerala. 
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3.4. WATER PROVISION THROUGH POST-PPC STRUCTURE OF PANCHAYATS IN 
KERALA 
 
The organizational ensemble for water provision in rural areas in Kerala is now a 
multi-layered structure. It begins at the first level with the NHGs/ ADSs/ BCs, in the 
form of ‘Drinking Water Committees” constituted from their membership at the 
neighborhood level and includes the State and Central government levels, as shown in 
Figure 3.8. With most local planning and implementation responsibilities devolved to  
Panchayats, the KWA was required to change to a channel for funding, a source of 
technical support and implementation of larger schemes for local governments 
(interviews Secretary SPB, Team Leader, Kollam PSU). However, KWA still retains a 
substantial role in the process. Of the existing 1050 projects to be handed over to 
Panchayats, only 116 mini- projects had been handed over by 2005, and its role in 
development and maintenance of the other installations continues. It remains the nodal 
agency for implementation of the AWRSP, with program funds routed through it to 
local governments for various projects; increasingly, funds have also been sourced for 
larger projects from multi-lateral and bilateral international donors, national-level  
banks and insurance companies.234 It also implements the National Human Resources 
Development Program of the GoI, selecting Panchayat staff for technical training in 
consultation with the District Collector. KWA officers are members of the BLEC and 
DLEC, and therefore vet the projects proposed by GPs, IPs and DPs.  
 
Clearly, the organizational structure, the actors and the decision-making process for 
water provision has changed to a notable extent in Kerala after the 1994 Panchayat 
reforms, though some of the legally mandated changes are not yet fully implemented. 
                                                 
234 Such as the State Bank of India and the Life Insurance Corporation (GoK 2002). 
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Figure 3.8:  Reformed institutional architecture for water provision after 
devolution in Kerala 
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What is notable is that the involvement of the Panchayats in the process began even 
before the revised 1999 guidelines of the ARWSP, with the initiation of the People’s 
Plan Campaign and the subsequent routinization of the participatory planning process. 
 
3.5. DRY WELLS AND PEOPLE’S PLANS: WATER PROVISION BY KERALA 
PANCHAYATS 
 
To map the trajectory of decision-making for water provision as it functions at the 
local level, the organizational structure and processes were studied in two panchayats 
of Anchal Block in the Pathanapuram Taluk of Kollam district. The large size of 
panchayats in Kerala, the dispersed nature of the habitations within them, and the need 
to study systems installed within the last five years resulted in the study of one 
Panchayat-initiated water supply system in each panchayat: the Mallavattam project in 
Anchal Panchayat and the Kanjavel project in Yeroor Panchayat. The pattern of water 
availability in the taluka is shown in Table 3.4 and the details of the panchayats and 
the projects are shown in Table 3.5.  
 
 
Table 3.4 
Percentage distribution of households by source of drinking water and its 
location in Pathanapuram Taluk in Kerala (2001) 
 
Kerala – Kollam district – Pathanpuram taluk 
Location of 
Water Source 
Total No.of 
HH 
% of 
HH 
Tap Hand 
pump 
Tube 
well 
Well Tank, Pond, 
Lake 
River, 
Canal 
Spring Any 
Other 
Total 93,334 100.0 6.8 0.4 0.3 85.5 3.0 0.4 1.1 2.5 
Within Premises 75,380 80.8 5.5 0.1 0.3 73.1 1.2 0.0 0.0 0.5 
Near Premises 10,467 11.2 1.0 0.1 0.0 7.6 0.8 0.3 0.5 0.9 
Away 7,487 8.0 0.3 0.1 0.0 4.8 1.0 0.1 0.6 1.1 
Source: Census of India, 2001: H-Series, Table H-8. 
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As is typical of Kerala, almost three-fourths of the households in the Pathanapuram 
Taluk depend on private wells as their primary source of water, and another 10% rely 
on wells at varying distances. Less than 6% of households have piped supply to the 
house, as is visible in Table 3.4. Though for most people water sources are self-owned 
or nearby, with only about 8% of households having to travel more than 100m for 
water, almost all interviewees reported that many wells run dry in the summer and 
more than half yield very little or muddy water (EE, Kollam; Engineer, Aanchal 
GVRT; users of Mallavattam, Kanjavel projects).  
 
Both Anchal and Yeroor are relatively large panchayats with low population densities, 
hilly terrain and extensive forest cover, with dispersed homesteads except in the urban 
area. About 12-15 households are located within a radius of 50m from a point source 
in the more clustered areas, but 5-6 is common. Homestead lands are covered with 
rubber plantations, with at least a few trees even when the plot is small; rubber tapping 
is both a commercial and house-hold activity. Other major economic activities are 
cashew production and making burnt bricks.  
 
Table 3.5 
Details of old water sources and the new projects** after Panchayat reforms in 
Aanchal and Yeroor Panchayats 
 
Panchayat  
(Project 
neighborhood) 
Popn Total houses/ 
hh 
Hh 
size 
House-
hold 
taps 
Existing sources New ESR 
Pub.Standposts 
& handpumps 
Private 
wells 
Other 
sources 
Capcity Hh 
conn 
Pub 
stp 
Aanchal 28,612 6120/ 6218  150 41 -     
Mallavattam 221 53 4.2 0 0 6 Borewell-1  25,000 36 3 
Yeroor 32,723 7153/ 7263  0 47  -     
Kanjyavel 57 14 4.1  0 1 Pub well-1 1000 0 3 
 
Source –Panchayat Level Statistics Kollam District, Dept. of Economics and Statistics, GoK; Table 1-B: Demographic 
Particulars –1991 (pg 13); Table 26: Drinking Water Facility as on 31.3.2000 (pg 186); Table 30:Basic details of Panchayats/ 
Municipalities/ Corporations as on 01-07-2000 (pg 251). ** Refers only to specific projects in study neighborhoods, not to all the 
projects in the panchayat area. 
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Grama Panchayats in Kerala stand in stark contrast to those in Gujarat and Madhya 
Pradesh; the explanation could lie in their large size, the fully-literate population, the 
history of local civic and political engagement or their revitalization through the PPC, 
participatory planning and devolution. Both Anchal and Yeroor Panchayats had a 
substantial presence in the towns from which they took their names. Housed in 
impressive multi-storeyed buildings fully populated throughout the day by visibly 
busy staff, they were obvious sites of fruitful interaction between constituents 
requiring services, the staff and elected representatives, who congregated on the 
premises atleast for a few hours every day235.  
 
Water scarcity is a major problem in both panchayat areas in the summer months, with 
many of the private wells and the 40-odd public sources running dry from about 
December to May except in the few low-lying areas. During these months, water is 
supplied through tankers by the Revenue Department and sometimes by the Panchayat 
(interview: Aanchal Secretary). The dispersed form of the settlements and the hilly 
topography makes large-scale piped water supply systems expensive and inefficient 
(interview: Exec Engineer; KRWSSA CEO). Only about 150 households (6%) in 
Aanchal have piped water supply, and none in Yeroor. Both were to be provided with 
piped supply under two Comprehensive Water Supply Schemes (CWSS) of the 
KWA236, but because the projects were not expected to be completed in a few years, 
the Aanchal Water Supply Scheme was initiated in 1999 by the KWA on the request 
of Aanchal Block Panchayat237. It was designed for 10,700 people, in four adjoining 
                                                 
235 This is particularly remarkable considering that my longest visits (of over 4 weeks each) were 
typically about early-April to mid-May, when the financial year and the planning/budgeting process had 
just been completed (March 31st). To my question if this were always so, the reply was positive, and 
the explanation for no ‘lull’ after March 31st was that it was “the best time to catch up with pending 
routine work” that tended to get less priority between January and March. 
236 A CWSS to Meena and adjoining villages and one to Kalathupuzha and adjoining villages 
237 Proposal and engineering report prepared in August 1999, vide letter no. DB2/156/98 of the KWA of 
the P.H.Division, Kollam; included parts of  
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panchayats238 and was to be later integrated into the larger CWSS schemes when they 
were completed. However, no household in Yeroor was connected till May 2005 as 
the last kilometer of pipeline was yet to be laid; a budget provision was made in the 
2005-2006 Annual Plan of the Yeroor Panchayat for this line.  
 
The Aanchal ‘mini scheme’, and a number of ‘single panchayat’ schemes have been 
designed and installed by the KWA on request from the respective Panchayat and their 
agreement to bear the capital costs out of their own plan funds. The installations were 
to be handed over to the Gram Panchayats after completion, but the transfer hasn’t 
been implemented to any extent in Kollam; “the KWA staff do not want to hand over 
the schemes, but they say the Panchayats don’t want to take over the responsibility” 
(EE KWA Kollam Division). All installations continue to be maintained by the KWA, 
from funds provided by the District Panchayat.  
 
Installations for domestic water supply have been listed as a priority in the 
comprehensive 5-yr plans (2002-2007)239 prepared by both Aanchal and Yeroor 
Panchayats, and significant annual allocations made for each year. In the seven years 
since the PPC and initiation of participatory planning, the two Panchayats have 
undertaken the construction of about a 100 new wells each as well as 60-70 projects to 
repair existing wells and handpumps, desilt ponds and provide proper sanitation 
facilities to check pollution. The funds for this have been taken from various plan 
schemes, including drinking water provision, poverty alleviation and support for 
backward communities, and from the Panchayats’ own funds and community 
contributions. The five year plan (2002-2007) of Yeroor includes the target of putting 
                                                 
238 Aanchal, Alayamon, Edamulakkal and Yeroor. 
239 Corresponding to the national 10th Five-year Plan 
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in place systems for sufficient and year-round domestic water for all households by 
2007. 
 
The Annual Plans in both panchayats were developed through the sequence of events 
and processes developed since the PPC: Grama Sabha in each ward and the 
constitution of Working Groups240 for various subjects, development of proposals by 
the working groups in consultation with the ADS, NHGs, ‘other interested people’ and 
potential beneficiaries, identification of projects and tentative budgets and eventually, 
presentation of the same to the general body by the Convener of each group. After 
further revision, the final plans were presented for ratification in a subsequent Gram 
Sabha.241 This was reported by all interviewees242, and matched the Panchayat 
records243. The Five-yr Plans were prepared through “Special Grama Sabhas”, and in 
Yeroor one such had been convened in late 2004 for the development of a 20-yr 
Development Plan with the help of the local Town Planning Office. A ‘Plan 
Coordinator’, a local KSSP member, anchored the planning process in Yeroor but no  
                                                 
240 Eight Working Groups were formed for the preparation of the Five-yr Plans as mandated by the 
Guidelines for the Preparation of Tenth Five Year Plan by Local Governments (GoK, 2002a:11). These 
were (1) Agriculture and allied sectors including irrigation and agro-processing, (2) Local economic 
development other than agriculture including local industries, facilitation of private and community 
investment, (3)Poverty reduction and social security including care of the aged and disabled, (4) 
Development of Scheduled Castes/ Scheduled Tribes, (5) Development of women and children, (6) 
Health, Water Supply and Sanitation, (7) Education, (8) Infrastructure. For the Annual Plans after 2004, 
two additional groups were included as directed by the modified guidelines for the preparation of 
Annual Plans (GoK 2004:15). These were (1) Social security including care of the aged and disabled 
(separated from the Poverty Alleviation heading), and (2) Animal Husbandry and related sectors. Each 
group had a Chairman, Vice Chairman, Convenor, and 4-10 members. (Aanchal and Yeroor 
panchayats, undated, List of working groups, 2004-2005)  
241 Though the steps were followed, most interviewees (President, Aanchal Panchayat, Plan 
Coordinator, Yeroor Panchayat) reported that participation in the Gram Sabhas was not widespread, 
though the quorum of 10% of voters was frequently surpassed. But all testified that a predominant 
proportion of attendees were women, and discussions were involved and often lasted beyond the 
scheduled 2 hours. Explanations offered included the timing of Sabhas (daytime working hours), the 
local party politics that made adherents of the party not in office stay away, a perception of the GS as 
meant for beneficiaries and BPL families only, and lack of understanding of the powers of the assembly 
(Aanchal President, Yeroor Plan Coordinator, GVRT member). 
242 Presidents of Panchayats, Secretary of Aanchal Panchayat, other elected representatives and 
community members. 
243 Minutes books 
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Figure 3.9:  Emergent institutional architecture for water provision by reformed 
local governments in Kerala 
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person was involved in this capacity in Aanchal. From the discussions in both 
Panchayats and with the KWA Executive Engineer in the Kollam Division Office, the 
typical sequence of events and processes for implementation of the planned projects 
that emerged is shown in Figure 3.9244. The design, tendering and contracting are still 
carried out by the KWA as before the local government reforms, as is maintenance, 
and the KWA ‘owns’ the installed system. The project is budgeted for in the 
Panchayat plan, but since both Central and State government programs for domestic 
water provision are channeled through the KWA, they have control over the funds. 
 
3.6. POST-DEVOLUTION WATER PROVISION IN KERALA: EFFICACY, 
EFFECTIVENESS AND PARTICIPATION 
 
Devolution in Kerala was certainly active and substantial, and there was extensive 
change in the efficacy of the resulting institutional architecture (unlike in Gujarat) in 
respect of both effective water supply and inclusion of women in local governance. 
This was due to the transfer of substantial powers and functions to local governments, 
as was the core of the devolution idea, and spaces and provisions for women’s 
participation were amply provided. In addition to the seats earmarked for women in 
the elected Panchayats, similar reservation was applied to Working Groups and 
Committees, as also in the NHGs at the neighborhood level that were the interface 
between the Panchayat and the citizens of an area. Further, these enabling institutional 
elements were energized by the active Campaign spearheaded by the GoK to activate a 
participatory planning process.  
 
 
                                                 
244 As mentioned before, the planned projects – new water sources - were usually construction of wells 
and tubewells, or very small piped supply schemes (eg, at Mallavatam in Aanchal); projects of this size 
were handled by the Sub-division office of the KWA, and sanctioned/ cleared by the Division office.  
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Figure 3.10: Distribution of Functions in Pre-devolved, Devolved and Observed 
Governance Arrangements in Kerala, derived using the  
Devolution Score Sheet (Table 2.6) 
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strengthening ‘people’s rule’ (President, KSSP; CEO Capdeck) and the convictions 
about the importance of decentralized planning by significant members of the Party, 
further action was almost inevitable. This fortuitous match between the political 
ideologies and configurations in Kerala and the intentions of the Panchayat Act 
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The PPC, however, was an unusually creative and courageous intervention; but with 
many senior and extremely competent administrators in the State Planning Board and 
other important departments being Party sympathisers245 it was not only carried 
through with fair success246, but also, much of the legal and administrative reforms 
required to institutionalize the process247 were implemented in the five years of LDF 
term in government. Most astutely, the architects of the PPC and attendant reforms, 
anticipating the LDF would lose the elections in 2001 – for strong anti-incumbency 
sentiments leading to alternate terms of the UDF and LDF had been the pattern in 
Kerala for decades – deliberately ensured that most of these reforms were irreversible. 
With such efforts, it is no surprise that the reformed design was very effective in 
improving the water supply situation in the localities, as seen in Table 3.6 and Figure 
3.11. Not only did the water availability increase substantially, but almost everyone 
had a source within 50m of the house. Most important, none of the households had to 
depend on unsafe sources or obliging neighbors, but 70 % of the households could get 
a household tap connection in the Mallavattam project, and the seventeen families in 
the area who did not, had three standposts between them.  
 
This ratio was also similar in the Kanjyavel project, with 14 households sharing three 
public standposts, though no family had a household connection in this project. A 
                                                 
245 The rules governing the Civil Services in India prohibit membership in political parties and 
involvement in political activities. 
246 There are disagreements regarding the extent of success of the PPC, and the fact that it was not 
equally successful in all districts is generally accepted. But the overwhelming consensus among 
academic and other observers has been that its success was very substantial, considering the mammoth 
size and extreme complexity of the project; and its impact and contribution to devolution in Kerala is 
unquestioned. It has also been pointed out that many detractors – even academic critics – have been 
affiliated to the UDF and therefore the criticism is not complexly objective (Prof, CDS). In a conference 
I attended in 1999, the session on decentralization experiences, which had a large number of 
presentations of the PPC experience by academics from Kerala, were stormy and factional, making the 
political biases of the presenters very obvious. 
247 Learnt from experience of the PPC, and recommended by the Sen Committee which was working 
alongside and presented its report in 1999 
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notable feature is that disparity between the households with private sources and those 
who did not was not increased as in Gujarat, and in Kanjyavel, was actually much 
reduced. Finally, what was most appreciated by the users was the short gestation 
period – even a large project like the construction of a 25,000 liter elevated storage 
reservoir (ESR) and distribution system in Mallavattam, was expected to be completed 
within a period of nine months. 
 
Table 3.6 
Change in effectiveness of water provision after Panchayat reforms in Kerala 
 
Mallavattam Kanjyavel K-PR 
Indicators Before  After Before After Before After 
Per Capita Availability 37.7 91.2 33.0 64.7 35.3 78.0
Per Cap from HH Source 90.1 128.6 92.1 91.5 91.1 110.0
Per Cap from Public Sources 22.8 37.8 10.2 37.5 16.5 37.7
Disparity 67.3 90.8 81.9 53.9 74.6 72.4
% Popn with HH Source 11.3 67.9 7.1 7.1 9.2 37.5
% HH < 50 m from Public Source 0 85 100 100 50.0 92.5
% HH - Unprotected Sources 88.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 44.3 0.0
Calculated from project data obtained from FDGs with users, interview with pump operator 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.11:  Effectiveness of water supply projects in Kerala villages after 
devolution, from Table 3.6 
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The promise of inclusion in the reformed institutional architecture was also fairly well 
realized in the moderate-to-high participation of women in the project processes, as 
can be seen in Figure. 3.12. Not only were the earmarked positions in the Panchayat 
occupied, but after two rounds of elections, there are more women than the reserved 
quota (GoI 2008). This is because, many women stood for re-election from their 
constituencies and won, even though the ward was no longer designated for women 
only. The President of Anchal was one such, and mentioned three others from her own 
Party (CPI-M) who had done the same in other Panchayats. Women – both Panchayat 
members and others elected by the Gram Sabha – are also members of the various 
Committees and working groups of the Panchayat and the Gram Sabha. Elected 
women are fairly regular attendees and active participants at meetings, of the 
Panchayat, Gram Sabha, Committees and Working Groups.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.12: Participation in development of water supply projects in Kerala after 
devolution, derived from interviews and Panchayat data. 
 
Though the women interviewed had not all attended every meeting they were required 
to, they had made use of almost 70% of the opportunities presented on an average, not 
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much less than their their male colleagues (interview, register, FDG Yeroor):  
 
 
‘…oh, all men and women members mostly attend, of course there is sometimes some 
reason they can’t – like weddings, some family emergency, or illness…two of our 
members were ill in the last year when we did our Annual Plan…” (Secretary, Anchal; 
male) 
 
All the women interviewed were also fully aware of the planning and budgeting 
processes, had negotiated and discussed the selection of projects and fund allocations. 
The ex-president of Yeroor Panchayat who had reverted to being a member248, and the 
current President of Anchal both described many of the projects undertaken in the 
previous years, in their own Wards and elsewhere in their Panchayat, and helped 
identify cases for this study. A Working Group member described her complex 
negotiations with NHGs and with co-members to include specific water supply 
projects in the Five-year Plan thus: 
 
‘…they [members of an NHG in her own Ward] wanted to put another small 
tank…but they already had one, ofcourse it was not enough….and these two other 
colonies [not in her own Ward] had only the handpumps, their wells were also going 
dry, and I really saw their need and wanted to put two tanks for them……my people 
[the NHG in her Ward] were also important, I could not say no to them, so I thought 
about how to do it…..we could include all three if the money we were giving for the 
overhead tank project [to the KWA] could be budgeted in two years instead of the first 
year only….I saw those people [the to-be-users of the OHT] already had decent water, 
four handpumps and most of them had wells too, but that is a prestige thing, some 
important people wanted that…anyway, in the end all agreed, though I really had to 
talk so much to all members [of the WG] one by one….’(interview, Panchayat 
member) 
 
Women users, in both Mallavatam and Kanjavel, had attended some Gram Sabha 
meetings, but more frequently, their own NHG meetings. Most had full information of 
                                                 
248 Because neither political party had a clear 2/3 majority in the Panchayat, it had been decided that the 
President’s position would be filled by a member elected from each party for half the term, i.e., two and 
half years. This arrangement made it possible for the President to get the required support from 
members of the opposition during her half-term, and enabled smooth functioning of the Panchayat.  
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the respective projects, from when and how it was planned to who implemented and 
how much it cost. In Mallavatam, it was a group of women – now users of the tank 
supply – who had pushed their Ward member and talked to the Panchayat President to 
initiate the project. One user of Mallavatam was the President of a beneficiary group 
in a Sector Reform project in an adjacent area (Nilamootil), because of her experience 
in initiating the Mallavatam project and observing the process249.   
 
The political ethos and civic-organizational culture was no doubt the primary reason 
for such enthusiastic participation by both women and men. The unusual density of 
civil and political society organizations in Kerala, and the links between this 
characteristic of the context and successful participatory planning has been discussed 
in section 3.3. This dimension has become even stronger with the institutional 
structures developed for neighborhood planning and economic development. One was 
the area-based NHGs in each neighborhood which are the initiation points for 
participatory planning, federated successively into Ward-level and Panchayat level 
Development Committees. The other was the all-women Community Development 
Societies (CDS) organized through the Kudumbashree program of the GoK, which not 
only federate in a Panchayat-level Area Development Society (ADS) but also work 
with the Development Committees in each Ward. The organic linkages of these 
community organizations, vertically through their federated structures and horizontally 
by inclusion of Ward members at both Ward and Panchayat level, makes for an 
intricate three-dimensional organizational web which provides spaces for both direct 
and representative participation. More important, the inclusion of the decisions of 
these groups in the Panchayat Plans has been made statutory; in fact the Panchayat 
                                                 
249 She had joined that group as her house was between the two areas and she needed more water than 
was available from the Mallavatam tank. 
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Plan is an integration of the priorities identified and decisions taken at the 
neighborhood level. 
 
What has made these organizational structures vibrant and active in local governance 
are the political, social and economic characteristics of their setting. There is a general 
political ethos of public engagement created by civic and political affiliations of a 
large proportion of the population as described above. Also, in addition to the high 
level of social development in terms of housing, education, health, social support for 
the elderly etc, almost all people in Kerala are literate, and majority are educated to the 
secondary level (GoI 2001). Engaging in formal governance processes which 
necessitate at least reading official communications, and often writing minutes of 
meetings and preparing reports is not daunting. Even in self-help groups (SHGs), 
records of decisions, and accounts of savings, borrowings and repayments have to be 
maintained, which is easily done by the literate and usually high-schooled women. 
The low level of economic development is surprisingly, another contributing factor – 
with high unemployment levels, individuals from many households have migrated for 
work elsewhere, and those at home have time, yet are not very poor.250 With high 
levels of political awareness, social development and education, and high levels of 
unemployment that allows time, it is not surprising that spaces for participation in the 
local governance structures and processes are occupied and used. 
 
The design of the organizational structures at the community-local government 
interface, the NHGs and CDSs, has also been a key element. NHGs were deliberately 
designed to comprise of members from all households within a locality, and its 
                                                 
250 Kerala has only 3.6.% of the population below the poverty line, compared to 29.5% in MP (see 
Table 2.2) 
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functioning is therefore strengthened251 by the pre-existing social relationships among 
members. More, both men and women were statutorily included, not only for parity, 
but also because most women did not work outside the house, allowing them the time 
and opportunity to participate in meetings, especially when the meetings are within the 
locality (interview: Thomas Isaac). Not surprisingly, it is women who are most active 
in NHGs, and in many localities, it has become an all-women’s group. The shared 
sense of belonging to the area also builds a common interest in development of 
infrastructure and facilities in their locality, and the subjects included in the 
discussion, including water supply and sanitation, children’s health, and schooling 
among others, are directly related to their household concerns. CDSs comprise women 
from economically weaker households, and though they are not from the same area, 
the monetary benefits of participation and low work participation rates makes them 
active participants.252  
 
Why women in Kerala have the most active involvement in local governance as 
described in section 3.6 is partly explained above; the design of the interface 
structures, the low work participation rate and the content of the discussions. 
According to the President of the Aanchal Panchayat, a woman who won the seat from 
a non-reserved constituency in her second term, the high literacy rates and levels of 
education among women are other factors, and have particularly helped elected 
members in the Panchayat structure who have to ‘deal’ with the State bureaucracy253. 
It has also provided the foundation for developing confidence in their new roles, and 
                                                 
251 Sometimes vitiated by pre-existing antagonisms, but the need for water, the interest in development 
of the locality and pressure from other households usually leads to ewven such households joining the 
group.  
252 This is changing; with the rapid spead of the Kudumbasree units, women have begun working 
outside the house. 
253 In the course of one of the interviews with the President, the skill with which she kept the male 
Secretary of the Panchayat, who was also present, from answering questions or taking over the 
discussion was very apparent.  
 
 
 
 
227
quick learning on the job. (President, Aanchal Panchayat)  
 
But as two women members of the Yeroor Panchayat pointed out, the most important 
factor is that the customary restrictions, which have been the greatest obstacle to 
women’s participation in many other States, have been substantially diluted. Women 
have traditionally enjoyed almost equal or, in communities where matrilineal systems 
were prevalent, more social privileges than men. Restrictive traditions that were 
present varied across castes and locations and with modernization and widespread 
education have eroded to a great extent. Coupled with the political mobilization and 
active recruitment to political cadres that has been ongoing for decades, many elected 
women are or have been Party members and organizers, which has provided valuable 
political experience and information. 
 
The situation observed in Kerala was clearly at the other end of the scale from that in 
Gujarat and arguably a product of the local social, political and economic conditions. 
How does the reform fare in Madhya Pradesh, which differs in these aspects from 
both? In the next section, I examine this, before comparing the patterns that were 
visible in the three States in the following one. 
 
 
4. GRAM SWARAJ AND WATER PROVISION IN MADHYA PRADESH  
 
As in many other parts of India, in the area now in Madhya Pradesh water provision 
had historically been the responsibility of village Panchayats, either traditional caste-
based or community-based organizations or those formally constituted by rulers. It is 
however, one of the largest States in India and includes a number of regions with 
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significantly different socio-cultural characteristics and political trajectories, and the 
extent of responsibility, authority and resources of these local bodies varied widely 
among them. When Madhya Pradesh was formed in 1956, there were three-tier 
Panchayat systems in the eastern parts which had been under direct colonial rule, but 
village (Gram) Panchayats existed in some form in all areas254.  
 
Historically, dugwells and tanks were the most common sources of domestic water in 
rural areas, except in settlements along streams or rivers. These were typically owned 
and managed by communities, and only very few rich households had private wells. 
The common sources had developed over time with community contributions, and 
grants or other assistance from rulers and large landowners. Maintenance was almost 
invariably by the community, or governing bodies like panchayats, with various 
systems of rules to regulate access and use.  
 
After 1956, the three tier system of Gram Panchayats, Janpad Panchayats (at Block 
level) and Zilla Panchayats (at district level) was applied across the State through 
successive legislation in 1962, 1981 and 1990255. Cumulatively, the provisions had 
come to include reservation of a proportion of seats for women and dalits, and 
plebiscitary decision-making by the Gram Sabha (GS, the assembly of voters in a 
village) with the Gram Panchayat as the executive body of the GS. The actual 
functioning of the Panchayats was however, repeatedly hindered and eventually, 
precluded by political and legal disputes.  
                                                 
254 Both in British-ruled areas and the many princely states, the tribal areas, which constitute a large 
proportion of the present State, had different local governance structures from the non-tribal areas in 
recognition of their cultural traditions and practices.  
255 The 1980 and 1991 (and later, 1993) panchayat legislations of Madhya Pradesh did not make special 
provisions for tribal areas, recognized as such under Schedule V of the Constitution; it was not till the 
Central Government extended the 1993 Panchayat Act, with relevant modifications, to Schedule V 
areas in 1996 that different provisions were enacted in the 1997 amendment to the 1993 Act (Buch 
2000)  
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In the meanwhile the Public Health Engineering Department of the State government 
had been constituted after the State was formed, and been charged with the 
responsibility and powers to attend to domestic water provision in the State. In the 
absence of functioning Panchayats, the PHED was the only institutional structure for 
water provision in rural areas, except in the few scattered locations where NGOs 
worked to mobilize communities and restore traditional sources. 
 
4.1. PRE-REFORM MODALITIES AND STATUS OF WATER PROVISION IN MADHYA 
PRADESH 
 
Installation of handpumps and tubewells was the major thrust of the PHED in the rural 
areas during its first decades, through its typical departmental structure of Zones, 
Circles, Divisions and Sub-division offices. The inadequacy of its network in the face 
of the geographical spread of the State has been pointed out as recently as 2005 
(WaterAid 2005), even after its steady expansion since its inception; in the first 
decades this was obviously even less adequate. Water provision was implemented by 
the department mainly under the AWRSP program of the GoI initiated in the 70’s, as 
in other States, and efforts were accelerated and intensified in the eighties when the 
issue of domestic water provision became a development priority nationally under the 
Rajiv Gandhi Drinking Water Mission. The process was typical – survey of the water 
sources in villages within sub-division jurisdictions, formulation of proposals at that 
level, scrutiny and sanction by Division and Circle offices according to the size of the 
project, and eventually, implementation by the Sub-division. Figure 3.13 shows the 
pre-reform organizational set-up for water provision in Madhya Pradesh.  
 
In 1981, only 8% of rural households had access to protected water sources, against  
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Figure 3.13: Institutional structure for water provision in Madhya Pradesh 
before devolution 
 
67% in urban areas; by 1991 this had increased to 46% in rural areas and 80% in urban  
areas, a combined increase in coverage of 33% in the decade (CoI 1991). Access to 
water in rural areas was getting more difficult with falling levels of groundwater due 
to extraction through tubewells for agriculture; dugwells dried up in the summer 
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months, and ground-water salinity was increasing. The western districts and some in 
the northeast part of the State receive less rainfall and over the years have been 
classified as drought-prone, but with five major river basins, surface water was not 
scarce, even allowing for sufficient flow to downstream States. Reservoirs were 
however built mainly for irrigation and urban supply, and piping water to rural areas 
was not a priority.  
 
Groundwater was almost wholly the source for domestic water, and remains so till 
date. However, with the PHED focus on tubewells, dugwells and ponds were falling 
into disrepair and disuse. Recharge of water tables through watershed treatment under 
the Rajiv Gandhi Watershed Mission initiated in 1994 has been widespread and 
successful in the areas where it has been implemented, as has the ‘Pani Roko Abhiyan’ 
(literally, Retain Water Movement) in some other areas. These are however, present in 
less than 20% of the blocks in the State, and access to safe and sufficient water 
throughout the year has been a major issue in the last decade (RGNDWM interviews, 
Wateraid 2005, Das 2006). 
 
Local institutional involvement in water provision in the 90’s was perhaps the least in 
Madhya Pradesh among the three study States, and reportedly, quite far below most 
other States (CEO,  Taal). There were very few reputed non-governmental 
organizations in Madhya Pradesh as compared to some other States (for example in 
Gujarat), and without functioning Panchayats, caste-based (or ethnic or kin-based in 
the tribal areas) community organizations were almost the only kind of local 
organizations. These systems had also eroded with time, and withdrawn from general 
community action, retreating to regulation of social and cultural norms and arbitration 
within the caste only. Water access was, predictably, most problematic in localities 
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inhabited by the poor and the dalits, and a substantial proportion of the State 
population belonged to these groups. It is therefore not surprising that the ability of 
such community organizations to demand action from the PHED was very limited, 
both for installation of new systems or repair and maintenance of existing ones.  
  
4.2. PANCHAYAT REFORMS IN MADHYA PRADESH 
 
Madhya Pradesh amended its existing 1990 Panchayat legislation in January 1994 to 
conform to the reforms mandated by the Central Act, making only a few changes in its 
existing Act. Three were significant – one, earmarking of one-third of the seats at all 
levels for women, and for dalits and OBCs in proportion to their population; two, a 
strong role for the Gram Sabha; and three, the transfer of control over the DRDAs 
from the Collector to the Zilla Panchayat, and over the Block Development Offices to 
the Janpad (intermediate) Panchayat. A Congress government was office at the time, 
and the then Chief Minister (CM) enthusiastically initiated a process of devolution, in 
what observers maintain was a move to impress the national leaders of the Congress; 
but with a backlash from his own Ministers, and protest from the State bureaucracy, 
had to soon revise his position. In the effort to placate them while retaining the wider 
political appeal of devolution, the structure was revised, and a District Government 
with a Minister as its Chairman and the District Collector as the Secretary was added, 
thereby keeping both Ministers and officers happy, but undermining the Zilla 
Panchayat (CEO, Samarthan, CEO, Taal, Prof, SIPA).  
 
In 2001, the CM declared a policy of ‘Gram Swaraj’ (literally, village self-
governance), strengthening the village assembly (Gram Sabha) through a ‘Gram 
Swaraj Adhiniyam’. Under that, the Gram Sabha is constituted by the voters in each 
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revenue village, which is usually co-terminous with a hamlet or habitation, instead of 
the whole panchayat, which typically includes 2-4 villages. The funds for some 
development programs are transferred from the village government (Gram Panchayat, 
or GP) to a separate bank account of the Gram Sabha, and are handled by an elected 
Treasurer who maintains registers and operates the bank account with the Sarpanch as 
co-signatory. Seven Committees for village-level tasks are also constituted by the 
Gram Sabha256, for Health, Education, Infrastructure, Agriculture, Social justice, 
Social security and Public Resources, with eight to twelve elected members in each. 
The chairpersons of these committees, elected by the GS from among themselves, 
constitute the Village Development Committee (VDC) that is chaired by the Sarpanch. 
Half of the members in each committee are required to be from the socially 
marginalized groups, and one-third women. (Prof, SIPA; GoMP 2001). The 
cumulative result of various Government orders and legislation is that the Gram Sabha 
is now a statutory body for direct decision-making, with the Gram Panchayat as its 
elected executive bound to carry out the recommendations of the general body. 
Decisions, including budget allocations of the GP have to be ratified by the GS, which 
meets atleast quarterly, during fixed weeks of the year, and has a quorum requirement 
of 20% of members, of which one-third have to be women. In effect, a direct-
democratic system was instituted (Manor 2001, Behar 2003). 
 
Gram Sabhas are entrusted primarily with civic functions, among which is the 
responsibility for domestic water provision, to be undertaken by the Health 
Committee. The following are the items pertaining to domestic water supply which 
have been listed as functions of the Gram Sabha in the MP Gram Swaraj Adhiniyam 
                                                 
256 Members of these committees are to be elected or selected by the Gram Sabha, or the lists prepared 
by the Panchayat ratified by them. However, this process was almost completely bypassed in a majority 
of the villages, and the composition of the committees were filled in the Annual Report of the 
Panchayat by the Panchayat President (Sarpanch) and Secretary (Sachiv).    
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2001 (GoMP): 
 
 Repairing and maintaining public wells, ponds and tank and supply of water for 
domestic use,  
 Construction and maintenance of sources of water for bathing and washing and 
supply of water for domestic animals. 
 Constructing, maintaining and clearing of public streets, latrines, trains, tanks, wells 
etc, 
 Filling in disused wells, unsanitary ponds, pools ditches and pits and conversion of 
step wells into sanitary wells, 
 Planning and managing basic amenities  
(GoMP 2001, reported in Wateraid 2005) 
 
The State and Central government programs that were being implemented by the 
PHED have, however, not been transferred to the Panchayats, and neither have the 
professional personnel handling projects at the local levels such as engineers and 
hydrologists. However, in a set of instructions issued by the GoMP in 1998, some staff 
of the PHED is listed as being under the control of Janpad and District Panchayats257. 
The funds from major water provision programs such as the AWRSP continue to be 
with the PHED, though with the transfer of a portion of State revenues to Panchayats, 
the latter do have other funds at their disposal for small water supply projects, and 
operation and maintenance of existing ones. In addition to these direct transfers from 
the State government258, they also receive funds allocated by the Central government 
for programs that were being implemented by the District Rural Development 
Agencies (DRDAs). 
Figure 3.14 shows the changes in the organizational set-up for water provision in 
Madhya Pradesh, A prime issue in local governance, which a number of observers of  
                                                 
257 This means that they are to work under the direction of Panchayats, but their salaries continue to be 
paid by the PHED and they report to their superiors in the State Department.  
258 The revenue transfers are on the basis of recommendations by the First and Second State Finance 
Commissions, which were constituted to suggest the division of revenues between the State and local 
governments. 
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Figure 3.14:  Reformed institutional architecture for water provision in Madhya 
Pradesh villages after devolution. 
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devolution in Madhya Pradesh have pointed out, is the proliferation of a large number 
of “parallel organizations” at the village level. A number of task-specific and user-
groups such as Joint Forest Management and Watershed Committees, and community-
based organizations like the Village Education Committee have been set up by various 
line departments of the State government and parastatals created to manage programs 
like the District Poverty Eradication Program (DPEP), the Rajiv Gandhi Watershed 
Mission and the Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan (literally, Education-to-all Campaign). The 
overlap of functions and domains of action between these, the Gram Sabha 
Committees, and the Panchayat and its Standing Committees are seen to be 
undermining the legitimacy, resource-base and effective functioning of the latter 
elected bodies (Behar, 2003, ISS 2000). The resource position of such user-groups is 
typically far better than that of Panchayats, with the government channeling more 
development funds through the State programs under which these parallel groups are 
constituted, than the amounts transferred to Panchayats. In addition, almost all villages 
have a number of self-help groups (SHGs) for savings and credit organized by banks, 
NGOs or State departments. Most villages also have ‘Yuvak Sansthas’ (youth groups), 
‘Bhajan Mandalis’ (prayer groups), Temple Committees and other such self-organized 
community groups. The roles of these organizations in the development projects in the 
village range from almost nonexistent to strong mobilization and organizing. 
(interview: DC, Samarthan, FDGs in Kharpa, Lasudia Dhakad). 
 
4.3. (LITTLE) BUSINESS AS USUAL: THE PHED AND PANCHAYATS IN MADHYA 
PRADESH 
 
To understand the modalities for water provision and how the reformed structure 
functioned at the village level, the organizational arrangement and process of decision-
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making for recently constructed water supply systems was studied in three Panchayats, 
comprising nine villages in Sehore Taluka of the district. Sehore district is classified 
as semi-critical in terms of over-exploitation of groundwater, and in most parts has a 
problem of floride and iron contamination and salinity. Of the 1019 villages in the 
district, all are officially recorded as having adequate drinking water facilities (GoI 
2001), but in reality the falling levels of groundwater, contamination and not least, the 
state of disrepair of handpumps and wells – the two main sources - make access to 
water a major problem in almost all villages (Samarthan Dist Coord; CEO, Taal). In 
Sehore Taluk 60% of the people depend on handpumps for water, but only a very few 
– 3.5% - have private ones (see Table 3.7). More than one-third of the households 
have to fetch water from more than 300 m away259, and in the summer when wells run 
dry and handpumps yield contaminated water, as far as one kilometer to the nearest 
irrigation tubewell260.   
 
Table 3.7 
Distribution of households by location and sources of water in Sehore Taluk 
 
Sehore Taluk in Sehore District, MP 
Location of Water 
Source 
Total No. 
of HH 
% of HH Tap Hand 
pump 
Tubewell Well Tank, Pond, 
Lake 
River, 
Canal 
Spring Any 
Other 
Total 44,885 100.0 7.9 61.5 5.0 24.8 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.2 
Within Premises 4,317 9.6 3.1 3.5 1.4 1.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Near Premises 24,528 54.6 4.0 35.9 2.1 12.5 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 
Away 16,040 35.7 0.9 22.1 1.6 10.6 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.2 
Source: Developed from Census of India, 2001: H-Series, Table H-8 
 
                                                 
259 Estimated during fieldwork in the village, through the transect walks.  
260 Many irrigation tubewells have electric pumpsets to draw water, and because in the summer the 
electricity supply is erratic, the anxiety over getting water is very high for households who don’t own 
these tubewells but have to rely on permission from the owner. Through the day, women keep an ear 
cocked for news that the power supply is back so that they can run to the tubewells before the power 
goes off again or the owner decides to switch off the pump. 
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The three study Panchayats, Kharpa, Lasiduya Dhakad and Rola, include 4, 3 and 2 
villages respectively, separated by distances of between 1 to 5 kms. All villages have 
taps, wells, tubewells, tanks and handpumps (GoI, 2001), but like in the rest of the 
Taluk, many of these are not functioning or dry in summer. Of the nine villages, all 
except Bisan Kheda and Karadiya Atah had had some new water supply system 
developed between 2001-2005 under various development programs, or community 
initiative. The Panchayat or some of its office-holders were involved in all to various 
extents; in this chapter, however, I only discuss those that are outside the Sector 
Reform program, which I discuss specifically in the next chapter. Details of the 
existing and new water supply installations are provided in Table 3.8. 
 
Table 3.8 
Details of old and new water sources in the study panchayats in Madhya Pradesh 
 
Panchayat  
 - Village 
Population No. of 
Hhold 
Hhold 
size 
Existing Water Sources New 
handpumps Total % SC % ST Well Handpump Pub.Tap Other 
Kharpa 583 39 8 143 4.1 2 3 (+4 pvt)  River 1 
 - Karadiya Atah 402 26 2 61 6.6      
 - Ram Khedi 823 2 0 133 6.2      
 - Kaheri Kadam 578 12 0 104 5.6      
Lasudiya Dhakad 818 44 5 155 5.3 2 4  Dam 2 
 - Lasudiya khas 810 15 0 156 5.2 1 6 (+1 pvt) 2 2 ponds 1 
 - Bishan Kheda 248 42 0 51 4.9      
Rola 1244 5 4 183 6.8      
 - Manpura 446 12 0 62 7.2 31 3(+2 pvt) 1  2 
Sources: Census of India 2001; for water sources PHED Sub-division, focus group discussions and transect 
walks. 
 
Except in Bishan Kheda and Karadiya Atah, there has been some work to revive or 
add to the water sources in all villages. New systems (elevated tank with public taps) 
have been constructed under the Sector Reform Program of the GoI, implemented by 
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the PHED. Other work such as excavation of a large pond and construction of a tank 
in Lasudiya Khas, deepening and repair of two existing wells, and construction of a 
small dam across a village stream to store water in Lasudiya Dhakad, and installation 
of a new handpump and tank in Kharpa has been undertaken with funds from other 
sources. These have been initiated and followed through by either the Sarpanch, the 
Health Committee President or community groups, with program funds that are 
channeled through the Zilla and Janpad Panchayats or – in case of the tank in Kharpa 
– from untied funds available with the Gram Panchayat. In each case, the community 
has also contributed either money or labor. Samarthan, a Bhopal-based NGO working 
in most of these villages, has also provided funds in two cases. Development of new 
water supply systems by the PHED in these villages was restricted to those admissible 
under the Sector Reform Program261, and without other funds, they did not undertake 
work such as installation of new handpumps or maintenance of existing systems.  
After devolution and the assignment of water supply functions and some untied funds 
to Panchayats, the planning and implementation of non-Sector Reform projects had 
become their responsibility. However, the participatory planning and community 
involvement that was envisaged did not happen, and the projects undertaken in these 
villages were initiated and driven by individuals. The Gram Swaraj system intended to 
develop participatory decision-making in the Gram Sabha has had the unintended 
consequence of creating a disconnect between the village and the Panchayat by 
removing the statutory requirement of a general Gram Sabha of all voters in the 
panchayat. Hamlet-level Gram Sabhas were held only on the four occasions made 
legally mandatory, and were poorly attended with the 20% quorum was rarely met262.  
                                                 
261 That was because these villages were3 listed as ‘fully covered’ in the PHED records (PHED 2004).   
262 This of course did not stop the ‘meeting’; decisions were made among the few people present, of 
which the largest proportion were usually friends, family members and political allies of the Sarpanch. 
The ‘minutes book’ was then circulated in the village for more signatures to make up the requisite 
quorum. The pond in Lasudiya Khas was decided in this manner and constructed by the Sarpanch on 
land that had already been allocated to a landless Scheduled Caste family. The family was completely 
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With a Sarpanch from one of the villages that comprise the Panchayat, and typically, 
the better off, upper-caste and/or more politically connected one, there is a clear 
concentration of resources in the that village. Information about development 
programs are easily withheld, and the funds channeled unilaterally by the Sarpanch for 
politically or personally useful projects. Project decisions were taken by the Sarpanch 
in consultation with the Sachiv (Panchayat Secretary) and a few other significant 
people in the village. With information and influence, the Sarpanch is able to source 
funds from the Janpad Panchayat for his proposals. He is also able to raise the 
minimum 10% contribution from the ‘beneficiaries’ as most programs require, or 
commandeer the amount from other village funds such as the Temple Committee or 
deposit the money himself, since there is usually ample scope to recover any personal 
investment during the implementation of the project. 
 
The typical process, providing the picture of the emergent institutional architecture, is 
shown in Figure 3.15. The projects in Lasudiya Khas were all in the above mode. In 
Lasudiya Dhakad, the initiative was taken by the Health Committee President, who 
learnt – accidentally on a visit to the Janpad Panchayat – of funds available under the 
Jawahar Rozgar Yojana (JRY) of the GoI. He mobilized the community to develop 
plans for repairing and deepening the wells and agree to contribute 10% in labor, 
persuaded the officer handling JRY to allocate the other 90%, and when that was not 
sufficient, applied to Samarthan and secured the rest. None of this involved 
consultations with the Panchayat members, Sarpanch, the village Treasurer or even 
members of the Health Committee. In Kharpa and Ramkhedi too, it was the Health 
 
                                                                                                                                            
unaware till they tried to get possession of the land, and had signed the resolution about the pond taken 
at a Gram Sabha meeting they did not attend. 
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Figure 3.15:  Emergent institutional architecture for developing water supply 
projects in Madhya Pradesh villages after devolution. 
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Committee President who initiated and anchored the projects; in Kaheri Kadam, it was 
the previous Sarpanch, and in Jarkhedi, a low-caste neighborhood of Kharpa, a youth 
group organized by Samarthan. In the last case, the group not only mobilized 
engagement of the residents, but also compelled the Sarpanch to allocate one third of 
the required funds from the Panchayat account.  
 
The PHED did not implement these projects though was involved in an advisory 
capacity, except for the handpump installation in Kharpa and the tank in Jarkhedi 
which were more ‘technical’ in nature. “We don’t need them to tell us how to dig a 
pond or repair the well!” said the Health Committee President of Lasudiya Dhakad, 
though he admitted they would need the PHED to design and supervise construction a 
proposed mini-dam that was being planned. 
 
4.4. DEVOLUTION IN MADHYA PRADESH: EFFICACY, EFFECTIVENESS AND 
PARTICIPATION 
 
The nature of devolution and the extent of efficacy of devolution in Madhya Pradesh 
can also, as in Gujarat and Madhya Pradesh, be linked to its political situation at the 
State level and the political-economic and socio-cultural characteristics of the 
localities. The Congress government in place in the State enacted the conforming Act 
in December 1993, and in a series of amendments over the following years, prescribed 
rules of functioning of Gram Sabhas, functions of Panchayats and their functional 
control263 over staff of State departments associated with Panchayat functions and 
devolution of tasks to Panchayats. A bold measure was the introduction of the ‘Gram 
                                                 
263 That is, the personnel remained State government employees and under the control of their 
respective district heads, but were answerable to Panchayats to some extent in the discharge of their 
duties.  
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Swaraj’ structure, which took formal governance processes right into the hamlets (see 
Figure 3.13). The resulting institutional architecture had the potential to be both highly 
effective and participative, for not only was devolution substantial, as shown in Figure 
3.16 but the institutional arrangements included a large number of spaces and 
opportunities for participation of women in the villages, right at their doorstep.  
 
This promise was however, belied by the real-politick of the State and the socio-
cultural and political-economic characteristics of villages. The ostensibly energetic 
pace of devolution which earned the Chief Minister brownie points with the national 
Congress leaders and the media, however, masked the reality that Panchayats were 
given little additional power or resources. The specified design and procedures of  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.16:  Relative extent of decentralization in pre-devolved, devolved and 
observed governance arrangements in Madhya Pradesh, derived 
using Devolution Score Sheet (see Table 2.6) 
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Panchayat bodies. This was required to placate State leaders and government staff who 
were increasingly restive, but emasculated the Panchayat system at the district level 
and reversed the intent of devolution. In effect, the Gram Swaraj Adhiniyam of 2001, 
which changed the structure at the village level, was another populist step that many 
observers have perceived as undermining the Gram Panchayat, though ostensibly the 
design took decision-making closer to the people (CEO, Samarthan; Prof, SIPA). In 
sum, political compulsions led to apparently active devolution on one hand while the 
small print ensured continuing State control over the local governments on the other.   
 
The undermined efficacy of the reforms, however, did not preclude more effective 
provision of water as is visible in Figure. 3.17 and Table 3.9. Per capita availability  
increased only marginally but in a situation of water scarcity, it meant a great deal in 
terms of household welfare.264 Moreover, without any supply to private connections, 
the disparity between households with private sources – typically wells or tube wells – 
and households dependant on public sources reduced notably. Also, it eased access 
and reduced dependence on unprotected sources by more than half. None of these are 
negligible yields from the reformed process. 
 
Participation in the reformed processes was, however, not as notable. The institutional 
architecture as designed was highly efficacious in this respect, for the spaces created 
for women in the Madhya Pradesh system were far more than in Gujarat: one third of 
elected positions in Panchayats, its Standing Committees and the seven development 
committees of the Gram Sabha. The 20% quorum for Gram Sabhas also included a 
specification that one-third present had to be women. This presented a host of  
                                                 
264 The women interviewed referred repeatedly to the reduction in the anxiety and effort that was 
associated with water collection before, and also to the fact that now they didn’t have to send their very 
young children to bathe in distant ponds or other sources.    
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Table 3.9 
Change in effectiveness of water provision after Panchayat reforms in Madhya 
Pradesh 
Calculated from data obtained from users, Panchayat and PHED subdivision office. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.17:  Effectiveness of water provision in villages in Madhya Pradesh 
after devolution 
 
opportunities for participation at the hamlet level – and hamlets in MP are small and 
compact, not very much bigger than the NHGs of Kerala. But there was little uptake of 
the opportunities, as can be seen in Figure 3.18. 
 
Undeniably, the local socio-cultural characteristics undermined of the efficacy of the 
opportunities presented in the reformed arrangements. Though women occupied the 
 Kharpa Lasudiya Dhakad Lasudiya Khas Manpura MP PR 
 Before After Before After Before After Before After Before After 
Per Capita Availability 34.3 44.6 29.3 44.0 48.8 56.2 42.6 69.5 38.8 53.6 
Per Cap from HH Source 88.3 88.3 0.0 0.0 96.3 96.3 103.1 103.1 71.9 71.9 
Per Cap from Public Sources 32.1 42.8 29.3 44.0 59.6 67.1 41.3 68.8 40.6 55.7 
Disparity  56.2 45.5 0.0 0.0 36.7 29.2 61.9 34.4 38.7 27.3 
% Popn with HH Source 3.9 3.9 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.6 2.2 2.2 1.7 1.7 
% HH < 50 m from Pub Srce 76.7 91.3 58.1 77.4 87.2 96.8 100.0 100.0 80.5 91.4 
% HH - Unprotected Srces 19.4 4.9 41.9 22.6 12.2 2.6 0.0 0.0 18.4 7.5 
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statutory spaces provided in the Panchayats, the other spaces were neither made 
available by those who controlled decisions at the village and hamlet levels, nor filled 
except on paper.  The provision for Committee membership was however, not met in 
the Health Committee in two villages, not even on paper, and in various other 
Committees in four villages. The reason advanced was uncannily similar to the 
opinion expressed in Umbhel (Gujarat), 
 
‘…its so difficult to know who to include, there are hardly one or two who are 
active…even they hardly come to meetings, so this would be just cosmetic 
anyway….and we can’t put their names everywhere…’(Kharpa, Panchayat member).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.18:  Participation in the development of water supply processes in 
Madhya Pradesh villages after devolution 
 
In most hamlets, there was no election for members of the various Aam Sabha 
Committees, but names proposed by those at the meeting in which this was decided. 
Even when their names were included, to fulfill statutory requirements, the women did 
not always know about their membership. Attendance at Panchayat meetings and 
Gram Sabha meetings was less than even that in Gujarat, and only three of the women 
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interviewed had any prior information about the proposed projects before the location 
was surveyed by the PHED engineer – and mostly by hearsay. Half of the women had 
never done anything except put their thumbprints where and when instructed, usually 
by male members of their family. The practice of a male member of the household 
attending meetings in place of the elected woman is common, and only three of the 
women interviewed said they had heard about the discussion at the meetings from 
those men. A frequent remark of the elected women interviewed was…’why should 
we bother, they all know and decide, anyway what can we say…’ or words to that 
effect. Participation in the active SHGs in which they had membership was also 
observed to be intermittent and purely for the saving-credit-repayment tasks; other 
conversation typically centered on the personal lives and activities of their kith and 
kin. 
 
This pattern of low participation was arguably a consequence of the socio-economic 
conditions of the villages. MP has among the highest proportion of poor people 
relative to other States265 (see Table 2.2) and very low levels of almost all indicators of 
social development such as literacy, health and education; infrastructure is also poorly 
developed and rates of employment low. Low levels of education and information and 
the continuous struggle for a decent existence – sometimes, even for survival – was 
apparently not fertile ground for civic and political engagement, particularly where 
feudal relations, caste structures and traditions of restriction and exclusion remain 
strong. Community organization only happened with interventions by NGOs, and the 
associative and mutual-help organizations they seeded in the community required 
constant nurturing and revitalization – even after seven years of effort by Samarthan, 
very few had developed a motive power of their own. Most unfortunately, the 
                                                 
265 About 30% of the population is below poverty line, compared to 4% in Kerala and 2% in Gujarat. 
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splintering of the all-panchayat Gram Sabha into village-level Gram Sabhas, instead of 
increasing flow of information, transparency and participation, actually enabled the 
capture of resources and powers by the Sarpanch – in the words of Samarthan staff, 
the reality was ‘Sarpanch Raj’ – literally, ‘Panchayat President’s Rule’.  
 
Given this situation with respect to the overall functioning of the system, it is not 
surprising that women’s involvement was minimal, and almost non-existent in the 
processes of decision-making for the water-supply projects studied, as described 
earlier in this section. The primary reason cited by all the women interviewed was 
customary restrictions, either gendered or casteist. Only two specifically mentioned 
the lack of literacy, but other elected women said it was the inability to comprehend 
the discussions, which took place primarily between the Sarpanch, the Secretary, and 
one or two other significant male members. Interestingly, only two women mentioned 
time constraints. Clearly the social and customary practices were the prime inhibitor of 
women’s participation, though the ‘group effect’ did lead to better attendance in Gram 
Sabhas and Aam Sabhas. The same was also the reason for the occasional active 
involvement in community work such as when the poorer sections of the village 
organized for a specific project such as the water tank in Jarkhedi, and cleaning of a 
well in Lasudiya Dhakad. 
 
The interesting dynamic in MP is that the participation of men varies sharply in 
relation to the almost uniformly low attendance of women. The data here is however, 
likely to be unreliable, as the male elected representatives interviewed were in most 
villages the Sarpanch and Sachiv, and a few of their associates, who by definition 
were active and fully engaged. Access to other elected representatives was difficult – 
whether by design of ‘gatekeepers’ or accidentally, was not clear. The two villages in 
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which the interviews and surveys were less ‘directed’ – Kharpa and Manpura – are 
likely to be closer to the reality. And if the pattern in these two is considered, the 
participation of men does not exceed that of women by much, though Panchayat 
meetings are far better attended than the assembly. This could indicate that women’s 
low participation is as much the result of the political economy of caste and class 
relations in the village as the gendered norms and practices. From the interviews and 
focus group discussions in these villages, this appears to be closer to the reality than 
the extremely divergent levels of participation between men and women seen in the 
data from Lasudiya Khas and Lasudiya Dhakad.  
 
More of the male Panchayat members do attend Panchayat and Gram Sabha meetings, 
and the Health Committee Presidents were active initiators and organizers of the 
projects in two villages. But barring such unusually active persons and the Sarpanch, 
Sachiv and the Gram Sabha Treasurer, only some upper-caste members attended 
atleast half the meetings; the participation of lower-caste members was as marginal as 
that of women. It was in the case of the projects which were in lower-caste 
neighborhoods that members from that group, or a perceived leader were specifically 
called if they were not already present at meetings where it was discussed. As one 
Sarpanch explained… 
 
”…we have to make sure they know we are doing it for them, they have to 
cooperate…sometimes there are fights over the location [within the neighborhood] 
and its good if one of their own people can tell them that there are technical 
difficulties because of which only that location is possible…”.(Sarpanch, Lasudiya 
Khas) 
 
An underlying pattern of individual leadership, direct contact with the Janpad 
Panchayat and mobilization (or commandeering) of community contributions emerges 
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in the processes for the non-Sector Reform projects. When not initiated by the 
Sarpanch, the support of Samarthan staff who work in the village has been an 
important part of the success. The role of Youth Groups has been significant too, and 
availability of the funds of the Temple Committees. This tends to be large266 as 
everybody donates freely for the temple, and it typically is in the control of or 
accessible to the Sarpanch. While individual leadership, community energies and 
NGO efforts are applied to projects considered urgent by the village residents, the 
funds available to the Panchayat are managed and used by the Sarpanch, the Sachiv 
and the relevant technical officer - for example, the PHED AE or the VEO – for self-
identified and formulated projects. In sum, the socio-cultural and economic situation 
in the hamlets and Village Panchayats have led to a substantial modification of the 
statutory structure in the State, as shown in Figure 3.13, but with the community 
organizing and support of the NGO and the emergence of individual leadership, 
community involvement has not been inconsequential.  
 
 
5. DEVOLUTION IN THREE CONTEXTS 
 
The substantial differences in the designs of the local governance architectures in the 
three study States that emerged in the encounter of the skeletal structure specified in 
the GoI Panchayat Act with the respective State level political-economic situations 
                                                 
266 A temple in Rola had been completed at a cost of around 15 lakhs, and others of imposing height and 
similar estimated cost were being built in other villages. The Temple Committee in Lasudiya Khas 
reportedly has about Rs. 400,000 to complete construction of the 12m high Temple; the amount used 
for most of the water projects ranged from Rs. 20,000 to Rs. 40,000, except for the pond in Lasudiya 
Khas which allegedly cost Rs.400,000. This is also the estimate for the proposed mini-dam in Lasudiya 
Dhakad, and since in that predominantly lower-caste and Muslim village there are no community funds, 
the contractor interested in implementing the project has offered to pay the 10% ‘beneficiary 
contribution’to get the rest (Rs 360,000) from the Janpad Panchayat. It is common knowledge that he 
would not only take back his advance from the project funds, but would also make a lot of money in 
implementing the project. (interviews) 
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and its further mutation in practice by the local circumstances, has been described in 
the previous three sections. These context-related modulations of the Centrally 
instituted reform clearly had very different outcomes in terms of the effectiveness of 
and inclusion in the resulting organizational and institutional governance configuration 
for water provision. The important question is of the relative efficacy of the State-
specific designs that emerged, and its relationship to the patterns of effectiveness and 
participation in each case. To answer this question, the patterns of efficacy, 
effectiveness and participation that were observed in the three State cases (G-PR, K-
PR and MP-PR) are compared in Chapter V, and the discernible reasons for the 
relative outcomes discussed, after describing the three cases of water provision 
through liberalized arrangements in the same three States, in the next Chapter.    
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CHAPTER  IV 
 REFORM EFFICACY AND DEMOCRACY: LIBERALIZATION IN 
THREE STATES  
 
 
The drinking water sector in India was liberalized in 1999 to enable faster and more 
effective development of water supply systems, in tune with the neo-liberal discourses 
in the country and policy prescription of international institutions. Though the 
provision of drinking water is the responsibility of the States267, in the last three 
decades the Government of India (GoI) had increasingly become the largest sponsor of 
water supply projects in rural areas, setting the policy framework and providing 
substantial funds. As described in chapter II, the target has been to ensure that all 
habitations have safe sources that provide at least minimum supplies – fixed at 40 lpcd 
– of potable water to all households. Since 1972, the GoI’s Accelerated Rural Water 
Supply Program (ARWSP) has been the largest drinking water program in the country, 
and its policy-making role has become even more significant with the institution of the 
National Drinking Water Mission (NDWM) in 1986 and framing of a National Water 
Policy in 1987.  
 
The drinking water situation in rural India however, remained dismal even by the early 
nineties, and in an effort to improve the situation, the GoI introduced significant 
changes in the design of the ARWSP, in line with the contemporary neo-liberal policy 
discourses. A pilot Sector Reform (SR) program was also introduced along with the 
revised ARWSP, directed at replacing the existing pattern of government provision 
and management of water supply systems with ‘demand-driven’, community-based, 
                                                 
267 In the division of powers between the governments of India and the States, drinking water is in the 
‘Concurrent list’. This means that the States have both primary responsibility and full authority to 
legislate in matters pertaining to drinking water supply, but the Government of India can also act in this 
regard with the concurrence of the State governments. 
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participatory development and management of small water supply systems. The key 
components were local management, user contributions towards capital investment 
and the full cost of operation and maintenance.  In 2002, the pilot SR program was 
extended country-wide and re-launched as the Swajaldhara program.  
 
The SR-Swajaldhara program was explicitly a liberalization program, to enable the 
involvement of non-government organizations, private firms, individual experts and 
most centrally, users, in the production and distribution processes of domestic water. 
Some of the costs borne by the State were also to be transferred to the users, who were 
to own the installed system. This last dimension of the program also made it a 
privatization program, in the Build, Own, Operate (BOO) variation of the BOOT 
(Build, Operate, Own and Transfer) framework that has become popular in many 
countries for infrastructure privatization, for some costs and the responsibility for 
building and operating was transferred to the users268.  The design of the SR-
Swajaldhara program, including templates for the institutional arrangements, 
operational guidelines and sequencing of project activities was specified by the 
Department of Drinking Water Supply (DDWS) in the Ministry of Rural Development 
(MoRD) of the Government of India (GoI). Some leeway was, however, provided for 
the States to tailor the institutional arrangements to their context and accordingly 
reform existing organizational structures. The institutional set up therefore varies 
across states, with different implications for efficacy.  
 
                                                 
268 See Quiggan (1998) and Gamble (2002), for a overviews of the BOOT system and its variations, 
advantages and problems. As Quiggan explains, “The private sector builds the project, owns it, and 
operates it……Every time somebody builds themselves a house, they are building it, owning and 
operating it. What distinguishes things that are called BOO projects is typically that there is some 
continuing level of government involvement and so we distinguish BOO projects from private 
investment in general by the fact typically that there's an essential service of some kind being provided, 
in a situation where we can't simply rely on the existence of a large number of competitive suppliers of 
that service.” 
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In this chapter I discuss the functioning of the program in the three study States, to 
compare how the State and local contexts modulated the received institutional design 
specified by the GoI, and the relative effectiveness of and participation in the projects 
that resulted. In the next section I discuss the reforms prescribed and the institutional 
framework set out by the Department of Drinking Water Supply (DDWS) of the GoI, 
and the options left open for State-wise variations in the design. I also point out the 
devices and spaces incorporated in the institutional arrangements to enable actors 
outside the national and State governments, and users, especially women, to be 
involved in the process. In the following sections (2 to 4), I present the cases of 
Gujarat, Kerala and Madhya Pradesh respectively, including the pre-reform 
arrangements for State water provision, the reforms undertaken for the SR-
Swajaldhara program and the functioning of the reformed institutional architecture as 
observed in the study villages. In the final section I compare the reformed 
arrangements in the three States to assess the extent and nature of liberalization, and 
the effectiveness of and participation in the reformed processes at the local levels.  
 
 
1. LIBERALIZATION OF STATE WATER PROVISION: SECTOR REFORMS 
AND THE SWAJALDHARA PROGRAM  
 
By official estimates, almost one-third of rural households in India did not have access 
to any potable water from safe sources in 1995 (Planning Commision, 2002)269, and of 
those who had access, a substantial proportion did not get the GoI specified minimum 
(40 lpcd) or did not have perennial access.  To escalate the pace of coverage, the Ninth 
                                                 
269 Even official estimates of water coverage vary; see Planning Commission (2002: 31-32) for the 
estimates by different organizations and the linear regression trend line.  
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and Tenth Five year Plans (1997-2002, 2002-2007)270 prioritized the issue of drinking 
water provision. The approach specified in the latter271, and the National Water Policy 
(NWP, GoI 2002) closely mirrored the neo-liberal reform prescriptions that populated 
scholarly and policy discourses within the country and donor evaluations and 
advice272. Such an approach constituted a paradigm shift from the prevailing 
perception of drinking water as a free, common good, its use for drinking a natural 
human right and its provision a state responsibility, perceptions which were endemic 
and embedded in the customary practices in many parts of the country (Saleth 2004; 
Mehta 2001). However, given the persistence of the problem and the pressures for 
reform273 in 1999 the GoI revised the ARWSP and introduced the Sector Reform 
program, tying grants for water projects to reforms in the existing approaches, 
institutional structure and processes by the State governments.  
 
The revised ARWSP guidelines notified in 1999 incorporated most of the Dublin 
Principles: water to be treated as a socio-economic good, people’s participation in the 
development of supply systems to be increased and women to be definitely involved in 
planning and management (GoI-DDWS 1999). The pilot Sector Reform (SR) program 
introduced at the same time, by earmarking 20% of the ARWSP funds, to 
“institutionalis(e) community participation in capital cost sharing, Operation & 
Maintenance and Water Quality Monitoring & Surveillance in identified pilot 
                                                 
270The Planning Commission of India has prepared five-year plans since Independence, based on 
regular assessments of the economy and status of development, that set out policy priorities and 
resource allocations for various sectors and programs for a five-year period. The Ninth Plan was for 
1997-2002 and the Tenth Plan was for the period 2002-2007. Available at 
www.planningcommission.nic.in/plans/planrel/fiveyr/index9.html  
271 In the priorities for Rural Water Supply and Sanitation, decentralization, user involvement and 
involvement of PRIs and other organizations was emphasized. See 
http://planningcommission.nic.in/plans/planrel/fiveyr/10th/default.htm 
272 See, for example, Pushpangadan and Murugan (1995,1998); Veerashekharappa (1999); Reddy 
(2006), Saleth (2004), GoI (2002); World Bank (1999) 
273 By both domestic and international observers and policy analysts, as noted in 6 above. 
 
 
 
 
256
districts” (GoI 1999:2) was more explicit. The stated objective of the pilot was to 
change the existing ‘supply-driven’ process to a ‘demand-driven’ one, through a 
reformed approach initially applied in 58 districts274 of the country; in 2002, it was 
extended to the rest of the country as the ‘Swajaldhara’ program. Like its predecessor, 
the Swajaldhara program also mandated the implementation of the neo-liberal reforms, 
with an increased financial incentive for States that did. The program was introduced 
independently, fully funded by the GoI (100% refinance of the costs borne by the 
State), alongside the existing ARWSP for which the GoI provided only about 50% of 
the funds required for any project275.  
 
The organizational structure and processes for the Sector Reform program was 
communicated to the States in 1999; with its re-incarnation as Swajaldhara, all reform 
initiatives in the rural drinking water sector were brought into its ambit, and detailed 
guidelines for implementation by the States were developed in June 2003. (GoI, 2003: 
iii). I set out the GoI prescribed framework below, and in subsequent sections, discuss 
the variations introduced in the three study States, the emergent structure and 
processes in the respective contexts, and their relative efficacy and inclusiveness.    
 
1.1. THE REVISED ARWSP AND THE SECTOR REFORM INITIATIVE  
 
The substantial revisions of the ARWSP introduced in 1999 did not specify any major 
structural reform for its implementation, but only directed a change in the role of the 
State government, the inclusion of Panchayats and specifically, women, in the process. 
The State government’s lead sector institution viz. the PHED /Water Supply and 
                                                 
274 Later, some more districts were added, taking the total to 67 districts. 
275 Except for projects in Desert and Drought Prone areas (DDP), where the GoI provided 75%. In all 
cases, State governments had to provide the balance. 
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Sanitation Board /Nigam /Authority was to remain the nodal coordinating agency for 
the project, but shift from implementation to facilitation. This nodal agency was to 
retain “the overall responsibility for planning, implementation, supervision and 
monitoring of the approved schemes” (GoI-DDWS 1999: section 2.1.4). The subject 
of drinking water provision had already been devolved to Panchayats in most states, 
following the reconstitution of the Panchayati Raj (PR, literally ‘local government 
rule’) system through the Panchayat Act of 1993276. Inclusion of the Panchayats (local 
governments) in the implementation of schemes, particularly in selecting the location 
of standposts, identification of spot sources, operation and maintenance, and fixing of 
water tariffs was therefore also mandated.  
 
The inclusion of women, in the revised ARWSP guidelines, was specifically with the 
direction that they must be consulted in the decisions on the location of the standposts 
or other spot sources in the habitations, and in identifying sources of water. Women 
were to be the caretakers of installed handpumps and trained as repair-persons; atleast 
30% of the total trainees in any project had to be women. Satisfactory completion of 
the projects was to be certified by women, and prominent women of the locality were 
to be included in the village-level monitoring committees. Project proposals submitted 
by State governments for GoI funding were required to include details of the proposed 
involvement of women. 
 
1.2. THE SECTOR REFORM-SWAJALDHARA PROGRAM STRUCTURE  
 
The Sector Reform pilot project, introduced in the same revised AWRSP guidelines, 
however, specified a completely different institutional framework from that through 
                                                 
276 As is discussed in Section II, Chapters 9-12, of this report. 
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which the ARWSP was being implemented. 20% of the AWRSP funds (from the GoI) 
were earmarked for the SR projects, with incentives for the States for faster and more 
extensive implementation.  
 
The institutional arrangements for developing ‘community-based’ water supply 
projects, outlined in the SR guidelines, are captured also in the June 2003 Guidelines 
for Swajaldhara (GoI, 2003). These guidelines clearly state that the program was 
launched by the DDWS of the Central government with the explicit aim of “open[ing] 
up the reform initiatives in the rural drinking water supply sector throughout the 
country.” (DDWS 2002: letter No.W-11037/51/2002-TM.III). The notification of 
program initiation sent to all States by the DDWS stated that it was to have five ‘key 
elements’:  
  
(i) demand-driven and community participation approach;  
(ii) Panchayats / communities to plan, implement, operate, maintain and manage all 
drinking water schemes;  
(iii) partial capital cost sharing by the communities upfront in cash;  
(iv) full ownership of drinking water assets with GPs; and  
(v) full Operation and Maintenance (O&M) by the users / Panchayats.   
GPs and Blocks adopting the reforms principles will be eligible for Swajaldhara projects. 
(DDWS letter No. W-11037/51/2002-TM.III dated the 16th November, 2002) 
 
Refinancing of all costs of projects developed under this program (excluding 
beneficiary contribution) was made conditional on the full application of these reform 
principles in the implementation of water supply projects.  
 
Under the SR-Swajaldhara guidelines, a State Water and Sanitation Mission 
(henceforth, SWSM) was to be constituted as a separate registered society of the nodal 
agency – Department, Board, Nigam, Authority or Agency – implementing rural water 
supply projects in the State.  The Mission was to have an Apex Committee chaired by 
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the Chief Secretary/Additional Chief Secretary of the State, the head of the nodal 
agency as the Committee Secretary and the heads of various related departments277 as 
members.  An Executive Committee was to be constituted by the Apex Committee, 
headed by the Secretary of the department/ agency looking after drinking water 
provision in the State, with a Joint-Secretary of the department as Committee 
Secretary. Officers from other departments with an interest in safe water supply278 
were to ex-officio members of the executive committee. A maximum of six NGOs, 
experts in the field of information, education and communication (IEC), human 
resource development (HRD), management information systems (MIS) or the media 
could also be co-opted into the Executive.  
 
At the district level, Swajaldhara was to be implemented through the district 
Panchayat (DP), which was also to channel program funds to localities. A District 
Water and Sanitation Committee (DWSC) headed by the Chief Executive Officer of 
the DP or the District Collector or Magistrate was to be constituted, as a DP 
Committee, with the Executive Engineer in charge of drinking water provision in the 
district as the Secretary279. Members were to include district officers in the 
departments of Health, Education, Social Welfare, Panchayati Raj, Information and 
Public Relations, and the Project Director of the DRDA. Three members were to be 
co-opted from among reputed NGOs or/ and experts,280 and the NGOs were to be 
                                                 
277 Including the departments of Public Health Engineering (PHE), Rural Development (RD), 
Panchayati Raj (PR), Finance, Health, Education and Information and Public Relations (I&PR) 
278 Including the Departments of Rural Development, Public Health Engineering (Chief Engineer), 
Panchayati Raj, Health , Education, Social Welfare, Information and Public Relations 
279 In the Sector Reform program the formation of a District Water and Sanitation Mission (DWSM), 
named ‘PRAKALP’ had been specified. It was to be constituted as a registered society with a 
Governing Body headed by Chairman of Zilla Parishad, or where the Zilla Parishads had not been 
constituted, the Chairman of the District Planning Committee or the District Collector/Deputy 
Commissioner.  
280 Previously, under the Sector Reform guidelines, all MPs/MLAs and MLCs of the district, Chairman 
of the Standing Committees of the Zilla Parishad and District Collector/Deputy Commissioner were 
also members, and the CEO of the Zilla Parishad was to be the Member Secretary. 
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responsible for generating community participation in the projects through volunteer 
‘motivators’ in the villages. Optionally, at the district level a Core Group comprising 
professionals in community development, drinking water supply and other related 
areas could also be formed, to help the DWSC in implementing the program.  
 
There were two variants in the Swajaldhara program. Swajaldhara I included 
situations where individual GPs with a district, typically those with more acute 
scarcity of safe water sources, were selected for the implementation of the program. 
Swajaldhara II could be applied to those districts in which the more acutely water-
deprived GPs had already been covered, to extend the program throughout the district. 
Morever, in the latter cases, systems could be installed to raise the per capita water 
availability to 55 lpcd or more, if the users were willing to bear the additional cost.   
 
In the project villages, Swajaldhara projects were to be implemented by a Village 
Water and Sanitation Committee (VWSC), constituted under the chairmanship of the 
President of the GP or a member of the Panchayat elected by the VWSC. For projects 
spanning a number of villages, such a Committee was to be constituted by the IP281. 
Though the composition of the VWSC could be decided by the State government, 
atleast 30% of the total members had to be women, and persons from the marginalized 
communities, poor families, experts and representatives of NGOs or CBOs working in 
the village had to be included.  
 
The organizational framework piloted in the Sector Reform program and finally 
mandated in Swajaldhara guidelines is shown in Figure 4.1.  
                                                 
281 The State was required to make appropriate arrangements in their local government legislation, if 
necessary, to enable these Committees to function as integral part of the respective GPs/ IPs, and in the 
interim, issue government orders to that effect.  
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Figure 4.1:  Institutional structure for implementation of Swajaldhara program 
specified by the Department of Drinking Water Supply (DDWS), 
Government of India. 
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1.3. PROJECT DEVELOPMENT IN THE SR-SWAJALDHARA PROGRAM 
 
Though not reiterated in the June 2003 Guidelines, the Dec 2002 notification of the 
program delineates the process for development of projects. Proposals were to be 
developed by GPs/BPs/VWSC or Beneficiary Groups and forwarded to the DDWS 
through the district-level implementing agency (DIA), requesting the necessary funds.  
Beneficiary Groups (BG) could be constituted by any group of households that were to 
be connected to the proposed water supply system, and formally registered under the 
Societies Act. They could submit proposals through the GP or IP as the case may be. 
The National Scheme Sanctioning Committee (NSSC) of the DDWS would scrutinize 
and sanction proposals. Funds would be disbursed directly to the DIAs which would 
be responsible for (a) the formulation, implementation and management of the project; 
(b) receipt and management of Central funds for the project; (c) selection of agencies 
for project implementation by IP / GP / VWSC / BG; and (d) sanctioning of the 
schemes and entering into bipartite or tripartite agreement between BG /GP/ VWSC / 
IP. (DDWS 2003). 
 
Communities’ or user contributions towards the capital cost, at 10% of the total if the 
supply system was to deliver 40 lpcd of water and 20% if it was between 40-55 lcpd, 
was to be collected and deposited in a project account before GoI funds were granted. 
Atleast 50% of the community contributions had to be in cash, and the balance could 
be contributed in labour, land for the project, or in other ways. Users could also design 
capacities beyond 55 lpcd, if they were willing to bear the entire additional cost. 
 
The BP / GP / VWSC / BG proposing the project was responsible for execution of the 
sanctioned schemes including collection of community contributions towards capital 
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cost (in cash), opening and managing bank accounts for management of project funds, 
selecting contractors for construction activities, procuring construction materials and 
supervising construction activities. It was required to provide details and progress of 
implementation to the Gram Sabha and ensure community participation in project 
activities. After completion, it would also commission and take over the completed 
water supply system in the presence of the Gram Sabha, and manage operations and 
maintenance of the system through collection of fees from users. The NSSC282 could 
grant a one-time start-up operation and maintenance fund (O&M) to the GP/ VWSC/ 
BP within six months of their take over of the schemes. This start up grant was not 
intended to replace the community contribution for O&M but to institute an O&M 
revolving fund. 
 
1.4. STRUCTURAL VARIATIONS IN THE SR-SWAJALDHARA INSTITUTIONAL 
FRAMEWORK 
 
While the institutional structure described above applies to all States, some elements 
of the structure and process are not binding, and the States can vary the arrangements 
to an extent. It is not mandatory for the States to formalize the SWSM as an 
autonomous entity by registration under the Societies Act283, nor to include experts or 
representatives from NGOs or other civil society organizations among the membership 
of either the Apex or Executive Committees of the SWSM or in the DWSC284, as is 
mandatory for the VWSC. The formation of a Core Group of professionals at the 
district level is also optional285, and the constitution of the VWSC is left to the 
                                                 
282 National Scheme Sanctioning Committee of the DDWS, GoI. 
283 The Guidelines state “The SWSM may be a registered society.” (GoI 2003: 9, emphasis mine) 
284 According to the Guidelines, “…3 members who shall be experts and/ from (sic) reputed NGOs, may 
be co-opted into the Committee…” (GoI 2003: 11, emphasis mine) 
285 Item 7.3.7 in the Guidelines – “The Core Group may be positioned to assist the district Water and 
Sanitation Committee…” (GoI 2003:12, emphasis mine) 
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discretion of the State government, on condition that one third of members are women 
and other marginalized groups are included286. The training necessary to support the 
change in roles of the staff of the nodal agency or for the VWSC members could be 
undertaken by the State Institute of Rural Development or sourced from other experts/ 
institutions. It was only suggested that the services of NGOs might be used for social 
mobilization, capacity development at the village level and such other activities, and 
that in such case the NGOs could be additionally trained for the purpose. The 
formation of women-only user groups at the village level to engage with the VWSC 
was also not mandatory. Also, if the State government wished, consultants and/or 
professionals could be engaged for any of the necessary tasks.  
 
These openings left for deviation from the institutional structure and processes 
prescribed in the program guidelines are not insignificant, for they allow States to vary 
the extent and nature of involvement of non-State organizations and individuals 
substantially. Transfer of functions to organizations outside the purview of the state is 
the defining element of liberalization; and any reduction in the suggested involvement 
of non-state actors alters the potential of the reformed arrangements to produce effects 
is concomitantly reduced. To what extent this happened in the application of the 
reform and how it affected the effectiveness of projects developed though the 
reformed arrangements and the participation of women in the process in the study 
States is discussed in the three sections below.   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
286 Item 7.4.2 in the Guidelines. (GoI 2003:13) 
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2. SECTOR REFORMS IN GUJARAT: GWSSB, WASMO AND PANI 
SAMITIS 
 
In the 1991 Census of India (CoI 1993), only 60% of the households in rural Gujarat 
had access to safe sources of drinking water, and the situation had not improved 
substantially by the late nineties. For though the State efforts persisted, the rate at 
which habitations were becoming water scarce due to pollution and falling water 
tables outstripped the pace of State efforts. Till the recent reforms, the primary State 
agency for domestic water provision was the Gujarat State Water Supply and 
Sewerage Board (GWSSB), a semi-autonomous parastatal within the Water Supply 
Department. Reportedly, the erstwhile Public Health Engineering Department was 
replaced by the GWSSB “to obviate the cumbersome formalities…[such as] 
government procedures for budgeting…[and] introduce greater flexibility and 
efficiency” (interview with Ex-Chief Engineer, GWSSB). But the GWSSB 
nevertheless faced a host of issues, as was endemic to similar parastatals across the 
country. I describe the structure, functioning and issues faced by the GWSSB and the 
state of water provision in Gujarat prior to reforms, introduction of the SR-
Swajaldhara program and the functioning of the reformed institutional architecture in 
the State. 
 
2.1. PRE REFORM INSTITUTIONAL ARCHITECTURE FOR WATER PROVISION IN 
GUJARAT 
 
A picture of the institutional framework and processes for development of water 
supply systems in rural Gujarat was assembled from Hirway (2005, 2008), interviews 
with senior government officials in the Water Supply Department and documents of 
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the GWSSB (listed in Annexure V). All drinking-water programs of the State 
government and the GoI were implemented by the GWSSB, which undertook need-
surveys, design and construction of the systems, and operation and maintenance of 
multi-village water-supply schemes. Smaller, individual village systems and point 
sources like public taps and handpumps were handed over to the GP for operation and 
maintenance, though technical support for major repairs was provided by the GWSSB 
sub-division office when required. The GWSSB functioned through a hierarchical 
arrangement of zones, circles, division and subdivision, with a core staff primarily of 
engineers who are employees of the State government.  
 
Though the development of water supply systems in the villages was the responsibility 
of the GWSSB, Panchayats in Gujarat continued to allocate resources from their own 
revenues and discretionary funds, or marshaled finances from donors to develop water 
supply systems, even after the responsibility was transferred to GWSSB287. In the case 
of smaller installations, field offices of the GWSSB – subdivisions and lower – 
surveyed ‘not covered’ (NC) and ‘partially covered’ (PC)288 villages within their 
jurisdiction and proposed appropriate systems. GWSSB engineers decided the 
capacity, coverage, location of installations and technology to be used, with help from 
the Ground Water Board when required. GPs were consulted during the process and 
helped acquire land for the installations but the GWSSB staff decided the design and 
prepared detailed proposals and estimates. For multi-village or regional schemes, the 
relevant higher offices undertook these tasks, and consulted Intermediate or District 
                                                 
287 As described in Chapter III, Section 2, Panchayats in Gujarat had substantial sources of own revenue 
and were also allocated a share of State revenues. Philanthropy for development of their native villages 
by the elite has also been a hall mark of civic action in south Gujarat, and this is common knowledge. 
288 Partially covered refers to villages with less than the minimum 40 lpcd of water specified by the GoI 
as the norm that is to be arranged for by the government. NC villages are those which have less than 10 
lpcd. The Gujarat government has a 55 lpcd norm; the costs for this additional capacity built into 
projects are borne by the State government from its own revenues. 
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Panchayats depending on the area covered. Proposals were scrutinized and sanctioned 
by higher-level officers of the GWSSB, and implemented by proposing offices aided 
by field staff; this included tendering and contracting, supervision and payment to 
contractors. Single-village systems were handed over to GPs for operation and small 
maintenance, though the GWSSB undertook major maintenance and repair tasks.  
 
Though the local government reforms of the mid-nineties required the transfer of 
various functions including water supply to Panchayats, there was scarce change in the 
institutional structure and processes, as described in chapter III and shown in Figure 
3.3. The organizational architecture for water provision that therefore existed in 
Gujarat by the end of the nineties was the same as before the Panchayat reforms, and 
is shown in Figure 4.2. 
 
2.2. WATER PROVISION BY THE GWSSB: APPROACHES AND ISSUES 
 
In the 70’s and 80’s GWSSB focused primarily on developing water sources and 
regional water supply schemes (RWSS289) delivering piped water to clusters of 
villages, a strategy that to date remains the State government’s main approach to 
drinking water provision (Hirway 2005: CEO, WASMO). Though single-village water 
supply systems and point-sources such as handpumps and wells were also developed, 
the emphasis has been on medium and large projects transferring water in bulk to 
groups of villages. This approach has been extensively critiqued, for the drinking 
water situation remains dismal. Despite the extensive coverage reported by the State 
government, with only 50 of the 30,269 habitations not having access to even 10 lpcd 
                                                 
289 Also known as Multi-Village Water Supply Schemes or MVWSS 
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Figure 4.2: Institutional Architecture for Water Provision in Gujarat prior to 
Sector Reforms 
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of water, and 1428 having between 10 and 40 lpcd, the actual situation is far worse. 
Many ‘fully covered’ (FC) and’ partly covered’ (PC)290 villages get water that is not 
potable: State government surveys indicate that the water supplies in almost 30% of 
villages are contaminated, with nitrates, arsenic, flouride or a combination of these 
salts far above permissible limits set by the WHO (WASMO 2004), and independent 
micro studies bear this out (Bharwada and Mahajan 2002).  There are other problems - 
tail-end villages in RWSSs were usually deprived, and elsewhere supply was irregular 
and unreliable, very inadequate quantities of water were supplied, and the water was 
often not of potable quality either because of contamination of the source or though 
breakages in the distribution system (Hirway 2005).  
 
According to Hirway (2005), these problems are rooted in the top-down approach of 
GWSSB, and the lack of people’s involvement in the management of the schemes at 
the local level. Centralized functioning of the GWSSB leads to inadequate supervision 
and monitoring, resulting in poor operation and maintenance; breakages and leakages 
remain unattended, there is under growth of plants in pipelines, lack of enough water 
pressure in pipelines, unauthorized connections and theft of water. Clearly, the RWSS 
approach has not delivered.  In addition to being costlier than smaller individual-
village schemes, sources are often inadequate in relation to the demand, there is 
corruption and misappropriation of funds in water related programs in general and 
regional schemes in particular. Other research studies have shown that individual 
village-level systems (IWSS) are cheaper and perform better but with the availability 
of piped water under the RWSS, local sources have become defunct (Bharwada and 
Mahajan 2002, Sharma 1996, cited in Hirway 2005).  
                                                 
290 According to GoI norms, a habitation is considered fully covered if 40 lpcd of water from safe 
sources is available. Partly covered are those with between 10 to 40 lpcd of safe water within the 
habitation. 
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Despite these issues, the State’s preference for large-scale systems and bulk-transfer to 
water-poor areas continues. The Narmada mega-project for transferring water from the 
Sardar Sarovar dam across the river Narmada in south Gujarat to the parched northern 
parts has been positioned as the ‘life-line of Gujarat’, and is slated to reach water to 
8215 villages (45% of the 18144 villages of Gujarat) (WASMO 2004), and in 2003, 
there were 121 additional RWSSs under construction (GWSSB 2004). Smaller 
systems continue to be maintained by Panchayats, which also managed the internal 
distribution systems of regional schemes.  
 
2.3. SECTOR REFORMS AND SWAJALDHARA IN GUJARAT 
 
In face of the grim drinking water situation and the growing water crisis in recent 
years, the Gujarat government is perceived to have adopted a ‘crisis management 
approach’, relying on the Narmada mega-project and additional RWSSs to meet the 
need to a large extent (Hirway 2005). At the same time alternative approaches have 
been initiated by civil society organizations and NGOs, including revival of traditional 
local sources, rainwater harvesting and watershed treatment and recharging 
(PRAVAH 2004, 2005, Hirway 2005). The efficacy and sustainability of such smaller 
and local solutions have been amply demonstrated and has led to some State support 
for such programs. These are all community-developed and managed projects, which 
have successfully demonstrated the positive results of participatory planning and 
generated some enthusiasm for a non-centralized approach. A successful Netherlands-
aided project – the Gogha Water Supply and Sanitation Project - for community-
management of a regional water supply system291, reforms in the AWRSP and the 
                                                 
291 The project was initiated to pilot community management of a RWSS in the Gogha Taluka of 
Bhavnagar district of Gujarat, and became the precursor of the Sector Reform Program in Gujarat. 
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introduction of the pilot Sector Reform program of the GoI in 1999 also directed a 
shift in the overall approach. In the words of one key informant, 
 
“…there was an ideological shift in the State’s approach….it was realized that all this 
investment [in the Narmada project] would only be fruitful if we decentralize systems…if 
reliable, adequate, safe water, regular water supply, 365 days in a year, had to be 
provided, it can no longer be done by GWSSB…learnt a lot from the Gogha 
experience…community had to be empowered, its capacity built, technical support 
provided….the system had to be reformed….institutional restructuring would be required 
at all the levels to…. [bring about] decentralization, to empower local bodies, to 
encourage community participation, to ensure financial viability of the sector, to 
encourage GO-NGO-private sector partnerships ….”(Senior Advisor, WASMO) 
 
The Sector Reform pilot program was introduced in three districts – Surat, Rajkot and 
Mehsana – of Gujarat in 2000. The Gujarat Jal Seva Training Institute of the GWSSB 
was designated the State Coordinator for the program with the Secretary, Water 
Supply Department as Chair of the State Water and Sanitation Mission. A District 
Project Management Unit was established in the three pilot districts, with officers 
deputed from the GWSSB, and housed in the respective Division office. The District 
Water and Sanitation Mission and the Village Water and Sanitation Committees 
(called Pani Samiti in Gujarat) under the GP were also constituted as directed in the 
program guidelines. NGOs were identified and associated as Implementation Support 
Agencies, to undertake community mobilization and dissemination of information in 
the villages. But despite these structural changes, the GWSSB remained the primary 
implementer in the initial stages of the pilot program.  
 
It was through the implementation of the Gogha Project that a distinctly different 
institutional structure was initiated, with the setting up of the Water and Sanitation 
Management Organization (WASMO) in September 2002. Donor support for the 
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Gogha project included funds for setting up an independent organization to 
institutionalize community participation and management in water provision across 
the State, and with the relative success of the Sector Reform program, the GoG 
provided additional funds. WASMO was established as an independent and 
autonomous organization of the State Water Supply Department, with the mandate of 
promoting decentralized and community-owned and managed water supply systems. It 
was made the nodal agency for the implementation of the ongoing Gogha Project and 
Sector Reform Program, and soon after, the Swajaldhara program. The GWSSB 
continues to implement the AWRSP. 
 
WASMO is the State Water and Sanitation Mission in Gujarat, headed by a CEO 
appointed directly by the GoG, advised by an Apex Committee and assisted by an 
Executive Committee that he convenes. Both of these Committees are constituted as 
per the Swajaldhara guidelines, and include five to seven non-official members from 
among well-known NGOs, academics and research institutions with expertise in the 
water sector. The District Water and Sanitation Committee chaired by the District 
Collector and the Village Water and Sanitation Committees continue in the same form 
as under Sector Reform program, and NGOs are selected by the DWSM as 
Implementation Support Agencies (ISAs), to “assist the village community in 
planning, implementation, management, operation and maintenance of water supply, 
rainwater harvesting and sanitation structures.” (WASMO 2004:6) WASMO itself has, 
in the words of its CEO, “developed a need-based organizational structure”, with 
Coordination, Monitoring and Support Units (CMSU’s) in the project areas (CEO, 
WASMO), “staffed by motivated personnel with diverse experience and commitment 
to serve”. (WASMO 2004:6). Where the Sector Reform program was already  
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Figure 4.3: Reformed Institutional Framework for SR-Swajaldhara in Gujarat 
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underway, as in Surat, the DPMU continues as the CMSU, with the addition of staff 
for community mobilization and coordination. The reformed institutional set-up is 
shown in Figure 4.3.  
 
WASMO is intended and designed to be a temporary organization, to be dismantled 
when the earlier modalities of State provision are transformed into the demand-driven, 
community-based process that is envisaged in the reforms. Staff is therefore hired on 
contractual basis for short periods, unlike the large permanent staff of the GWSSB; 
WASMO also helps train GWSSB staff to re-orient them to community-led processes. 
 
2.4. SECTOR REFORMS, GUJARAT STYLE: PANI SAMITIS AND PARTICIPATORY 
WATER PROVISION  
 
The reform of the existing modalities for State provision of drinking water and the 
alternate institutional structure and processes put in place by the government of 
Gujarat for implementation of the SR-Swajaldhara program have been described 
above. To understand how these reformed arrangements work at the village level, 
water supply projects developed under the program were studied in four villages in 
two talukas of Surat district. Table 4.1 shows the drinking water sources and coverage 
in the two talukas, and the water availability in the four villages – Laskana and Ladvi 
in Kamrej taluka and Vadadla and Tatijhagda in Palsana taluka – is shown in Table 
4.2, including both existing and new (SR) projects. More extensive village profiles as 
well as further details of existing and new water sources are in Annexure III. 
 
 
 
 
 
275
As described before (chapter III), villages in this part of Surat differ in their size and 
composition. Villages near the city are large, with mixed caste groups in different 
‘falias’ or neighborhoods, good infrastructure and services. Towards the north are 
small villages with a large proportion of tribal families - Vadadla is one such - often 
with lesser infrastructure, though almost all are well-connected by metalled access 
roads and regular bus service to nearby towns.   
 
 
Table 4.1 
Percentage distribution of households by source of drinking water and its 
location (2001). 
 Source: Developed from Census of India, 2001: H-Series, Table H-8 
* Note: The rest of the population depends on other unprotected sources such as ponds, open tanks, river, streams 
or irrigation wells. 
 
 
The area is flat, and houses are clustered in different neighborhoods of the ‘Gamtal’ or 
village area according to caste, with the lower-caste and dalit neighborhoods at a 
distance from the other clusters as is typical of villages in India.  The main occupation 
is agriculture, though a segment of the working population commutes to other jobs in 
the nearby towns and to a local sugar factory292. Agriculture is a mix of grains, 
vegetables and cash crops like sugarcane and bananas, with two or in some instances 
three crops supported by a dense network of irrigation canals. Landowning families 
                                                 
292 In Kamrej Taluka. 
Surat 
District  
Kamrej Taluka* Palsana Taluka* 
Location of 
Water Source 
Total HH % of 
HH 
Tap Hand-
pump 
Tube-
well 
Well Total  
HH 
% of 
HH 
Tap Hand-
pump 
Tube-
well 
Well 
Total 29,527 100.0 89.0 6.2 2.4 1.4 17,416 100.0 66.6 13.5 5.7 14.0 
In Premises 12,269 41.6 40.2 0.5 0.6 0 5,564 31.9 28.1 0.5 2.6 0.6 
Nr Premises 14,954 50.6 44.2 4.4 1.1 0.5 9,864 56.6 33.4 10.9 3.0 9.3 
Away 2,304 7.8 4.7 1.2 0.7 0.8 1,988 11.4 5.1 2.1 0 4.1 
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are therefore reasonably well-off, while the landless find employment as farm labor in 
the agricultural seasons, and sundry jobs in Surat city in the off-season.   
 
 
Table 4.2 
Sources of water in study villages, before and after SR-Swajaldhara projects 
 
Sources: Population statistics from Census of India 2001; details of existing and new water sources and distribution 
system are from DPMU files, focus group discussions, transect walks in the village by the author. 
 
The four study villages are accessible by paved roads, had basic infrastructure 
including piped water supply to some households (before the SR projects), electricity, 
post-office, telephone and cable television service, schools and health centers. 
However, only about 25-30% of the households were connected to the existing water 
supply system, and atleast one-third of those received little water because of the low 
pressure in the pipelines; these were households located either at the tail-end or, as is 
typical of upper-income households, on relatively higher ground within the village. 
The situation in Laskana is characteristic; according to the current VWSC President,  
 
“Originally [we had] Panchayat supply, directly from bore, no storage capacity….not 
for everyone, not at all enough… only rich people had connections to the house, 
mainly rabaris [a middle-ranked caste group] ….but these people had pipes but no 
water…Sarpanch’s house is at [the] highest level, so no supply….” (originally in 
Village Total Popn 
No. of 
HHs 
Old Elevated Storage 
Reservoir Wells Other (unprotected sources) 
New Elevated Storage 
Reservoir (SR Project) 
St. Cap 
in liters 
HH 
conn 
Stand
-posts 
St. cap 
in liters 
HH 
conn 
Stand
-posts 
Laskana  @ 6000 (8452) 
@ 1250 
(1749)  50,000  300 3 3 Pond (1) 
1,55,000 680 4 
Ladvi  1546 280 10,000  67 5 1 
Tank,  Handpump-2, 
Field wells (12), 
borewells (40 
80,000 168 7 
Tatijhagda  800 148 17,000 48 0 0 
RO plant, Field 
wells(100), handpum-2, 
pond-1 
50,000 81 3 
Vadadla  897 193 No OHT 0 0 2 
RO plant, Tank, 
Handpumps-2, field 
wells (80), checkdam at 
1.5 kms, canal 
50,000 46 6 
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Hindi; Laskana VWSC President, male)   
 
The Additional. Assistant Engineer (AAE) of the Surat DPMU explained the reasons 
for lack of better coverage:  
 
“… [The] main problems – spread-out settlements, small villages….poor quality of 
groundwater, high TDS [total dissolved solids above 2000]. So never full-village 
coverage before SR.…official population in most villages in this area is low, but 
‘illegal’ population is more – migrants to work in local industries, fields…SRP can 
provide for bigger projects to cover all, which GWSSB can’t, GWSSB is only allowed 
to provide for census population… ” (AAE, DPMU, Surat).  
 
Vadadla, with the largest proportion of tribal and lower-caste households, had no 
piped water system; the only sources till 2001 were a tank, one handpump, and private 
irrigation wells in the agricultural fields outside the village. Though it had a paved 
approach road, electricity supply and a post office, there was only a primary school 
and public health sub-center. Other facilities like higher schools, medical facilities and 
banks were within 10kms, and there was twice-daily bus service from the village.  
 
It is noteworthy that two villages also had Reverse Osmosis plants for production of 
purified drinking water, installed in Vadadla in 2001 and Tatijhagda in 2000, by the 
Village Samooh (Committee) from funds donated by wealthier households and 
successful immigrants. Residents are allowed a limited quantity of water (10-20litres 
for each person) for drinking, on payment of a fixed amount per month. In Tatijhagda, 
a card system has been instituted, where daily collection is noted. More water than is 
allocated can be collected, if available, on payment of cash. 
 
According to the Assistant Executive Engineer (AEE) in the DPMU, Surat, the SR 
program was introduced in the district in 2000, with seminars organized by the 
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GWSSB and the DP in all sub-district headquarters. The SR principles and processes 
by which the village could develop additional water supply systems under the program 
were explained to the attendees, who were mostly elected Panchayat members and 
village notables, Eventually,  
 
“…. villages applied for projects…In SRP, NGOs surveyed the villages….Villages 
applied, [responsibility was] distributed to selected NGOs,….NGOs surveyed, 
prepared plan, got approval….NGOs are there from beginning, till 3 months after 
audit report is filed.” (AEE, Surat DPMU; words in brackets mine)  
 
The Laskana VWSC President described the process as it happened in the village: 
 
“…Sandeepbhai [of Aadesh Trust, the NGO-ISA] explained system first, we liked 
it, then explained to people – took a while, about a month. We got contributions 
according to paying capacity, and total exceeded the required 10% [of capital 
cost]. The excess was placed in maintenance fund. ALL households had 
contributed something, minimum Rs 50, maximum 11,000 (2-3 people), 5000 (10-
15 people) …” (President, LaskanaPanchayat; originally in Hindi, emphasis and 
words in brackets mine) 
 
In all four villages, interviewees reported almost identical processes. Aadesh 
Charitable Trust and Nirav Mahila Trust, two Surat-based NGOs, were appointed the 
consultants (ISAs) for the projects, with the former working in all study villages 
except Ladvi. The NGOs were contracted by the VWSC constituted for the purpose of 
the program, and their charges included in the project cost. They conducted a 
participatory rural appraisal (PRA) exercise and a household survey in the village, and 
developed a Village Action Plan (VAP) for water. A suitable project proposal, 
including design, rates and estimates, was then developed by the NGO with the 
GWSSB technical staff. On approval of both the VAP and the project proposal by the 
DWSC, the VWSC hired contractors through a tendering process overseen by 
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GWSSB and NGO staff. 
 
As in Laskana, beneficary contributions were collected in all villages according to the 
household’s ability to pay, with some households contributing substantially higher 
amounts; in Tatijhagda one household paid almost 50% of the total collected amount 
(Rs. 50,000). In each case the total collections exceeded the 10% of the project cost 
that the user group was required to contribute293, and the excess was retained as a 
maintenance fund by the VWSC. The VWSC hired an operator – to run the pump and 
release water at two fixed times during the day, for 1-2 hours – but in two villages the 
Panchayat paid half the salary. The electricity connection to the pump house was also 
in the name of the Panchayat; interviewees in Laskana and Vadadla explained that this 
arrangement was to avail of the reduced rates for electricity allowed to Panchayats 
under a State program (Jyotir Gram Yojana) (VWSC member, Laskana; Panchayat 
member, Vadadla). Another explanation was also provided in Vadadla:  
 
“If in VWSC name, we have to pay, but if in Panchayat name it is free…that is, the 
bill is passed on to the GWSSB, who pays – or rather, does not pay, they owe crores294 
to the Water Resources Department and the Gujarat Electricity Board!” (Panchayat 
member, Vadadla). 
 
The process through which the new projects were developed in the villages is shown 
diagrammatically in Figure. 4.4. As is visible, it closely adheres to the organizational 
arrangements and formal procedures as set out by WASMO. However, the crucial 
element of community organizing and involvement that is a core principle in the  
                                                 
293 Users are required to contribute 10% of the project cost, for projects designed to supply water at 40 
lpcd; for additional capacity, upto 55lpcd, users are required to meet 20% of the project cost. Projects in 
these villages were designed at 60 lpcd, taking into account drinking water requirements for cattle, and 
the water requirement norms set by the Gujarat government, but the users still paid only 10% of the 
cost. The balance was paid by the Gujarat government (CEO, WASMO) 
294 A crore is ten million. 
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Figure 4.4:  Observed Institutional Architecture for Implementation of Sector 
Reform projects in Gujarat 
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program is abbreviated substantially. The formation of the VWSC in the villages was 
a priori; the program was introduced to the village residents afterwards. In three of the 
study villages, the VWSCs were formed by the Panchayats on advice from a GWSSB 
officer; in Ladvi, village elders learnt of the program from its implementation in 
another village. The guidelines suggest that after receiving information about the 
program, community members and users would be asked to discuss, organize 
themselves into a group and initiate the process along with the respective Panchayats; 
this process was almost completely bypassed. The projects were initiated by the 
Panchayat, and handled by the VWSC like a Panchayat project. While this facilitated 
the implementation process and provided benefits like the cheaper rates for electricity, 
the emphasis on ‘generating demand’, ‘enabling the community’ and ‘empowering’ 
them to meet their water needs was clearly missing.  A large part of the decision-
making also remained centered in the GWSSB, with technical staff deciding the 
design, location and other details, though with the agreement of the VWSC and/ or 
other eminent people in the village. As the AAE explained – 
 
“…Yes…the involvement of beneficiaries could not be done as required…it takes a 
lot of working with the village people….educating them, explaining the main ideas of 
the program….we’re not social engineers, first we are civil engineers….When this 
project started, GWSSB got the GJTI  to train the deputed staff in participatory 
methods, participatory planning, demand-driven approach etc….training was for the 
technical staff, also NGOs who were associated, but we were not used to that 
approach ….now we only give technical help and suggest options but do the planning 
with people.” (AAE, Surat DPMU) 
  
In sum, the mandated changes in the pre-reform structure were visible in the 
implementation of the projects in the study villages, but some of the softer and more 
important elements were missing. How effective these reformed arrangements were in 
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meeting the local water needs, and to what extent were the processes participatory, I 
discuss in the next section. 
2.5. SECTOR REFORMS IN GUJARAT: EFFICACY, EFFECTIVENESS AND 
PARTICIPATION 
 
The shifts from the State-centered governance system of water provision in Gujarat 
are striking, both in the extensive reforms that were actually instituted, and the 
transformations that took place in practice at the local level (Figure. 4.4). The State 
was not the sole actor in the pre-liberalized governance conFigureuration even before 
reform, as Panchayats had traditionally had and continued to have a substantial role. 
The reformed structure that was instituted for implementation of the SR-Swajaldhara 
Program was substantially liberalized, by creating a separate parastatal (WASMO) 
with a greater degree of autonomy than the GWSSB had, and, more starkly, in the 
involvement of user-groups that was enabled. Equally striking is the extent to which  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.5:  Shifts in the distribution of functions from State provision to 
liberalized (SR-Swajaldhara) governance systems in Gujarat, 
derived using the Devolution Score Sheet (Table 2.6) 
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the envisaged role of community groups (and users) is actually taken over by the 
VWSC of the Panchayat. In effect, liberalization has resulted in devolution, following 
and amplifying, the existing pattern of Panchayat activity in water provision. 
 
Despite this unintended ‘roll-back’, the implementation of the four projects through 
the reformed arrangements has made a substantial difference to the availability of 
water in the study villages. Three villages already had a piped water system, and all 
four had public standposts and handpumps for households not connected to the 
system. These had been installed either by the GWSSB or the respective Panchayats 
over the years. However, even calculated on the basis of installed capacity, average 
water availability was close to the minimum norm of 50 lpcd (fixed by the GoG) in all 
four villages as seen in Table 4.3 and Figure. 4.6. Community members reported that 
water actually received from these installed systems was far less, because of leakages 
and inadequate maintenance. Leakages from the distribution networks in the very old 
system in Ladvi and even the more recent one in Tatijhagda were not attended to, 
valves in standpost taps deteriorated very quickly and often water flow could not be 
turned off fully after use (fgd nos 8,9). In Tatijhagda the water flow in the supply 
borewell had reduced over the years, as had discharge from the handpumps.  Water 
from installed systems had to be therefore augmented from other unprotected sources 
such as wells, ponds, irrigation borewells and even a nearby checkdam on an irrigation 
canal. Quality of water from installed systems was also poor, with high TDS in all 
villages, contamination from rusting pipes in Laskana and muddy water yielded by the 
old borewell in Ladvi. 
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The new systems installed through the SR program therefore were a boon to all four 
villages, in almost every respect, as can be seen in Table 4.1 and Figure. 4.6. Water 
availability increased to much above the necessary minimum in all except Laskana, 
and even in the latter, the quantity of safe water available doubled, to above the 
minimum specified by the GoI. Water quality also improved, for in addition to the 
 
Table 4.3 
Change in water situation in study villages after SRP water project in Gujarat 
Laskana Ladvi Tatijhagda Vadadla Gujarat SR 
Before After Before After Before After Before After Before After 
Per Capita Average 41.4 60.7 44.0 113.2 67.5 139.4 44.2 110.9 49.3 106.0
Per Cap - HH Source 68.1 76.5 47.0 94.3 65.5 142.5 0.0 185.5 45.2 124.7
Per Cap - Pub. Source 7.7 13.9 15.0 44.5 22.2 45.9 20.1 41.5 16.2 36.4
Disparity  60.4 62.6 32.1 49.9 43.3 96.6 0.0 144.0 28.9 88.3
% Popn - HH Source 24.0 54.4 23.9 60.0 32.4 54.7 0.0 23.8 20.1 48.2
% HH < 50 m from Public Source 20.0 28.0 71.4 100.0 33.8 84.5 51.8 100.0 44.3 78.1
% HH - Unprotected Sources 56.0 17.6 4.6 0.0 33.8 0.0 48.2 0.0 48.2 4.4
Calculated from Panchayat records and SR project files 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.6:  Change in water situation after Sector Reform project in Gujarat 
study villages, from Table 4.3 
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measures taken in the new systems, the older systems were also repaired. For example, 
the old borewell with reduced flow in Ladvi was replaced and cracks in the existing 
elevated storage reservoir were repaired in Tatijhagda; the VWSC, once formed and 
energized by the construction of the new system, initiated overhaul and repair of older 
installations. Reliability was also improved and duration of supply increased, but 
according to users, the most important improvement was that disruption of supply 
because of breakdowns was minimized. The new systems had not needed any repair 
since they were commissioned, except once in Laskana when the new pump broke 
down (reported in FDG no 4, Laskana). 
 
Was the reformed process more participatory, and to what extent did it enable women 
to be involved? As mentioned in the previous section, the process of community 
organizing and participatory planning was very abbreviated, if not totally bypassed. 
The Panchayat formed the VWSC without prior discussion in the community, and 
members were nominated (not elected) in all villages. Once formed, however, the 
VWSC was involved in the process to a great extent. It emerged that though they did 
not take many of the key decisions about the new project, they were aware and 
agreeable. There was also little consultation or deliberation with the actual users; most 
users were involved only to the extent of paying the beneficiary contribution. They 
were all, however, aware that the new system had been developed under the SR 
program, though many did not know details of the actual process. 
 
The involvement of women was, however, noticeable by its absence, as can be seen in 
Figure 4.6 below. The VWSCs in all four study villages had at least two women 
members, of whom one belonged to a Scheduled Caste or Tribe in all villages except 
in Laskana.. Their membership, however, remained largely a formality. Though five 
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of the eight women VWSC members interviewed in the four villages had ever 
attended a meeting; only one had attended more than once; of the 54 opportunities that 
were available across the four villages, between them they had utilized only six. All 
except one said they went to attend a meeting out of curiosity – “to see what 
happened” – and none of them joined in the discussion. Two of them, one in Ladvi 
and the other in Vadadla, were however fully aware of the different stages and details 
of the implementation process, though like the others, they did not participate in 
deliberations or undertake any activity. All knew about the project almost from its 
inception, as did the other women users who were interviewed. The latter also reported 
non-participation in the project activities, though all had known of the new projects 
soon after its inception.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.7:  Women’s participation in the development process for the Sector 
Reform Project in Gujarat, from interviews and Panchayat records) 
 
Of the thirteen women elected representatives interviewed, eight were from the better-
off families in the village, educated at least till class 12 and wives of members of the 
Panchayat or the Gram Samooh. Almost all admitted to reading or scanning the 
minutes when the register was brought home for their signature. The two dalit (Halpati 
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caste) interviewees reported being asked to visit the Panchayat office, or on occasion 
the President’s house, to affix their thumb-prints, and on the former occasions, asking 
for information about the project and the decisions taken. This clearly indicated their 
interest in the process, so why did they not participate more actively? Most of the 
interviewees smiled; from one familiar with the local culture, it was almost a 
redundant question. “What do we know of such things, the men do it…”, “ I don’t 
know when they meet…”, “I have all the housework to finish, how can I go…”, were 
most often the reasons given. The one member in Ladvi who attended two meetings 
said “I went twice, but it was so embarrassing to be the only woman present…in any 
case, the discussion was all technical, I didn’t say anything…”. The Harijan woman 
member in Ladvi had another reason – meetings were often held in the President or 
Secretary’s house, which was generally out-of-bounds for people of her caste. 
 
This pattern of non-participation stands in stark contrast to the active involvement of 
the male members (see Figure. 4.6), and is surprising in view of the literacy and 
awareness levels, and the greater freedom of movement enjoyed by women of the 
area. Discussions revealed that the customary boundaries and prohibitions on 
intermingling and movement in public spaces had eroded, but very selectively. 
Customary practices had changed for social occasions such as weddings or other 
celebrations and during festivals, but not in the arena of public or community affairs. 
Panchayat or other government offices, and processes centered in them remained 
largely male bastions, and only women without an adult male relative dealt with 
‘official’ matters themselves. Village governance was even more completely the 
prerogative of males, and most often, of males of the upper caste and better-off 
families. The Village Samooh that had a stronger developmental presence than even 
the Panchayat included no female members, like the Committees formed to manage 
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the Reverse Osmosis plants in two villages.  
 
Despite their limited involvement, however, both men and women users in all villages 
expressed their satisfaction with the new program in the focus group discussions. This 
was echoed in a number of interviews (users in Laskana, Vadadla, Tatijhagda), with 
interviewees emphasizing one crucial difference made by the SR; the short time taken 
for implementation of the project. GWSSB installations of piped water systems never 
took less than two years, about 3-5 years being typical; all SRP projects were 
completed in less than a year. Also, there was no need for the continual requests and 
persuasion to GWSSB that was normally required – if there was need, and a proposal 
could be quickly formulated by the VWSC according to program guidelines, funds 
were readily allocated. Another gain was in the quality of construction; even GWSSB 
staff agreed that it was remarkably better than in their own projects. The VWSC hired 
the contractor and supervised the work; presence of the members and other future 
users in the village itself meant that there was continuous monitoring of the 
construction activities. Also, the AAE pointed out that,  
 
“….residents were very quality-conscious, and watchful of the quality of materials 
and design..… they sometimes get architects advice on tank design, or for nice 
pumphouses, often insisted on better quality materials than was possible under the 
government-sanctioned rates…they were willing to pay the difference…”(AAE, 
DPMU Surat) 
 
The head of Aadesh Charitable Trust, the NGO which had been involved in three of 
the study villages, summed up the situation thus –  
 
‘People are surprised…..very happy because full village is covered. Surprised at the 
system evolved….they were very skeptical at first, refused to believe, poked fun at the 
GWSSB staff, our [NGOs] staff etc….but now they are impressed and happy. Many 
reasons…it is a very quick process, GWSSB projects take years, also it is fully a piped 
water supply scheme…no one wants handpumps now. The work is also good… it is 
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‘good’ primarily because of high awareness, also media is watching…in Gujarat, even 
in the villages people value quality…for example, in Ankhroli [a nearby village], only 
the pipeline was constructed from existing tank, only three lakhs [Rs 300,000] 
estimate, but one NRI party was very quality-conscious, paid one lakh [Rs 100,000] 
extra just for Finolex [a premium brand] pipes…” (CEO, Aadesh Trust) 
 
In sum, though the users were not involved in the decision-processes, the program was 
effective in Gujarat and all were very satisfied. Is the SR program equally effective in 
Madhya Pradesh and in Kerala? Are users as satisfied? Do the different socio-
economic and cultural contexts make any difference, and in what ways? In the next 
two sections, I set out the cases of Kerala and Madhya Pradesh respectively, to find 
answers to these questions. 
 
 
3. SECTOR REFORMS IN KERALA: KWA, SLSC AND BENEFICIARY 
GROUPS 
 
Drinking water had historically been self-provided in Kerala, primarily from 
household wells. For those without, natural ponds and community-created common 
wells were the norm, till falling levels of groundwater and increasing pollution made 
these sources unavailable or unsafe. Since the sixties, the State government began to 
take increasing responsibility for water provision and did so till the reforms of the 
nineties. The State’s Public Health Engineering Department (PHED) was the main 
provider till 1984, when the primary responsibilities were transferred to the Kerala 
Water Authority (henceforth, KWA), a parastatal organization constituted under State 
law. With the institution of the the Kerala Water Supply and Sewerage Act, 1986, all 
functions relating to the provision of domestic water were fully vested with the 
Authority; among others,  
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“Preparation, execution, promotion, operation, maintenance and financing of the schemes 
for the supply of water…Rendering all necessary services in regard to water 
supply….Preparation of State plans….Fixation and revision of tariffs, taxes and charges of 
water supply and maintenance services…Establishment of state [sic] standards…” (The 
Kerala Water Supply and Sewerage Act, 1986, quoted in Government of Kerala, 2002) 
With this Act, the locus of water provision shifted away from private, community and 
local government efforts, and the KWA became almost the sole institution developing 
and managing systems for domestic water provision in the State. In this section I 
discuss the efforts of KWA, the issues faced by the organization and the institutional 
framework for water provision before Sector Reforms were introduced. In the 
following sections, the processes and structures developed in Kerala for the 
implementation of the SR-Swajaldhara program, and their operation as observed in 
selected study villages is discussed.  
 
3.1. PRE-REFORM INSTITUTIONAL ARCHITECTURE IN KERALA  
 
Households, communities and local governments in Kerala had typically constructed 
small spot sources like wells and ponds for domestic water supply. The KWA, 
however, focused predominantly on large-scale, piped-water supply projects, often 
covering more than one hamlet or panchayat area. This was a very expensive approach 
in a State where despite an overall high density of population, in large parts of the 
State neighbourhoods were scattered or houses located on homestead land at some 
distance from each other. For those not covered by the piped systems – and these were 
the majority of households, for the large systems had long gestation periods and 
coverage was very limited – the KWA installed public handpumps and standposts.   
 
A picture of the historical trajectory, structure, functioning and current issues of the 
KWA emerges from a 2002 Government of Kerala (henceforth, GoK) review of the 
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organization (GoK 2002) and other recent evaluatory studies295, as also from the 
interviews with senior State government officers (see Annexure V). Since its 
inception, the KWA has held responsibility for piped water provision for both rural 
and urban areas, and over the years has constructed and maintains 607 multi-
panchayat and 1093 single-panchayat water supply schemes296. All programs of the 
GoI, including the AWRSP, are implemented by the KWA. Project and establishment 
costs have been funded by budget allocations of the GoK every year (both capital and 
revenue grants), program funds from the GoI, loans from the GoK, GoI and large 
public-sector corporations, and both grants and loans from international donors297.  
 
The organization functions under the overall supervision of a Board comprising of the 
heads of the State departments of water supply, finance, local administration and rural 
development, among others, two members representing the local governments, and 
technical and accounts members. The organizational structure is typical of 
infrastructure parastatals in the country, with a series of hierarchically ordered offices, 
and a core staff of technical personnel, primarily engineers298. The lowest tiers – the 
subdivision and section offices – manned by Assistant Executive and Additional 
Assistant Executive Engineers respectively, are the field offices that deal directly with 
users, community groups and local governments. 
 
 
                                                 
295 Including “Technical Assistance to Govt. of Kerala for Developing a Sector Vision for the Drinking 
Water & Sanitation Sector : An Assessment of the Current Status and Future of Kerala Water Authority 
(KWA)” by CRISIL and the “Water and Sanitation: Sector Status Report” by the Socio-Economic Unit 
Foundation, both funded by the World Bank’s Water and Sanitation Program for South Asia (WSP-SA) 
296 Kerala has 999 GPs, and some have more than one scheme. Even those Panchayats which do have 
piped systems may or not be fully covered.  
297 Including the Life Insurance Corporation (LIC) and Housing and Urban Development Corporation 
(HUDCO), and donors like the World Bank (WB), Danida, Royal Netherlands Embassy (RNE) and 
Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC).  
298 For operational purposes, the State is divided in three regions – north, south and central – and further 
into 10 circles, 42 divisions, 127 subdivisions and 298 section offices, headed by the Superintending, 
Chief, Executive, Assistant Executive and Additional Assistant Executive Engineers respectively. 
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Figure 4.8:  Institutional architecture for water provision by the State in Kerala 
prior to the introduction of sector reforms. 
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Need is assessed and proposals are developed by the appropriate field office 
depending on the size and coverage, vetted and sanctioned by officers in the higher 
tiers and implemented by the proposing office with the help of local area office – 
typically, the Division - through contractors; again, a process that closely mirrors that 
in parallel organizations in other States. After the local government reforms in 1995 
and the introduction of participatory planning, Gram Panchayats became responsible  
for identifying need and planning for water supply projects, and monitoring the 
construction processes, but the actual construction process continued to remain in the 
purview of the KWA. This was only in the case of projects funded from Panchayat 
resources (allocated by the State government); in other State government programs 
and the ARWSP, the entire planning, budgeting and implementation remained with the 
KWA. The institutional architecture for water provision that existed in Kerala at the 
time when the SR program was introduced in 1999 is depicted in Figure 4.8.  
 
3.2. WATER PROVISION BY THE KWA: TRAJECTORY AND ISSUES 
 
Nine years after KWA started functioning, a survey by the GoI revealed that almost 
one-fourth of the habitations in Kerala remained without access to the 40 lpcd of safe 
water from protected sources that was its responsibility to provide. Reportedly, the 
reality was far worse, with wells considered safe running dry for months or affected by 
pollution, handpumps set in inappropriate locations and groundwater levels falling 
(Officer, State Bureau of Economics and Statistics). Like its counterparts in other 
States, the organization was increasingly becoming ineffective and unsustainable299 
                                                 
299 In addition to projects being supply driven and often over-designed, internal inefficiencies led almost 
inevitably to escalation of project costs. Planned projects had to be shelved because of lack of funds or 
proper implementation, leaving a huge inventory of procured materials unused. Losses on account of 
very low tariffs, number of unauthorized connections, distribution inefficiencies and faulty metering, 
among other reasons, left inadequate resources for servicing loans. Overstaffing and corruption were 
other issues. (Secretary, SPB; State Coordinator WB-WSP). 
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and a Sector Status Report (2005) states that 
 
“ …..on account of various internal and external reasons, the institution and 
investments have become unsustainable. The systems are typically supply driven, 
at times over designed, high UAF, and poor cost recovery. The impact of the 
model was: (i) drinking water provision, which was mostly self financing was 
brought under heavily subsidized governmental provision, with the people made 
increasingly dependent (ii) investments made over the years [in wells, ponds etc.] 
were rendered at least partially infructuous and (iii) increasing cost of service 
delivery and disregard for cost of capital [public funds]. ….De jure, KWA is an 
autonomous institution, but de facto it depends on GoK for most of the critical 
decisions…..for carrying out of most of its functions and execution of the above 
powers, the Authority has to take prior approval of GoK, which for all practical 
purposes renders its autonomy ineffective.” (SEUF 2005:50) 
 
Till 1991, tariffs were collected from users by the local governments, who in turn were 
billed by the KWA for the maintenance cost of installations. After 1991, however, 
KWA was empowered to collect water charges directly from consumers, and from the 
urban local governments for public taps and handpumps installed and maintained by 
KWA300 within their jurisdiction. But tariff revisions had to be approved by the GoK, 
and despite the 1991 order that specified an annual increase of 15% in subsequent 
years, tariffs have not been revised since 1999. At the user’s end, the long gestation 
period of projects led to inadequate supply as in the meantime populations outgrew 
designed capacities or source condition changed301, installations were inadequate, 
inappropriately placed or ill maintained.  
 
Country-wide discourses on decentralization and user involvement as the panacea to 
this situation underpinned the devolution of water provision responsibilities to 
Panchayats in the local government reforms after 1995. However, the existing 
                                                 
300 Volumetric rates were fixed by assuming 8 hours of supply from taps in rural areas and 12 hours in 
urban areas, at Rs 1 per kilolitre in 1991, and have subsequently been revised only once, in 1999.  
301 Rivers running dry, groundwater falling – CEED interview 
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structure has proved too resistant to change302, and as discussed in chapter III (Section 
3), the KWA continued to be the main implementer for all projects303.   
 
3.3. SECTOR REFORM AND SWAJALDHARA IN KERALA 
 
When the Sector Reform pilot project was introduced by the DDWS in 1999, there 
was already recognition of the need for community involvement in local service 
provision among many senior officers of the State304. Panchayat reforms and the 
(State-led) shift to a participatory planning process in 1995 had initiated a paradigm 
shift in local governance. Historically domestic water had been self-provided, and in 
the face of increasing scarcity, community initiatives had emerged in some places and 
attracted wide attention, such as in Olavanna305. Organizations were being promoted 
by the GoI and international donors to replicate and institutionalize the community-
based models - the World Bank supported Jalanidhi306, RNE supported district 
programmes (Alleppy and Idukki)307 and the GoI supported Giridhara Scheme308 
implemented by the Socio-Economic Unit Foundation (SEUF). 
 
                                                 
302 See discussion in section 3.3; by 2008, functionaries and funds of all service departments have been 
transferred to Panchayats, except water supply (Mishra 2008) 
303 With the PPC and institution of the local planning process, however, water provision has been a 
prime focus of Panchayats in their own budgets.and between 1997 and 2002, local governments 
constructed about 100,000 community wells and installed almost 50,000 street taps, together, 1,58, 119 
water supply points; since its inception, the KWA had installed about 1,75,000 street taps. It has a much 
higher number of individual connections – 8,33,391. (GoK, 2002) 
304 Though according to the Director, SEUF, not as much within the KWA (interview). 
305 Olavanna is a village in north Kerala, where a community developed and run a water system. 
306 ‘Jalanidhi’, or the Kerala Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Agency is a GoK program to trigger the 
alternate demand driven delivery model. Supported by an IDA line of credit from the World Bank, the 
project piloted a bottom up planning process through a quadrilateral partnership between community, 
NGO, GP and KRWSA, and is now scaling up the program across the State. 
307 SEUF CEO interview 
308 The scheme is supported by the Water Supply Program –South Asia, of the WorlsBank, and involves 
reviving and repairing existing installations before handing them over to Panchayats or user groups. 
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Two districts of Kerala – Kasargode and Kollam – had been selected by the DDWS 
for implementation of the Sector Reform Pilot Project initiated in April 1999, but the 
program started in Kerala only in Jan 2001. The Irrigation and Water Supply 
department of the GoK set the detailed guidelines for its implementation in the State, 
including the project objectives, components, design and institutional structure (GoK 
2001).  In addition to the objectives of institutionalizing a demand-based approach to 
community water supply, the project had the specific objective of strengthening 
Panchayats (PRIs) through technical assistance and development of a management 
information system (MIS). A State-level Steering Committee (henceforth, SLSC), 
chaired by the Secretary of the Irrigation and Water Supply Department was 
constituted, to set the policy environment for the project, provide overall guidance, 
form rules for selection and remuneration of program staff and monitor progress.309 
The WSP-SA representative in Kerala was named State Coordinator for SRP. The 
World Bank’s Water Supply Program – South Asia (WSP-SA) representative in 
Kerala was named State Coordinator for SRP. 
 
The GoK Guidelines emphasize310 that the institutional structure “[was] worked out 
within the broader framework of the Panchayati Raj Institutions…on the premise that 
constitutional bodies will have longer-term sustainability than those by virtual 
organizations”. Named a ‘People On Top’ model,  
 
 
 
                                                 
309 The SLSC members included the Secretaries of the departments of Finance Resources and Local 
Self Government (Rural), Managing Director of KWA, the Executive Director of KRWSSA, and the 
Panchayat President, Panchayat Secretary and Collector of the implementing districts. Representatives 
of the RGNRWM (GoI), the World Bank’s Water Supply Program in South Asia (WSP-SA) and one 
NGO were also members, and an expert advisor for Sector Reforms and the President of one of the GPs 
in which the project was implemented could be co-opted. (GoK 2001) 
310 The primacy of people’s participation in the program is repeated in various ways throughout the 
document…. 
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“[T]he institutional design [is] a partnership between the following entities: 
i. Beneficiary Groups acting through a Beneficiary Committee 
ii. Grama Panchayats 
iii. Service Agencies 
iv. The District Panchayat acting through the Project Support Unit 
v. The Steering Committee. 
 The Beneficiary group [shall be] vested with the most important responsibilities of 
planning, designing, constructing, operating and managing rural water supply and 
sanitation facilities … contribute their share of capital investment and levy and collect 
water charges …. Existing participatory mechanisms like NHGs [Neighborhood 
Groups] and Grama Sabhas will be fully involved.” (GoK 2001:16) 
 
The Grama Panchayats were to coordinate the project activities of the Beneficiary 
Groups (BGs), facilitate clearances from State line departments and contribute 10% of 
the capital cost. Service Agencies would be contracted to support the GPs and BGs in 
social, engineering, hydro-geological and other aspects; they could be individual 
experts, consortium of experts, institutions or NGOs. The District Panchayat was to 
take the lead in facilitating implementation of the project, receive the funds directly 
from the GoI and transfer it to the BGs through the GPs. It was to house a Project 
Support Unit, chaired by the District Panchayat President and staffed with a 
multidisciplinary team of experts311, to manage project implementation. The District 
Collector, who chaired the District Level Expert Committee (DLEC), would also 
coordinate project Implementation (GoK 2001). The structure and tasks set out for 
various actors under SR, and later Swajaldhara, are shown in Figure 4.9.  
 
The GoK SR Guidelines emphasize the primacy and autonomy of the Beneficiary 
Groups, which are legal associations of all user families of a water supply system, in 
taking all decisions related to the design, implementation and management of the 
                                                 
311 The staff  were to be consultants, in the areas of Public Health Engineering, Community 
Development, Human Resource Development and Financial Management; as far as possible, from 
among the senior staff of the KWA, GoK or other public sector organizations. Three engineers, one IEC 
specialist, one Chartered Accountant and an MIS specialist were also to be hired, from the GoK, public 
sector, academic institutions or the open market. In addition, short-term consultants could be appointed, 
and eight supporting staff. 
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installations. A model byelaw specifying the constitution, membership rules and 
election of an executive Beneficiary Committee was developed by the SLSC. Two 
adult representatives from each household, one a woman, constituted the Beneficiary 
Group, who would elect an executive Beneficiary Committee from among themselves. 
50% of the members of the BC were to be women, and atleast one-fifth from dalit 
families. Three members of the BC were to be trained as Master Volunteers, in social, 
engineering and financial management aspects respectively, to “act as functional 
leaders in the social mobilization, engineering construction, operation maintenance 
and judicious management of finance and accounts.” (GoK 2001:19) The SLSC also 
decided to place Grama Panchayat Volunteer Resource Teams (GVRTs) in the Village 
Panchayats where the pilots were to be implemented, instead of the support agencies 
(SAs) suggested in the Guidelines. With two engineers, two community mobilizers 
and one accountant, the GVRT was to assist the beneficiary groups to organize and 
establish the association, form the BC, develop the proposal and execute the project. 
 
When the Swajaldhara program started in Kerala (on April 1st 2004) the structure was 
changed to follow the design set out by the DDWS.  The State Water and Sanitation 
Mission was constituted according to the program, with an Apex and Executive 
Committee to oversee the program in the State. The KWA was made the State nodal 
agency for the program, and DWSMs constituted as District Implementing Agencies, 
with a DWSC as executive. In a move that brought control back to the State 
government, the District Collector was named as Chair of the DWSM, despite the 
clear DDWS injunction that DWSMs should be under the District Panchayat if they 
were active – which they definitely were in Kerala312.  The Executive Engineer of 
                                                 
312 This structure of the DWSM as District Implementing Agency for the state was approved by the 
Government of India for Kerala, as a special case. (SEUF 2005:56) 
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KWA was Secretary of the DWSM. The DWSC was the executive to receive and 
allocate funds from the GoI, and give administrative and technical sanction to BG 
proposals, organizing which was to be the responsibility of VWSCs of the GPs. In 11 
non-SRP districts the program was to be implemented in selected Panchayats 
(Swajaldhara I) by the KWA working with the VWSCs of the GPs. In the two SR pilot 
districts, the PSU remained in place to extend the program to all Panchayats in the 
district (Swajaldhara II), and the PSU team leaders were included as members of the 
DWSM and DWSC. A monitoring cell was constituted in KWA headquarters with 
Deputy Chief Engineer, Projects & Monitoring Unit, as coordinator. 
 
This structure was designed by the State, and set in place with the roles of the different 
organizational actors specified in detail. Of the three States, Kerala has the most 
extensive and detailed Guidelines for implementation of the program in the State313, in 
which the unequivocal supremacy of the BG is reiterated in many sections. That it is 
“their own system” and users had to plan, construct, own, operate and maintain it – 
“we [sic] only pay most of the capital cost and help them with the technical part” – 
was also a remark made by many interviewees in the PSU and GVRT. How the design 
worked, the emergent processes at the local level, and whether this view of the 
respective roles of the government and the BGs was reflected in the actual functioning 
of the reform structure, was studied by examining the implementation of the program 
in five locations in Kollam district. This is discussed in the next section.  
 
 
                                                 
313 In Gujarat, there was no such document; the Guidelines published by the DDWS were re-issued by 
the GoG (WASMO 2004) with the addition of an introductory letter from the Minister and Secretary of 
Water Resources, in Gujarati (the local language). The only documents which describe the State-
specific structure and processes were the Annual Reports of WASMO, from which the State-specific 
design variations from the GoI framework could be read. In MP there was no document from which the 
State-specified arrangements could be read, except the GO authorizing the formation of a PSU within 
the PHED.  
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Figure 4.9:  Reformed Institutional Structure for the Sector Reforms -
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3.4. SECTOR REFORM-SWAJALDHARA IN KERALA: GVRT AND BENEFICIARY 
COMMITTEES 
 
By 31st March 2004, 315 of the 430 water supply projects proposed by BGs in Kollam 
and Kasargode districts had been completed under the SRP, and the rest were carried 
forward under Swajaldhara II (GoK 2004). As the program was transmuted to 
Swajaldhara, however, progress slowed; in the year after it was introduced, more than 
600 projects were proposed under Swajaldhara I and II across the State, but only 7 
completed and many were to be cancelled. Apparently, the SWSM constituted was 
weak and ineffectual, had not been given a strong mandate, a budget head and staff to 
enable it to function effectively (SEUF 2005:11; interview with SEUF CEO).  
 
To understand the functioning of the reformed institutional set-up, implementation of 
the SRP and Swajaldhara was studied in Kollam district, where the reforms were first 
introduced. The Sector Reform pilot began in Kerala in 2001, but it was not until 2002 
that the organizational arrangements were in place in Kollam. Of the two pilot 
districts, the program had an earlier start and made better progress in Kasargode; in 
Kollam the PSU and GVRT did not start functioning smoothly till the leadership of 
the ZP and the PSU both changed – the ZP President’s term was completed and a new 
President from the opposing party314 took over, and the first Team leaders was 
replaced (SLSC minutes, Consultant PSU). But by mid-2003, the initial problems due 
to weak leadership, confused reporting relationships and turf conflicts between the 
existing Panchayat bureaucracy and the PSU had been resolved315, and 29 projects 
                                                 
314 Since neither of the two political parties – the Left Democratic Front (LDF) and the United 
Democratic Front (UDF) had a clear majority in the District Panchayat, they had agreed that the five 
year term would be split between Presidents from each party in turn. The UDF President had just 
stepped down and the LDF President had taken over in 2003. 
315 These problems, decisions made by the SLSC for their resolution and actions taken are recorded in 
the minutes of the meetings held by the SLSC.  
 
 
 
 
302
were either completed or underway, in 26 GPs in Kollam (PSU records). The PSU and 
GVRT were fully staffed when this research was being done in 2005-2006 and 
according to them, had been adequately resourced in terms of a budget, office space, 
equipment, stationery and computers  for more than two years (as observed, and from 
Team Leader, PSU). 
 
To understand program implementation at the local level, three projects initiated in 
late 2003 – in the Nilamootil, Mayiladumkunnu and Pulari hamlets – were studied, 
and a fourth at Ambalakonam, which was just being completed. Nilamootil and 
Ambalakonam were in the Aanchal panchayat, Mayilladumkunnu in Yeroor and Pulari 
in Thevalakkara, and the Aanchal GVRT served all these projects. The process was 
retraced through interviews with elected officials of the DP and GP, staff of the PSU 
and GVRT, and members of the BG and BC, documents of the PSU, GVRT and BG 
and observation of their functioning (see Annexure V). The project document in all 
four cases is impressive in comparison to the Gujarat project files, with comprehensive 
details about the user families and the BG as a whole – including the process of 
organizing the latter – and the actual water supply system316. Of these, information 
relevant to this discussion is presented in Table 4.4 below, and additional details 
provided in Annexure III. One of the most striking dimensions is the number of 
community-based organizations existing in the project areas, with women actively 
involved in all. 
 
According to GVRT staff, the district PSU, the Grama Panchayat or the GVRT 
introduced the program through awareness programs, but users in the study projects 
                                                 
316 Discussions with GVRT staff and BC members confirmed that information about the user 
households had been collected through an independent survey by the GVRT staff and verified by 
presenting results at a BG meeting, and the water supply system had been constructed as per the 
technical details in the project document which incorporated changes in design and/or costs. 
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reported that seminars and discussions were held after they requested information 
from the GP. They first heard of the program from other sources:  
 
[The] Ward member came and told us…..we went to meet the Panchayat President and the 
Panchayat members.…… and requested them to give information, then panchayat 
arranged seminar.  In the seminar water scarce areas [were] identified. After the seminar, 
at ward level kind of meeting….they found out cluster and from there they form[ed] the 
group. That is the process….From the seminar we came to know… (fdg, Pulleri)  
 
“[We]…..come to know that there is a project established in the nearby area, 
Orunadabhagathu, to solve the water problems.  So the people from here went to join but 
they couldn’t get chance to join there.  Therefore, the people of here [sic] plan to organize 
a project like the one and then sir [indicating the GVRT member present] came and took a 
class.  Accordingly, as per the instruction, some people gathered and from them President, 
Secretary and Treasurer were elected. (President, Ambalakonam project, woman). 
 
Table 4.4 
Composition of BG households, pre-project access to water and the new water 
supply projects in Kerala 
Compiled from project files. 
 
At the organizational level, the Aanchal GVRT arranged discussions with ward 
members and local residents, to understand the patterns of water availability in their 
areas and the extent of need. A list that prioritized areas of most acute need was 
developed in a joint meeting of the GVRT, GP, IP, DP and well-known social 
workers.  
Project area Beneficiary Group Pre-project sources (% hh 
dependant) 
New Supply System 
No.of 
hhs 
Av hh 
size 
% hh 
BPL 
 
CBO  
involvmt 
%  hh 
Own 
well 
Other
s well 
Public 
source 
Srce dist 
( % hh > 
50m) 
Tank 
cap 
(liters) 
Per hh 
pipe 
length 
Dur of 
supply 
Neelamoottil  71 5 40 87 50 42 8 25% 15,000 79 m  
Mayiladum-
kunnu 
85 5 27  22 68 31 1 67% 12,500 52.5 m  
Pullari  130 5 62  45  7 15  74  80%  20,000 51 m 3-4 hrs 
Ambalakonam 45  42 68 18    10,000 47 m 2 hrs 
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All project areas were among those with high priority and except Pulleri, were spread 
over highly undulating terrain, in drought-prone areas where most wells are seasonal. 
For half the year, residents depended on the few perennial wells in some households or 
on ponds in the valley. During the dry months, almost three-fourth of the households 
had to carry water uphill from sources more than 100 m away. Water quality in both 
wells and ponds was also a problem, with high iron content or polluted by manure pits 
and fertilizers used in the paddy fields surrounding them. Pullari is located in the 
plains adjacent to the brackish backwaters of the Ashtamudi lake, and was equally 
water-starved. In this area, few people had wells; and most people fetched water from 
public standposts in the adjoining ward, walking the 150-odd meters.  
 
Interviewees agreed that the BG was quickly formed, in 2-3 meetings organized by the 
GVRT staff. In most cases, those who initiated the efforts mobilized other residents 
and anchored the process –  
 
We went around to all houses to tell them about it…there was water scarcity so many 
wanted to join….in the first meeting there were only 20 people so we called the second 
meeting where we had quite a few people, around 60-75. We collected Rs 24 as 
membership fee….They elected the BC – I was the President – and then all the work was 
done by us….Sir [the GVRT mobilizer] brought the papers, byelaws, registration form, 
everything…ofcourse the engineers came for finding the place and doing the drawings, 
but we did the tender, we supervised…we had to collect the money [beneficiary 
contribution] from everyone before that….first we collected 1000 Rs from all members, 
then we did the estimate and collected 500 Rs again…(President, Mayiladumkunnu BG) 
 
Two representatives of each household – one male and one female – were members of 
the BG in all projects.  Three to five of the 11 members of the BC were women317, 
with the highest number (5) in Ambalakonam. Women were also elected as Presidents 
and other officer-holders, except in Pulleri.  
                                                 
317 Half of the members are required to be women, by the model byelaws adopted by both BGs. 
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All the projects are designed to provide piped water to all households from a raised 
reservoir placed at the highest point in the area, to which water is pumped from an 
open well located in the valley below. Perennial sources were found, as expected, in 
the valley area, and the water is in some projects pumped up a height of more than 
40m to the storage reservoir so that all households get adequate pressure in their 
pipeline. Hydrologists from the Ground Water Board, requested by the GVRT, located 
sources in consultation with senior residents of the area, and estimated yield. (FDG - 
Neelamootil, GVRT engineer). The BG purchased the land on which the source was 
located and the elevated reservoir had to be constructed.  
 
All households contributed equally to the 10% of the capital cost as was required in 
the program – approximately Rs.1500 initially. A contribution, the amount to be 
decided by the BG at the time, would be asked of families moving into the locality in 
future. In Pulleri and Neelamootil, those unable to pay in cash contributed in labor for 
the construction. All BGs employ a pump operator to run the system; he is paid by a 
monthly water charge (ranging from Rs.20 to Rs.35) levied by the BG on member 
households, which he collects. The agreement is that when major repairs are required, 
members would contribute equally towards the cost. 
 
In all projects, the BG met about once a week during the construction process, for the 
BC to report progress and place issues for decision by the assembly, though after the 
system was operational, meetings were generally held once a month. A specific date 
was fixed for monthly meetings, and though attendance was thinner, the Secretary still 
maintains systematic records of attendance and discussion at the meetings in a 
“Minute Book”. Documentation is extensive in all BGs; in addition to the minutes, 
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accounts were maintained by the Treasurer, and a log book for pump operations and 
receipt books for the monthly contributions by the pump operator, who also filled a 
maintenance register and a water charge collection register. Byelaws and manuals for 
the functioning of the BG – its constitution, O& M rules, monthly reporting formats 
and chlorination formats were provided by the GVRT. At the time of this research, 
three of the projects had completed more than two years, and elections to the BC had 
been held for the second time, but most of the original BCs were still in place. Users 
explained that “….they were doing good work…it would not have been good to 
change the committee in the middle of the construction…” (FDGs - Neelamootil, 
Mayilladumkunnu). 
 
Both BG members and GVRT staff reported that the latter provided necessary 
information, legal and technical support for the project; after the formation of the BG 
and election of BC, its major task was the preparation of the Detailed Scheme Report, 
which was placed before the BG for approval before being sent for technical sanction 
and funding to the PSU. The PSU presented the Reports from various projects for 
technical sanction by the DLTC (for SR projects) and the DWSM (for Swajaldhara 
projects). They also collated and sent progress reports and financial requirements of 
proposed projects in the district for DDWS approval and remittance of funds, through 
the DWSM in case of Swajaldhara projects. 
 
The institutional structure and processes for the implementation of the SR program as 
observed in the study projects is shown in Figure 4.10 below. The entire process 
closely reflected that envisaged in the DDWS Guidelines, and embodied in the 
institutional design, but a number of operational issues were discussed by BG and BC 
members. A common problem was water quality: it was muddy and salty in 
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Neelamootil and Mayiladumkunnu, but for different reasons. In the former, it was due 
to percolation through the weep-holes in the well wall during the rainy season, a 
construction feature insisted upon by the engineers. In the latter, silt from the bottom 
was inevitably pumped into the reservoir when water percolation into the well 
decreased in summer. Both projects also had very low yields from the water source, 
much below that estimated by the hydrologists, and a full day of pumping was 
required to refill the raised storage reservoir in the summer months.  
 
A less technical problem was the non-payment of monthly dues, particularly during 
the rainy season when private wells were full. Some others, without private wells, also 
stopped paying because they were getting “less water” (only once a day), and it was 
often discoloured. This was a contentious issue in Neelamootil, where, as the pump 
operator explained,  
 
The main thing is the capacity of the tank is 12,000 [liters] only.  They want water 
in the morning and evening.  We are not in a position to do so.  Because the well 
doesn’t recharge till the next day.  Yes it will not recharge during the summer 
season….means February to May end.  In June monsoon will come….and the red 
colour also comes during the rain….there is another source nearby, but no money 
for the new well…and electricity is a problem as the three-phase line is far… 
(Pump Operator, Neelamootil) 
 
Pulleri had a different issue – the frequent cuts in electricity supply. This meant that 
the pump operator could not have a fixed schedule, and had to wait for the times when 
it was possible to refill the reservoir, preventing him from other livelihood activities 
which augmented the small salary he earned as the operator. 
 
There were also allegations of financial irregularity and misappropriation of funds by 
the BC, from users in Neelamootil and Mayiladumkunnu:  
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Figure 3.3: Observed institutional architecture for implementation of Kerala Sector Reform 
program.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.10: Observed institutional architecture in Kerala Sector Reform Project 
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First they said, Rs.1000. When the pipes are about to arrive, then they started telling 
that they would require an additional Rs.500, even foundation [support pillars] have to 
be laid. They collected Rs.500. But when they came here last time, they said, Rs.400 
would be returned…. This has another catch as well. If we do not pay the water tax 
[Rs.25/month] three months consecutively, our water connection would be cut…..now 
[they] have given several new connections; has money been collected against that? 
Has it come to the Samiti? Have these 85 families [the BG members] come to know 
about it? If not, why? It was announced at the time of inauguration that without our 
permission, no new water connections would be provided….(BG member, 
Mayiladumkunnu) 
 
[T]hey started collecting 30 rupees per month from every one.  Now for three-four 
months they are not collecting the money. Therefore there is no entry [in the register].  
Actually they have the project eleven lakh and they have spent about 9 – 9.5 lakh 
rupees.   The balance money where it has gone nobody knows.  What they have done 
with it, whether it is deposited in the Bank or somebody has taken it, we do not know 
because it was managed by the private agency.  Government is giving money 90%, 
10% we have collected from all members, thousand five hundred rupees each.  And 
then the electricity charges and other operation is about two thousand rupees per 
month.  For that we are collecting Rs. 30 each from the family….. Actually the project 
is meant for 50 persons but they have taken 72 persons.  From 72 persons they have 
taken Rs. 1500 each that itself is a big amount…and now the electricity bill is reduced 
to 300-400 Rs [from @1400 earlier] (User and BG member, Neelamootil)318 
 
Committee members explained that accounts were complicated and could be updated 
and presented only at meetings after they were balanced, which gave rise to such 
questions. The flow of funds was unpredictable, not least because the government 
money only came in after the construction was well advanced:  
 
[T]hey [the ZP] gave 80% of the total only when we finished 80% of the work…I had 
to take loans…private loans…so that the work will not stop….when we got more 
money we repaid the loans, also the interest…so they think we are taking the extra 
money for ourselves…and in this project the estimate was revised, now it is Rs.2000 
for each member…” (President, Mayilladumkunnu)  
 
Also, the reduction in electricity bills only meant that outstanding dues were being 
paid off, such as pending repair bills, pump operators salary arrears, etc. Why was all 
this not explained at the BG meetings? The President said it was, but few members 
                                                 
318 The high electricity charges that BGs were paying in the first year had been reduced after the recent 
Kerala government’s notification that the rates for such projects would be the same as for domestic 
connections; previously, these projects were billed as commercial projects. 
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attended; also, many of the personal loan transactions were not entered in the 
accounts. Other BC members and users present during the interviews agreed that the 
accusations were baseless, though no one understood why the ZP was only remitting 
80% of the funds that had been approved.  
 
Discrepancies also stemmed from the difference in the estimated amounts and the 
actual costs of the project. Estimates contained in the Detailed Scheme Report, on 
which basis the GoI share was granted, were based on the PWD/ KWA rates as 
required by the rules. These rates were often substantially below the prevailing market 
rate. This issue had been discussed in a number of meetings of the SLSC, but the 
Committee took a long time to resolve that estimates could be based on rates 
published by the PSU, which would be consistent with local market rates. Till then, 
the solution that was developed was to keep the actual construction cost @ 80% of the 
estimated rate, and use the difference to adjust for market rates. This mechanism was 
devised in consultation with the GVRT staff, in fact, on their suggestion, but it 
complicated accounts and made them difficult to explain.  
 
This practice also had a perverse effect of making the projects unattractive for 
contractors, who under daily tight supervision of users, were unable to ‘make extra 
money’, as was almost de riguer for government projects. It also encouraged a 
practice of ‘false tendering’; that is, the same contractor quoted different prices by 
filling in tenders under various proxies. Even worse, GVRT members reported that in 
a couple of projects, those who won the contract had quoted a low price that was quite 
infeasible, and had stopped construction midway demanding a revision of the contract.  
 
Despite the complaints of financial irregularity, the same users agreed that the project 
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was a “good thing” and had eased the acute scarcity during the summer months, an 
opinion echoed by other users as well: 
 
In the past, our sources, including the well from where I would fetch water, used to 
get dried up in summer and we had to go to low lying areas. I my opinion, this is the 
best thing for all of us. Since I have physical problems, I could never carry the water 
from long distances. So my personal opinion is that it is extremely useful. I also do 
not waste water. I have not planted even a sapling for that matter. (woman user, 
Mayiladumkunnu) 
 
3.5. SECTOR REFORM IN KERALA: EFFICACY, EFFECTIVENESS AND 
PARTICIPATION  
 
The liberalized structure instituted in Kerala shifted a large proportion of the functions 
involved in water provision to area-based user-groups (Beneficiary Groups), and from 
the working of the four SR projects described above, it was clear that the reformed 
structure worked almost fully as designed (see Figures 4.9 and 4.10). The description 
of the structure as a ‘People on Top’ model was not inappropriate, as the beneficiary 
groups were the organizational fulcrum and functioning as envisaged, despite the 
issues that had surfaced. In each case, members of the BG and BC saw it as something 
that ‘we have done’, with the financial, technical and legal help of ‘the government’. 
Their full involvement in the process and many significant decisions was not only 
evident, but the pride and sense of ownership was palpable. This was despite the fact 
that the State government determined their constitution and byelaws, and there were 
extensive guidelines and reporting requirements imposed by the PSU. This made the 
structure and functioning of the BG and the processes of development, operation and 
management of the water supply system almost identical across projects. While the 
rationale was to prevent malpractices and ensure transparent, democratic and equitable 
functioning of the user group, it replicated one structure and manner of functioning, 
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allowing little place for the groups to evolve their own unique systems.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.11:  Shifts in the distribution of functions from State provision to 
liberalized (SR-Swajaldhara) governance systems in Kerala, 
derived using the Devolution score Sheet (Table 2.6) 
 
To what extent was the new institutional architecture more effective than the previous 
arrangements? Was the reformed process more participatory, and the organizational 
arrangement more supportive of women’s involvement? Comparisons of the water 
availability before and after the projects were implemented, and the changed patterns 
of access, clearly illustrate that water availability increased notably for the 
beneficiaries of these projects (see Table 4.5 and Figure 4.12). All residents, except 
those with perennial wells, had faced acute problems for almost half the year, from 
Feb to June, and had to rely on the goodwill of well-owners, or carry water over long 
distances and uphill from the valley – often, from wells or ponds with contaminated 
water. The most important change was therefore that the minimum required quantity 
of water for personal needs had become available during the dry season. This was in 
addition to that available from the sources they previously used, where they returned  
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Table 4.5 
Effectiveness of liberalized governance arrangements for water supply in Kerala 
Calculated from project files 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.12: Effectiveness of Sector Reform Program water supply projects 
observed in Kerala, from Table 4.5 
 
when on some days water from the new system was inadequate or contaminated. An 
equally notable change was in the proximity of collection points – the piped 
connection to each house. All summer water did not need to be carried over long 
distances nor did access depend on neighbors. In the two years that projects had been 
operational, repair time when breakdowns occurred had been reasonably short.  
The question of quality, is however, more vexed. Water in three completed projects 
 Neelamootil Mayiladum-
kunnu 
Pulleri Ambalako-
nam 
 K-SR 
 Before After  Before After  Before After  Before After  Before After  
Per Capita Availability 31 93 32 91 30 76 39 83 33 86 
Per Cap from HH Source 75 77 75 77 75 76 75 74 75 76 
Per Cap from Public Sources 27 27 27 27 27 27 39 47 30 32 
Disparity  48 0 48 0 48 0 36 0 45 0 
% Popn with HH Source 7 100 7 100 5 100 7 100 7 100 
% HH < 50 m from Pub Source 21 21 18 18 58 58 100 100 49 49 
% HH - Unprotected Sources 72 0 75 0 37 0 0 0 46 0 
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were either colored, salty or both, at various times. Except chlorination the water was 
not treated, and no BG had done any scientific examination of water quality since it 
was expensive and facilities were not easily accessible. While the wells which were 
the most common sources earlier – and continued to be when there was water – were 
unprotected, all households routinely boiled drinking water and applied other 
traditional methods, which apparently rendered the well water safe. Users continued to 
prefer that over the piped supply for drinking purposes, for when the piped water was 
discoloured or unpalatable, they had to undertake additional treatment such as with 
alum to sediment the suspended silt.  
 
An even greater change was in the extent of users’ involvement with and control over 
the development and management of the project. A decade ago, only politically or 
socially significant persons ever knew about projects proposed by the KWA or even 
the Panchayat. This had changed with the institutionalization of the participatory 
planning and budgeting process about five years previously, but only to the extent of 
proposing, lobbying and eventually, if it was implemented, monitoring the 
construction process. Under the reformed institutional arrangement however, users – 
or their elected representatives in the BC and other committees – were fully involved 
in the process. They undertook most of the tasks involved, and were part of the final 
decisions even where ‘experts’ were involved, such as in the identification of 
sources319, and the preparation of the DSR containing the technical details of and cost 
estimates for construction.  
 
The extent of involvement of women was notable, surpassing that of men in two 
projects – Neelamootil and Mayiladumkunnu. (See Figure 4.13 below) Not only were 
                                                 
319 Done by hydrologists from the GWB 
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women elected as significant officers in the BC, and discharged the responsibilities 
that came with the position, but ordinary members of the BG were also involved in 
organizing meetings, collection of dues and supervision of construction activities. In 
Ambalakonam, the President, other users and the GVRT organizer all reported that 
meetings were mostly attended by women members, and with six women in the 
Committee, it had almost become a ‘women’s project’ (GVRT member, FGD 
Ambalakonam). In Pulleri and Nilamcootil, this was less true; in Pulleri, two BC 
members reported that their ‘husbands attended the meetings and did a lot of work’ 
and in Nilamootil less women habitually attended than men (Users, Pulleri, FDG 3)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.13:  Patterns of participation of women as compared to men in SR 
projects in Kerala, from interviews and BG records. 
 
Certainly this level of involvement of women was a new phenomenon in the case of 
water supply projects, or other ones considered equally ‘technical’. The PR reforms 
and participatory planning process had enabled women’s active involvement in public 
affairs, especially in Panchayat plans for small community water supply projects. 
Project implementation had however, continued to be the responsibility of KWA, 
without any involvement of users. The space for participation in the reformed 
institutional structure was nevertheless fully used; observers agreed that participation 
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in the organizational structures that had developed during and after the PPC – NHGs, 
ADS and CDS – and successful involvement in the Kudumbasree units for economic 
activities had prepared the way for such involvement (CEO CapDeck, Secretary SPB). 
The high level of organizational participation among residents in all four areas also 
testifies to this (see Table 4.3). 
 
What motivated and enabled the women to take an active part? Answers were mixed, 
including ‘I got elected….’(BC member, Neelamootil), “We really needed water….” 
(BC member, Ambalakonam.), “I am President of our NHG and the SHG…”(Vice-
President Mayilladumkunnu) and “I am a member of the Mallavattam project and I 
know how to do this…”(President, Ambalakonam). Some just shrugged or smiled. 
And how did those who had more responsibility find the time, and manage all the 
housework? Some of them reported doing it themselves, helped by daughters, mothers 
or sisters, but at least three interviewees reported that their husbands also helped 
(interview nos 31, 34, 37). The same remark also was made in the fdgs at the 
Ambalakonam and Mayiladumkunnu project sites. A GVRT staff later explained that,  
 
Women are making good money through Kudumbasree…. also cashew processing at 
home …[so] the men are supporting them in household too. They [the husbands] are 
also getting into kitchen from the morning. The women have to leave for job and 
earning so men are doing. They are giving more help and the main thing is that in 
Kerala there are in a nuclear family there is no other way, no extended family and so 
they have to help….there is some tension also…”(member, Aanchal GVRT) 
 
One pattern that was consistent across the projects was that males occupied the 
positions of Secretary and Treasurer in all four BCs, and the Purchase Committee had 
women only in Ambalakonam. Supervising Committees, on the other hand, had a 
majority of women members. On pointing this out, the President of Ambalakonam 
explained that it was because these people (Secretary, Purchase Committee members) 
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had to do “a lot of running around”, but that she always asked for detailed information 
on all activities and about the accounts. 
 
This level of participation is remarkable in comparison to Gujarat, and explanations 
need to be explored. Before attempting that in the last section, however, the patterns 
that occur in a very different socio-economic and cultural context, in Madhya Pradesh, 
are discussed. In the next section I set out the context in which sector reforms were 
introduced in Madhya Pradesh, the institutional arrangements that were made for its 
implementation and how they played out at the local level, and changes in the efficacy 
of and participation in water provision. 
 
 
4. SECTOR REFORMS IN MADHYA PRADESH: THE MPPHED, VWSC 
AND HEALTH COMMITTEES 
 
Much as in other States, water provision in Madhya Pradesh (MP) had become the 
responsibility of the State’s Public Health Engineering Department (MPPHED, or 
more commonly, PHED) during the seventies. However, unlike Gujarat and Kerala 
where the responsibility was transferred to parastatals in the eighties, in MP the 
responsibility remained fully with the line department even after the reforms of the 
90’s. The series of local government reforms in the state after 1995 did not bring very 
substantial change; the State’s PHED continued to remain the primary institutional 
structure for implementation of water supply projects, at least till the end of the 
nineties. In this section I describe the structure and functioning of the PHED, status of 
the domestic water situation in the State, the introduction of the Sector Reforms-
Swajaldhara program, and its functioning as observed in the study villages.  
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4.1. PRE-LIBERALIZATION INSTITUTIONAL ARCHITECTURE FOR WATER 
PROVISION IN MADHYA PRADESH 
 
A picture of the functioning of the PHED has been assembled from a number of 
sources – a review of the drinking water sector in MP by Wateraid (2005), the report 
of an organizational review of the MP-PHED by an independent consultant in 2005, 
the 2003 Annual Report of the Department and not least, interviews with senior 
officials of the department and staff of state-level NGOs familiar with its working 
(listed in Annexure V). Like its counterpart parastatals in other States, the MP-PHED 
implemented all water supply programs of the GoI, (primarily the ARWSP)320 and the 
Madhya Pradesh government. Since 1986, the AWRSP, directed towards providing 
atleast 40lpcd of safe water in all habitations, has been the largest drinking water 
program in the State, and though a number of other programs introduced at various 
times continue, allocations for the State government programs have dwindled very 
substantially over the years (PHED 2003). 
 
The MP PHED is headed by the Engineer-in-Chief, who reports to the Principal 
Secretary of the Ministry. Its operational structure is multilayered, with the 
geographical expanse of the State divided into Regions, Circles, Divisions and Sub-
divisions, coordinated from a Head Office in the State capital, Bhopal, by the 
Engineer-in-Chief.321 In sum, the department, though it has offices across the State, is 
                                                 
320 Though the water supply components of other programs like the Minimum Needs Program (MNP), 
the Employmenmt Guarantee Scheme (EGS) of the GoI were also implemented, the bulk of the funds – 
and therefore, the projects, were financed through the ARWSP (See PHED 2004). 
321 The Engineer-in-Chief coordinates the work of the department across the four PHED regions in the 
State. Each region is headed by a Chief Engineer, and comprises a number of Circles, which in turn 
contain Divisions and Sub-divisions. The Superintending Engineer heads the Circle, and Executive 
Engineers and Assistant Engineers look after the lower offices respectively. There is one Division 
Office for each district in the State, as well as a District Laboratory for water quality testing. There is, 
however, one Sub-division office for a number of Blocks, depending on the area and population . In 
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highly centralized with most significant decisions taken at the Head Office in the State 
capital. Moreover, the authority of officers heading Divisions and Circles is very low 
in relation to the resources required for the large water supply projects that are typical 
of the Department, which leads to most projects having to be approved at the Circle or 
Regional level.  
 
The PHED undertakes both rural and urban water supply projects. In rural areas, 
projects are identified and formulated for ‘no safe source’ habitations and ‘partly 
covered’ habitations, based on the department’s annual surveys of water sources in 
various habitations. The Sub-division office formulates the proposal with size, 
location, technology and design of the project, and after budget approval from the 
authorized higher office, implements it. Village Panchayats are rarely consulted, 
though Intermediate Panchayats sometimes are in the case of multi-village schemes, 
particularly after the local government reforms. The most regular consultation was 
with the District Panchayat, which since 1995 had increasingly been granted the 
responsibility and funds for various development and service provision programs of 
both the MP and Indian government322. The institutional arrangement for water 
provision prior to the introduction of reforms is depicted in Figure 4.14. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
recent years regions and circles have been re-organized or relocated, and additional ones created 
(Khanna 2005; SE, Bhopal). 
322 With the shift of the District Rural Development Agency (DRDA) to the District Panchayat (DP)and 
the erstwhile Project Director DRDA being named the CEO of the DP, the Central Sector Schemes 
(CSS) that were being implemented by the DRDA automatically came under the purview of the District 
Panchayat. In addition, a proportion of State revenues began to be transferred to the DP when the State 
Finance Commission recommendations were implemented.  
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Figure 4.14:  Institutional architecture for Water Provision in MP prior to 
Sector Reforms. 
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4.2. THE MPPHED AND STATUS OF WATER PROVISION IN THE STATE 
 
The PHED concentrated on making water available through three kinds of systems: 
piped water supply schemes (PWSS) in villages with more than 20,000 population, 
mini piped water supply schemes (MPWSS) – which supplied water in one spot – and 
installation of handpumps. Ground water was the primary source, constituting 90% of 
the drinking water supplied, despite the State being traversed by four major rivers. 
However, even after more than two decades of effort by the PHED, about 20% of the 
habitations in the State still had less than the minimum of 40 lpcd of water that is 
considered absolutely essential. By 2003, despite the regular annual extension of 
coverage, the proportion of NC and PC villages number had increased, to over 40%, 
with the number of ‘Fully Covered’ (FC) habitations actually shrinking (Das 2006). 
This is attributed to falling groundwater levels, rise in chemical content in the water, 
growth in village population that reduced per capita availability and breakdown of 
existing systems323. In 2005, more than one-third of the 126,172 habitations in the 
State were still water-poor (Wateraid 2005). 
 
The State lacked an overall water policy, and functioning of the PHED was 
constrained by a number of factors. In addition to suffering from the typical 
inefficiencies of a large, multi-layered bureaucratic organization, it had to work with 
the other departments who had jurisdiction over the water resources of the State, such 
as the Ground Water Board and the Irrigation department. Like its counterparts in 
other States, the overwhelming focus on the installation of hardware, the use of 
technologies unfamiliar to the rural populace and the burden of maintenance of every 
installation, even in villages at substantial distances from its local (sub-division) office 
                                                 
323 This change is concentrated in some districts and Das (2006) shows that these are also the districts 
which are drier or known for over-exploitation of groundwater. 
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were other constraining aspects. Their operations were underwritten by the State and 
Central governments, but since all programs were subsidized and water tariffs were 
minimal – if they were paid at all – it functioned on a perpetually deficit budget. Like 
the GWSSB in Gujarat, it owed millions in electricity bills to the State Electricity 
Board. The issues were therefore much the same as faced by its counterparts in other 
States, and the need for institutional reform was articulated often (Wateraid 2005, Das 
2006, CEO Samarthan, Head, RGDWM Unit).   
 
It was against this backdrop that the GoI–DDWS Sector Reform pilot project was 
initiated in the State, in five districts identified by the DDWS – Raisen, Sehore, 
Gwalior, Hoshangabad and Narsinghpur324. In these, development of water supply 
projects was initiated through the process mandated in the SRP – ‘demand-driven’ and 
incorporating the principle of beneficiary contributions towards capital and O&M 
costs – which was substantially at variance from the PHED’s established procedures. 
The central tenet of the program was the reform of existing institutional arrangements 
and organizational procedures to incorporate substantial involvement of local 
governments and users in the entire process, a situation unfamiliar to PHED staff. The 
inception of the SR program in MP and the institutional structure delineated for its 
implementation and its functioning at various levels was therefore slow and uneven, as 
described below.  
 
4.3. SECTOR REFORMS AND SWAJALDHARA IN MADHYA PRADESH 
 
Though the GoI initiated the program in 1999, the Sector Reform pilots started in MP 
                                                 
324 A sixth district – Durg – was also included, but because the district is now in the State of Chattisgarh 
which was carved out of MP in 2002, it has not been included here.  
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in 2001. The MP government designated the PHED as the Project Implementation 
Agency (PIA), and the position of Project Director was created at the State Level to 
coordinate the implementation of the program in the State. Though located in the 
office of the departmental head (Engineer-in-Chief), the Project Director was to report 
directly to the Principal Secretary of PHED in the Ministry (GoMP 2002). There was 
little change introduced in the structure elaborated in the GoI SRP guidelines 
(GoI1999, revised 2001), except that existing Health Committees were designated as 
the village-level implementing bodies (SE, PMU Bhopal). However, it was not until 
August 2003 and the introduction of the Swajaldhara program that the government 
orders (GO) for constitution of the SWSM (with Apex and Executive Committees), 
DWSM, DWSC and VWSC were issued. Till then the SRP project functioned under 
the Project Director at the PHED Head Office, a designated EE in charge of Sector 
Reform in the Division Offices of the SR districts and two Asst Engineers in the Sub-
divisions. At the district level, the EE worked with the CEO, District Panchayat, as for 
other projects such as AWRSP, and the Asst Engineers with the Intermediate and 
Village Panchayats within the subdivision (GoMP 2003)  
 
When eventually constituted, however, the DP was named the DWSM. District-level 
Health and Family Welfare Committees had been constituted in 2001325, chaired by 
the District Collector, and these were named the DWSC for actual project 
implementation. The EE (Swajaldhara) of the PHED Division Office was the 
Member-Secretary of this Committee. At the village level, the Village Development 
Committee of the Village Panchayat326 was to be the VWSC. The SWSM and its Apex 
and Executive Committees were constituted as mandated in the GoI guidelines, but 
                                                 
325 By GO 1-8/9/2000/M-II, dated 28th Nov 2001, of the MP Public Health and Family Welfare 
department (GoMP 2003) 
326 VDCs were constituted under the MP Panchayati Raj and Gram Swaraj Act of 1993, as one of the 
three Standing Committees of the Panchayat. 
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with additional members from some other departments (for example, Department of 
Women and Child Welfare) as members, in addition to those specified. Both these 
Committees were much larger than those of the Gujarat and Kerala SWSMs, but they 
did not include any members from civil society organizations, nor any experts or 
professionals as in the latter two cases. NGO representatives or professionals were 
also not included in the DWSM or DWSC; nor was the Core Group suggested by the 
GoI constituted.  
 
Though it had been decided to constitute a Project Cell PHED Head Office to assist 
the Project Director, constituted of five expert consultants in the areas of social 
mobilization, monitoring and information systems, human resource development, and 
communication, it was not until Dec 2004-Jan 2005 that the notification for 
appointment of professionals was issued. Till then it was manned by officers of the 
PHED, and no outside consultants were appointed; UNICEF had supported the 
placement of five professionals as District Liaison Officers (DLOs) in the SR pilot 
districts and one State Liaison Officer (SLO) with the State Project Director. With the 
reconstitution of the PMU in 2004, the UNICEF-supported professionals placed at the 
district level were re-assigned to the Unit. (GoMP 2004). 
 
The intended institutional structure, processes and roles of various organizational 
entities within a district is specified in the Project Document (proposal) prepared in 
1999 by the Sehore PHED Division for the DDWS. The project cycle was to span 3 
years, with four phases wherein,  
 
“ The main activities … are to train grass roots workers and make people to (sic) 
understand the idea of community participation by information media. The help of 
NGOs & other voluntary organizations will be appreciated by providing 
honorarium…Institutionalizing Phase ….. comprises formation of grass root level 
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committees, identification of NGOs.\ Training Institutes (sic) and signing of 
MOUs….The sarpanchs will be assigned a job, to attract the villagers by arranging 
social programmes in the gram sabha meetings in which committees will be formed 
having 4 to 5 members…Sensitization and Identification phase…would involve 
sensitizing and creating awareness among various govt. functionaries \ political 
leaders \ NGOs \ community at all levels through various communication channels 
about the programme….Group discussions and workshops shall be organized through 
selected Community based Organizations and Gramsabhas to mobilize active 
participation of the community in the programme….” (GoMp 1999: pp7-8) 
 
The proposal included the constitution of the DWSM and DWSC according the SR 
guidelines, and representatives of two NGOs were coopted as members in the DWSC. 
The ‘Nodal Water Supply Agency” was the PHED and funds would be chanelled by 
the EE, Sehore. Responsibilities of various levels of local government were also 
specified. The DP would sanction scheme, allot fund and monitor, the IP was 
responsible for “(S)anction of village and its proposal on Block Level” and the VP 
would select the site of the installation and maintain the PWSS (GoMP 1999: 27). 
Clearly, the institutional structure in MP for the SRP and eventually, the Swajaldhara, 
was state-centered, as shown in Figure 4.15, with the PHED continuing as the primary 
implementing organization at both State and district levels. The faded-out parts of the 
diagram show the pre sector reform institutional set-up and the organizational 
differences between that and the overlaid (reformed) structure provides a picture of the 
shifts in functions and resources that was intended.  
 
4.4. TURF TROUBLES: THE MPPHED, VWSC AND HEALTH COMMITTEES. 
 
Though the project proposal for the Sehore SR pilot was prepared in 1999, setting out 
the intended plan of action in the district (GoMP 1999), the actual implementation of 
the program apparently did not start till late 2001 (SE, PMU Bhopal). The launch of 
Swajaldhara in Dec 2002 added some impetus, but the mandated institutional 
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Figure 4.15: Reformed institutional architecture for SR-Swajaldhara projects in 
Madhya Pradesh 
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structure was not in place till 2003, either at the State or district levels. The necessary 
government orders were issued in August 2003, and the SWSM was registered only in 
Dec 2004 (EE, PMU Bhopal, GoMP 2004). Even after the institutional structure was 
officially notified, there was delay in filling the positions and appointing staff. The 
Project Director for the State was appointed in mid-2003 and the notification for 
constitution of the PMU and appointment of professionals was issued in Dec 2004; till 
then officers of the PHED were deputed or positioned for short durations. Though a 
proportion of the requested funds were received from the DDWS in 2000-2001 in 
response to the proposals sent by the MP PHED, it was, reportedly, not utilized for 
more than a year. (Social Mobilization Consultant, PMU) 
 
A major bottleneck in implementation was the frequent change in officers with key 
responsibilities in the project. Reportedly, the State-level Project Director was 
changed six times between 2000 to 2005, and three District Collectors had held office 
in Sehore during that time. The Executive Engineer and the ZP CEO had also changed 
atleast once. The lack of continuity was exacerbated by the lack of motivation in the 
PHED and a fair degree of resentment, for in the pilot, the funds from the DDWS were 
channeled through the ZP directly to the GP. It was only with the changes notified 
after the program was converted to Swajaldhara, which included designating the EE as 
the ‘Drawing and Disbursing Officer’, and the realization that all projects would 
henceforth have to be on the reformed model that acceptance of the program increased 
among PHED staff.  
 
“(There was) lack of interest of the EE in the district, because money is used by the 
Sarpanch, given by the Collector….After April first 2003 when Swajaldhara was 
initiated (in MP), the execution was to be done by the PHED, so we took lots of 
interest…because we were (again) the masters…se we made proposals worth 78 
crores (780 million). But GoI said only 10.8 crores would be given, since the 
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procedure was that funds would be given according to performance…we had not 
utilized much before…” (EE Swajaldhara)  
 
“In fact that’s what happened, advances were taken from GoI, work hasn’t been done, 
accounts not settled. Now GoI is insisting – that all governments sign MOUs with GoI 
by March 2005, that sector reform principles will be implemented in all sectors, 
before they give any money to states. (PMU Social Coordinator) 
 
When engineers from the PHED Subdivision did begin to identify and develop 
projects in the reformed pattern – for after April 2000 AWRSP funds shrank – there 
was little prelude to implementation of the project in villages – “…no training, 
awareness-raising (sic) or even information to the Health Committees…” (Social 
Mobilization Consultant, PMU; also echoed by EE, PMU). This was an observation 
made by PHED officers interviewed at both State and district levels327 as well as 
members of the PMU. The project was treated much as the earlier government projects 
were, except that 10% of the cost was recovered from the users. There was confusion 
within the implementing department, and sufficient information about the project did 
not reach lower-level offices (CEO, Samarthan). Field officers were not clear that the 
two main principles of the reforms were that it be ‘demand driven’ and have public 
participation (SE, PHED Head Office).  
 
To understand how the de-jure reformed structure that was developed in the State for 
water provision actually functioned, particularly at the district level and below, the 
implementation of the program was studied in three Panchayats (including a number 
of villages each) in Sehore. The processes through which piped water supply systems 
were developed in four of the nine villages covered in this study were mapped, 
through interviews with district, block and village officials, elected representatives in 
                                                 
327 EE, AEEs, Bhopal PMU members.  
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the VP, users, and field staff of the NGO working in these villages. Information about 
the villages pertinent to this discussion and details of the pre-existing water sources 
and the SRP projects are given in Table 4.6 328  
 
Table 4.6 
SRP villages, their pre-SR access to water and the new water supply projects in 
Madhya Pradesh 
Village Population 
 
No. of 
Hhold 
 
Hhold 
size 
Existing Sources 
 
SR Project (piped supply) 
Total % 
SC 
% 
ST 
Well Hand
pump 
Stand 
posts 
Other Storage
Capacty
(liters) 
Times 
refilled 
per day 
HH. 
Conn 
(Nos)  
Stand 
posts 
Kharpa 583 39 8 143 4.1 2 9 (+4 
priv) 
2 River 6,000 1 4 4 
Ram Khedi 823 2 0 133 6.2 4 5 2 2 8,000 1 2 3 
Lasudiya 
Dhakad 
818 44 5 155 5.3 2 5  Dam ,8000 1  4 
Lasudiya 
khas 
810 15 0 156 5.2 1 6 (+1 
priv) 
3  St.tank-
3000 l cap, 
2 ponds 
8,000 1 6 4 
 Manpura 446 12 0 62 7.2 1 6   20,000 0.5 9 4 
Sources: Developed from 2001 Census of India, Samarthan and PHED Sehore subdivision records, participatory 
mapping and transect walks in the villages; interviews. 
 
The process of developing projects in the reformed arrangements that emerged from 
village interviews bore out the descriptions of how the reforms were received at the 
State level and the understanding (or its lack) in the implementing agency described 
by officers of the PMU (above). Except in one village – Manpura – where the process 
was initiated after demands from the village women in response to an awareness 
campaign carried out by the AE of the area, village residents had almost no 
information about the program except that it involved a 10% contribution from users. 
The AE in charge of the area was particularly noted for his social awareness and 
commitment to development, and had conducted street-plays and information-sharing 
sessions in many villages of the area, of which Manpura was one. In the other study 
                                                 
328 Other details of the villages are presented in the Appendices. 
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villages the program was implemented like the pre-reform projects, in response to 
requests and the initiatives of the President of the Health Committee (in Ramkhedi and 
Kharpa) or active residents of the village (Lasudiya Dhakad). In Lasudiya Khas, the 
Sarpanch received information from the intermediate Panchayat and because of the 
political gain and the pressure from residents supported by the NGO working in the 
village, negotiated installation of the system with the PHED. None of the study 
villages were classified as ‘Not Covered’ habitations (they were ‘Partially Covered”), 
and therefore were neither a priority with the PHED, nor could funds be allocated 
readily from other programs such as the AWRSP (PHED 2004, 2004a) 
 
No ‘beneficiary groups’ were formally constituted in any village, though in Kharpa 
two tanks were installed, one each in the upper and lower-caste neighborhoods of the 
village and had identifiably distinct user groups. The project was treated as a village 
project, and user contributions were in both cash and labour for construction. Even 
then, not all villages were able to collect the necessary 10% of the estimated cost; in 
Lasudiya Dhakad, the NGO provided a small proportion from its donor account, and 
in Kharpa, the NGO and the Panchayat together made up the deficit329.   
 
One of the important actors in this process was the NGO (Samarthan) working in 
villages of the area. There was no formal support role allocated to the organization in 
the SR pilot, but Samarthan field staff had been working with residents for over five 
years, attempting to stimulate collective action and democratic processes within the 
new Panchayat system. Supported by a number of donors for different aspects of their 
work, one of their primary engagements was in mobilizing village communities to 
                                                 
329 The NGO (Samarthan) had donor funds for the purpose, and the Panchayat could contribute towards 
the tank in the lower-caste neighborhood because of the earmarked funds it received under various 
programs for that segment of the population.  
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develop micro-plans for village development through a participatory process. Since 
the need to augment water sources emerged as a top priority in almost all villages, 
their involvement in the process was substantial – from organizing meetings, helping 
beneficiary or village committees to negotiate the PHED system and dealing with 
contractors to providing some funds for installations in the poorer villages such as 
Kharpa and Lasudiya Dhakad330.  In villages with a greater proportion of land-owning 
elites, the implementing committees mobilized extra funds to augment their 
collections from the wealthier families or from the ubiquitous Temple Committees 
which typically had a substantial corpus. Working with existing Youth groups or 
where such groups were absent, supporting the development of new ones, was a core 
strategy of Samarthan, and these groups were the key organizational actors in some 
villages (Kharpa, Ramkhedi).   
 
Once initiated, either the village Health Committee (Kharpa, Ramkhedi, Manpura), the 
Construction Committee (Manpura) or an ad-hoc Implementation Committee led by 
the Sarpanch (Lasudiya Khas) anchored the process. In two villages, individuals 
substantially led the process – an active and community-spirited resident in Lasudiya 
Dhakad (Sarif Khan) and in Manpura, the Treasurer of the Gram Sabha. Though the 
PHED engineer developed the formal proposal, with the technical details, drawings 
and estimates, and prepared tender documents and supervised the construction 
process, the spearheading committee decided on location, collected contributions 
selected the contractor and monitored the whole project. Money was paid by the 
PHED, the Village Panchayat or the Intermediate Panchayat as the case may be, but in 
almost all cases project accounts were also maintained by the committee, though the 
                                                 
330 These villages had a greater proportion of SC and ST households, almost none of which owned any 
productive land; most families depended almost fully on wage labor in the agricultural seasons. See 
Appendices for the social profile of study villages.  
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funds were not transferred to them. The PHED or the contractor supplied the 
materials, though in the latter case, the respective committees were involved to a great 
extent. 
 
The substantial role of the village committee was clearly a product not only of the 
NGO organizing, but also because it also had the full information about the SR-
Swajaldhara project and the roles defined for various actors. Samarthan was the NGO 
co-opted into the DWSC, though not an active participant in its deliberations331. Field 
staff reported that they had to educate the village residents and organizing committees 
about “the new way of doing things” and in Kharpa, where the engineer was clearly 
offended by the residents “taking charge”, also persuade the engineer to take renewed 
interest in the project. Anchoring negotiations between factions in the village and 
conflict resolution was a ubiquitous role that required a major proportion of their 
energies in the village (Field officer, Samarthan).  
 
The emergent institutional structure observed in the study villages is shown in Figure 
4.16 below. Interviewees pointed out a host of issues in the implementation of the 
program; from lack of community participation, to malpractices by the PHED, a few 
of which were observable in the study villages. Community participation varied 
substantially across villages, and the State PD’s observation that in most cases the 
“Sarpanch (VP President) does all the work’ was certainly true in Lasudiya Khas. 
“The hardware part is going on, but software part practically nil”, according to the PD. 
In Kharpa and Manpura, Samarthan’s mobilization and sharing of information clearly 
underpinned the wider involvement of residents, but since NGOs were not appointed 
                                                 
331 According to the district co-ordinator of Samarthan in the Sehore office, the DWSC met very 
occasionally – three times in the previous year was what they recollected – and they were rarely notified 
of meetings in time. 
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as Support  Agencies332 – as directed in the SRP guidelines – this was not the usual 
situation. 
 
According to all reports (Wateraid CEO, Samrthan CEO, PMU staff) MP had few 
NGOs, atleast not many of repute, though “many government officers have set up 
something in their relatives names, there are so many projects in which NGOs are 
supposed to be involved”(PMU staff). The SE and EE (Swajaldhara) in the PHED 
Head Office observed that user contributions were not forthcoming, though the latter 
qualified that the 10% of the capital cost was not a problem in most cases. It was the 
“maintenance they are not willing…so State government takes the view that when 
50% of our population is poor, with their work routines they cannot maintain and run 
the project, they should not be asked to” (EE). The Assistant Engineer in the Sehore 
Subdivision had another explanation – 
 
“[Earlier] basic problem was because people were losing faith (in the PHED), so they 
[the GoI] said let the people do it, but before, it was done systematically, we surveyed 
where there was no coverage, partial coverage etc and then undertook work in those 
villages first. With this [SR program] ofcourse the more ‘able’ villages are coming 
forward with contribution and getting the project. Now the poorest villages or difficult 
villages are left – SC, ST areas, etc. These people are not able to give the contribution, 
so now they will not be covered. It is said that people are not contributing, but when 
such places are only left, how will they contribute? So in both cases they get left out. 
The rich people, they have own sources, but also want to use community sources 
handpumps, wells, tubewells etc. So they want more work [in the village], they are 
getting more than 40 lpcd.” (Asst Engineer, SW Project Cell, Bhopal) 
 
Another interviewee also made the same observation; that the program was  
 
 
“(P)rimarily augmenting private supply in better-off sections – wells, borewells with 
submersibles, tubewells and handpumps.” (CEO, Samarthan). This was clearly the  
                                                 
332 According to both the SE and EE (Swajaldhara) in the PHED Head Office, no NGOs were involved 
till the time of this research (2005 May), but a decision had been made to start including them; selection 
procedures, qualifications and guidelines for identifying appropriate organizations were being decided 
at the time.  
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Figure 4.16: Emergent structure for SR-Swajaldhara projects in MP 
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case in Lasudiya Khas where the tank was located right in front of the Sarpanch’s 
house, and reportedly, only people of that (richer) neighborhood had contributed. 
There was also a palpable lack of ability to pay in the poorer villages – Lasudiya 
Dhakad and Kharpa - where Samarthan and the Panchayat had had to provide funds to 
make up the beneficiaries’ contribution. In a new project being considered in Lasudiya 
Dhakad, a small dam, the contractor interested in the project had offered to pay most 
of the community contribution; apparently, not an unusual situation, for often, 
“…there is no community…one person, either the Sarpanch or contractor 
contributes…” (PMU staff). 
 
There, however, appeared to be another side to the story –  
 
Now it is always discussed that community contribution is not forthcoming, but 
actually that’s not the real picture. One has to mobilize – after all, community spends 
a lot, building temples, having havans, pujas, joint celebrations for festivals, etc. So 
mobilization is possible. But…[we] have to have credibility, and the PHED doesn’t 
have – no one believes they will do the work after taking the community money. 
(PMU staff)  
 
Recently constructed or ongoing construction of imposing temples333 was certainly a 
visible landmark in six of the ten villages I the study Panchayats, and according to 
both the Temple Committee officers (eg., Sarpanch, Lasidiya Khas) and village 
residents (fdgs in Manpura, Ramakhedi), almost every household334 contributed some 
amount from time to time during the construction process. ‘Bhajan Mandalis’ or 
prayer groups were also present in every village, even those without a temple.  
 
But in addition to the lack of credibility of the PHED, which prevented community 
interest, there were other issues in the implementing organization – 
 
                                                 
333 The temple heights ranged from about 10meters to almost 25 meters, though in none of the study 
villages there was any building – residential or otherwise – that was more than 5 –6 m in height. 
Expensive finishings were also common, such as glazed tiles or polished stone flooring. 
334 Presumably, the Hindu households. 
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“Despite being a ‘technical’ dept, PHED has fixed technology, standard designs – not 
even ten alternatives for villages [sic] to choose from…how did the department do 
this before? Primarily by outsourcing, getting the contractors to do it…they just 
check depth [at which water is available], after that the design is standard…”(PMU 
staff) 
 
“ There is also the practice of PHED giving materials instead of money…instead of 
giving the full 90%, they purchased hardware centrally and gave that in lieu of funds. 
People protested because it was of very poor quality and higher price…PHED enquiry 
is in motion now, regarding sector reforms335…They actually wanted to implement the 
projects fully so that they can keep the margin…”(District Co-ordinator, Samarthan) 
 
A final observation by the district coordinator of Samarthan, however, was more 
hopeful of a change from the original institutional structure towards a more 
participatory process at the village level:  
 
Normally, the Panchayat and PHED are only involved, the Village Health Committee 
not included… the Panchayat generally uses Sansad fund or the Vidhayak fund. With 
sector reform, at least the VWSC is consulted, they’re in the picture. And in a few 
villages where the Committee is getting active, they are getting fully involved…” 
(Sehore District Coordinator, Samarthan) 
 
Has the situation really changed? This is discussed in the next section, by comparing 
water availability and accessibility in the study villages, and the extent of women’s 
involvement in the provisioning process before and after the sector reforms.  
 
4.5. LIBERALIZED WATER PROVISION IN MADHYA PRADESH: EFFICACY, 
EFFECTIVENESS AND PARTICIPATION  
 
The reforms instituted in the existing State-centered (PHED) system of water 
provision in MP were not inconsequential, with users and community-groups provided 
                                                 
335 This was also mentioned by a resident of Sehore in an informal conversation, but no details could be 
elicited from other interviewees.  
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with the authority to take on a number of decisive functions. The existence of hamlet-
level Committees for Health and Construction activities also provided a ready 
structure for role-taking. That is, not only was the efficacy of the liberalized structure 
substantial, but the pre-reform structures already in place at the local level provided a 
conducive situation. However, the Panchayat-level VWSC, designed as  a 
coordinating, enabling and funds-transfer mechanism; set in the reality of the socio-
economic power-structures at the local level, afforded a convenient forum for capture 
of resources and authority by the Gram Panchayat-village elites, and eroded this 
efficacy to a large extent. 
 
Despite, this, however, the involvement of groups at the hamlet and cluster level was 
substantial, approximating the designed structure, though it was a consequence of the 
design. The key factor in this positive modulation was clearly the involvement of a 
committed NGO with a historical presence and legitimacy in the area, a factor which 
had been bypassed in the designed arrangements. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.17:  Shifts in the distribution of functions from State to liberalized 
water provision in Madhya Pradesh, from the Devolution Score 
Sheet (Table 2.6) 
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Comparison of the water availability and access in the study villages before and after 
the SR projects, along the five major indicators for effectiveness – per capita water 
availability, disparities in access, number of household connections, distance to source 
and extent of coverage – indicates that there was a definite change for the better in all 
villages (Figure 4.18). Almost all the parameters improved, though the extent of  
 
Table 4.7 
Effectiveness of SRP water supply projects in Madhya Pradesh 
Calculated from records of Panchayat, CBOs and Samarthan 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.18:  Changes in indicators of effectiveness in SRP projects in study 
villages in MP, from Table 4.7 
 
 Kharpa Ramkhedi Lasudiya 
Dhakad 
Las khas Manpura MP-SR 
 Before After Before After Before After Before After Before After Before After 
Per Capita Availability 34 45 29 39 22 32 49 55 43 65 35 47 
Per Cap from HH Source 123 123 0 162 0 0 96 108 70 95 58 97 
Per Capita from Public 
sources 
32 76 29 52 22 51 60 78 42 98 37 71 
Disparity  90.9 46.3 0.0 109.8 0.0 0.0 36.7 30.5 27.8 3.6 31 37 
% Popn. With HH Source 3 6 0 2 0 0 1 5 3 18 1 6 
% HH < 50 m from Public 
Source 
52 94 79 100 48 87 87 100 100 100 73 96 
% HH – Unprotected 
Srces 
45 0 21 0 52 13 13 0 0 0 26 3 
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change differed across villages. Water availability increased in all, and some  
households got household taps, where none existed previously. Where a few families 
already had (private) piped supply in the house, they got an additional tap from the 
public piped supply, and some others could get a household tap for the first time. 
Convenience increased greatly for most users, as the distance to the source decreased 
– substantially for some – and more important, the timing and duration of supply 
became predictable. Above all, households who had been dependant on unprotected 
wells, ponds or streams, got access to protected sources and safe water.  
 
The overall change for the better, was however, marred by the differences in 
availability and access between the better off households and households in the lower-
income groups in the villages – the per capita water availability of those with 
household connections and those without. The difference was sharp in all villages 
except in Lasudiya Dhakad (See Table 4.7 and Figure 4.18). The distribution was not 
only highly skewed, but the difference in the quantity of water available to the two 
groups was exacerbated by the difference in access – the elite had either got a 
household connection or the public tap was located one within a few meters of the 
house, whereas others had to walk much more to fetch water from the same tap. 
Interestingly, in Lasudiya Dhakad, which had a greater proportion of low-income 
households, the tap location was as fair as was possible, and there were no household 
connections.  
 
The time-to-completion varied across villages, but all installations were completed 
within a year from the time that the effort was seriously begun, about the time taken 
for handpump installations by the PHED. The reformed process is no faster, but as a 
field staff of Samarthan pointed out,  
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“…[T]his is the first time that this process is being applied, we had to spend a lot of 
time to organize the community…to vitalize the committees that are there on paper, 
[or] help them form new ones with better representation….deal with the [often 
resentful] engineer…hopefully, if this reformed process continues, the people will be 
more proactive, so the project will be completed faster…”(field staff, Sehore Office, 
Samarthan) 
 
Repairs took a almost a week, sometimes more, for though repairmen were in the 
same or nearby villages, money had to be collected from all households, and required 
parts to be purchased from the nearest town. It was still shorter than in the case of 
PHED-installed handpumps, which took departmental staff weeks or even months to 
attend to.  
 
Participation of community members or their elected representatives in the 
development processes, however, varied substantially across villages, in contrast to the 
reasonably consistent change in effectiveness336. In Lasudiya Khas, the Sarpanch and a 
small coterie took all decisions, including others in the community – the perceived 
leaders of various caste groups – only in the matter of collecting the user-
contributions. At the other end of the spectrum, women not only spearheaded the 
demand for an installation in Manpura, but some of them – the Secretary and two 
members of a particularly active SHG – were fully involved, along with the village 
Treasurer and a some youth leaders, at various stages. They participated fully in 
collecting contributions, deciding the tank location, and the location of public taps, 
and took their turn in supervising construction. At the same time, though the village 
Treasurer, the Health Committee which anchored the process, and the Construction 
Committee which helped to supervise the work were all involved, neither Committee 
had women members, despite the statutory reservation of a third of the membership. 
                                                 
336 Except that unlike the skewed districution of benefits in other villages, residents of Lasudiya Dhakad 
were more equitably benefited. 
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The Treasurer explained that “there was so much demand for membership, so we 
filled [sic] the Committee without taking any women members”(Treasurer, Manpura). 
The highly variable participation of women, consistently meager in comparison to that 
of men, can be seen in Figure 4.19 below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.19:  Participation of women and men in SR projects in MP study 
villages, from interviews and records of CBOs and Samarthan. 
 
In Kharpa, the Youth Association spearheaded the entire effort, supported by one of 
Samarthan’s staff, but a group of women from the lower-caste neighborhood (where 
one tank was to be located) were “active” in the process (Samarthan field staff). The 
one women’s SHG in that neighborhood was responsible for coordinating operation 
and maintenance, and the Secretary was evidently very proactive in this regard. A 
women neighbor (admiringly) narrated how, on one of the two occasions when the tap 
needed repairs, the Secretary arranged for the new part to be delivered, through a 
complicated relay process – it arrived the next day. However, this, and the actively 
involved women of the SHG in Manpura appeared to be exceptions with regard to 
women’s participation. In other villages, women were made de-jure members of the 
Health Committee, but were not involved to any noticeable extent. In many instances 
the women were relatives of the male members, and one such interviewee – in 
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Lasudiya Dhakad – had definite and accurate information about the water supply 
project despite never having attended a committee meeting. One of the two others 
interviewed in Lasudiya Dhakad did not even know that she was a member, though 
her name was included in the Panchayat register. 
 
Where the Panchayat was involved, as in Lasudiya Khas, primarily the GP Sarpanch 
and Secretary made the decisions, and occasionally, other significant men of the 
village were included in the discussion. Only once was the project discussed with the 
other members of the GP – when a resolution had to be passed approving its 
construction. Women Panchayat members therefore did not even have the opportunity 
to participate in their official capacity, though given their negligible participation in 
Panchayat affairs (described in Chapter III, section 4.5), it was unlikely these 
opportunities would have been utilized even if available.   
 
An issue that was flagged by NGO staff was the role conflict between the VWSC and 
the habitation-level committees that in most instances anchored the projects. A large 
number of functions assigned to the VWSC in the reformed organizational 
conFigureuration, was usually undertaken by habitation-level Committees, either the 
Health Committee, the Construction Committee or a specially constituted 
Implementation Committee (as discussed before and shown in Figure 4.14). This role 
conflict often was a hurdle in implementation (eg., Lasudiya Dhakad), for the Sector 
Reform funds were channeled through the VWSC.  
 
Mostly, individual leadership and initiative, or continuous support of Samarthan staff 
explains the relatively higher level of participation, particularly that of women (where 
it existed). Active community-based women’s organizations like the SHGs in 
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Manpura and Kharpa appear to be the backdrop for women’s leadership, and higher 
caste and education appears to hinder participation. These women inevitably belong to 
upper-caste and richer households, where customary norms of seclusion remain 
strong.   
 
 
5. LIBERALIZED WATER PROVISION IN THREE STATES  
 
In sections 2, 3 and 4, I discussed (a) the ways in which the GoI-driven reform agenda 
to liberalize state provision of domestic water (through the SR-Swajaldhara program) 
have been applied to their existing system by the three study States, (b) how the 
reformed institutional arrangements actually played out at State, district and village 
levels, (c) to what extent the reformed arrangements in each State have been more or 
less effective than the previous system, and (d) to what extent women’s participation 
was enabled in the reformed organizational set-up in the State and how women 
utilized the spaces earmarked for them. The objective was to compare how a centrally 
designed, liberalized system is assimilated in different State contexts and whether the 
emergent arrangements are more effective and participatory than the pre-reform State 
systems. In the previous three sections, I set out the answers to these questions as they 
pertain to Gujarat, Kerala and Madhya Pradesh respectively.  
 
It is clear that not only was the institutional design for liberalized governance of water 
provision specified by the GoI (in the SR-Swajaldhara Guidelines) modified in 
different ways in its adoption by the three States, but also that the State-instituted 
design was further modulated by the socio-economic and political variables of the 
locality. The relative efficacy of the State-devised governance arrangements and the 
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relationship with the patterns of effectiveness and participation that emerged in the 
respective localities can only be assessed through a comparative analysis of the three 
cases. Such an analysis is undertaken in the next chapter, to find answers to the larger 
research question of whether and where a liberalized governance arrangement was 
efficacious and democratic. 
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CHAPTER V 
DEVOLUTION AND LIBERALIZATION IN WATER PROVISION: A 
CONTEXTUAL COMPARISON 
 
 
The question of the relative suitability of devolution and liberalization to different 
kinds of contexts has two sub-questions: how well each type works in different 
contexts, and how the two types of reform work in comparison to each other in the 
same kind of context. The patterns of water provision through devolved and liberalized 
governance configurations observed in the three study states have been described in 
Chapters III and IV respectively and provide the basis for answering both. First, to 
assess how devolution and liberalization work in different kinds of contexts, I compare 
the functioning of each type across the three States (sections 1 and 2 below). Then, to 
assess how devolved and liberalized systems work in the same context, I compare the 
patterns discerned in the two cases (PR and SR) in each State, and discuss which 
emerges as relatively more suitable in the three contexts respectively (section 3). To 
assess the relative performance, I use the scoring system described in Chapter II 
(section 5.1), to aggregate the outcomes observed along the various indicators for 
effectiveness and inclusion in each case.    
 
From the two kinds of comparisons, a picture of the relative suitability of devolution 
and liberalization in different kinds of developing contexts emerges. The comparisons 
also provide an understanding of hoe the two types of reformed governance 
arrangements ‘fit’ in the context, and thereby, the relationship between the 
organizational configurations and the contextual variables in each case. However, 
these answers still remain disaggregated along the effectiveness, equity and inclusion 
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parameters. This understanding is analytically and theoretically important, but fails to 
provide an overall measure of the relative suitability of the two types of reform to the 
different contexts, which is more directly usable for policy-design. Therefore, I finally 
aggregate the findings into a composite ‘score’ for each case, to provide a final answer 
to the question a policy-designer faces – which type of reformed arrangements work 
better – and therefore, are most suitable – in the three kinds of contexts?  
 
 
1. DEVOLUTION IN THREE DIFFERENT CONTEXTS 
 
The substantial differences in the designs of the local governance architectures in the 
three study States that emerged in the encounter of the skeletal structure specified in 
the GoI Panchayat Act and the respective State level political-economic situations and 
its further mutation in practice by the local circumstances, described in Chapter III, is 
shown in Figure 5.1. In the organograms, the distribution of responsibilities among the 
organizations as observed in the processes of project development from the State to 
the local levels is depicted in the relative sizes of their boxes, estimated using the 
score sheet developed (Table 2.6)337. The pre-reformed situation is visible in the 
faded-out boxes and the reformed architecture specified by the State is outlined in 
broken lines. The relative extent of devolution as well as the successive shifts from the 
pre-reform distribution in each case is shown in Figure 5.2. 338  
 
                                                 
337 Only the tasks devolved is considered here, and the degree of transfer – whether it is deconcentrated, 
delegated or truly devolved -  has not been considered. 
338 As explained in the previous chapter (section…) the efficacy of the reformed arrangements along the 
two dimensions of interest – effectiveness and inclusiveness – can be gauged from the extent to which 
the essential elements of the reform type are embodied in the institutional design – in devolution, the 
extent to which responsibilities, and the authority and resources to discharge them are actually 
transferred to the local government.  
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Figure 5.1:  Post-devolution governance configurations for water provision in 
Gujarat, Kerala and Madhya Pradesh. 
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Figure 5.2:  Distribution of functions for water provision in Gujarat, Kerala and 
Madhya Pradesh, derived using Devolution Score Sheet (Table 2.6) 
 
 
Among the three States, post-reform changes have visibly been the least in Gujarat, 
but the Panchayats already had a larger set of functions and resources than those in the 
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MP. Similarly, the relative extent of responsibility of the Gujarat GP is much larger 
than that of reformed GPs in MP, even if one includes the structures at the hamlet 
level such as the Health Committee. Devolution has clearly been the most substantial 
in Kerala, though in actual practice the KWA has more involvement and the GP less 
than was designed. Clearly, State-level socio-economic and political characteristics of 
Kerala were most favorable to devolution, and the extent of devolution was not 
reversed significantly by the village circumstances. 
 
1.1. EFFECTIVENESS OF WATER PROVISION THROUGH LOCAL GOVERNMENTS  
 
Is the relative potential of the different emergent configurations realized in the extent 
to which the arrangements are effective in actually improving water provision? From 
the comparison of the patterns of effectiveness in the three States (Table 5.1 and 
Figure 5.3 below) it evidently is in each case. In Kerala the reformed process yields 
the maximum increase in per-capita water availability, and complete elimination of the 
need to use unsafe sources, despite the fact that the proportion of village residents 
dependant on those before devolution was the highest among the three States. Even if 
it is small in absolute terms, the increase in the proportion of people with household 
connections is also best. Though it does not reduce disparity in the quantity of water 
available to those with private sources and those without very noticeably – as happens 
in Madhya Pradesh, there is no increase in disparities as in Gujarat.  
 
The reformed institutional architecture in respect of water provision was least 
efficacious in MP, despite the innovation of taking the decision-making right into the 
hamlets, and its effectiveness follows suit. The establishment of the Gram Swaraj  
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Table 5.1 
Relative Effectiveness of Water Provision through Devolved Governance 
Arrangements in Gujarat, Kerala and Madhya Pradesh 
Compiled fro Tables 3.3, 3.6 and 3.9; Scores derived using method in Table 2.7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.3:  Relative effectiveness of water provision after devolution in Gujarat, 
Kerala and Madhya Pradesh, from Table 5.1 
 
system in Madhya Pradesh is a radical step, particularly in a State where Panchayats 
had virtually no presence immediately before 1994, but without the executive actions 
to implement the legislation, the local-level processes have remained comparatively 
the least effective. However, with reforms, the need for people to use unsafe sources is 
largely eliminated, and most remarkably, the disparity between those with and without 
Indicators of Effectiveness GUJARAT-PR KERALA-PR MADHYA PRADESH-PR 
 Change % 
Change 
Score Change %  
Change 
Score Change %  
Change 
Score 
Per Capita Availability 18.0 36.2 3.6 42.6 120.6 12.1 14.8 38.2 3.8 
Per Cap from HH Source 40.2 128.1  19.0 20.8  0.0 0.0  
Per Cap from Public Sources 11.7 55.3  21.2 128.6  15.1 37.2  
Disparity (HH and Shared Sources) 23.0 147.3 14.7 2.2 3.0 0.3 11.4 29.5 3.0 
% Popn with HH Source 19.6 19.6 2.0 28.3 28.3 2.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 
% HH < 50 m from Pub Srce 24.3 24.3 2.4 42.5 42.5 4.2 10.9 10.9 1.1 
% HH - Unprotected Srces 12.5 100.0 10.0 44.3 100.0 10.0 10.9 59.2 5.9 
OVERALL (including Disparities)   3.3   29.4   13.8 
W/O CONSIDERING DISPARITIES   18.0   29.1   10.8 
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public sources is reduced. This could be an artifact of the technologies used by the 
MPPHED for village installations (public handpumps), but also emerge from other 
institutional reasons as discussed in the next chapter. 
 
While the effectiveness of local government processes in Gujarat lies in between the 
two other States on most indicators, the sharp increase in disparity between those with 
and without private connections is highly problematic. On this basis alone one could 
question the devolution of powers to Gujarat Panchayats, for the fears of critics, that 
the higher income groups would corner devolved resources appears to be borne out to 
an extent. However, half the households have private piped connections, making the 
distribution flatter than elsewhere, and all households dependant on public sources are 
within 50m from one.  
 
Here it must be noted that for the households who get water from a shared source at a 
distance from the house, both carrying the water and storage are constraints, and in 
instances where supply is for a limited duration (as in the Kerala villages), the volume 
that can actually be collected, in the brief time they get their turn, is limited. Therefore 
increase in the ease of access or duration of supply does not always lead to very high 
increases in consumption. What is important for such households is the reliability of 
the source, with water available throughout the year in a reasonably predictable 
pattern.  Even more important is the control over the source, especially in the case of 
the Madhya Pradesh villages, where access of the poorer households was almost 
completely dependent on the permission of the big farmers with field tubewells.  
 
For those who have a household piped supply (as in Gujarat villages) the main 
constraint is storage. People in those families try to complete ablutions while the water 
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is running, and women wash the clothes, but only after the storage vessels are topped 
up. They therefore actually use more water than the volume they collect and store, 
unlike the households in Kerala where the tap is shared. Similarly, households in the 
Madhya Pradesh villages wash clothes and sometimes, cooking vessels near the 
handpump or well, using more water than they actually carry home.  
 
Was the process of improving and augmenting water supply systems easier, or 
gestation periods reduced? In Gujarat, there is little difference in any aspect. Though 
records of the process by which the pre-reform systems had been developed were not 
available, the new systems studied took between 1-5 years to be completed. Though 
long, the process required little input from the village residents or the Panchayat, as 
the tasks of getting the project developed, sanctioned and constructed were handled by 
the GWSSB staff. The village leaders (elected or social) only had to occasionally 
remind and request the GWSSB officials, and furnished the required no-objection 
certificate from the Panchayat. Clearly, users or village residents did not participate in 
the decision-making, except in providing some information such as which locations 
were thought to have good groundwater and the depth of existing private borewells. 
 
In Madhya Pradesh too, there is little change in the degree of effort and time required 
to develop a new project, and it remains as taxing as before reforms. It still takes 
repeated visits to the Janpad offices by a significant person of the village, and atleast 
between eight months to a year to install a handpump or small tank. Earlier, it was the 
DE at the PHED Sub-division who had to be petitioned; now it is the officer in the 
Janpad Panchayat, but the continuous effort and gestation time remain unchanged. 
What has changed is the degree of power of Sarpanches, who have a larger amount of 
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untied funds, greater information from and more ‘connections’339 at the Block office 
because of membership in the Janpad Panchayat. This enables them to initiate projects  
for their constituents and social groups. A small advance is the credibility gained by 
otherwise non-elites in the village due to their positions in Gram Sabha structures, 
such as the Health Committee President. In the words of the very active President of 
the Lasudiya Dhakad Health Committee,  
 
“Now I can go to talk to someone in the Janpad, when I say I am Health Committee 
President, they at least talk to me that day, even if they make me wait. Earlier I had to 
go (for personal work) three-four times at least, waste so many days, before I could 
talk to the clerk.” (interview) 
 
The process in Kerala seems to have changed to a much greater extent. Not all projects 
have to be sanctioned and funded by KWA Division Offices; for the projects planned 
by the GP are financed from the Panchayats funds and only executed by the KWA – 
this reduces the time-to-completion significantly. The differences begin with the 
greater familiarity of the residents with their Ward member, acquired in the course of 
the annual participatory planning exercises with NHGs and CDSs. This enables them 
to make demands on the member to push for community projects, and the opportunity 
to get their needs listed with the relevant Working Group. Also, once the project was 
included in the Annual Plan, the time to completion was only a few months, for funds 
were already allocated and had to be utilized within the year. This is in sharp contrast 
to the earlier process, when KWA staff were less accessible (the Sub-Division Office 
is located at the Block level) and were ‘experts’ with little time for ‘technically 
                                                 
339 Social contact and relationship with staff in government offices or their kin is so important as to be 
almost a pre-requisite to getting any ‘work done’ (in Hindi, ‘kaam karaana’) that the word ‘connection’, 
spoken with a local intonation (‘conecson’ or ‘conacson’), is part of the vocabulary of the male village 
residents who are more active or interested in civic/ development work. Another word is ‘politics’ 
(pronounced ‘pultics’) which is frequently used, in a negative connotation, as explanation for any 
government system, program, or process that doesn’t work as it is meant to, or as an euphemism for 
collusion and corruption. 
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ignorant’ suggestions from ‘ordinary’ people.(focus group, Mallvattam). More, even if 
the needs were pointed out and requests made, it was for the officer to formulate the 
project, request funds and sanction and undertake implementation – a process that took 
between one to two years for a standpost or handpump. That is, if the project was 
approved at all, for smaller projects had less priority. In the KWA’s focus on 
Comprehensive Water Supply Systems that were designed to cover large areas and 
populations in one stroke; the fact that such projects had a gestation period of more 
than five to ten years (sometimes even longer), and in the meantime people remained 
without access to water, was brushed aside. The reformed process is therefore quicker, 
more attuned to the immediate needs of small neighborhoods and most notably, 
participatory and transparent.  
 
In sum, devolution seems to be most suited to the political and economic conditions of 
Kerala, followed by those in MP, despite the higher per capita increase in Gujarat and 
in MP.  
 
1.2. PARTICIPATION IN LOCAL GOVERNANCE AFTER DEVOLUTION.  
 
The relative efficacy of the reformed arrangements in respect of its propensity to 
include women resides in the kind of spaces and other provisions that are included. In 
this too, the three States differed sharply, for though the proportion of seats earmarked 
for women in the three-tier local government structure remained the same, additional 
spaces that were created in associated organizational structures differed. The thematic 
Panchayat Working Groups and area-based NHGs in Kerala and the seven committees 
of the Village Assembly in Madhya Pradesh added significantly to the number of 
assured opportunities to participate, for one-third of the seats in these bodies were also 
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earmarked. More, these were closer to home (rather than at block or district levels) 
making access easier.  
 
Whether seats were earmarked in various Standing Committees of the of the Panchayat and if 
there was a specification of women’s presence in the quorum for meetings were other enabling 
provisions that differed – and in this too, Kerala won out, on both counts. The situation was 
uneven in MP, with some provisions made such as the requirement for women’s presence in 
the quorum for village assemblies and Panchayat meetings, but not for the meetings of the 
various committees. Gujarat was equally tardy in this respect, with provisions for quorum at 
meetings only in some Standing Committees.  
 
Table 5.2 and Figure 5.4 show the extents to which women occupy the reserved 
positions provided and make use of the opportunities presented for participation, in 
comparison with men. It clearly emerges that women’s involvement in local 
governance processes in both Gujarat and Madhya Pradesh compares very poorly with 
the situation in Kerala. In both places, few elected women attend Panchayat meetings, 
though in both states they fill the statutory quota of one-third of seats in Panchayats.  
 
The pattern, however, does not mirror the relative efficacies of the institutional 
configurations in the three States discussed above. The relationship between efficacy 
and effect holds in the case of Kerala, where the potential of the reformed institutional 
architecture is best realized, and in Gujarat where the lack of extensive provisions is 
also visible in the low level of women’s participation in the State. It is in MP where 
the pattern fails, for the greater extent of opportunities to participate presented by the 
Gram Swaraj arrangements is not utilized even to the (low) extent in Gujarat.  
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Table 5.2 
Relative Inclusion in Devolved Governance Arrangements for Water Provision in 
Gujarat, Kerala and Madhya Pradesh 
Compiled from values in Fig. 3.6, 3.12 and 3.18; scores derived as described in Chapter 2 and Table 2.7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.4:  Comparative participation of women in the development of water 
supply projects in Gujarat, Kerala and Madhya Pradesh, based on 
Table 5.2.  
 
What explains this anomaly? The lack of effective implementation of the provisions of 
the Gram Swaraj system is no doubt one major reason, for it enabled the free 
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transformation of the reformed arrangements by the local political-economic and 
social conditions in the villages. As a result, the emergent institutional architecture is 
far less hospitable to women’s involvement than designed, for even the requirement to 
include them in the Gram Sabha Committees is not always honored, and quorum 
conditions for meetings almost completely disregarded340. The complex of gendered 
and casteist social norms and practices in the MP villages that limit women’s lives and 
actions is the other contributing factor, as discussed in section 4. 
 
The pattern of extensive and decisive involvement of women in Kerala and its stark 
contrast with the lack of participation in Gujarat and Madhya Pradesh is apparent. 
However, on closer interrogation, other interesting contours of similarity and 
difference emerge that complicate this ready observation. One is that the pattern of 
women’s participation in the village-level processes is close to that of men in both 
Kerala and Madhya Pradesh. Kerala women are as highly involved as men are, though 
in smaller numbers, at the Panchayat level; but at the neighborhood level, where 
NHGs and a large number of SHGs have developed in tandem, often more women 
than men participate and more actively. The parity is also true of Madhya Pradesh, but 
in reverse: the participation of both men and women is almost equally low in village-
level governance processes, with women’s participation being only slightly lower than 
that of men. The low involvement of women is therefore not only a gendered 
phenomenon, but as much a product of the larger social relations in the village which 
constrain men’s involvement almost as much as women’s.  Differences in the relative 
patterns of participation by men and women in Gujarat and Madhya Pradesh therefore 
appear to be best explained by the respective pre-reform histories of local governance 
                                                 
340 The women members are usually asked to affix their signatures (or thumb prints) in the minutes 
book after the meetings. 
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and Panchayat functioning and the differences in the socio-economic contexts. 
 
1.3. DEVOLUTION IN CONTEXT: EFFICACY AND DEMOCRACY  
 
In which kind of context, from among those in the three study States, does devolution 
work best, and why? What emerges is that among the institutional architecture for 
devolution that emerged in the political-economic circumstances of the respective 
States that in Kerala was most efficacious, followed by those Madhya Pradesh and 
Gujarat. The social, political and economic conditions at the local level in Kerala were 
also hospitable to the reformed structure and processes and therefore the potential of 
the substantially devolved governance arrangements to effect change was not reduced, 
and the uptake of opportunities presented for change was substantial. The (little) 
reformed institutional configuration in Gujarat was also not modified in is functioning, 
and the low-to-moderate efficacy of the designed structure was unaffected. There was 
substantially more devolution in Madhya Pradesh, but the local political economy and 
socio-cultural characteristics sharply reduced the efficacy of the reformed structures 
and processes to effect change.  
 
However, all the three governance configurations were effective in improving the 
availability of water in relation to the previous situation, in quantity and ease of 
access. What differed was the extent of effort required by the users to improve the 
situation, the time taken for the installation of additional systems and the kind of 
participation in the decision-making process, either of users, or their elected 
representatives in the local government. In Kerala, the organizational arrangements 
and decision-making processes were most participatory, reduced the gestation period 
for new systems (or repairs) and the most user-friendly. The governance arrangements 
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had only minimal advantages over the pre-reform arrangements in Gujarat and 
Madhya Pradesh for improved participation, both leading to a very slight positive 
change in the involvement of village residents. However, despite least change from the 
previous arrangements, the system in Gujarat perhaps could be said to be somewhat 
easier on village residents in that the process of developing new water supply systems 
requires much less effort and energy on their part than in Madhya Pradesh, where 
repeated petitioning, support of politically powerful individuals or credible NGOs and 
continuous follow-up by whoever in the village initiates the process, is inevitably 
required. Also, in the latter case, there is a very obvious capture of decision-making 
processes and resources by the Sarpanch, who is typically from among the local elites. 
 
The comparative situation in regard to women’s participation is more revealing, as it 
shows clear differences in the nature and extent of their involvement in the processes 
in the three States. There was almost no involvement of women in local governance 
structures in any State prior to the 1994 reforms and the introduction of a mandatory 
quota of elected positions. This has resulted in women constituting one-third of the 
elected members in local governments in all three States, but it is in the nature and 
extent of active involvement that the differences are glaring. In Kerala, elected women 
– both members and Presidents of Gram Panchayats – are most energetically involved 
– they attend meetings, voice opinions, engage in deliberations, and chair Committees 
and Working Groups. Women are much less actively involved in Gujarat, and very 
occasionally do attend meetings and sometimes, voice their opinions, though the 
involvement of women at both ends of the caste continuum – which coincided with 
income levels – is very minimal. In Madhya Pradesh the situation is least encouraging; 
often, women’s membership in GS Committees itself is either not in the statutory 
proportion or only on paper, and very few attend meetings and even fewer speak up.  
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What is therefore the answer that emerges to the central question of this exercise – in 
which kind of context does devolution work best, and why? From the comparisons in 
the previous section, it can be safely concluded that it is most efficacious, effective 
and participatory in locations with high political and social development, and 
moderate economic development, such as in Kerala. These factors not only provide a 
reasonably hospitable State context in which the institutional architecture for local 
governance is that is devised is consistent with the objective of improving service 
provision and including citizens in governance, but the political will also exists for full 
implementation and institutionalization of the reformed arrangements. The level of 
human, social and political development also enables moderate-to-high uptake by 
citizens of the opportunities to participate, and yields substantial improvements in 
water provision. This bears out the relationship that is the corner-stone of the 
arguments for devolution – that the democratic inclusion of citizens in governance, 
while being an important end in itself, can also yield improvements in service 
provision.  
 
A conducive political situation at the State level appears to be a requirement, for it was 
that which led to an efficacious design for decentralized governance in two cases – 
Kerala and MP – while in contrast, in Gujarat the presence of an Opposition party in 
government blocked any substantial reform. However, it is not a sufficient condition, 
for what emerges as more crucial is the level of human, social and political 
development in the State without which even efficacious and bold devolution 
initiatives are undermined and subverted at both State and local levels, as in MP. 
There, the extent of devolution itself swung between the bold initiatives of the 
reforming Chief Minister and the reluctance of the political-bureaucratic establishment 
to part with power, and devolution could be retracted without protest from citizens, 
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who lacked the extensive political awareness and engagement seen in Kerala. Then the 
same lack prevented a good off-take of the still-substantial opportunities presented at 
the local level, and the capture of state power and resources by local elites. The level 
of economic development does not appear to be a critical condition, and high 
economic development may actually constrain civic engagement of average citizens, 
as in Gujarat, where despite higher literacy and general awareness, there was no 
groundswell for devolution after the Panchayat Act that could have spurred reforms.  
  
Th relationships posited here between reform efficacy, effectives and participation 
appear the best explanations for the variations observed across States. Certainly it 
appears to be more than the design of the structure and processes, though the Kerala 
design is quite revolutionary (Heller 2001). But the Gram Swaraj design in Madhya 
Pradesh is a close contender, atleast in its possibilities for participatory decision-
making (Manor, 2003) and women’s involvement. The alacrity of the Kerala 
government in kick-starting a participatory planning process and altering 
administrative arrangements to synchronise with decentralized governance appears 
another obvious explanation, for that is missing in the other two States, but that 
nitiative is itself a function of a conducive political situation in the State, and a highly 
literate and aware population. In Gujarat there is little energy applied to devolution, 
with more attention and funds allocated to special programs initiated by the Chief 
Minister, but little protest, for it is precluded by the availability of economic 
opportunities and the characteristic market-rationality of citizens as discuseed in 
section 2.5. In the case of Madhya Pradesh also the explanation is found in the 
political, economic and social dimensions of the context, which modulated received 
designs at both macro and micro levels.   
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In sum, devolution works best, in terms of both effectiveness and participation, in 
situations with high political, social and human development, though it may be 
effective to a degree in improving service provision in other contexts, as in Gujarat 
and MP. In both the latter cases, however, it was accompanied by undesirable 
consequences such as increased disparity (in Gujarat) and resource capture by elites 
(in both). The lack of widespread civic engagement is the key issue, for it is the 
primary mechanism that prevents perverse outcomes such as these, by increasing 
transparency and downward accountability. High economic development with a strong 
orientation to cultural traditions as in Gujarat appears to actually militate against 
participation, for by presenting economic opportunities on one hand and civic 
philanthropy on the other, there is little need or motivation to participate. Need, on the 
other hand, does spur some civic engagement in MP despite low political and social 
development. 
 
It also emerges that institutional design in itself cannot increase effectiveness or even 
more, participation, for even the apparently enabling Gram Swaraj arrangements did 
neither. However, with the involvement of the NGOs - Samarthan in MP and KSSP in 
Kerala – a difference is visible in both cases. Even with a limited degree of political 
development, the information and organizational capacities provided by Samarthan 
were useful. Institutional mechanisms for such in the reformed arrangements – such as 
the wide-spread information dissemination in the PPC in Kerala – are very likely to 
improve effectiveness and participation. There are other indications, and an important 
task is to identify specific design features in the institutional arrangements for local 
governance that could make devolution effective in each kind of context. I return to 
this question in the last section, after considering how the other mode of decentralizing 
water provision – the Sector Reform program – works in the same three locations. 
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2. LIBERALIZATION IN THE THREE STATES 
 
In Chapter IV (sections 2, 3 and 4), I discussed (a) the ways in which the GoI-driven 
reform agenda to liberalize state provision of domestic water (through the SR-
Swajaldhara program) have been applied to their existing systems by the three study 
States, (b) how the reformed institutional arrangements actually played out at State, 
district and village levels, and (c) to what extent the reformed arrangements in each 
State have been more or less effective and participative than the previous system. Here 
I compare the situation in the three study States to assess how a centrally designed 
reform to liberalize State provision of domestic water is assimilated in the different 
State contexts and find an answer to the larger research question of the context-
appropriateness of liberalized arrangements.  
 
2.1. COMPARATIVE EFFICACY OF REFORMED INSTITUTIONAL ARCHITECTURE  
 
In the Sector Reform and Swajaldhara programs, the DDWS (GoI) prescribed the 
design of the liberalized institutional configuration in substantial detail, though some 
organizational alternatives were made available for the States to tailor the overall 
design to their own institutional contexts. As elaborated in Chapter IV (section 1), 
these were not many, but the substantial differences that it permitted are visible with a 
graphic comparison of the organizational structures in the three States. Comparative 
analysis is possible at two levels –first, in the de jure structure and processes specified 
by the State, second, and in the de facto processes and emergent structure observed in 
this research.  
 
Figure 5.5 shows the emergent organizational structures in the study States, with the 
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total number of functions, responsibilities or powers that are held by actors in different 
domains represented by the relative sizes of the organizational units in the diagrams. 
The extent of the functions and resources held by the State (includes departments and 
parastatals and their subsidiary or field offices), elected local governments at district 
or lower levels, NGOs, CBOs and private firms or individuals was derived using the 
relative weightages assigned to various functions (see Table 2.6 in Chapter II). The 
most faded-out boxes represent the pre-reform distribution of functions and resources, 
the darker ones outlined in dotted lines represent the extent of the functions and 
resources assigned to the units in the de-jure reformed structure delineated by the 
State. The shifts in the role and relative importance of various units can therefore be 
read in each case. Patterns of distribution of functions across organizational actors in 
the pre-reformed, designed and observed governance configuration is shown in Figure 
5.6. 
 
That the extent of transfer from the State institutions to other actors differs sharply 
across States is evident; Kerala appears to be, in design, the most ‘liberalized’, with 
CBOs341 (Beneficiary Groups) intensively involved, though Gujarat is a close 
contender. In Madhya Pradesh the PHED (State) still remains the most significant 
actor, with the VWSC at the village level expected to take on a few responsibilities. 
While control of the GoI funds and formulation of policy remains with the State 
government in all three cases, there is greatest autonomy in the discharge of these 
functions in Gujarat, with the institution of WASMO, which by all accounts 
functioned with a great degree of autonomy since its inception till the time of this 
                                                 
341 Morever, State structures such as the SWSM, SWSC and DLTC in Kerala include a not insignificant 
number of members from outside the State – representatives of donors and NGOs, and experts and 
professionals. This is true at the State level in Gujarat, but much less so at the district level where NGOs 
are not included in the DWSM, though they are part of the village-level process as support agencies 
(SAs). 
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Figure 5.5:  Post-liberalization governance configurations for water provision 
in study States. 
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Figure 5.6:  Shifts in the distribution of functions for water provision after 
liberalization in study States. 
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made almost all decisions. In contrast, both in Gujarat and Madhya Pradesh, the state 
retained control even at the district level, through the Collector, who chaired the 
DWSM. Moreover, the GWSSB in Gujarat and the PHED in MP continued to be 
important in the implementation process, though much more so in MP. In sum, Kerala 
is arguably the most liberalized, with the maximum number of decisions in the process 
taken by elected local governments and CBOs, followed by Gujarat. 
 
The de jure institutional structure underwent little transformation in its functioning 
except in the case of Gujarat (see Figure 5.18). In Kerala and MP the designed 
structures observably function almost as set out in State Guidelines and the attendant 
government directives, though in the former, the Gram Panchayat (in the form of the 
GVRT) is more actively involved than envisaged. In Madhya Pradesh, at the village 
level the Panchayat takes on more than designed and the unplanned involvement of the 
NGO is significant. The most significant change in MP was in the availability of funds 
for new projects. With the villages in the area not being considered in the NC or PC 
category – though in reality the per-capita availability of water from protected sources 
within 200m of all households was below the 40 lpcd statutory minimum342 – they 
were not eligible for funds from almost any program.343 In the SR-Swajaldhara 
program, however, funds were available wherever there was adequate ‘demand’, as 
attested by the users’ agreement to pay the 10% contribution and bear the operational 
expenses. In fact, MP’s off-take from the funds initially earmarked for the State was 
                                                 
342 This was because the PHED records – and surveys – listed handpumps that did not actually work, or 
produced unpotable water, and wells that ran dry for more than half the year. Particpatory mapping one 
during this research clearly indicated the number of perennial, functioning sources with poptable yields 
to be less than the survey indicated in all villages.  
343 Panchayat funds under various programs were allocated at the discretion, preference or influence of 
the controlling elites, which almost inevitably resulted in installations in the upper-caste and better-
income neighborhoods. Strictly earmarked funds for marginalized and disadvantaged groups were 
available for their neighborhoods but without the pressure from connected elites, the priority accorded 
by the PHED engineers to implementing such projects was much less. 
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only a small proportion of the total, and the pressure on the DWSM to develop more 
projects “has made it almost like any other ‘target-driven program’.” (ZP Secretary, 
Sehore) This has made the implementing agency keen to install more sources even in 
the villages listed as FC. 
 
What explains this variation among the States? Clearly, the institutional arrangement 
set in place by the State was a product of the State’s political willingness to reduce its 
functional domain, its need to retain legitimacy with the pro-liberalization forces and 
the relative influence of the existing bureaucracy. In Gujarat, a liberal approach to 
service provision and involvement of non-State actors has historically existed, and 
continues to survive in areas not completely overtaken by the State, in addition to a 
general positive orientation to market-based approaches. This definitively undergirded 
the more proximate reasons for naming the autonomous WASMO as the nodal agency, 
such as lobbying by the well-developed pro-community NGO sector and the need to 
retain credibility with international civil society organizations such as their 
Netherlands donor (CEO, WASMO).  
 
A similar explanation is applicable in Kerala, where the political, administrative and 
financial devolution that preceded the SR arguably provided the socio-political 
underpinning to the more immediate pressures such as the influence of donor agencies, 
the issues plaguing the KWA and the success of various community-based models. 
Despite the KWA’s political weight, the nodal role in the SWSM implementation at 
the district level and below was entrusted to elected local governments, and despite the 
obstruction of the State bureaucracy at the district level, the State (SWSM) decisions 
weighed in favor of local governments. 
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In MP, none of these pro-liberalization factors appeared to exist in sufficient strength 
to counter the political weight of the PHED and the reluctance of the State government 
to reduce its functional domain. Neither a liberal orientation as in Gujarat, nor the 
local socio-political mobilization around the idea of decentralization existed in the 
State. An active and vocal NGO sector that could advocate pro-community policy was 
also absent, as were international donors in programs focused singularly on water 
provision. Local civil society was just emerging, and international donor presence in 
the area of drinking water was equally nascent.344  
 
The functioning of the institutional structure and processes as intended in Gujarat and 
Kerala can also be attributed to the same reasons. In Gujarat, the existence of a strong 
local government system and the remarkable ability to mobilize and utilize all 
resources that is a hall-mark of the State as well as its residents meant that there was 
quick off-take of the program at the local levels. VWSCs were quickly formed, though 
without any social-organization process, and they capably utilized the opportunity for 
infrastructure creation offered by the program. Relative prosperity in the area made it 
easy for the community contributions to be mobilized. A remark by the Sarpanch of 
Laskana embodies this spirit “…When we are getting 90% of the funds by giving 
10%, why should we let the opportunity go? We are not fools….”. In Kerala, the local 
organizational capacity and political awareness in the community furthered by the 
local government reforms created the same energy both in the local government 
system as well as in the communities. No doubt in both cases the water shortage was a 
significant driving force.  
 
                                                 
344 UNICEF had extended support to the SR program, but water supply was not its primary focus in the 
State, and WaterAid had started operating in the State only after 2000. 
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While the same kind of scarcity existed in Sehore, it was not sufficient to activate the 
formal structure at the local levels. The local government system at the village level 
remained embodied in the Sarpanch and Sachiv, except in a few places where 
unusually self-efficacious individuals energized in the Panchayat and/ or the 
community. This ensured the continuation of the patron-client relationships between 
the Village Sarpanch or other influential – and inevitably, higher-caste – persons and 
officials and elected representatives at block or district levels. VWSCs existed on 
paper, as Panchayat Committees, and funds were channeled through them, but they 
were used for projects decided by the Sarpanch and Sachiv or in the habitations where 
active leadership was taken by a community member or village functionary (like the 
Treasurer or Health Committee President). The local community – the village 
assembly (Gram Sabha) – which was envisaged as the main organ for accountability 
of elected members hardly functioned in this role, except where NGOs took on the 
task of organizing and making them politically active assemblies. In short, the 
conditions for active functioning of self-determining community organizations that 
was the fulcrum of the SR-Swajaldhara program did not exist to any extent in rural 
MP, precluding the functioning of the reformed arrangements at the local level. 
Therefore, even the minimally reformed structure set in place – or prescribed – by the 
State government, which in design was the least liberalized among those in the three 
States, was in practice overwhelmed by the existing power structures and the lack of 
either socio-political awareness or local organizational capacities, or both.   
 
Is the extent of liberalization and the functioning of the reformed structures in each 
case related in any patterned way to the effectiveness of water provision and 
participation in the new governance arrangements in each State? I address these 
questions next. 
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2.2. EFFECTIVENESS OF LIBERALIZED ARRANGEMENTS IN THE THREE STATES  
 
In all States, the overall availability of water to the community distinctly improved, as 
did the ease of access (Table 3 and Figure 5.7.). Assessing this in relation to other 
factors like time taken for project completion and for repair assures the conclusion that 
the reformed system was more effective in delivering water to the community. This 
virtue of the reformed systems in all States, however, covered some less encouraging 
aspects. The first, though perhaps less important, was the fact that while the per capita 
availability of water improved, there is a substantial gap in the average quantity 
available in each case, as well as in the extent of change. The situation in Gujarat by 
far exceeds that in Madhya Pradesh, though with the difference in the baselines, this is 
perhaps not surprising.  
 
The second and less acceptable situation is that those with household connections 
benefit remarkably more from the installation of the new systems than those 
dependent on public sources, in two of the three States. The disparity is notably 
greater in Gujarat than in MP, where only a few households take private connections. 
In Gujarat, household connections are extended to larger segments of the village 
community though, inevitably, including the upper caste households. The rationale 
advanced was that the installation costs and monthly charges for household 
connections far exceeded the paying capacity of the poorer households; water was 
provided ‘free’ to them through the standposts.  Also, that piped supply to the entire 
village would eventually be extended, but it would be accomplished in phases since 
the resources were limited. In MP, on the other hand, only a few households had 
private taps, by paying the cost of extending the pipeline to their houses. Their 
monthly rates, however, were only as much as was charged from those without 
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Table 5.3 
Relative Effectiveness of Water Provision through Liberalized Governance 
Arrangements in Gujarat, Kerala and Madhya Pradesh 
Compiled from Tables 4.3, 4.5 and 4.7; Scores derived using method in Table 2.7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.7:  Comparison of the change in water availability after SR projects in 
Gujarat, Kerala and Madhya Pradesh, from Table 5.3 
 
household connections. Therein lay another difference – in Gujarat, those without a 
household connection paid no monthly rates, though they did contribute some amount 
towards the capital cost, according to their paying capacity, as was required by the 
SRP Guidelines. Water supply is fully egalitarian in Kerala, with all households who 
are members of the BGs connected to the distribution system. All member households 
STATE COMPARISON: SR G-SR K-SR MP-SR 
Indicators of Effectiveness Change % 
Change 
Score Change % 
Change 
Score Change % 
Change 
Score 
Per Capita Availability 56.7 115.1 11.5 52.8 159.6 16.0 11.7 33 3.3 
Per Cap from HH Source 79.5 176.1  1.3 1.7  39.7 69  
Per Cap from Public Sources 20.2 124.7  2.0 6.8  34.2 93  
Disparity (HH and Shared Sources) 59.3 205.0 20.5 45.1 100.0 10.0 5.5 18 1.8 
% Popn with HH Source 28.2 28.2 2.8 93.5 93.5 9.3 4.7 5 0.5 
% HH < 50 m from Pub Srce 33.9 33.9 3.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 23.0 23 2.3 
% HH - Unprotected Srces 43.8 90.9 9.1 46.0 100.0 10.0 23.5 90 9.0 
OVERALL (including Disparities)   6.3   45.3   13.3 
W/O CONSIDERING DISPARITIES   26.8   35.3   15.1 
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therefore have access to equal quantity of water from the new project, though those 
with private wells can use additional quantities from their own source.  
 
The difference in the paying capacity of the households in the three States emerges as 
a significant issue. In Kerala, all households contributed an equal amount, and even 
interviewees of modest circumstances stated that it was not very difficult to for them 
to pay (fdg Mayilladumkunnu, Ambalakonam). In Gujarat, despite very high 
differences in income and asset ownership within the community, all households 
contributed according to their capacity, with a few contributing very large amounts to 
make up the 10% of capital costs; collections exceeded the required amount in all but 
one of the study villages (Vadadla). It was in MP that raising the community 
contributions was difficult; according to the staff of Samarthan, the proportion of 
destitute families in some habitations made it almost impossible. For there were few 
who were sufficiently better-off to make up these deficits. Funds had to be cobbled 
together from elsewhere, including government funds from programs administered by 
the Panchayat and from donors outside the community (through Samarthan). In two 
instances, a proportion of the deficit was made up from the corpus held by the Temple 
Committee, a very large amount in the case of Lasudiya Khas.  
This is qualitatively different from the more secular intra-community philanthropy in 
the Gujarat villages, for the Temple Committees are organizations of the majority 
religious group, in villages with socially heterogeneous populations including 
households from minority religious groups, notified tribes and lower castes.  
 
Water quality remained a problem in all locations, though least so in Gujarat, where 
the projects were implemented through the GWSSB, and a quality test of the proposed 
water source in a certified laboratory had to be undertaken before before funds could 
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be sanctioned. Though testing for quality was also required in the other two States, the 
engineers filled the requirement in most cases through physical examination, without 
insisting on the laboratory tests, since minimizing costs were a major concern. 
Important sources of information about source quality were older residents perceived 
to have a good knowledge of local ecologies in both Madhya Pradesh and Kerala, 
though in two villages (Neelamootil in Kerala and Kharpa in MP), reportedly the 
engineer’s suggestion prevailed. Even in the cases where the source water was fully 
tested, as in Neelamootil in Kerala, periodic testing was not a practice, even though 
the quality of the water perceptively changed in different seasons. 
 
In sum, the water situation was much eased in all study villages by the projects 
implemented in the reformed process, and in a much shorter gestation period than 
previously. The effectiveness of the reformed arrangements did not therefore, appear 
to be related to the extent of reform, for even in the least reformed situation in MP, the 
new process yielded appreciable results. 
 
2.3. PARTICIPATION IN LIBERALIZED GOVERNANCE IN THE THREE STATES  
 
The first and most obvious observation in relation to the pattern of women’s 
involvement in the reformed institutional processes (shown in Table 5.4 and Figure 
5.8 below) is that it is as high and active as that of men in Kerala, in stark contrast to 
the picture in the other two States. This can no doubt be attributed directly to the levels 
of education and earlier mobilization and participation in the reformed local 
governance processes. Though the institutional architecture was most liberalized in 
Kerala among the three States, the active and equal participation of women and men 
may not be substantially attributable to this, as a similar pattern was visible in the case  
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Table 5.4 
Relative Inclusion in Liberalized Governance Arrangements for Water Provision 
in Gujarat, Kerala and Madhya Pradesh 
Compiled from values in Figures 4.7, 4.13 and 4.18; Scores derived using method in Chapter 2, Table 2.7 
 
 
Figure 5.8:  Relative participation of women in development of water supply 
projects after liberalization in the study States, from Table 5.4 
 
of local governments (discussed in Chapter III, section 3). On the other hand, the 
similarity also indicates the high efficacy of the reformed institutional architecture, in 
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that it offered as substantial opportunity for participation as did the reformed local 
governments.   
 
The situation was very different in the other two States, and the lower efficacy of the 
instituted arrangements was no doubt a contributing factor. Unlike the ‘non-official’, 
community and area-based BGs in Kerala, in Gujarat and MP, the organizational set-
up remained tied to the ‘official’ structure of the Panchayats, for the VWSC became 
one more of its Standing Committees. Another important difference in the institutional 
designs across the study States was that the respective reformed institutional structures 
created different numbers and kinds of spaces for women. Though the DDWS 
guidelines earmarked only one-third of seats in the Panchayat VWSCs for women, the 
existing two-tier structure of the Village Panchayat led to the earmarking of a similar 
proportion in the habitation-level Health Committees in MP. But in Kerala, the State 
government did even better, earmarking 50% of the seats in the Beneficiary  
Committees (BCs) as well as in the constitution of the Beneficacry Groups (BGs)345. 
That is, the number of spaces and opportunities for women’s participation in an MP 
village was atleast double that in Gujarat, but still much lesser than in Kerala.   
 
Morever, while in all three States spaces were created village-level executive bodies – 
the VWSC in Gujarat, the Beneficiary Committee in Kerala and the VWSC and 
Health Committee in MP – there was no statutory requirement for their presence in the 
general assembly except in Kerala. There, women were required to constitute half the 
members of the assembly (the BG), but in the other two States, the Village Assembly 
(Gram Sabha) constituted the user-group, and no specification was made in this 
                                                 
345 By specifying that two adults – one man and one woman – from each household would be the 
members of the BG; that is, gender parity in representation of households was ensured.  
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respect. Also, in neither Gujarat nor MP were any spaces created for women in the 
District-level Water and Sanitation Missions or the Water and Sanitation Committees, 
unlike the provisions for the same in the counterpart entities in Kerala.   
 
In all States, less than the proportion of seats earmarked in the respective executive 
committees are occupied by women – surprisingly, even in Kerala where women’s 
engagement was substantial and meaningful, as described in section 3.4. The 
explanation perhaps lies equally in the fact of women’s increasing engagement in 
income-earning activities in the Kudumbasree units, or the ubiquitous domestic 
responsibilities of women as well as the constraints posed by social or patriarchal 
norms. In the other two States, the proportion of positions occupied is about on par346, 
but different explanations were advanced in the two States for the not meeting the 
statutory requirement. In Gujarat, the answer from the Sarpanch in one village and 
VWSC members in another two was that “…they anyway don’t get involved, they 
don’t come to meetings…and other people are interested and active, there is so much 
work to be done and they actually do it…” (Sarpanch, Laskana; VWSC member, 
Ladvi, Tatijhagda). In Manpura in MP, where there were no women in the HC, the 
Treasurer of the village assembly explained that “…there is so much demand [for 
membership]….but it [absence of women members] doesn’t matter, they [women] are 
very active anyway…you know the SHG group started the whole project, they 
demanded it…”. But in Ramkhedi the HC President and in Lausudiya Khas the 
Sarpanch were equally surprised and offended when the discrepancy was pointed out – 
it appeared that by including two women (in committees of seven and nine 
respectively) they were satisfied that the statutory requirement was adequately met. 
                                                 
346 The proportion in MP appears lower than in Gujarat in the diagram due to the lowering of the 
average by the lack of any women in the Health Committee in Manpura village; the explanation 
received in the village in discussed in section 4.4. 
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Neither of the supportive factors – the preceding local government reforms nor the 
direct interest in augmenting domestic water supplies apparently counteracted the 
relatively less supportive institutional design and the socio-cultural norms of the 
context. 
 
The additional space provided for women in the institutional design in Kerala was 
actively used, matching the high involvement of men. Women participated not only as 
members but also held executive and officer positions, including that of the BC 
President. Their attendance, and reportedly, active participation in discussions at BC 
and BG meetings was on par with that of men – the difference in the levels of 
attendance seen in Figure 5.8 is likely to be more an artifact of the small sample size 
rather than a reflection of any substantial difference.  
 
Participation levels in Gujarat and Madhya Pradesh surface an interesting dynamic, 
observed also in the case of participation in local government processes (Chapter III, 
section 5).  While in both States the levels of women’s involvement are very low, both 
in the executive committees and the user assemblies, it differs less from that of men in 
the case of attendance in user-assemblies than in committee meetings. Men are much 
less interested in assembly meetings in both States, though their attendance is far 
better in MP than in Gujarat. These patterns, as well as the somewhat higher 
attendance of women at user-assemblies in MP can perhaps be explained by the 
differences in the local socio-economic contexts, as well as the intervention of the 
NGO Samarthan in the MP villages. In Gujarat, atleast two interviewees mentioned 
that “the committee [VWSC] is doing good work, why should we interfere…” and 
another said “I have to work, where is the time…and I will know all the news from 
others who were there…”. It can be inferred that both the perception of adequate and 
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efficient functioning of the VWSC and the better employment opportunities in Gujarat 
resulted in lower involvement of the men in the community.  
 
On the other hand, the much higher involvement of both men and women in MP – 
relative to Gujarat – can be attributed to the involvement of the NGO Samarthan, for a 
number of interviewees, both men and women, said they went to the assembly 
meetings because the “bhai” – literally, “brother”, referring to the Samarthan staff 
member most involved in the village – had organized it (the meeting), and wanted 
them to find out what was going on in the village (woman users- Kharpa, Lasudiya 
Dhakad; Panchayat member Kharpa). Three others were vocal about attending in order 
to claim their share of local government benefits; one user indignantly said,  
 
 “…there are so many projects coming to the village, a lot of money…but it is 
spent by the Sarpanch and Sachiv in their village…we have to demand more 
work in our village…in any case they have all the control, but atleast we 
should get something…” (user, Lasudiya Dhakad).  
This latter motivation is also likely to be partly an artifact of Samarthan’s efforts at 
mobilizing the community to play an active civic role in the new local government 
arrangements.  
 
In sum, the higher efficacy of the reformed institutional architecture in Kerala, which 
was clearly a result of the State-level political-economic dynamics and social 
characteristics like high literacy and awareness, and prior civic-political mobilization, 
contributed to the successful increase in involvement of women (and men). State-level 
political-economic situations did not result in very supportive - or efficacious - 
(reformed) governance arrangements in Gujarat or MP, and this was compounded by 
the prevailing socio-cultural characteristics in the study villages. Whether more 
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efficacious – or more liberalized – arrangements would have elicited higher levels of 
involvement is an open question, but the active involvement of the habitation-level 
Health Committees, which were not part of the reformed design in MP, does indicate 
the possibility. The point is that such an eventuality was largely precluded by the State 
context. 
 
 
3. DEVOLUTION AND LIBERALIZATION IN THE SAME CONTEXT 
 
The second sub-question contained in the question of the relative suitability of 
devolution and liberalization to different kinds of contexts is how the two types of 
reform work in comparison to each other in the same context, and I now explore 
answers to this. Two important points need to be considered in comparing the 
performance of the two kinds of reforms within each State. The first is that the two 
kinds of reform were not introduced at the same time, but with a gap of more than five 
years347. Though when the GoI introduced the respective reforms, they were applied 
simultaneously in all three study States, local government reforms (PR) that devolved 
responsibility for water provision to local governments in were applied in 1993-94, 
and reforms liberalizing the sector five years later, in 1999.  This meant that prior to 
the introduction of the sector reforms, the idea – and some degree of practical 
experience – of formalized community involvement in local governance processes had 
already been planted. So had the idea of women’s participation in formal political 
processes and local governance structures. Spaces had already been created for women 
in local government, by earmarking one-third of the constituencies for women, and by 
                                                 
347 The  local government reforms were introduced in 1992-93 by the GoI, but it was 1995 by the time 
the first elections to local governments were held in most States. The Sector Reform Program was 
introduced in 1999, but again, its actual implementation did not begin in most States till the next year. 
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1999 – when the sector reforms were introduced – women had been part of local 
governance structures for about 4-5 years and had had almost one full term348 in 
office. Despite their generally slim participation except in Kerala349, the idea had 
found roots in administrative arrangements and rules, as well as the mindscape of 
citizens.  The question is, did this improve the performance of the SRP, or facilitate 
better patterns of women’s participation?   
 
There is also another reason to expect better inclusion in the liberalized arrangements 
introduced than in the devolved set-up of local governments. Except in MP where 
Health Committees were among the eight Gram Sabha-level Committees statutorily 
constituted under the 2001 Gram Swaraj Adhiniyam, neither of the other States had 
any Panchayat-level groups directed primarily towards improving water supply, before 
the SR program. So with the initiation of the program, additional spaces were created 
for women in the organizational lattice of local governance in Gujarat and Kerala; 
moreover, these were in bodies specifically directed towards domestic water 
provision, a matter of direct interest to women in their roles as home-makers, but also 
to men in the light of the increasing scarcity. That is, in a number of ways, changes 
had been introduced in the ‘constitutive rules’ (Searle 1995, also Scott 2001) 
embedded in the local political-administrative and socio-cultural landscape in regard 
to decentralized local governance, prior to the SRP. Whether these had rendered the 
local context any more hospitable to the liberalization of water provision than its 
devolution to local governments is an open question, but the likelihood of this merits 
attention in comparing the relative performance of the two reforms. Therefore, in 
examining the comparative effectiveness and inclusion of the devolved and liberalized 
                                                 
348 A full term is five years (GoI 1992) 
349 Buch (2000, 2000a) and others survey the pattern of women’s participation across a number of 
States and found nil to low participation in general. That did not exclude some individual women from 
being actively involved and displaying exceptional leadership qualities.  
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arrangements in Gujarat, Kerala and Madhya Pradesh respectively, as I do below, I not 
only examine effectiveness and inclusion in the two reformed arrangements and the 
relationship with features of the institutional design or context (or both), but also 
attempt to find if the sequential application of the two reforms had any effect.   
 
3.1. COMPARING DEVOLUTION AND LIBERALIZATION IN GUJARAT 
 
In response to the Constitutional mandate in 1992 for devolution to local governments, 
Gujarat had made almost no change to the existing structure, except earmarking one-
third of the elected seats at all three Panchayat350 levels for women. Despite that, the 
institutional architecture for local governance was close to being the most 
decentralized among the three study States, rivaling the decentralization in Kerala (see 
Figure 5.2). In comparing this with the liberalized institutional structure after SR 
(Figures 5.9 and 5.10), it emerges as being almost as decentralized as the latter. For 
the VWSC, which plays a major role in the process, is also a Panchayat entity351, 
though ordinary citizens are included as members. However, these tend to be the 
village elite (close associates of the Panchayat President or other important 
members)352, except for the required representation of women and other marginalized 
groups353. The latter are also usually from among the elected Panchayat members, and 
the women relatives of Panchayat members, and in any case, tend to be little involved.  
 
The most significant change was the increased involvement of the users, primarily by 
way of contributing to the capital, operation and maintenance costs. This increases the 
role of the users in the process, but without giving them a significantly greater role in 
                                                 
350 Gram (village), Taluka (intermediate) and District. 
351 This is explicitly directed in the SRP Guidelines (GoI DDWS 2003) 
352 See Chapter IV, section 2 for a more detailed discussion. 
353 As observed in the study villages.  
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Figure 5.9:  Comparative extent of decentralization in Gujarat after devolution 
to local governments and liberalization of State water provision 
 
the decision-making354. However, even prior to the liberalized arrangements requiring 
users to pay, the upper-caste and upper-class elite with significantly higher incomes 
contributed in important ways and in substantial amounts to developing village 
                                                 
354Only a minimal role for a few people in the operations and maintenance, and in supervisory activities. 
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infrastructure, and the Panchayat was very active in raising such contributions 
(Panchayat records, Laskana, Ladvi; interview, AEE, Surat). In other words, 
community contributions were already part of the local governance resources, and not 
infrequently, for water supply projects355.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.10:  Relative pattern of decentralization in devolved and liberalized 
systems in Gujarat, using the Devolution Score Sheet (Table 2.6) 
 
In sum, therefore, the shift in the extent of decentralization under devolution and 
liberalization, is limited to the Panchayat. The different and additional roles of the 
community envisaged in the Sector Reforms, such as pro-active organization and 
development of projects (the ‘demand’) and more participation in other decisions such 
as project location, design or tendering has not fully materialized. Nor do the users 
appear to wish more involvement, as discussed before356. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
355 As evidenced by the two reverse-osmosis water purfication plants in two of the study villages, and 
atleast three old handpumps donated in other villages which had fallen into disuse after piped water 
supply was introduced.   
356 In chapter IV, section 2.5. 
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3.1.1. EFFECTIVENESS  OF DEVOLVED AND LIBERALIZED SYSTEMS  IN GUJARAT  
 
The effectiveness of the two kinds of reforms also appears to differ little, as seen in 
Figure 5.2, with the projects in both cases increasing the per capita quantity of safe 
water available, and the proportion of people with household connections as well as 
the access of others to public sources. This apparent similarity of effect, however, 
masks some important differences. On one hand, the liberalized process seems much 
more capable of substantially raising the quantity of water available, possibly because 
in practice there is no ceiling on the size of the project – though there is one implied in 
the design357 – as long as users are willing to contribute their share. On the other, this 
increased availability is unfairly distributed between those with and without household 
connections. That is, though the SR projects increase per capita availability to a 
greater extent, there is also a greater disparity in the quantity available to those with 
household taps and those dependant on public sources. This appears to bear out the 
concerns of those worried about the regressive propensities of liberalization; in 
comparison, the effect of devolution appears to be relatively more egalitarian. 
 
The alacrity with which the Village Panchayats utilized the opportunity offered by the 
SR program to form VWSCs and implement the projects is arguably a result of the 
long history of fairly robust Panchayats in Gujarat. It certainly cannot be attributed to 
the fact that local government reforms preceded sector reforms, since there was little 
change in the existing architecture as a consequence of the Panchayat Act.  
                                                 
357 In an administrative sleight-of-hand, in designing the project the capacities of the existing sources 
are not included, resulting in the actual available quantity being higher than that designed. In any case, 
the Guidelines of the GoI and the States do not actually prescribe a ceiling, but require the users to pay 
a greater proportion of the capital costs (20%) for projects providing more than 40 lpcd, upto 55 lpcd. 
However, projects of even larger capacity can be constructed if users are willing to bear all the 
additional costs beyond 55 lpcd. Since the marginal cost of increasing capacities is much less than the 
initial cost, users are willing to pay; but in Gujarat the State government bears this additional cost, upto 
55 lpcd.  
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Table 5.5 
Comparative Effectiveness of Water Provision after Devolution and 
Liberalization in Gujarat. 
Compiled from Tables 3.3 and 4.3; Scores derived by method explained in Table 2.7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.11:   Effectiveness of water provision after devolution and liberalization 
in Gujarat, from Table 5.5 
 
3.1.2. GUJARAT: INCLUSION IN DEVOLVED AND LIBERALIZED GOVERNANCE  
 
The sequence of devolution and liberalization does not also seem to be related to the 
pattern of women’s participation in the respective emergent processes (see Table 5.6 
and Figure 5.12 below). In fact, their involvement, low as it is, is relatively better in 
GUJARAT: PR-SR G-PR G-SR 
 Change % Change Score Change % Change Score 
Per Capita Availability 18.0 36.2 3.6 56.7 115.1 11.5 
Per Cap from HH Source 40.2 128.1  79.5 176.1  
Per Cap from Public Sources 11.7 55.3  20.2 124.7  
Disparity (HH and Shared Sources) 23.0 147.3 14.7 59.3 205.0 20.5 
% Popn with HH Source 19.6 19.6 2.0 28.2 28.2 2.8 
% HH < 50 m from Pub Srce 24.3 24.3 2.4 33.9 33.9 3.4 
% HH - Unprotected Srces 12.5 100.0 10.0 43.8 90.9 9.1 
OVERALL (including Disparities)   3.3   6.3 
Without Considering Disparities   18.0   26.8 
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local government processes than in the sector reform projects. Neither women VWSC 
members nor users take advantage of the additional opportunities offered for 
participation in local governance, in stark contrast to the greater involvement of male 
VWSC members in the SR project than in the Village Panchayat. 
 
The reasons could lie in their non-representative status, for women VWSC members 
are not elected and therefore do not have a constituency to answer to; or in the fact that 
they were mostly relatives of local government representatives or members of the 
VWSC, included for the statutory requirements rather than any real involvement. 
Social norms of seclusion and practices of exclusion would be faced by both women 
Panchayat and VWSC members, but the very fact that their participation in the two 
processes differs indicates that those are perhaps not the only factors responsible for 
the difference.  
 
The small difference in occupancy of the earmarked seats could be also due to the 
difference in the level of statutory oversight of the State over the local government and 
of WASMO over the VWSC. Panchayat functioning is overseen by the State 
Department of Panchayats and the State Election Commission, through intricate and 
well- established procedures, whereas the WASMO’s only check on the actual 
constitution and functioning of the VWSC is that members be listed in the project 
proposal. It could be inferred that dilution of the statutory provisions in respect of 
women is more possible under liberalized arrangements, when the community is 
provided with greater space for un-monitored functioning. 
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Table 5.6 
Relative Inclusion in Devolved and Liberalized Governance Configurations in 
Gujarat 
From values in Figures 3.6 and 4.7; Scores derived by method in Table 2.7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.12:  Women’s participation in Panchayat and Sector Reform projects, 
relative to men’s, in Gujarat from Table 5.6 
 
In sum, therefore, in the economic, political and socio-cultural conditions that 
characterized the study region in Gujarat, both devolution and liberalization were 
apparently effective, with liberalized arrangements performing better. But both were 
marred by increased disparities in water availability between those with household 
connections and those dependent on public sources. Liberalized systems were more 
iniquitous in the distribution of benefits. Morever, in the provisions for the inclusion 
of women could be more easily diluted, and were less used.  
Gujarat- PR-SR GUJARAT – PR GUJARAT-SR 
Indicators  Earmarked Occupied SCORES Earmarked Occupied SCORES 
%  Elected seats: earmarked & occupied 33.0 33.5 10.1 33.0 28.5 9.6 
 Men women  Men Women  
% Att in Panch mtgs: Men & women 78.3 30.9 3.9 92.5 10.3 1.1 
% Att in Vill Assembly: Men and women 36.2 19.7 5.4 25.0 10.8 4.3 
OVERALL SCORE   19.4   15.0 
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3.2. REFORMS IN KERALA: EFFICACY, EFFECTIVENESS AND 
PARTICIPATION 
 
In Kerala, the Sector Reform program was preceded not only by the statutory 
devolution to local governments that had been Constitutionally mandated, but also by 
the State-initiated People’s Plan Campaign to mobilize and institutionalize civic 
participation in the local planning process358. Communities were therefore not only 
aware and active, but structures for participatory local governance had been 
institutionalized to an extent. The implementation of the Sector Reform program, 
when it was introduced, was therefore centered in the local government structures 
from the district level and below (see Figure 5.13 and 5.14). Moreover, at the village 
level, while the local government remained the support agency, the process was 
centered in the area-level Beneficiary Groups, moving the locus of participation even 
further into the community than after devolution. In effect, there was greater 
decentralization through liberalization than with devolution.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.13:  Relative extent of decentralization in devolved and liberalized 
systems in Kerala, using the Devolution Score Sheet (Table 2.6) 
                                                 
358 See section 3, Chapter III for a description of the People’s Plan Campaign. 
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Figure 5.14:  Comparative extent of decentralization in Kerala after devolution 
to local governments and liberalization of State water provision 
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3.2.1. KERALA: COMPARATIVE EFFECTIVENESS OF DEVOLUTION AND 
LIBERALIZATION 
 
In Kerala, both Panchayat and SR processes were equally effective in increasing the 
quantity of water available to households, reduce distance to source and ensure supply 
throughout the year, though seasonal contamination undermined the latter gain in both  
 
Table 5.7 
Comparative Effectiveness of Water Provision after Devolution and 
Liberalization in Kerala. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Compiled from Tables 3.6 and 4.5; Scores derived using Devolution Score Sheet (Table 2.6) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.15: Effectiveness of water provision after devolution and liberalization 
in Kerala, based on Table 5.7 above. 
KERALA: PR-SR K-PR   K-SR   
 Change % Change Score Change % Change Score 
Per Capita Availability 42.6 120.6 12.1 53 159.6 16.0 
Per Cap from HH Source 19.0 20.8  1 1.7  
Per Cap from Public Sources 21.2 128.6  2 6.8  
Disparity (HH and Shared Sources) 2.2 3.0 0.3 45 100.0 10.0 
% Popn with HH Source 28.3 28.3 2.8 93 93.5 9.3 
% HH < 50 m from Public Source 42.5 42.5 4.2 0 0.0 0.0 
% HH - Unprotected Sources 44.3 100.0 10.0 46 100.0 10.0 
OVERALL (including Disparities)   29.4   45.3 
Without considering disparities   29.1   35.3 
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cases. SR-Swajaldhara projects were however, fully egalitarian in that all households  
were connected to the system, and had access to an equal amount of water from the  
project359 (see Table 5.7 and Figure 5.15). Panchayat projects, typically small  
and comprising handpumps, wells or small tanks with public taps, could not  
substantially alter the differences in availability between those who had private wells 
and those who were dependant on public sources or neighbors. Overall, therefore, the 
liberalized arrangements yielded both more effective and more egalitarian outcomes. 
 
3.2.2. KERALA: INCLUSION IN DEVOLVED AND LIBERALIZED GOVERNANCE 
ARRANGEMENTS 
 
Participation was also better in the liberalized processes, as can be seen in Table 5.8 
and Figure 5.16 below. The institutional structure was clearly more efficacious in this 
respect, as the quantum of statutory earmarked spaces for women both in the executive 
committee as well as the general assembly of users was higher (50%) than that in the 
local government (33%). This not only set the tone with regard to the constitution and 
functioning of the user groups, but as the (woman) President of Aanchal Panchayat 
remarked, questioning the 33% reservation in local governments,  
 
“reserving 30% seats looks like a favor, after all we are 50% of the 
population…saying there has to be equal numbers (sic) makes it clear that there has to 
be equality in everything, equal involvement, equal reponsibility, equal 
power…..because we are all equal…” (President, Aanchal Panchayat). 
 
The additional spaces created by the higher reservation were also fully used by 
women, rivalling the involvement of men, as has been described before (chapter IV, 
section 3).As has also been discussed, the preceding local government reforms and the 
                                                 
359 Those with private wells of course had access to more, but the project benefits were equally 
distributed. 
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subsequent proliferation of community-based organizations, both civic (neighborhood 
groups, community development societies) and economic (Kudumbasree units) had 
also created practices of community involvement. The acute water shortage and the 
women’s need to find more convenient sources was ofcourse also a major contributing 
factor.  
Table 5.8 
Relative Inclusion in Devolved and Liberalized Governance Configurations in 
Kerala 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.16: Women’s participation in Panchayat and Sector Reform projects, 
relative to men’s, in Kerala; based on Table 5.8 above 
 
Under the prevailing soco-cultural, political and economic conditions in Kerala, 
therefore, not only did liberalized arrangements yield better results, but were also 
Kerala PR -SR KERALA-PR KERALA-SR 
Indicators Earmarked Occupied SCORES Earmarked Occupied SCORES 
%  Elected seats: earmarked & occupied 33.0 36.5 10.4 50.0 37.3 8.7 
 Men women  Men Women  
% Att in Panch mtgs: Men & women 76.0 69.0 9.1 87.3 87.5 10.0 
% Att in Vill Assembly: Men and women 77.0 66.0 8.6 81.0 76.8 9.5 
 K-PR 28.0  K-SR 28.2 
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fully egalitarian in the distribution of benefficiaries. They also supported full 
engagement by women in all decision-making processes, unlike in the case of Gujarat. 
Whether that would have been the situation without the prior devolution and 
institutionalization of participatory planning that had occurred between 1995 and 1999 
is an open question, but the research does provide some indication of the answer. I 
discuss this in the last section, after examining the performance of the two reforms in 
Madhya Pradesh in the next.   
 
 
3.3. DEVOLUTION AND LIBERALIZATION IN MADHYA PRADESH 
 
Comparison of the institutional architectures for water provision after devolution and 
liberalization in Madhya Pradesh, as in Figures 5.17 and 5.18 below, shows that the 
emergent institutional architecture s clearly more decentralized in the latter. This is 
however, ony true of the processes as they play out in the reality of the villages; the 
de-jure institutional architecture for the SRP, as actually designed, remains as centered 
in the State and local government arenas as are the local government processes. This is 
because almost all the functions of the VWSC are actually taken on by either the 
habitation-level Health Committees or other groups – such as Implementation 
Committees formed for the purpose – leaving the VWSC to act only as the designated 
channel for funds. Health Committees are creations of the local government reforms, 
and part of the architecture of local government, but in this instance, they act more as 
community-based organizations rather than arms of the local government. That is the 
reason why they are (more appropriately) categorised as CBOs in the organizational 
diagram, and by that characteristic, create a greater degree of decentralization than 
actually designed. Moreover, if one were to categorize them as local government  
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Figure 5.17: Comparative extent of decentralization in Madhya Pradesh after 
devolution to local governments and liberalization of State water 
provision. 
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Figure 5.18:  Relative pattern of decentralization in devolved and liberalized 
systems in Madhya Pradesh 
 
structures – as they technically are – then the extent of decentralization by devolution 
and by liberalization would be almost identical in Madhya Pradesh.  
 
The important dimension here is that the structure of the Sector Reforms project itself 
enables this opening up of the role of the Health Committee. In other words, the 
liberalized arrangements appear to be more efficacious in enabling active civic role-
taking by community-based organizations than does devolution. That is true in the 
case of individuals also, for in some study villages, it was individuals with civic 
inclinations who initiated and anchored the project processes, as discussed in Chapter 
IV (section 4). Local government processes, as they stand, appear to allow little space 
for such role-taking by ordinary citizens; captured as they are by the President, the 
Secretary and their associates, such initiative even by elected members who are non-
elites is, reportedly, severely inhibited360. The prevailing inter-class economic 
depenencies and feudal relationships within villages no doubt perpetuate this dynamic. 
                                                 
360 From the experience of Samarthan staff, shared during interview.  
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3.3.1. MADHYA PRADESH: EFFECTIVENESS OF DEVOLUTION AND LIBERALIZATION 
 
How effective are the two kinds of reformed arrangements? From Table 5.9 and 
Figure 5.19 below, it is clear that both arrangements yield almost the same results, but 
with important caveats. Both are effective in raising per-capita availability, increasing  
 
Table 5.9 
Comparative Effectiveness of Water Provision after Devolution and 
Liberalization in Madhya Pradesh. 
From Tables 3.9 and 4.7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.19:  Comparative effectiveness of devolution and liberalization in 
Madhya Pradesh from Table 5.9 
MP: PR-SR MP-PR   MP-SR   
Indicators Change % Change Score Change % Change Score 
Per Capita Availability 14.8 38.2 3.8 12 33.0 3.3 
Per Cap from HH Source 0.0 0.0  40 68.8  
Per Cap from Public Sources 15.1 37.2  34 92.7  
Disparity (HH and Shared Sources) 11.4 29.5 3.0 6 17.8 1.8 
% Popn with HH Source 0.0 0.0 0.0 5 4.7 0.5 
% HH < 50 m from Pub Srce 10.9 10.9 1.1 23 23.0 2.3 
% HH - Unprotected Srces 10.9 59.2 5.9 23 90.1 9.0 
OVERALL (including Disparities)   13.8   13.3 
Without considering disparities   10.8   15.1 
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access and reducing the number of people dependant on public sources. The SRP  
however, is much better at increasing access, likely because of the technology – with  
piped water, multiple taps or standposts can be installed radiating from one point  
source, unlike the handpumps typically installed in local government projects. But in a 
less conclusive way361, there is an echo of the disparities in availability between those 
with household conections and those without. The number of households in the former 
category is extremely small, and the extension of the pipeline to the houses paid for by 
themselves. That is, those with greater paying capacities are able to buy superior 
benefits that far surpass that received by others, and they are very few in a sea of 
households with far lower income levels.  
 
This in unlike in Gujarat, where the benefits were not linked to initial investment – for 
a few paid very large amounts towards the capital cost, completely unrelated to the 
costs of their household connection, for which they paid the same tariffs as others. 
This dynamic of intra-village philanthropy makes the social implications of the 
differential benefits very different.  
 
3.3.2. MADHYA PRADESH: COMPARATIVE INCLUSION 
 
Participation of women in either local government processes or the Sector Reform 
projects is notable for its near-absence in both cases as can be seen in Table 5.10 and 
Figure 5.20, though their attendance at village assemblies is a little higher. This is 
again, like in Gujarat, in sharp contrast to the active and extensive involvement of men 
in both kinds of arrangements. Also, in keeping with the pattern in both Gujarat and 
                                                 
361 Since the discrepancy is not as large as in Gujarat, and those dependant on public sources do get 
more than the minimum norm of 40 lpcd, which even after the new projects, is not the case in Gujarat. 
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Kerala, their involvement is higher in the Sector Reforms projects than in local 
government projects. Another paralell with Gujarat is that women occupy less than the 
statutory proportion of seats in the VWSC and Health Committees, organizational 
components of the institutional architecture that are located in the habitations or 
hamlets and which are therefore not subject to as much oversight by the State 
Panchayat department as the Gram Panchayat. 
 
 
Table 5.10 
Relative Inclusion in Devolved and Liberalized Governance Configurations in 
Madhya Pradesh 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure  5.20: Comparative participation of men and women in local government 
and Sector Reform projects in Madhya Pradesh, from Table 5.10 
 
Madhya Pradesh PR-SR MP-PR   MP-SR   
Earmarked Occupied SCORES Reserved Occupied SCORES 
%  Elected seats: earmarked & occupied 33.0 28.6 9.6 33.0 23.4 9.0 
 Men women  Men Women  
% Att in Panch mtgs: Men & women 88.3 13.5 1.5 92.2 11.0 1.2 
% Att in Vill Assembly: Men and women 49.5 22.8 4.6 64.8 22.6 3.5 
OVERALL SCORES  MP-PR 15.7  MP-SR 13.7 
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 The relatively better attendance of women at village assemblies than at meetings of 
executive bodies is linked both to the fact that they can attend in groups and the efforts  
of the NGO Samarthan to engender civic participation, as discussed in chapter IV 
 (section 4). The reduced visibility – or greater anonymity – in a larger crowd also 
helped. Four village assemblies are statutory requirements in the local government 
procedures, but more can be convened if the community requires. A number of such  
‘extraordinary’ meetings were convened in the case of projects that affected whole 
villages – such as the one in Manpura – but since most others were smaller and 
benefitted only segments of the village, smaller community meetings were held. These 
were usually near the project site, and attendance at such meetings, held in a familiar 
neighborhood where a project of direct interest was discussed, “was easier and more 
ineresting to attend” (Kharpa, two women users).  
 
Clearly, within the economic, political and socio-cultural mileu of the region, both 
kinds of reforms were effective in MP, but liberalized arrangements were more 
conducive both to a degree of resource capture as well as dilution of statutory 
provisions for inclusion of women. On the other hand, the flexibility in the SR 
program design, particularly the group-specificity that is possible, also enables 
relatively more involvement of women. 
 
3.4. CONTEXT-APPROPRIATENESS OF DEVOLUTION AND LIBERALIZATION  
 
In comparing devolved and liberalized arrangements for water provision in the three 
study States, the most notable finding is that there is little difference in the 
performance of the two kinds of reform, in improving water availability and access, in 
the same context. There are, however, differences in how they perform along the five 
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indicators, most significantly, in the accompanying levels of disparity between those 
with household supply and those without, in the three States.362 Also, patterns of 
participation vary, in ways not always consonant with effectiveness. While on one 
hand the similar performance of both types of decentralization in each State indicates 
that some kinds of contexts are more hospitable to decentralized governance per se, on 
the other, the differences in participation and equity indicate that the nature of the 
outcomes is linked to the fit between reform design and context. Conversely, the two 
types of reforms clearly yield different patterns of outcomes in different contexts. To 
assess how these patterns differ, and understand why, a comparison of the 
performance of each type in the three State contexts is necessary, and is discussed in 
the next two sections. 
 
 
4. DEVOLUTION OR LIBERALIZATION?  
 
While the disaggregated understanding of the relative efficacy, effectiveness and 
inclusion in devolved and liberalized governance arrangements along multiple 
indicators serves analytical and theoretical purposes well, it is less useful in a policy 
context, where a synthesized (or composite) estimation of the outcomes is necessary to 
make policy choices. The performance of the reformed systems in different contexts 
were therefore aggregated across the two parameters, effectiveness and inclusion, to 
assess which type of reform is more suitable in each State context, and this is set out 
below. However, the disparity indicator was found to substantially alter the 
                                                 
362 The disparity in the average quantity of water available in the three States is another noteworthy 
dimension, though it is not related to the questions asked in this research. Though some of the variation 
can be explained by the levels of water available in the respective geo-ecological regions, a greater 
explanation clearly lies in the relative levels of development in the three States and the nature of the 
pre-reform governance structures.  
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effectiveness of the reformed systems when assessed in terms of simply improving the 
level of water availability, access and coverage, and therefore it has also been shown 
separately to illustrate this.  
 
4.1. REFORMS IN GUJARAT, KERALA AND MP: AN OVERALL COMPARISION 
 
Bringing together the scores for relative performance of devolution and liberalization 
in different contexts as in Table 5.11 illustrates the substantial differences that emerge 
when the same reforms are applied in different economic, political and socio-cultural 
contexts. Further, the divergences between effectiveness, equity and participation 
become clearer when the performance of each case on these parameters is so 
juxtaposed. The scores also highlight the  issue of disparities in the distribution of 
water that surfaced in the study. In the table, increase in disparities are shown as 
negatives, and in italics.  
 
The patterns of effectiveness, equity and inclusion that have emerged are not only 
interesting in themselves and useful for policy-design, but illustrate the startlingly 
strong effect of context in shaping outcomes. In all three States liberalized (SR) 
systems consistently deliver more water to more people, but the disparities in the 
amount of water made available to households with individual connections and private 
taps and those without complicate this picture. When equity in the distribution of 
benefits is included as an indicator of effectiveness, however, liberalized systems 
perform worse than devolved systems in the least-developed State, Madhya Pradesh. 
Even in economically well-developed Gujarat, effectiveness of liberalized 
arrangements is sharply reduced to a level not much above Panchayat provision, by 
the sharp exarcerbation of existing inequities in water availbility and access. Morever, 
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the extent of disparities produced by liberalized systems is, among all cases studied, 
highest in this context (Gujarat), as evident in Table 5.11.  
 
Table 5.11 
Devolution and Liberalization - Effectiveness and Inclusion in Gujarat, Kerala 
and MP 
 
Type of Reform Parameters Gujarat Kerala M. P 
 
 
 
 
 
Devolved  
(Panchayat) provision 
Effectiveness 
(excluding disparity score) 
18.0 29.1 10.8 
Disparity ** -14.7 0.3 3.0 
Effectiveness 3.3 29.4 13.8 
Inclusion 19.4 28 15.7 
Overall Case Score 22.7 57.4 29.5 
 
 
 
 
Liberalized  
(SR-Swajaldhara) 
provision 
Effectiveness 
(excluding disparity score) 
26.8 35.3 15.1 
Disparity ** -20.5 10.0 -1.8 
Effectiveness 6.3 45.3 13.3 
Inclusion 15 28.2 13.7 
Overall Case Score 21.3 73.5 27 
** Increase in the extent of disparities is assigned a negative value. 
 
In MP, on the other hand, provision of water by local governments, despite being 
much less effective than provision through liberalized arrangements, actually reduces 
disparities in availability and access to the resource between those with household 
sources – that is, the few high-income households in the village - and those dependant 
on shared public sources. Because of this, it is preferable to liberalization in MP, and 
even more so when considered along with participation, for that is also higher in local 
government processes.  
 
A consideration of the extent of inclusion that is enabled by the two types of reformed 
arrangements further reverses the apparent success of liberalized systems. Devolved 
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governance arrangements are either equally or consistently more participatory in all 
three States, the slightly greater score of liberalized systems in Kerala 
notwithstanding. The marginal difference between the inclusiveness scores of 
Panchayat and SR systems in Kerala is interesting in this respect, for it could be 
interpreted in two ways. The first, and more probable, is that it is an artifact of the 
methodological approach taken, with selected cases and an indicative rather than exact 
scoring method.  On the other hand, it could also signal that in a context with a high 
degree of social capital an civic and political engagement as in Kerala, liberalized 
arrangements can potentially be much more inclusive. 
 
Consequences of liberalizing water provision are remakable in their negative effects, 
for the increase in disparities in greatest and the propensity to include women in the 
processes the lowest, as can be seen in the cases of the SRP in Gujarat and MP. This is 
neither surprising nor inconsistent with the theoretical expectations (Chapter I: Section 
3) and empirical observations (Chapter I: Section 4). The increased scope for resource 
capture and the perpetuation of regressive traditions and practices, which was feared 
by some authors, has been observed to be misused. What is startling, however, is that 
the same arrangements also reduced disparity tremendously, and enabled 
(marginally) higher participation of women in Kerala. This indicates that in enabling 
more autonomous functioning, liberalization can yield highly desirable outcomes, 
since it removes provisioning from the monopolistic government and bureacratic 
control that is typical of developing locations. But this happens only in a context with  
high social and and political development resulting from high literacy, widespread 
unionization, and organizational involvement, that is not quite the same as Putnam’s 
‘social capital’. I will elaborate on this, but here the point is that without a citizenry 
with such characteristics, which constantly demands information from and imposes 
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accountabilty on those in executive positions, and an institutional structure363 that 
enables them to do so, liberalization can have highly perverse outcomes. In the 
absence ofsuch conditions, devolution to local governments could be a safer, if less 
dramatically effective option, for elected representatives are atleast subject to electoral 
accountability, however imperfectly. 
 
The high degree of civic and political engagement in Kerala is a little different (or 
more than) Putnam’s ‘social capital’ (Putnam 1993) though the latter is also 
significantly present in Kerala. The difference lies in the nature of the engagement, for 
in Kerala, it is the widespread unionization of the sixties and seventies, and the 
grassroots political recruitment into (Left) Party cadres that undergirds the 
organizational base and not the network of primarily recreational or social 
organizations that Putnam discusses. Though libraries, sports clubs and such other 
organizations have a significant presence in the civic-organizational landscape, it is 
the active grassroots mobilization of  the political parties that underpins and pervades 
these, and imparts a distinctly political dimension to social organization; the activities 
and influence of the KSSP (also called the People’s Science Movement) is emblematic 
of this dynamic. As such, the civic-organizational landscape is more accurately seen as 
a well-developed ‘political society’ in Ndegwa’s (1996) terms, with close ties with 
political parties and organizations, that generally exhibits a civic-social character, but 
which actively and overtly becomes political when required (for example, during 
elections). 
 
                                                 
363 Such as the egalitarian associational structure of the BG prescribed in the SRP guidelines in Kerala. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
This research was aimed at finding answers to an important question in decentralizing 
local governance: which type of community-focussed governance reform – the 
‘revised neo-liberal’ type or the ‘progressive-communitarian’ type – is more 
appropriate, in that it delivers better outcomes, in various kinds of developing 
contexts? Located in the context of reforms in the governance configurations for 
domestic water provision in India, where the two types of communitarian approaches 
(neo-liberal and progressive) have been applied in devolving and liberalizing water 
provision, this larger question was translated to a more specific one –    
 
What is the relative efficacy, effectiveness and inclusiveness of devolved (Panchayat) 
and liberalized (Sector Reform-Swajaldhara) arrangements for water provision,  
(a) in the same type of context, and  
(b) in three contexts with different degrees of economic, political and social 
development? 
 
The comparative study of the functioning of devolved and liberalized arrangements for 
water provision in Gujarat, Kerala and Madhya Pradesh set out in the last three 
chapters has provided clear answers to these questions. Also, the point of departure 
was a practical question of policy-design, and aggregating the performance of the 
reformed arrangements in each case provides the answers in a form that is useful for 
policy decisions. Beyond these immediate and aggregated answers to the research 
questions, however, lies a more revealing tapestry of findings about why and how the 
decentralized governance arrangements that emerged from the two types of reform 
yielded the outcomes they did in the three different kinds of economic, political and 
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socio-cultural contexts. More, by surfacing the intricate relationships between the 
reform design (which emerges from specific underlying political-economic visions as 
much as the prevailing political-economic circumstances),  the context characteristics 
and the outcomes, the six cases shed some light on important theoretical questions that 
remain undecided. These include the relationship between degree of 
decentralization364 and effective and participatory governance, between extent of 
participation and nature of outcomes, and most importantly, in the three-way 
relationship between the institutional-organizational design, the contextual conditions 
and the outcomes.  
 
A different set of questions relate to the conditions that facilitate (or militate against) 
women’s participation, at two levels. At the first level, the question is of the relative 
importance of three different sets of variables: women’s personal attributes (such as 
literacy, employment or public experience), the institutional design for governance 
(the kind of spaces and procedures instituted) and contextual conditions (such as 
socio-cultural norms and the division of labour). At the second level, the questions 
pertain to the relative importance of specific variables within each set (for example, is 
literacy more important or economic empowerment?). While the case studies do not 
speak to all these questions with equal strength or reliability – for not all of them were 
questions that this study was directed at answering – the findings provide valuable 
insights into some of them. 
 
                                                 
364 The question is most frequently couched in terms of the relative merits of centralized versus 
decentralized governance, such as in the fiscal decentralization literature (Oates 2005, 2006, Seabright 
1996 and others). The underlying binary assumption of only two alternatives is faulty, for there are 
clearly different degrees and designs of decentralization; that is, centralization – decentralization is a 
continuum and the distribution of different government functions across actors and levels can be varied, 
and therefore, the question is more appropriately asked in terms of degree (or extent) of 
decentralization.  
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In this concluding chapter, therefore, I not only summarize and present the answers 
that emerged to the research questions, but bring together the insights gained from the 
six case studies to discuss what is indicated in regard to some of these other important 
questions. Before that, however, I first draw together the main findings in relation to 
the specific research questions that were investigated and state the answers that 
emerge from this study. Next I summarize the explanations that are found in the case 
studies for these answers. In the third section, I examine the specific attributes of the 
State contexts that modulated identical institutional designs in completely different 
ways to yield dramatically different outcomes, and in the fourth discuss the findings in 
relation to the important theoretical questions in governance that still remain open. In 
the fifth section I engage with some of the questions that preoccupy authors on 
women’s participation in governance, on the basis of the insights gained in this study, 
and also point to the limitations in the study that qualify some of the observations. 
 
The findings from the study, and the intricate relationship between context variables 
and the functioning of the reformed institutional arrangements that they indicate, 
however, problematizes the notion of ‘context-appropriateness’ and the (apparent) 
desirability of tailoring of reforms to the context, which is argued by many authors to 
be important for effective governance. The necessity for ‘institutional fit’ is also 
axiomatic from the understanding of institutions and organizational functioning that is 
offered by sociologists and organization theorists as much as in the development 
literature, but in the context of instituting societal change – as decentralizing and 
democratizing governance implies – important conceptual and practical issues surface. 
In conclusion, therefore, I discuss these issues that qualify the notion of institutional 
‘fit’, when applied to questions of ‘appropriate’ governance reform, and discuss the 
directions that are therefore indicated for future research. 
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1. ANSWERING THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS: ‘CONTEXT-APPROPRIATE’ REFORM  
 
Which type of reform – devolution or liberalization – is more appropriate in the three 
kinds of State contexts included in this study? The consolidated answers to this 
question that emerge from this study are clear: overall, devolution is more suitable, in 
that it yields relatively better governance outcomes, except where political and social 
development are high, as in Kerala. Decentralization of the neo-liberal type (in 
partnership models) to communties, that enables the participation of other actors in 
delivery of services that were till recently provided primarily by the State, emerges as 
the preferable option only in these kinds of locations. In conditions of low or moderate 
political and social development as in Gujarat and MP, devolution appears to be more 
appropriate. These conclusions can be directly used to select reforms for locations 
with characteristics similar to those in the study States. 
 
These consolidated conclusions, however, conceal a number of important aspects, 
some of which are problematic from a developmental perspective but all of which can 
be theoretically revealing. The first discovery, surprising in the light of the discussions 
in the literature, is that both types worked best and liberalization yielded the most 
impressive results in Kerala, which has the highest degrees of political and human 
development (see Table 2.2). This counters the fears of some authors that reforms 
premised on neo-liberal assumptions, since they emerge in relation to conditions in 
industrialized countries, are inappropriate in developing contexts (for example, 
Litvack 1998, Turner and Hulme 1997). No doubt Kerala compares favorably with 
many developed countries on human development indicators such as literacy, health, 
mortality and life expectancy, but Kerala’s low-to-moderate level of economic 
development is typical of the developing South (see Dreze and Sen 1995). On the 
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other hand, following the reasoning of authors who question the application of neo-
liberal reforms to developing countries, the performance of liberalized governance 
arrangements should be best in Gujarat365, which has about the highest levels of 
industrialization and economic development in India, much above that in Kerala. 
Contrary to these expectations, however, liberalization works best in Kerala, 
significantly surpassing even the gains from devolution.   
 
Liberalization in Kerala also yielded the most equitable distribution of benefits, 
among all the six cases studied. This is also startling, for disparities in distribution of 
benefits have been found to be almost endemic to neo-liberal communitarian models 
based on partnerships with community organizations and user-groups in manty studies 
reviewed by Mansuri and Rao (2004) and Pozzoni and Kumar (2005), and neo-liberal 
reforms in general (Birdsall and Nellis 2002, Sheahan 1997). In fact, the equal 
distribution of benefits through household connections to all families in the project 
area, and thereby, the complete removal of disparities (100%) in access to water, make 
liberalization in Kerala even more successful than devolution in terms of effective 
water provision.  
 
The fears of the critics of the various communitarian approaches and the findings in 
many studies,366 that devolution in the face of entrenched inequities within local 
communities is subject to elite capture of local decision-making bodies and resources, 
and therefore can exarcebate inequities, is also completely countered in the case of 
Kerala. Not only is devolution almost as effective as liberalization in Kerala, but 
participation is also equally extensive, particularly of the poorer sections of the 
                                                 
365 In comparison with other States, see Table 2.2 
366 In the reviews by Pozzoni and Kumar 2005, Mansuri and Rao 2004 mentioned before. 
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community367. With the greatest degree of devolution among the three States, in both 
functions and resources (see Fig 5.2, also in Mahipal 2004) it also has the highest level 
of participation in the devolved local governance arrangements. The same pattern is 
mirrored in liberalized governance arrangements (Fig 5.6): the thin and elite-biased 
participation widely observed in the neo-liberal communitarian models of 
decentralization, involving partnerships with interest-groups are certainly not the 
pattern observed in Kerala.  
 
The second dynamic that is equally interesting theoretically, but extremely 
problematic from a development perspective, is that both types of decentralization in 
Gujarat exarcerbate disparities in access between families with household 
connections and those dependent on shared public sources, to the greatest extent 
among the three States. Predictably, liberalization works better than devolution in 
Gujarat in improving water availability, but it also accentuates existing disparities in 
access to a notably greater extent than devolution. In fact, despite the SRP and 
Panchayat provision actually performing better than in much-less-developed MP, the 
increased disparities in water access that result from decentralizing the governance 
arrangements in Gujarat erode both these outcomes very substantially. Inequitous 
outcomes pulls the successful performance of decentralized systems to a lower level 
than that in MP, and most notably, makes Panchayat provision in Gujarat by far the 
least effective among all six cases. Though the fact remains that in absolute terms the 
quantity and convenience of water supply was better in Gujarat villages to start with, 
and the post-reform situation remains far better in Gujarat than in MP (see Figs 5.3 
and 5.7), the extent to which existing inequities in resource access are exacerbated by 
                                                 
367 In all mini-cases, of both devolved and liberalized arrangements, the beneficiary groups as well as 
the executive officers of the group were not from the elite, as described in sections 3.3 and 4.3 in 
Chapters III and IV respectively. The only exception was in Neelamootil, where the primary office-
bearers were from the more affluent and connected families in the neighborhood. 
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both types of governance decentralization in the former is a major issue. The 
inequitous outcomes of neo-liberal reforms in general have been often reported as 
mentioned before, including in neo-liberal communitarian approaches such as in the 
SRP. Expectations of the same affliction in devolved systems, in situations of 
inequality and resource scarcity are equally common (Bardhan 1996368, 2006; 
Leftwich 2005). Gujarat therefore emerges, apparently, as a ‘text-book’ case of the 
problems of decentralized governance, but the successes of decentralization in Kerala, 
and the mixed outcomes in MP obviate such a conclusion. I return to this situation of 
exceptional ‘institutional’ and resource capture’ in economically developed Gujarat 
later in this chapter. 
 
The third interesting pattern that emerges is the lack of any obvious relationship 
between participation and effectiveness. With the most inclusive arrangements 
delivering the best outcomes (in Kerala), support emerges for the positive relationship 
between the two, which is the primary theoretical argument for decentralization to 
communities and participatory governance.369 This positive link, however, does not 
hold in the other four cases, for the next highest level of  participation (among the 
other four cases) is in Panchayat functioning in Gujarat, the outcomes of which are the 
worst among all cases. The extent of women’s involvement in the two types of 
reformed governance arrangements in Gujarat is not remarkable, but participation in 
                                                 
368 However, see Bardhan and Mookherjee (1999), where they conclude that “[s]imple generalizations 
about relative capture are therefore hazardous on the basis of theory alone; empirical research is 
necessary to identify the nature and degree of local capture. In particular, it is unlikely that local 
governments are universally prone to greater capture, as many influential thinkers have commonly 
presupposed. Recent empirical studies also cast doubt on the traditional presumption. To the extent that 
this presumption is mistaken, decentralization of authority to lower levels of government can potentially 
combine the advantages of greater utilization of local information without sacrificing accoun tability.” 
(p.33)  The contrasting findings in Gujarat and Kerala clearly illustrate the importance of local 
characteristics in determining capture; human and political development appear to be more important 
than economic development, from the cases in this research.  
369 In both neo-liberal and communitarian arguments, as reviewed in Chapter I. 
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Panchayat processes is relatively higher, as it is in MP. This however does not 
correspond with the pattern of effectiveness in any predictable manner, and this is 
where the theoretically posited relationship between participation and effectiveness 
breaks down. I return to this important finding later, but here the notable point is that 
the trade-offs between participation and effectiveness in a context such as in Gujarat 
poses a quandary for the conscientious policy-designer. For on one hand the structures 
and processes of local governance after devolution are relatively more sucessful in 
actually including women, but perform very poorly and inequitously despite this 
(scant)370 virtue. The combined performance on both parameters indicates that 
devolution is more appropriate to the Gujarat context, despite its inequitable 
propensities in the local circumstances.  
 
Disparities in the access to the water supplied by new systems is also the prime issue 
that mars liberalized governance arrangements in MP, despite the relatively higher 
effectiveness in actually improving provision. Again, this reaffirms the fndings in the 
literature on inequitous outcomes of neo-liberal reforms, but surprisingly, Panchayat 
provision in the resource-poor MP actually reduces disparities, countering fears of 
resource capture expressed in the literature (for example in Bardhan 1996, 2006) and 
in complete contravention of the case in Gujarat. More, the reduction in existing 
disparities in access to water is to an extent that not only offsets the gains in terms of 
better provision through the SRP, but makes Panchayat provision far more appropriate 
from a combined consideration. In addition, it is also more inclusive of women, even 
if by a moderate margin – a moderate reinforcement of theoretical arguments of the 
positive link between participation and equitous outcomes, but again, contrary to the 
                                                 
370 For as the scores show, the difference between levels of participation in SRP and Panchayat 
processes is not very large. 
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findings in Gujarat. Devolving governance therefore appears to be decisively more 
appropriate in the prevailing conditions in MP, but raises the question of what 
counters the potential for resource capture.  
 
In sum, while clear indications of the relative suitability of devolved and liberalized 
arrangements to the three kinds of State contexts emerge from the study, the 
unexpected success of liberalization in Kerala, the increase in disparities in resource 
access in both kinds of decentralization in Gujarat, and the relative success of 
Panchayat provision in MP bears further scrutiny and analyses. How can these 
counter-intuitive findings, for which there is little expectation or evidence in the 
literature, be explained? To find possible answers, in the next section, I explore further 
the patterns in the findings and the relationships between the design characteristics of 
both types of reforms, specific variables in the context and the nature of the outcomes 
that could provide explanations for these anomalous observations.  
 
2. EXPLAINING ANOMALOUS OUTCOMES  
 
The comparative analyses of the functioning of the SRP and Panchayat provision 
across the three different State contexts that was undertaken in this study and is set out 
in Chapter V, provides clues that can help find explanations for the unexpected 
findings in this study. Two anomalies need explanation. One is the completely 
opposite outcomes of liberalization in Gujarat and Kerala. The other is the less 
obvious, but no less important, question of why devolution consistently performs 
worse than liberalization in providing water in all three contexts, though the extent of 
disparity that is produced and inclusion that is enabled differs and therefore alters the 
final outcomes very dramatically.  
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Clearly, level of economic development is not the determining factor in the success of 
liberalized local governance, for, if disparity in the distribution of benefits is not 
included, SRP initiatives provided water more effectively than Panchayat systems in 
locations with sharply differing levels of economic development. Nor is the 
relationship linear, for though effectiveness was lowest in the poorest State (MP), it 
was most effective in a State that was only a little better off (Kerala) and not in the 
most-developed371 (Gujarat). Political and social development in the three States are 
more consistently related to the effectiveness, though the remarkable extent of 
disparities in the distribution of benefits in a relatively more socially developed, 
literate and media-exposed372 context (as Gujarat is in relation to MP) again indicates 
a more complex relationship.  
 
This lack of a predictable relationship between the type of reform and economic, 
political and social characteristics of the context directs the search for explanations to 
the nature and design of the reformed governance arrangements. In reform design, 
both the technology involved and the organizational design are implicated. The non-
negotiable design of the SRP specified by the GoI includes an insistence on piped 
water supply, though it leaves the option of individual or shared connections open. 
More, details of project design – size, storage capacity and form, duration of supply, 
extent of coverage – are left to the users/ beneficiaries,373 without a cap except in 
terms of the per-capita maximum, which can also be revised upwards if the users pay 
the difference. Therefore, the maximum capacity that is affordable by the user group is 
designed in each case, and as many users as are willing to pay the beneficiary 
                                                 
371 Among the study States, see Table 2.2. 
372 See Table 2.2 and the discussion on Gujarat in section 4.2 (Chapter II) 
373 Though in practice they may be decide by others such as State officers , Panchayat leaders or support 
organzations (eg., NGOs).  
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contribution can be included. This results in consistently more effective provision than 
by Panchayats irrespective of the context, since the latter is limited by the (limited) 
resources granted by the State or Central government, through the State agency, which 
therefore installs smaller and shared systems. This also explains the greater capacity of 
the systems in the Gujarat SRP, a large proportion of the cost of which is borne by 
wealthy residents and the (much better resourced) State government than in MP374. 
The different amounts contributed by households in the village, however, also 
udergirds the disparity in the quantum of water provided to different segments of the 
population.  
 
These design features also explain the success of liberalized arrangements in Kerala, 
where it performs even better than in Gujarat, despite the lower capacities to pay and 
no additional funding from the State government. Analysis of the relative scores along 
the specific indicators for effectiveness shows that the substantial difference between 
the two State cases (39 points) accrues only little from the difference in per-capita 
average availability (3.7 points) after reforms. Liberalized systems in Kerala score 
additional points from the fact that they raise the per-capita availability to almost that 
of Gujarat, from a much lower pre-reform situation, but most substantially from the 
much better performance on equity indicators. One, the disparities in water access are 
completely removed in Kerala (100%, which is 10 points), while in Gujarat, disparities 
are increased by about 200% (that is, 20 negative points). Another source of 
difference is that all households are provided private connections to the supply 
network (an increase in coverage from 6.5% of households to 100%, that is, 9.35 
                                                 
374 As explained in Chapter IV:Section 2, the system of contribution in Gujarat is ‘according to the 
ability to pay’, and the State government pays for an additional capacity of 15 lpcd over the 40 lpcd for 
which the beneficiaries contribute 10% of the cost. This, by enabling provision of a higher per-capita 
average quantity than in MP, results in a better score for effectiveness. Neither in MP nor Kerala do the 
State governments contribute funds to the SRP. 
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points). In effect, what makes the SRP score better on effectiveness in Kerala, is not 
the higher-capacity systems that are constructed, but the fully egalitarian distribution 
of benefits. In Kerala, all users pay an equal contribution and all are provided 
household connections.375 This kind of all-inclusive distribution is potentially possible 
in the GoI program design, but it is the use of this potential in practice that is radically 
different in Gujarat and Kerala. This diametrically opposite design of the project is 
therefore clearly a function of the State context, either at the State or local levels, or 
both, and merits detailed attention. I return to this a little later. 
 
While the provision for user-specification of design details makes the SRP perform 
better than devolution in all locations, it is precisely this that allows for greater 
disparity in provision in both MP and Gujarat. However, in the former, the low 
economic development means that even the capacity of the elite is not as high as in 
Gujarat, nor can piped supply systems to all (or a large number of) houses be 
developed. Instead, shared public taps supplied from small above-ground tanks are 
installed, and though the more powerful can influence its location to improve 
convenient access and increase the quantity of water collected, a relatively lower 
degree of disparity results than in Gujarat.  
 
Why devolution fares worse than liberalization is explained above, but why does the 
former actually reduce disparities in MP while exacerbating them very sharply in 
Gujarat? The technology variable is again the answer, for by design the Panchayat 
(actually State) installations in MP376 are shared point systems and mandatorily 
                                                 
375 Except where geography or geology makes it infeasible, as in Ambalakonam where public 
standposts are provided, at no cost, for the users in a contiguous neighborhood who were water-starved 
but were unable to join the beneficiary group because extending the network to these 18 families would 
have involved a non-proportional increase in the cost of the project (interview: Ambalakonam 
President) 
376 Such as through the ARWSP. 
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located in the poorer areas of the village. By increasing access of the disadvantaged 
groups while those with household sources (typically, wells) continue to have the 
same, disparities are noticeably reduced. In better-resourced Gujarat, on the other 
hand, Panchayat or State installations are most often piped systems, and since 
households do not contribute to the costs at all, those on the margins can be largely 
ignored or provided the bare minimum while the better-off with household 
connections retain much greater access. With comparatively less resources flowing 
through such programs, the gains from such installations are, howver, less than from 
SRP projects, though not negligible at all. However, from a policy perspective, these 
gains are more than offset by the extent of disparity.   
 
Technology alone, however, cannot explain the anomalies fully, and neither can 
design features as evident from the different use of the designed potential of GoI 
reforms in Kerala and Gujarat discussed above. This leaves the effect of contextual 
variables, and another indication of their importance emerges from the fact that both 
types of decentralized arrangements work best in Kerala, while disparities caused by 
both types are the highest in Gujarat. Clearly, a large part of the explanation lies in the 
contextual variables and the successive modulations of the received institutional 
configurations in both types of reform (which are identical across States) by variables 
in the State and local contexts. To explore these connections, I examine the reformed 
arrangements as they emerged at the State level and as observed in the local mini-
cases, and consider the specific contextual variables that were implicated in shaping 
both, in the next section. Such an exploration also draws out the relationships between 
the extent and nature of decentralization (the efficacy), the context and the outcomes, 
which bear on a number of questions raised in the governance literature.  
 
 
 
 
 
419
3. CONTEXT CHARACTERISTICS, REFORM DESIGN, AND OUTCOMES  
 
One of the most striking patterns that partly explains the unusual capture of resources 
by the better-off in Gujarat villages emerges in the comparison of the pre-reform, 
reformed and observed governance patterns in the three States, (Figures 5.2 and 5.6). 
These figures show that the actual decentralization of functions (and roles) in the 
provision of water in Gujarat extends to only the Panchayats, in both devolved and 
liberalized configurations. This is in clear contrast to the non-negligible involvement 
of lay citizens, the community or their (civic) organizations in both types of 
decentralized arrangements in the two other States. This pattern can explain the 
unusual capture of decision-making bodies and thereby, project benefits by the elite in 
Gujarat villages both in devolved and liberalized arrangements. For there is little scope 
for either articulation of demands, or ‘downward’ accountability, though it was found 
in the case studies that there is sufficient circulation of information. 
 
This explanation still leaves the question of why this pattern obtains in Gujarat, and the 
features of the context which support its maintenance.  An allied question is the lack 
of protest, mobilization or demand from the less privileged sections, despite the 
greater degree of social development and the relatively free flow of information. To 
understand the dynamic interplay of context and institutional design variables that 
could yield some answers, the conceptual understanding of institutions, organizations 
and institutional change offered by Scott (2001), is useful. This is explained in Chapter 
I (section 1.2) but briefly, as Scott explains, organizations (and organizational 
structures) become institutionalized when they are valued beyond their immediate 
functions, and such institutions persist when regulative, normative and cognitive 
elements associated with their functioning cohere. Institutional change therefore 
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involves not only a change in the regulative structures and elements (as in governance 
reforms) but also in the normative and cognitive structures and elements in the context 
which are the constitutive elements that are implicated in the institutionalization of the 
new structures. Put another way, the functioning of newly-instituted regulative 
structures (organizational and procedural) in any context would be a function of the 
intersection of the reformed arrangements and the existing normative and cognitive 
(together, the constitutive) elements in that context.377  
 
What are therefore the constitutive elements in the Gujarat polity, economy or socio-
cultural mileu, or even general behavioural and cognitive characteristics, that shaped 
the GoI designs in the ways that were observed? As found in the two case studies in 
the State (and discussed in Chapter III: section 2), the (lack of) Panchayat reforms was 
a product of both the historical existence of functional and active Panchayats and the 
oppositional political dynamic between the Central and State government. This meant 
that a key component of the Panchayat Act, the activation of plebiscitary decision-
making in the Gram Sabha, was bypassed. However, the existing status of water 
provision in the State had made it a politically sensitive issue, and together with the 
noted Gujarati characteristic of rational, self-interested action and enterpreneurial 
accumulation,378 the Sector Reform Program was efficiently and quickly instituted to 
tap the Central government resources that were made available to ‘reforming’ States. 
The Program design closely followed the GoI SRP Guidelines, and did accord full 
centrality to user-groups to the process (see Fig 5.6). However, it was the the already 
                                                 
377 These can ofcourse be altered purposively – as was done through the People’s Plan Campaign in 
Kerala – or clter organically over time as the effect of non-purposive changes in the wider context. 
378 Joshi (2000) sums up the business orientation and entrepreneurial characteristics of Gujaratis: 
“Gujaratis are also known as best the entrepreneurs in India, and next only to Jews in the world. One 
will find Gujaratis in any corner of the world doing some business. Gujarat and Gujaratis are also 
known as more westernised and modernised than 
the rest of India and Indians.”(pp G-61). However, as he also points out, this is most true of only parts 
of Gujarat, including the central belt where this study is located. 
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institutionalized role of the Panchayat as service providers that reshaped the State-
designed functional distribution, and by exclusing users from the actual decision-
making process, provided the scope for inequitous project design.  
 
The legitimacy, efficiency and generally effective functioning of the Gram 
Panchayats, the paternalistic investments in village development by the wealthier 
residents, the higher level of development and service availability than is characteristic 
of Indian villages, a bouyant economy, low levels of unemployment, the image of 
village leaders as genuinely interested in improving village facilities, are other 
constitutive elements in the local context that served to quickly institutionalize the 
patterns of ‘liberalized’ functioning that were developed at the district and village 
levels. The general market rationality (see Joshi 2000) of residents also served to 
make the inequitous distribution of water appear ‘fair’, since user contributions to the 
capital costs were according to the ability to pay, and those provided with shared 
public sources did not have to pay the monthly tariffs. Water, close to the amounts that 
were needed, was provided ‘free’ for the less privileged, and without any investment 
of effort in development of the project379. This perception precluded contestation or 
dissatisfaction, and the moderate level of political development and mobilization in 
the State380 (as compared to Kerala) also militated against that possibility. In sum, this 
mutually reinforcing combination of State political predelictions and compulsions, 
local perceptions, norms, values, practices and historical patterns all contributed to 
quickly center and institutionalise the implementation of the SRP in Panchayats 
instead of user-groups. In Andrades’s words, the existing pattern of elite-directed 
                                                 
379 Though those who could not pay a cash contribution could contribute in labor, no one had chosen 
that option, since the minimum contributions could be as low as Rs 51 (about $ 1), which is about one-
third of the agricultural wages per day in the area.  
380 The ‘low level’ of political development is in relation to that of the two other study States, and based 
on the variables 
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Panchayat functioning was ‘over-determined in the sense that social sanctions, plus 
pressure for conformity, plus intrinsic direct reward, plus values…all….act[ed] 
together.” (Andrade 1984:98) 
 
In the Kerala context, the same reform designs (of the GoI), took on a very different 
shape because of the existence of very different normative and cognitive structures 
and elements at both State and local levels. The high political development differed 
not only in degree from that of Gujarat, but also in its nature, centered as it was on a 
socialist framework of egalitarian provision of social services by the State. This 
ideological framing of the local policy discourses on decentralization made the State-
instituted design for both devolved and liberalized governance citizen-centered and 
structured for direct-democratic decision-making381. Though the heavy and politically 
formidable bureaucratic apparatus that was the accompaniment to the socialistic polity 
could effect a certain degree of ‘rollback’ from the designed levels of devolution, 
particularly in relation to ‘technical’ tasks such as water provision, the decades of 
grassroots mobilization had produced high political and civic engagement, 
perceptions of the State bureacracies as ‘corrupt’ and ‘rent-seeking’, which, together 
with the high levels of literacy and low levels of employment served to institutionalize 
participatory functioning of both types of reformed arrangements to a much greater 
degree than in other States. The orientation to ‘egalitarianism’ and awareness of 
‘rights’ of citizens were characteristics that produced highly effective water provision 
in both devolved and liberalized governance systems.382 This however, did not happen 
suo-moto, and the interventions of the more progressive parts of the bureaucracy to de-
institutionalize historical patterns of centralized and non-participatory governance, 
                                                 
381 In the Ward-Sabha centered participatory planning process and the extensive roles for the 
Beneficiary groups. 
382 As explained in the previous section, the high effectiveness score is less because of greater amount 
of water provided and to a much larger extent due to the egalitarian distribution of benefits. 
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through the People’s Plan Campaign and systematic changes in the regulatory 
frameworks pertaining to local governance, was an important factor,383 but one that 
also emerged from the ideological predelictions of the State government. In other 
words, though a number of constitutive features that cohered with the instituted 
reforms existed in the context, a continuous re-calibration of the regulatory and 
constitutive elements by the State government384 has also been an important factor in 
the institutionalization of more effective decentralized governance than in other States.  
 
In MP, neither the effective Panchayats as in Gujarat nor the ideological orientation to 
citizen-centered governance existed. Despite that, however, a fair degree of 
decentralized functioning is observed in both devolved and liberalized arrangements, 
for the State commitment to the GoI initiative in Panchayat reform yielded a design 
for devolved governance that provided substantial space for direct involvement of 
citizens and community-based organizations, and an active role for the Gram Sabha. 
Though the State bureacratic structure was resistant to both devolution and 
liberalization, this feature, combined with the (fortuitous) presence of a committed 
NGO in the area resulted in sufficient ‘role-taking’ by the community groups for the 
actual functioning of decentralized arrangements to approximate the designed 
distribution of functions. Liberalization did not have even the moderate measure of 
progressive elements that devolution did, for implementation of the SRP was vested in 
the PHED, but the hamlet-level governance structures instituted earlier had already 
created spaces for citizen involvement that could be used. The opportunities for 
initiatives from the community that was inherent in the SRP design,   reinforced by the 
                                                 
383 Without such active de-institutionalization of constitutive elements that cohered with the previous 
governance arrangements, the tendency to fall back into established patterns could have eroded reform 
success.  
384 Particularly in the two terms that the LEFT democratic front (LDF) has been in office since the 
initiation of governance reforms (1996-2001 and again since 2006) 
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general distrust of both the State stucture (PHED) and local elites who occupy 
Panchayat positions, a perception that both are corrupt, and the acute water scarcity 
in the area led to community action. However, most of the normative, cognitive, 
behavioral and other elements required for institutionalization of even reasonably 
participatory functioning at the village level, for example literacy or political 
awareness and mobilization, were missing. Governance effectiveness is also low 
because neither the capital nor the philanthropic orientation that could produce a 
higher service level exist among the community elites, and the low levels of 
participation cannot counter diversion of available public resources by local 
government leaders. Moreover, even the measure of participation that exists is 
precarious and requires the continuous engagement of the NGO staff. It is precisely 
their efforts at awareness-raising, information dissemination, political and 
administrative education, community-organizing and mobilization, all of which are 
directed at creating the constitutive elements that could provide a hospitable context to 
decentralized governance, that makes possible the current levels of involvement at the 
community level.  
 
What does this analysis of the reasons for the anomalous patterns of effectiveness and 
disparity that emerge in the case studies, or the findings themselves, indicate for 
questions that engage decentralization theorists? A number of them remain 
unresolved, including the relationships between decentralized governance, effective 
outcomes and participation, and the relative merits of different types of 
decentralization, and I discuss the study findings in relation to these questions next.  
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4. DECENTRALIZATION, PARTICIPATION AND EFFECTIVE SERVICE PROVISION.   
 
The prime theoretical argument for decentralizing water provision to communities, in 
either neo-liberal or more progressive ways, is that the increased involvement of 
citizens would result in more effective provision. The latter includes a range of 
virtuous outcomes, starting with, in the context of domestic water provision in 
developing countries, providing currently unserved  populations with atleast the 
minimum quantum of safe water required for life. Others are cost-recovery (or 
reduction), alignment of user-preferences and patterns of provision, better operation 
and maintenance, better consevation (or atleast, less waste) and sustainable 
management of installed systems. To assess the relationship between decentralized 
governance and these various dimensions of effectiveness, both the extent of 
decentralization as well as its design (that is, the type) must be considered.  
 
The findings from the case studies indicate that decentralization, of both types, has 
indeed increased the availability of safe water to atleast the required minimum in all 
cases, and increased coverage. The number of households with individual connections 
and those within 50m of a public source have also increased, and the number of 
households dependant on non-safe sources has been reduced to zero in almost all 
cases. Since all systems studied in the mini-cases are less than five years old, major 
repair or maintenance has not been required, though in the few instances when the 
pump broke down, repair has been very quick instead of the weeks taken by State 
personnel before reforms, and the costs minimal. There were also no issues about 
regular and responsible operation reported in any project. The amounts of water 
supplied are so small and practices of water use in these areas where supply is limited 
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are prudent enough that the issue of waste and consevation is not very relevant here.385 
Decentralizing water provision has therefore been effective on all the indicators that 
have been used in this study, bearing out the arguments and expectations of its 
proponents.  
 
The question of cost-recovery connot be fully explored here, but the small proportion 
of the capital investment that is expected from users in the SRP (10%) have been 
forthcoming, and generally without hardship, in Gujarat and Kerala. In the much 
poorer State of Madhya Pradesh, however, even the small amount to be paid by 
beneficiaries has been a problem in all villages studied. In every project, funds had to 
be marshalled from other sources to make up the deficit, and only a very minimal 
contribution towards the salary of the pump-operator is collected from users every 
month (as low as Rs. 10  or US $ 0.20). Collection of the small funds required for 
repairs (when required) has also been difficult, and in one village, the pump operator 
complained that he had had to invest his own money which had yet to be paid back by 
users.  
 
The alignment of preferences and provision is also not a pertinent question to ask in 
the context of MP where even after additions to the supply systems, barely the 
specified minimum quantity of water is available, and that, only in the SR projects. In 
the somewhat better sitution in Kerala and the even better one in Gujarat, the question 
is pertinent, and the answer resoundingly affirmative, particularly in the SRP. 
Panchayat provision in Kerala, however, is still determined by the State, both in 
                                                 
385 Amounts of water available to those with household connections are relatively, very high (in excess 
of 100lpcd in some instances) that increase in consumption before and after installation of new systems 
can definitely be questioned, but in most households, the traditional ‘water-conserving’ attitudes and 
practices, from the historical inaccessibility, are strongly entrenched. This is particularly characteristic 
of water-scarce Gujarat where customary practices have been built around conservation, sharing and 
respect for water.  
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choice of technology and design of project details, though there is little complaint 
about the extent of effort made after the People’s Planning system was introduced.  
 
In sum, decentralization has been found to consistently improve provision. However, 
no patterned relationship can be discerned between the aggregated extent of 
effectiveness (across all indicators) with the extent or type of decentralization. The 
governance arrangements for implementation of the SRP in Kerala are, visibly, the 
most decentralized among all cases, and the Panchayat system in Gujarat the least. 
These cases also earn the highest and lowest scores for effectiveness respectively, in 
this study. But beyond this, there appears to be little correspondence between the 
decentralization degree and type and extent of effectiveness in the other four cases.386  
 
Participation in the governance processes also displays no particular relationship with 
degree and type of decentralization. In fact, variation in levels of participation are 
consistent across both devolved and liberalized governance arrangements, in that it is 
best by far in Kerala, and lowest in Madhya Pradesh in both types, indicating that it 
has less to do with the design of decentralization than with the local context, and 
broadly correlates with the level of social development in the area. The extent of 
decentralization itself (in both devolved and liberalized types of reform) appears to be 
correlated to the level of political development in the State, as does the effectiveness 
of Panchayat provision. Most notably, the extent of disparities characterising the two 
types of reformed systems also paralell the level of political development in the 
context. In sum, therefore, there emerges little conclusive evidence of any patterned 
links between design of decentralization and participation, but the indication that 
inclusion (in terms of the spaces and opportunities provided) and participation (the 
                                                 
386 SRP in Gujarat, Panchayat provision in Kerala and both types in MP. 
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extent to which the opportunities are used) are both functions of the level of social and 
political development in the context. 
 
The third relationship of theoretical interest is that between participation and 
effectiveness, and here levels of participation and extent of effectiveness do appear to 
be consistent in the three cases of liberalized governance, but only if the disparities 
produced are not considered. When the latter is also condidered, this regularity breaks 
down. In fact, when effectiveness includes a consideration of inequities, it appears to 
be closely related to the level of political development in the context, as mentioned 
above. The discussion in the previous sections also highlight this relationship, and it 
has been discussed in detail. The findings of this study therefore seriously challenge 
the association between (increased) levels of participation and governance 
effectiveness on which communitarian arguments for decentralization are premised. I 
expand on this further in the last section to show how the notion of ‘contextual fit’ of 
decentralization arrangements is therefore problematized, but before that, I explore 
how the study findings relate to questions of women’s participation in governance.  
 
5. WOMEN’S INCLUSION AND PARTICIPATION IN DECENTRALIZED GOVERNANCE 
 
The barriers to women’s participation in governance, and the enabling elements that 
can help women counter these, are among the central questions that preoccupy 
scholars of governance and democracy as well as feminist theorists. In this study, I 
had focussed on the enabling organizational provisons instituted for women’s 
inclusion in reformed governance arrangements, that is, the extent and kind of spaces 
created,  rather than the barriers to their participation, though the importance of 
understanding the latter cannot be overstated. The case studies, however, in exploring 
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the patterns of inclusion and participation have also provided important insights into 
the latter. Here I discuss some of these insights and how they relate to the discussions 
in the literature.  
 
To analyse the ‘women and governance’ problematic, the distinction made in this 
study between inclusion and participation is an useful one, but two other kinds of 
distinctions are also analytically helpful. One is to distinguish between barriers and 
enabling features, but both can be in turn grouped into three sets of variables based on 
their location – one, those in the socio-cultural, political and economic context, the 
second in the institutional configurations for governance and third, the personal 
characteristics of women.387 Also, barriers and enabling factors (or elements) are 
intersecting sets, for many are mirror images.388 Investigations – both theoretical and 
empirical – in the area of ‘women and governance’, reviewed in Chapter II, (section 
2.3) have identified a number of barriers, the most formidable, entrenched and 
universal being gendered patriarchal norms and practices and the gendered division of 
labor, both characteristics of the socio-cultural context. Personal attributes such as 
(lack of) education, economic strength (through employment, for example), public 
experience and leadership capacities are another set of factors. The third set of 
variables, to do wth the institutional arrangements for governance, have, however, 
drawn less attention (Kudva and Misra 2008, Corwall and Goetz 2005). It is this last 
that was the focus of this study, but I also discuss the implications of the findings for 
the two other sets of variables. 
                                                 
387 This is not to imply that these are non-intersecting sets; many variables are clearly interrelated, as for 
example, education of women and patriarchal social norms. Nevertheless, it is analytically useful to 
distinguish between, and consider where they are located, for emancipatory policy and strategy. 
388 For example, the lack of education can be a barrier, as can the lack of economic independence or 
strength, but education is an enabling feature as is economic independence. Patriarchal socio-cultural 
norms, that are major barriers, however, do not have ‘mirror-image’enabling features, and provision of 
earmarked spaces for women in governance structures does not have a counterpart barrier.  
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In the case studies, socio-cultural norms did emerge as the prime barriers to 
participation, constraining women in both Gujarat and MP, but barely noticed in 
Kerala where traditional gendered norms had eroded substantially. The gendered 
division of labour, however, did not emerge as a significant barrier except in MP, for 
modernization, women’s economic employment outside the house389 and 
nuclearisation of families have all altered the time required for housework as well as 
perceptions of the appropriate division of labour.390 Even in MP, time constraints or 
burden of housework were not among the reasons most often cited for non-
participation.391 In fact, the most frequently offered reasons for non-participation 
differed across States. In Kerala, the main obstacle was “men’s misbehavior…they are 
always suspicious” and “they don’t want us to take important positions”, “they don’t 
listen to us…”, but this was offset by “they are now getting used to it”, “we have 
shown them we are actually better in this kind of work”. In Gujarat and MP, 
predictably, social norms were most often cited, but the lack of personal capacity 
(such as literacy, familiarity with governmental processes) to participate meaningfully 
was an equally frequent reason, particularly in MP. 
 
It is this last set of variables which is worth scrutiny, particularly the importance of 
education, for some authors have found that literacy or education is not correlated to 
                                                 
389 In Kerala, with generally low employment levels, women’s participation in the workforce has been 
even lower than the State average (Kodoth 2004, Kodoth and Eappen 2005) but because of their 
requirement in specific niches (such as cashew-processing) and their increasing involvement in the 
‘Kudumbasree’ units that have proliferated, employment of women – albeit in informal activities – is 
reportedly becoming higher than that of men (interviews, GVRT members, Aanchal). 
390 Women reported having “the time, because we have a small family and there is not much 
housework” and “because we have a mixie, ‘fridge, all the gadgets [labour saving appliances], so work 
gets over in the morning”; also, in Kerala, that “I go for work in the morning, so my husband helps in 
the cooking” and “he does the children’s work, because I have to go to the factory [cashew processing 
unit]”.  
391 The most frequent reasons given were “feeling shy”, “I don’t understand anything they talk about”, 
“how can I go alone?”, “I can’t read and write, what will I do there?”, “they are big [important] people, 
I don’t belong there, what is the use?” 
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women’s participation in governance, and this is, apparently, true in very different 
contexts (Sapiro, 1981, Jayal 2008). In all cases, however, these two factors emerged 
as either an important barrier or enabling condition, as discussed in Chapters II and III. 
In MP, the lack of ability to “read and write” was cited by all women interviewees 
(who were barely literate or non-literate) as the most important barrier (after social 
norms). In Gujarat, the women interviewed were mostly all literate, but some felt 
inadequate for involvement in public meetings because they were “not more 
educated”, and three of the four non-literate (dalit) women interviewed said illiteracy 
was a prime barrier. In Kerala, education was cited as the most significant enabling 
factor, imparting “confidence and personality”, and the ability to “quickly understand 
the system and learn what to do”. Also, notably, the woman GP President interviewed 
saw it as the most important factor in learning to “control’ the male Secretary and 
counter his obfuscations.392  
 
These self-reports put a large question-mark on the findings by the authors who 
observe no correlation between literacy/education and participation in their analysis of 
large-scale survey data. The findings in this study are consistent with the observations 
of development professionals and NGOs who work closely with elected women 
representatives (EWRs) to develop their capacities to  participate meaningfully (CEO, 
Unnati; CEO and staff, Samarthan). Though developing literacy per se is not part of 
their training and capacity-building efforts for EWRs, their efforts are all implicitly or 
explicitly based on assessments of the importance of at least functional literacy, 
information about and understanding of governance systems and confidence-building 
(Kudva 2003, SEARCH 1993, 1994). If elected women as well as others report that 
                                                 
392 “[T]he Secretary can’t fool me, I read all the papers, I understand everything”, “Now he knows that I 
am the boss” were her revealing statements.  
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literacy or higher education builds both their competencies and confidence, the 
importance of these variables cannot be discounted.  
 
In the little attention given to institutional variables in the literature, the importance of 
time and location of meetings as determinants of women’s participation has been 
noted (Misra and Kudva 2008). These do emerge as important variables – in some 
cases, decisive ones – from the experience in Madhya Pradesh, where the constitution 
of the Gram Sabha at the hamlet level is felt to be an enabling factor by those who did 
attend some meetings, and has elicited somewhat higher participation than in the 
Panchayat meetings. Women elected to the Panchayat from villages other than where 
the Panchayat office is located often do not attend meetings because of the barriers to 
inter-village travel, and the suggestion of one NGO (Samarthan) staff that meetings 
should be statutorily required to be held in rotation in all hamlets within the Panchayat 
jurisdiction merits serious attention.   
 
In India, the reservation of one-third of elected positions in local governments for 
women and the opportunities it has opened up for participation appears to have 
diverted attention from identifying accompanying provisions that are required to make 
this reservation effective. Elsewhere (Kudva and Mishra 2008, Misra and Kudva 
2008) the point has been made at length,  that sufficient evidence of the critical 
importance of institutional design emerges from the quota experience in India, which 
has been missed in the disconnect between the institution-focussed feminist theorizing 
and the ‘identity-focussed’ examinations of the quota experiment. Enabling features of 
the institutional design that emerge from this study include the mandatory reservation 
of seats for women in Committees and their inclusion in the quorums specified for all 
meetings. The importance of increasing the number of spaces and mandating their 
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presence in decisive fora such as Executive and Standing Committees is clearly 
illustrated in the active and decisive involvement of women in the Beneficiary Groups 
in Kerala, where equal representation of both men and women is mandated both in the 
general assembly and the Executive Committee, and in the quorum for meetings. 
While this is clearly not the only, or even the most important factor in the active 
participation of women in Kerala, or the lack of a similar pattern in Gujarat and MP, it 
was pointed out as an enabling feature by interviewees in Kerala.  
 
Statutory oversight by the State over the functioning of local governments as well as 
reform programs such as the SRP emerges as another key institutional variable in all 
three States. While the presence of such oversight in Kerala for both devolved and 
liberalized governance has contributed substantially to the active participation that was 
observed, the higher levels of participation in Panchayat processes in comparison to 
that in the SRP in the two other States also illustrates its importance.393 For there are 
statutory requirements for functional and procedural audit of Panchayats by State 
Panchayat Departments, in addition to financial audit, while the latter is the only real 
check applied on the functioning of the SRP.  
 
The findings of this study definitely suggest positive relationships between extent of 
decentralization (whether it extends into localities and neighborhoods) and 
participation, as well as between the design of decentralization and participation. 
Though both these aspects are largely dependant on the overall contours of the reform, 
which are politically determined, they are determined by the specifics of 
                                                 
393There are critics of such close monitoring of reformed arrangements who contend that it erodes local 
autonomy, and leaves little space for local innovation and context-specific action. Moreover, the 
detailed directions from the State can frustrate and hamstring local functionaries. As one elected 
representative of a Gram Panchayat in Kerala reportedly remarked, “they give us one lakh (hundred 
thousand Indian rupees, about $2000) and 50 pages of guidelines on how we are allowed to spend it!” 
(interview, Professor, IRMA) 
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organizational design, and are therefore given full shape in the design details. A 
greater focus on institutional variables and further research in this area is therefore 
strongly indicated.  
 
6. THE ISSUE OF INSTITUTIONAL FIT AND DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH  
 
The findings of this research reaffirm the effectiveness of decentralization in 
improving delivery of water per se, and also point to the crucial importance of 
commitment to the process and monitoring by higher echelons of government, or 
external counter-elites as pointed out by a number of authors (Mahal 2000, Heller 
2001, Fiszbein 1997, Robinson 2003, Johnson 2001).  However the findings regarding 
the accentuation of disparities in Gujarat, in both devolved and liberalized 
arrangements, problematize these conclusions in a fundamental way, for they occur 
despite the comparatively high degree of decentralization and little reluctance on the 
part of the Government of Gujarat to enable community provisioning as in the SRP. 
Morever, there was historically a greater degree of devolution and stronger local 
governments, affording an ‘institutional fit’ which enabled an efficient uptake of both 
devolution and liberalization of water provision. Yet there is by far the greatest 
inequity in distribution of benefits among the three States, and low participation of 
citizens in the process of developing new projects.  
 
I suggest that the Gujarat cases question the desirability of ‘institutional fit’ itself and 
the intuitively appealing and theoretically argued notion of tailoring reforms to the 
context. For it was the fit between the notion of increased autonomy in local 
governance that underpinned the reforms, and the presence of relatively strong and 
effective local governments, local-elite initiative and community philanthropy, which 
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enabled the inequitable design and functioning of the water supply projects. Morever, 
the elision of the progressive element of direct user-participation in the decision-
making processes was not considered material or objectionable by community-
members, for the VWSC-centered functioning fitted the historically prevalent pattern 
of Panchayat governance. That is, the good fit of the reformed arrangements and 
context characteristics enabled the continuation of elite-centered local governance 
and inequitable access to public services, and the non-implementation of progressive 
institutional changes. This clearly indicates that in the case of progressive governance 
reforms aimed at changing institutionalized patterns of local governance, contextual fit 
may actually be undesirable. This is also borne out by the Kerala experience where the 
citizen participation envisaged in the reformed arrangements did not actually fit 
prevalent patterns of public engagement, and had to be deliberatively and 
systematically engendered and institutionalized by the State government. At the same 
time, some characteristics of the context such as the high literacy, human development 
and political and organizational involvement, were important constitutive elements 
that enabled the success of such efforts.  
 
Clearly, reformed arrangements need to fit some aspects of the context while 
deliberately countering others. What kind of ‘contextual fit’ is therefore necessary for 
successful institutionalization of reformed arrangements, which elements or aspects of 
the reform design and of the context must necessarily not fit, and how the latter kind of 
reform elements can be implemented and institutionalized, then emerge as important 
questions that require further investigation. Within-case comparisons (across the mini-
cases, for example) can yield further understanding in this respect.  Also, while this 
research has provided some important findings in relation to the appropriateness of 
liberalization and devolution in different contexts, these are in terms of the relative 
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degrees of development. Further specification of the threshold levels of economic, 
political and social development that enable successful decentralized governance (of 
any type, as in Kerala) is necessary. This can be obtained through comparative studies 
across these and other locations, using measures that enable both disaggregation and 
graduation of  ‘political’ ‘economic’ and ‘socio-cultural’ characteristics. Finally, 
replication across other locations and with larger number of ‘mini-cases’ would be 
useful to reinforce the findings of this study.   
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ANNEXURE I 
MULTIPLE DEFINITIONS OF DECENTRALIZATION 
 
Author(s) (Most widely used) definitions of decentralization 
UN (1962), 
quoted in Oyugi 
(2000:3) 
“The transfer of authority on a geographic basis whether by deconcentration 
(i.e., delegation) of administrative authority to field units of the same 
department or level of government, or by the political devolution of authority 
to local government units or special statutory bodies.” (italics mine) 
Cheema and 
Rondinelli 
(1983:18) 
“Decentralization is ….the transfer of planning, decision-making or 
administrative authority from the central government to its field 
organizations, local administrative units, semi-autonomous and parastatal 
organizations, local governments or non-governmental organizations” (italics 
mine) 
Rondinelli et 
al. (1984:9) 
“Decentralization can be defined as the transfer of responsibility for 
planning, management, resource-raising and allocation from the central 
government and its agencies to (a) field units of central government 
ministries or agencies, (b) subordinate units or levels of government, (c) 
semi-autonomous public authorities or corporations, (d) area-wide regional 
or functional authorities or (e) non-governmental private or voluntary 
organizations.” (italics mine). 
Mawhood 
(1983) and 
Smith (1985) 
“Decentralization is any act that formally cedes powers to actors and 
institutions within a political-administrative and territorial hierarchy” (italics 
mine). 
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ANNEXURE II A 
PROFILES OF STUDY VILLAGES IN GUJARAT  
(District: SURAT) 
 
Village Characteristics Study villages 
Location Sub-district  Kamrej Palsana Choriasi 
Panchayat Laskana Ladvi Umbhel Vadadla Tatijhagda Bhatia Vaktan
a 
Village Laskana Ladvi Umbhe
l 
Vadadl
a 
Tatijhagd
a 
Bhatia Vaktan
a 
Village Area (in Hectares) 388 401 834 317 217.57 453 431.42 
Number of 
Households 
Total  1,749 280 1,102 193 148 186 951 
Scheduled 
Castes 
  -   - - 
Scheduled 
Tribes 
  -   - - 
Panchayat Total members   -   - - 
From village – 
M 
  -   - - 
From village – F    -   - - 
Village 
Income 
Expenditure 
Total Income 1059 214  4350 1395 173 1020 
** 
Total 
expenditure 
933 218  2810 1243 83 981 
Landuse Agriculture (Irr) 235.93 349  206.78 162.27 383 139.92 
Non-Irrigated 67.50 2.31  65.51 30.41 5.40 127.34 
Forest 0 0  0 0 0 0 
Cultivable 
Waste 
45.90 16.63  22.66 10.18 19.66 36.69 
Uncultivable 38.98 33-02  21.94 14.71 45.54 127.47 
Total 
Population 
Persons
  
8,452 1,546 5,117 897 800 882 4743 
Male 4,517 928 2,732 456 404 442 2543 
Female 3,935 618 2,385 441 396 440 2200 
Scheduled 
Castes 
Persons 426 139 935 41 17 34 77 
Male 222 310 486 19 9 18 38 
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Female 204 259 449 22 8 16 39 
Scheduled 
Tribe 
Persons  985 569 1,912 526 299 505 629 
Male 511 310 971 267 156 252 341 
Female 474 259 941 259 143 253 288 
Literacy Total 4226 872 2673 636 677 456 2169 
Male 2653 605 1575 352 344 259 1449 
Female 1573 267 1098 284 333 206 747 
Main 
Workers: 
   
(Cultivators)  
Persons 3871 649  488 369 403 41 
Male 2667 413  302 262 258 40 
Female 1204 236  186 107 145 1 
Main 
Workers: 
 (Agri. 
Labor) 
Persons      111 297 
Male      104 165 
Female      7 132 
Marginal 
Workers:     
(Cultivators) 
Persons      292 0 
Male      154 0 
Female      138 0 
Marginal 
workers: 
  (Agri. 
Labor) 
Persons 818     276 76 
Male 422     147 34 
Female 396     129 42 
Non-
Workers 
Persons 4467 897  409 431 479 3072 
Male 1806 515  154 142 184 1156 
Female - -   - - 1916 
Primary 
Commoditie
s produced 
1 Sugarca
ne 
Sugar
cane 
Sugar 
cane 
 Paddy Sugar
cane 
Sugar 
cane 
2 Banana Padd
y 
Bajri  Sugar 
cane 
Padd
y 
- 
3 Vegetab
les 
Bajri Banan
a 
 Jowar Bana
na 
- 
Drinking 
Water  
Supply 
Piped/ Taps Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Standposts No No No No - - No 
Handpumps/ 
Tubewells 
No No No Tubew
ell 
Yes Yes No 
Other-well. pond, 
river 
Well, 
Tank 
Well, 
Tank 
Well 
water 
No Yes/river,
well,cana
l 
Well 
water 
Well 
water 
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Electricity Agricultural Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Domestic Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Schools/ 
Colleges 
Primary School 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 
Middle school 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
High School 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
College 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Medical  
Facilitie
s 
Primary Health 
Center or 
Dispensary 
0 0 1-sub 
centre 
1 sub 
cen/f,w
,c. 
0 0 0 
Hospital 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Medical 
Expertis
e 
Registered Doctors 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 
Comm. Health 
workers 
1 0 1 1 0 1 0 
Communica
tion facilities 
Post Office Yes-1 1 1 1 0 0 0 
Telephone Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes - Yes 
No. of tel. conn 50 10 - 3 8 15 18 
Accessibility Nearest town 
and distance 
Surat/15
km 
Kado
dara/
8km 
Kadod
ara/3 
km 
Chalth
an/10k
m 
Chalthan/
10 km 
Sachi
n8KM 
Utran  
4 km 
Roads (mud/ 
paved/ 
motorable 
Yes/pav
ed rd. 
Yes/p
aved 
Yes/pa
ved rd. 
Mud/P
aved 
rd. 
Paved rd. YES Paved 
road 
Public transport 
(Bus/ auto/ 
train) 
Bus Bus Bus Bus Bus Bus Bus, 
Train 
Banking 
Facilities 
Banks 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 
Credit Societies 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
Public and 
Recreation 
facilities 
Community Hall - 0 0 0 0 - - 
Cinema/ video 
hall 
- 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Other - 0 0 0 0 0 - 
Newspapers  Yes - Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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ANNEXURE II B  
PROFILES OF STUDY VILLAGES IN KERALA    
(District : KOLLAM) 
 
Village Characteristics Study Neighborhoods/ Hamlets 
Location Sub-district Pathanapuram 
Panchayat Aanchal Yerroor 
Hamlets/ Neighborhoods   
Village Area (in Hectares) 2455 2224 
Nunber of 
Households 
Total  7575 4586 
Scheduled Castes   
Scheduled Tribes   
Panchayat Total members   
From village – M   
From village – F    
Village Income 
Expenditure 
Total Income 4770500 1946050 
Total expenditure 4571300 1946050 
Landuse Agriculture (Irr) 425 21.05 
Non-Irrigated 1924 1749.49 
Forest 0 428.34 
Cultivable Waste 0 0 
Uncultivable 106 25.12 
Total Population Persons  31543 18680 
Male 15227 9023 
Female 16316 9657 
Scheduled 
Castes 
Persons 3089 1690 
Male 1479 831 
Female 1610 859 
Scheduled Tribe Persons  9 38 
Male 5 20 
Female 4 18 
Literacy Total   
Male   
Female   
 
 
 
 
443
Main Workers:   
(Cultivators)   
Persons   
Male   
Female   
Main Workers: 
(Agri. Labor) 
Persons   
Male   
Female   
Marginal 
Workers:     
(Cultivators) 
Persons   
Male   
Female   
Marginal 
workers: 
 (Agri. Labor) 
Persons   
Male   
Female   
Non-Workers Persons   
Male   
Female   
Primary 
Commodities 
produced 
1 Burnt Bricks Rubber 
2   
3   
Drinking 
Water  
Supply 
Piped/ Taps No information No information 
Standposts --  
Handpumps/ Tubewells Available Available 
Other-well. pond, river Available Available 
Electricity Agricultural Available Available 
Domestic Available Available 
Schools/ 
Colleges 
Primary School 12 6 
Middle school 6 3 
High School 6 2 
College 1 0 
Medical  
Facilities 
Primary Health Center or 
Dispensary 
1 1 
Hospital --  
Medical 
Expertise 
Registered Doctors 0 0 
Comm. Health workers 1 0 
Communication 
facilities 
Post Office 4 2 
Telephone Available Available 
No. of tel. conn 1800 850 
Accessibility Nearest town and distance Punalur, 12 KM Punalur, 15 KM 
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Roads (mud/ paved/ motorable Available Available 
Public transport (Bus/ auto/ train) Bus (yes) Train 
(no) 
Bus (yes) Train 
(no) 
Banking Facilities Banks 3 2 
Credit Societies 3 0 
Public and 
Recreation 
facilities 
Community Hall   
Cinema/ video hall 1 1 
Other   
Newspapers  Available Available 
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ANNEXURE II C 
PROFILES OF STUDY VILLAGES IN MADHYA PRADESH  
(District: SEHORE) 
 
Village Characteristic Study villages / hamlets 
Location Sub-district Sehore Taluka 
Panchayat Kharpa Lasudiya Dhakad Rola 
Village Kharpa Ramkhed
i 
Lasudiya 
Dhakad 
Lasudiya 
Khas 
Manpura 
Village Area (in Hectares) 304 248 389 314 198 
Nunber of 
Households 
Total  143 133 155 156 92 
Scheduled 
Castes 
     
Scheduled 
Tribes 
     
Panchayat Total members      
From village – M      
From village – F       
Village 
Income 
Expenditure 
Total Income - - - ni ni 
Total 
expenditure 
- - - ni ni 
Landuse Agriculture (Irr) 121 186 138 196 79 
Non-Irrigated 139 31 206 56 102 
Forest 0 0 0 0 0 
Cultivable 
Waste 
22 17 24 26 9 
Uncultivable 22 14 21 36 8 
Total 
Population 
Persons  583 823 818 810 446 
Male 311 429 435 410 217 
Female 272 394 383 400 229 
Scheduled 
Castes 
Persons 226 20 359 124 52 
Male 121 11 193 58 26 
Female 105 9 166 66 26 
Scheduled 
Tribe 
Persons  46 0 44 0 0 
Male 27 0 25 0 0 
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Female 19 0 19 0 0 
Literacy Total 186 254 354 356 215 
Male 143 172 253 262 137 
Female 43 82 101 94 78 
Main Workers: 
   (Cultivators)   
Persons 76 53 99 127 58 
Male 69 44 91 108 42 
Female 7 9 8 19 16 
Main Workers: 
 (Agri. Labor) 
Persons 182 104 43 35 8 
Male 71 52 34 28 8 
Female 111 52 9 7 0 
Marginal 
Workers:     
(Cultivators) 
Persons 0 2 2 61 22 
Male 0 1 2 6 12 
Female 0 1 0 55 10 
Marginal 
workers: 
  (Agri. Labor) 
Persons 14 25 228 29 144 
Male 2 3 64 8 55 
Female 12 22 164 21 89 
Non-Workers Persons 296 245 430 500 210 
Male 157 115 229 206 97 
Female 139 130 201 294 113 
Primary 
Commodities 
produced 
1 - Jaggery - - - 
2 - - - - - 
3 - - - - - 
Drinking 
Water  
Supply 
Piped/ Taps na na na - - 
Standposts na na na - - 
Handpumps/ 
Tubewells 
Available Available Available Available Available 
Other-well. pond, 
river 
Available 
(well) 
- Available 
(well) 
Available 
(well) 
Available 
(well) 
Electricity Agricultural Available Available Available Available Available 
Domestic Available Available Available Available Available 
Schools/ 
Colleges 
Primary School 1 1 1 1 1 
Middle school 0 0 0 0 0 
High School 0 0 0 0 0 
College 0 0 0 0 0 
Medical  
Facilities 
Primary Health 
Center or Dispensary 
0 0 0 0 0 
Hospital 0 0 0 0 0 
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Medical 
Expertise 
Registered Doctors 0 0 0 0 0 
Comm. Health 
workers 
0 0 0 0 0 
Communicatio
n facilities 
Post Office 0 0 0 0 0 
Telephone Available Available Available Available Available 
No. of tel. conn 1 1 1 1 1 
Accessibility Nearest town 
and distance 
Sehore 
20km 
Sehore 
19km 
Sehore 
16km  
Sehore 
16km 
Sehore 
11km 
Roads (mud/ 
paved/ 
motorable 
Mud road Mud road na Paved 
road 
Mud road 
Public transport 
(Bus/ auto/ train) 
no no no bus - yes no 
Banking 
Facilities 
Banks 0 0 0 0 0 
Credit Societies 0 0 0 0 0 
Public and 
Recreation 
facilities 
Community Hall 0 0 0 0 0 
Cinema/ video 
hall 
0 0 0 0 0 
Other 0 0 0 0 0 
Newspapers  na Available na na na 
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ANNEXURE III A 
LIST OF PEOPLE INTERVIEWED IN GUJARAT 
 
STATE LEVEL 
Water and Sanitation Management Organization (WASMO) 
  Director (CEO) 
Project Director, Sector Reforms 
Information and Monitoring Consultant 
Field Coordinator (Surat) 
Project Consultant   
Gujarat State Water Supply and Sewerage Board (GWSSB) 
Ex-Chief Engineer (Retired), GWSSB  
Executive Engineers (2), GWSSB Head Office 
Managing Director, Gujarat Infrastructure Development Corporation (GIDC) 
Managing Director, Gujarat Urban Development Corporation (GUDC) 
Sector Reform Cell, Gujarat Jalseva Training Institute (GJTI) 
Executive Engineer (Training) 
Assistant Engineer (Training)  
Project Director, PRAVAH (Multi-State Network of NGOs) 
Independent Researchers: 3 
 
DISTRICT LEVEL 
GWSSB, Surat Division (Public Health Works) 
Executive Engineer (Head of DPMU, Sector Reform 
(Also Secretary, District Water and Sanitation Committee (DWSC). 
District Project Management Unit (WASMO-GWSSB) 
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Additional Assistant Engineeer, DPMU, Surat 
Deputy Engineer,  DPMU, GWSSB Division Office, Surat 
Social Mobilizer, DPMU,  GWSSB Division Office, Surat 
Head, Aadesh Charitable Trust (NGO) 
 
VILLAGE/ PANCHAYAT LEVEL 
 
Villages Panchayat VWSC Users Additional  
Laskana Sarpanch 
Women members – 1 
Men members – 3 
President 
Secretary 
Men members – 2 men 
Women – 4 
Men – 2 
Focus Group  
Survey (18) 
Ladvi Sarpanch 
Women members – 2 
Men members – 2 
Secretary,  
Women members – 2 
Men members – 2  
Pump Operator 
Women – 5 
Men – 3 
Focua Group 
Survey (18) 
Tatijhagada Members – Men 2 Women members – 2 
Men members – 2 
Pump Operator 
Women – 4 
Men – 4 
Focus Group 
Survey (15) 
Vadadla Sarpanch  
Deputy Sarpanch 
Women members – 2 
Men members – 1 
President (Sarpanch) 
Secretary (Dy.Sarpanch) 
Women members – 2 
Men member – 1 
Women – 4 
Men – 3 
Focus Group  
Survey  (16) 
Umbhel Sarpanch 
Women members – 3 
Men members – 2 
Pump Operator 
No Sector Reform 
Project 
Women – 4 
Men – 4 
Survey  (18) 
Bhatia Sarpanch 
Talati (Sectretary) 
Women members – 3 
Men members – 2 
No Sector Reform 
Project 
Women – 5 
Men – 3 
Survey  (15) 
Vaktana Sarpanch 
Women members – 2 
Men members – 2 
Pump Operator 
No Sector Reform 
Project 
Women – 3 
Men – 4 
Focus Group 
Survey (17) 
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ANNEXURE  III B 
LIST OF PEOPLE INTERVIEWED IN KERALA 
 
STATE LEVEL 
State Planning Board, Kerala :  
Secretary. 
  Member, State Planning Board 
  Division Head, Decentralization Unit 
Jt-Director, Socio-Economic Planning Unit, Kerala Planning Board 
Member, Decentralization Unit 
Kerala Shastra Sahitya Parishad, (KSSP) Thiruvananthapuram 
President (also Director, Integrated Development Research Center, 
Pallakad) 
  Secretary, KSSP 
Members, KSSP – 2 
Director, Socio-Economic Unit Foundation (SEUF) 
Water Sector Program – South Asia (WSP-SA) of world Bank. 
State Coordinator, Sector Reform Program (WSP-SA) 
  Consultant, GoK-WASP-SA Program 
Joint Secretary, Water Resources Department 
Executive Engineer, KWA Swajaldhara Monitoring Cell 
MD, Kerala Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Agency (KRWSSA) 
Director, Cap-DecK (Capacity-building for Decentralization in Kerala) 
Deputy Director, Bureau of Economics and Statistics 
Director, SAHAYI (NGO) 
Academic/ Researchers:  
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Prof Michael Tharrakan, Center for Development Studies (CDS) 
Prof, Institute of Management in Government (IMG) 
Prof, Center for Environment and Development (CED) 
Prof, Center for Earth Sciences Studies (CESS) 
 
DISTRICT LEVEL 
Kerala Water Authority 
  Executive Engineer, Kollam West, Kollan Division 
  Asst-Executive Engineer, Kollam Subdivision 
District Coordinator (Kollam), Cap-DecK 
Ex-President, District Panchayat, Kollam 
Project Management Unit (Sector Reform) 
  Team Leader 
  Project Consultant – Community Organizing 
  Project Consultant – Finance and Accounts 
 
PANCHAYAT LEVEL 
Gram Panchayat Volunteer Resource Team (GVRT), Aanchal 
  Social Mobilizer 
  Engineer 
  Accountant 
Plan Coordinator, Yeroor Panchayat 
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VILLAGE LEVEL 
 
Panchayats and 
hamlets 
Panchayat Beneficiary groups 
 
Additional 
Panchayat Working Group / 
NHG 
Committee Users/ 
Members 
Aanchal (GP) President (w) 
Secretary 
Women – 3 
Men mem – 2 
Women –2 
Men -1 
   
Mallavattam    Pump Operator 
Women – 4  
Men – 4  
Survey (18) 
Focus Group 
Neelamootil   President 
Secretary 
Treasurer 
Pump Operator 
Women -2 
Women – 4 
Men – 3  
Survey (19) 
Focus Group 
Ambalakonam   President (w) 
Secretary 
Women – 2  
Men – 2  
Women – 3  
Men – 2  
Survey (17) 
Focus Group 
Yeroor (GP) President 
Secretary 
Women – 3 
Men – 2 
Women –3 
Men 2 
   
Kanjyavel  Pump Operator 
Women – 2 
Men -2 
 Pump Operator 
Women – 3 
Men – 3  
Survey (16) 
Focus Group 
Mayilladumkunnu   Vice-President 
Secretary 
Women – 2 
Men – 2   
Women – 3 
Men – 2   
Survey (18) 
Focus Group 
Pulleri 
(Thevallakara GP) 
  President 
(ward) 
Secretary 
Pump operator 
Women – 1 
Men – 1  
Women – 3 
Men – 2 
Survey (15) 
Focus Group  
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ANNEXURE III (C) 
LIST OF PEOPLE INTERVIEWED IN MADHYA PRADESH 
 
STATE LEVEL 
Samarthan (NGO) –  Director 
Project Coordinators – 2 
CEO, Taal (NGO) 
State Director, WaterAid, Bhopal 
State Director, UNICEF, Bhopal 
Sector Reform Project Cell, Bhopal –  
(In-Charge) Superintendant Engineer, PHED 
   Executive Engineer, PHED 
Social Mobilization Consultant, 
Monitoring Consultant 
Academics/ Researchers (Bhopal):   
Prof, State Institute of Public Administration. 
   Prof, Water and Land Management Institute. 
Rajiv Gandhi Watershed Mission (RGWM – Pani Roko Abhiyan):  
Task Manager, RGWM 
   Joint Development Commissioner, RGWM 
   Deputy Commissioner , RGWM 
   
DISTRICT LEVEL: 
Collector, Sehore  (also Chairperson, District Water and Sanitation Mission) 
CEO, Zilla Panchayat, Sehore 
Swajaldhara Cell, Sehore Subdivision, MP-PHED 
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Asst. Engineers (Swajaldhara) – 2 
Sub-Engineer (Swajaldhara)   
District Office, Samarthan (NGO)  
   District Coordinator 
Field Staff, Samarthan (3) 
 
 
 
Villages Panchayat VWSC Health 
Committee 
Users Additional 
Kharpa Sarpanch 
Upa-Sarpanch 
Sachiv (secretary) 
Women members – 1 
Men member – 1 
President (Sarpanch) 
Women – 1(Panch) 
Men – 2 
Men – 3 
         (1 Panch) 
W omen – 2  
        (1 Panch) 
Women – 4 
Men -3 
Survey -18 
Lasudiya 
Dhakad 
Sarpanch (Las. Khas) 
Women members – 2 
Men member – 1 
President (Sarpanch) 
Women-2 (Panches) 
Men – 2 
Ex-President 
Women – 2  
         (1 Panch) 
Men – 2 
Women – 3 
Men – 4 
 
Focus Group 
Survey -15 
Lasudiya 
Khas 
(Sarpanch) 
Women members – 2 
Men member – 2 
No VWSC Women – 2        
(Panches) 
Women – 3 
Men – 3 
Focus Group 
Survey -15 
Manpura UpSarpanch 
Women member – 1 
Men member – 2 
No VWSC Village Treasurer 
President 
Men – 2  
Women – 5 
Men – 2 
Focus Group 
Survey -16 
Ramkedi Women members – 2 
Men member – 1 
No VWSC Women – 2 
Men- 2 
Women – 4 
Men – 3 
Survey – 14 
 
 
PANCHAYAT/ VILLAGE LEVEL 
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ANNEXURE IV A 
LIST OF DOCUMENTS SOURCED IN GUJARAT 
 
DPMU Surat. Minutes of Sector Reform Meetings – Zilla Watsan Mission, Surat. 10/6 
and 11/4 2002; 25/8, 15/9 and 31/10/2003; 19/1 and 20/9/2004; 13/6/2005. E-
files. 
 
________ Laskana Village Water Supply Scheme, Kamrej, Surat. Sector Reform-
2002, District Watsan Mission, Surat. File Folder Photocopy. 
 
________ Vadadla Village Water Supply Scheme, Palsana, Surat. Sector Reform Pilot 
Project 2002-03. File Folder Photocopy. 
 
________ Tatizaghda Village Water Scheme , Taluka: Palsana, district: Surat. Sector 
Reform Pilot Project 2002-2003. File Folder Photocopy. 
 
________ Ladvi Village Water Scheme, Taluka: Kamrej, District: Surat, Sector 
Reform Pilot Project 2002-2003. File Folder Photocopy. 
 
GoG. Undated. Decentralized, Community Managed, Demand Driven Water and 
Sanitation Programme in Gujarat: Emerging Leadership. Gandhinagar : 
WASMO. (Leaflet) 
 
________ Undated. Lok Vyavasthapith Ghogha Pradeshik Pani Purvatta Ane 
Swachhata Kayrakram. Gandhinagar : WASMO. (Leaflet) 
 
GoG. Undated. Selection Criteria for Non-Government Organisations (NGOs) as 
Implementing Support Agencies (ISAs) under Swajaldhara programme / 
Sector Reform Scheme (State), Gandhinagar: Water and Sanitation 
Management Organisation. 
      
________ Undated. Community Participation in Rural Water Supply: Indian 
Initiative. (S K Tripathi and Bharat Lal), Rajiv Gandhi National Drinking 
Water Mission, DDWS, New Delhi : MORD. 
 
Gujarat Sarkar. Undated. Swajaldhara: Karyakramni Saral Samjhuti. Gandhinagar: 
WASMO. (Leaflet) 
 
________  Narmada, Jal Sampathi, Pani Purvatta aAne Kalpasar Vibhag, Thehrao 
kramank(GO) WSM-102003-1993-Kh 3  
 
GWSSB (Gujarat Water Supply and Sewerage Board) undated. Balance Sheet as on 
31st March 2004. Gandhinagar: GWSSB. Photocopy. 
 
________ undated. Balance Sheet as on 31st March 2005. Gandhinagar: GWSSB. 
Photocopy. 
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________ undated. Balance Sheet as on 31st March 2004. Gandhinagar: GWSSB. 
Photocopy. 
 
________ Vatkana Village Water Supply Scheme: Plans and Estimates. Surat: Gujarat 
Water Supply and Sewerage Board. File Folder Photocopy. 
 
________ Bhatiya Village Water Supply Scheme, Plans and Estimates. Surat: Gujarat 
Water Supply and Sewerage Board. File Folder Photocopy. 
 
________Gujarat Water supply and Sewerage Board, Surat,   Tribal Sub plan,  
Umbhel Village Water Supply Scheme, Plans and Estimates 
 
TERI (Tata Energy Research Institute). 2001. Regulatory framework for water 
services in the state of Gujarat. New Delhi: Tata Energy Research Institute. 
[TERI Project Report No. 2000ER61]. 349pp. 2 volumes. 
 
WASMO 2004: Swajaldhara Guidelines 
 
________ 2004. Swajaldhara Margadarshika. Gandhinagar : WASMO February. 
(Translated in Gujarati from English “Guidelines on Swajaldhara”, DDWS 
MORD Government of India in June 2003). 
 
________ 2005.  “Swajaldhara” Programme: Minutes of the Review meeting held on 
November 6, 2004 at WASMO, Gandhinagar. Gandhinagar: Water and 
Sanitation Management Organisation. E-file. 
 
________ Undated. “Swajaldhara” Programme – Proceedings of the Review meeting 
held on April 23, 2004 at WASMO, Gandhinagar. Gandhinagar: Water and 
Sanitation Management Organisation. E-file. 
 
________ Undated. “Swajaldhara” Programme – Proceedings of the workshop on 
“How to go about decentralized, demand-driven, community-managed water 
supply systems in rural areas of Gujarat – the Swajaldhara programme” held 
on January 8, 2004 in the Conference Room of WASMO. Gandhinagar. 
Gandhinagar: Water and Sanitation Management Organisation. E-file. 
 
________ Undated. Half Yearly Progress Report. 2004-2005. Gandhinagar: WASMO. 
Photocopy. 
 
________ Undated. Minutes of the 2nd meeting of the State Water and Sanitation 
Mission (SWSM) held on January 18, 2005 under the Chairmanship of Chief 
Secretary to review the progress of the implementation of Swajaldhara 
programme and Sector Reform Scheme (State) in the State. Gandhinagar. 
Gandhinagar: Water and Sanitation Management Organisation. E-file. 
 
________ Undated. Pani Samiti Margadarshika. Gandhinagar : WASMO. (Leaflet) 
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________ Undated. Water Committee Guidelines: Information regarding 
Implementation of Swajaldhara. Gandhinagar: Water and Sanitation 
Management Organisation. 
 
________ Water and Sanitation Management Organisation (WASMO) Annual Report  
2002-03. 
 
________ Water and Sanitation Management Organisation (WASMO) Annual Report 
2003-04. 
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ANNEXURE IV B 
LIST OF DOCUMENTS SOURCED IN KERALA 
 
Anchal Gram Panchayat. Undated. Kerala Vikasana Padhati: Varshika Padhati Rekha 
(Annual Plan Document), 2004-05. Anchal: Gram Panchayat. 
 
________ undated. Decentralization Plan, Anchal Panchayat 10th Five year Plan 2002-
07, Development Report, Revised version. 
 
________ Anchal Grama Panchayat Working Groups 2004-05 
 
________ Gram Sabha Minutes, Ward No. VIII March 2004-2005. 
 
CapDecK. Undated. Chapparappadavu Village Panchayat, Development Report 1996. 
CapDecK – Capacity Development for Decentralisation in Kerala 
(Collaborative Project of KILA and Swiss Agency for Development and 
Cooperation), Thiruvananthapuram. 
 
Eroor Grama Panchayat. Undated. Kerala Vikasana Padhati: Varshika Padhati Rekha 
(Annual Plan Document), 2004-05. Anchal: Gram Panchayat. 
 
________ undated. Tenth Five Year Plan Condensed Version 2002-07, Revised 
Development Report.  
 
________ Kerala Development  Programme, 2004-05, Annual Plans. 
 
________ Preliminary Development Plan, 10th Five Year Plan, 2002-2007. 
 
________ Kerala Development Programme : People’s Plan Campaign, Eroor Grama 
Panchayat – Citizens Rights Charter – 2003. 
 
________ Tenth Five Year Plan 2002-07, Renewed Development Plan 
 
GoI, Minstry of Water Resources, 2003. Ground Water Resources of Quilon District, 
Kerala, Central Ground Water Board, Kerala Region, Government of India, 
Ministry of Water Resources, Trivandrum. July. 
 
GoK (Government of Kerala). 2001. Fifteenth and Final Report of the Kerala 
Administrative Reforms Committee: Report on Reforming the Government – 
An Overview. Thiruvananthapuram May.  
 
________ 1998. First Report of the Kerala Administrative Reforms Committee, GoK, 
Thiruvananthapuram. September.  
 
________ 2001. Tenth Report of the Kerala Administrative Reforms Committee: 
Report on Execution of Public Works, Thiruvananthapuram May.  
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________ 2001. Thirteenth Report of the Kerala Administrative Reforms Committee: 
Decentralisation Initiatives in Kerala – Institutional Issues. 
Thiruvananthapuram, May 
 
________ 2002 Guidelines for the Preparation of Tenth Five Year Plan by Local 
Governments, Government of Kerala, 2002. G.O.(MS) No. 20/2002/ Plg Dated 
6.6.2002. 
 
________ 2004. Modified Guidelines for Preparation of Annual Plans Under the 
Tenth Five Year Plan by Local Governments, Planning and Economic Affairs 
Department, Trivandrum, Government of Kerala. (G.O. (MS) No. 40/2004/ 
Plg. Dated 31.3.2004). 
 
________ Office Order - Tenth Five year Plan – Decentralised Planning by Local 
Governments – Guidelines for the Preparation of Annual Plan 2005-06, 
Government of Kerala. Photocopy. 
 
________ 2001. Panchayat Level Statistics: Kollam District. Department of 
Economics & Statistics Thiruvananthapuram. 
 
________ 2001. (Abstract) Guidelines Issued for Implementation of Sector Reforms 
Pilot Project  to institutionalize community participation in the Rural Water 
Supply Programme and Total Sanitation Programme in Kollam District. 
 
________ 2004. Tenth Five Year Plan – Decentralised Planning by Local 
Governments - Guidelines for the Preparation of Annual Plan 2005-2006 - 
Approved – Orders Issued. GO (MS) No. 85/2004/plg. Dated 16th Dec 2004.,  
Planning and Economic Affairs (A)Division  
 
________ 2002. Kerala Water Authority – A Report, State Planning Board, 
Government of Kerala , Thiruvananthapuram, 19th June.  
 
________ Minutes of the State Level Steering Committee Meeting held on 12.7.2002 
at the Conference hall of KRWA, Trivandrum, Sector Reforms (RWSS) Pilot 
Projects – Kasaragod and Kollam Districts, Kerala  
----7.10.2002. 
----30 – 12- 2002 
----22-4-2003 
----21-7-2003 
----10 -3-2004 
 
________ Minutes of the State Level Steering Committee Meeting of Sector Reforms 
(RWSS) Pilot Project  Kasaragod Districts, Kerala held on 16.2.2001 at the 
Conference hall of KRWSA, Trivandrum. 
---30-7-2001 
---11-10-2001 
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---30-1-2002 
---22-3-2002 
 
GVRT, Anchal. Undated. Pulari Water Supply Scheme in Ward No 8, Sector Reforms 
(RWSS) Project, Kollam District. Anchal: Grama Panchayat. Photocopy.  
 
________ undated. Mayiladumkunnu  Water Supply Scheme in Ward No   15 of 
Yeroor Grama Panchayat, Detailed Scheme Report, Sector Reforms (RWSS) 
Project, Kollam District.  
 
________ undated. Neelamoottil Water Supply Scheme in Ward No 2 and 15 of 
Anchal Grama Panchayat, Detailed Scheme Report and Estimate of Source, 
Sector Reforms (RWSS) Project, Kollam District.  
 
Jilla Panchayat, Kollam, Kerala. 2004. Rajiv Gandhi National Drinking Water Mission 
– Sector Reforms Project, Proposal Submitted to Government of Kerala, 23rd 
January 2004.  
 
KWA (Kerala Water Authority) 1999. Engineering report for W.S.S. to Anchal Town 
& Adjoining Areas, I.P.D. Sub Division, Kollam, May.  
 
________ PH Division, Kollam, (undated) Schematic Diagram for RWSS to Oachira, 
Karunagappally, Clappana, Alappad.  
 
________ PH Division, Kollam. (Office of the Executive Engineer) Details of Deposit 
Works under Decentralized Planning, Progress Report for the Work taken up 
under 2000-01. 
 
________ P H Division, Kollam, Abstract of Works for the year 2000-2001. 
 
________ Technical approval docket sheet of the project of Anchal block panchayat, 
Kollam1998-99 
 
Mayiladumkunnu Beneficiary Group. Minutes of the BG meetings, various 
Committees – 16/05/03, 16/6, 16/7, 16/8, …various undated…20/4/04 
 
Neelamootil Beneficiary Group. Minutes of the meetings of Neelamootil DWSS. 
28.6.03 – Project Awareness 
General Body Meetings – 6/7/03. 10/8/03, 31/8, 12/10, 8/11, 31/12, 1/1/04, 
24/2, 25/3 and 10/4 
Executive Committee Meetings -10/7/03, 30/9, 28/10, 2/11, 5/11, 27/11, 9/12, 
14/12, 12/1/04, 30/1, 20/2, 27/2, 4/3, 15/3 and 31/3. 
  
PMU, Kollam. Undated. District Level Technical Committee  (DLTC) meeting on 
7.4.2005 at 4 pm: Agenda 
 
________ undated. Details of Schemes under SRP – Kollam District, Kerala  
 
 
 
 
461
 
________ undated. Swajaldhara-II Project: List of SRP Schemes – Kollam District, 
Kerala  
 
________ undated. District Level Technical Committee  (DLTC) meeting on 
22.9.2004 (Minutes).   
 
________ Aanchal GVRT Review Meeting – 5th and 6th April 2005 
 
________ Minutes of the DLTC meeting held on 4.3.05 in District Collector’s 
Chamber for according technical sanction for detailed Scheme reports and 
source estimates of Water Supply Schemes in SWAJALDHARA II project, 
Estimates of School Water Supply Schemes, Revision of Estimates for 
Schemes under Sector Reforms (RWSS)project of various  Grama Panchayats  
in Kollam district of Kerala. Photocopy. 
 
Thevalakkara Grama Panchayat, List of Working Group members- Annual Plan 2005-
06 
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ANNEXURE IV C 
LIST OF DOCUMENTS SOURCED IN MADHYA PRADESH 
 
 
Behar, Amitabh and Yogesh Kumar. 2002. Process of Decentralisation in Madhya 
Pradesh :Panchayati Raj to Gram Swaraj (1995-2001). Bhopal: Samarthan - 
Centre for Development Support. Manuscript. E-file. 
 
GoI Report of the 11th Finance Commission, Chapter VIII: Local Bodies 
 
GoMP 2002. Synopsis of Madhya Pradesh HDR (2002): Introduction - Using the 
Power of Democracy for Development: The Madhya Pradesh Effort. In Human 
Development Report, Madhya Pradesh.Bhopal: GoMP. E-file.  
 
________ 2002a. Madhya Pradesh Sashan Lok Swasthya Yatriki Vibhag Manthralaya, 
Bhopal, 2002, Sector Reform Karyakram vistruth Disha Nirdesh, (G.O. No.16-
7-2002/2/34) 
 
________ 2005. Gram Sachivalaya Subharambh – announcement, structure 
 
GoMP PHED 1999. Public Health Engineering Division, Sehore, 1999. Project Report 
on Community Participation in Rural Water Supply Programme in Identified 
Pilot District, Sehore, October 1999. 
 
________ PHE Division, Sehore. 2001. Guidelines for Implementation of Rural Water 
Supply Programme, Rajiv Gandhi National Drinking Water Mission, 
Department of Drinking Water Supply, Ministry of Rural Development, 
Government of India. 
 
________ 2003. Madhya Pradesh Shashan Lok Swasthya Yantriki Vibhag, Varshik 
Prashaskiya Prativeshan, 2003. 
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ANNEXURE V 
 
TASKS/ STEPS IN WATER SUPPLY PROJECT DEVELOPMENT  
 
Generic steps as developed by key resource persons, and used to develop the scoring 
sheet for assessing redistribution of activities/ functions after decentralization. Each 
State has small variations in the offices/ officers involved.  
 
Step 1: Need is assessed and the project is identified by the Assistant Engineer. 
Step 2: The AE prepares the Rough Cost Estimate and forwards it to the relevant 
officer (usually Executive Engineer) for Administrative Sanction.  
Step 3: Administrative Sanction is granted by Executive Engineer 
Step 4:  If soil and water quality investigations are to be undertaken, the AE prepares 
an investigation estimate, and sends the same for sanction.   
Step 5:  Land is acquired, either from private owners by the Revenue Department or 
from the Panchayat/ village. 
Step 6:  On approval of the investigation estimate, soil/ water investigation is done by 
the Public Works Department or any other technical agency.  
Step 7:  Soil details are sent to Design Wing/ Section 
Step 8:  Detailed design (technical) drawings are prepared  
Step 9:  The drawings are sent to the Superintendant/ Chief Engineer. The 
Superintendant/ Chief Engineer's office forwards the drawings to the 
subordinate officers for preparing the estimate. 
Step 10:  The concerned Assistant Engineer prepares the detailed cost estimate based 
on the current schedule of rates approved by the organization. 
Step 11:  The detailed estimate is sent for approval and Technical Sanction. 
Step 12:  On approval of the estimate, tenders are invited for execution of work. 
Usually materials are procured in bulk by the State.   
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Step 13: Contractor is selected, through the competitive bidding process; usually, the 
lowest bid is accepted.  
Step 14:  The contractor begins executing the work. The site engineer including the 
Assistant Executive Engineer supervises the work.  
Step 15:  The Engineers also take measurements of completed works, check the bills 
and make arrangements for the payment to the contractor. They also submit 
necessary reports on completion of the work including the completion report. 
Step 16:  The work is handed over to the concerned Panchayat for operation (and 
sometimes, maintenance. 
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